Madam Speaker, I was saying that this is very similar to the process followed by the United Kingdom's intelligence and security committee, which must submit its annual and special reports to the prime minister for consultation and review prior to tabling, identifying at that time any redactions that have been made on national security grounds.
Since 2017, we have completed seven studies and produced three annual reports and two special reports. Every member of Parliament and every senator recently received paper copies of our 2020 annual report. This report and the others are also available on our website.
The very important thing for the House to note is that in each instance, NSICOP members reviewed and assessed information up to the government's highest classification. The committee did so with the utmost discretion, arriving at its findings and recommendations independently. Those were then provided to the Prime Minister and responsible ministers.
In our 2018 inaugural annual report, we provided a functional overview of the security and intelligence community, including the most significant national security threats as described by key members of the security and intelligence community. These were terrorism, espionage and foreign interference, cyber-threats, major organized crime and weapons of mass destruction.
Also in 2018, the committee reviewed the government's process for setting intelligence priorities as well as the intelligence activities of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces.
We recognized that defence intelligence activities are essential to the safety and security of our armed forces and the success of Canadian military missions, including overseas operations. The committee recommended, among other things, that the government seriously consider providing explicit legislative authority to the conduct of defence intelligence activities.
The committee also presented its first special report in 2018 regarding the allegations associated with the Prime Minister's official visit to India. One recommendation repeated in the subsequent review of the government response to foreign interference was that members of Parliament and senators be briefed upon being sworn in, and regularly thereafter, on the risks of foreign interference and extremism in Canada.
In 2019, the committee conducted a review of diversity and inclusion in the security and intelligence community. The review provided a baseline assessment of the diversity and inclusion of certain designated groups in the security and intelligence community. On the whole, it was revealed that there was not as much representation there as in the rest of the Canadian public service and that the rates of harassment and discrimination remained unacceptable. We recommended that the situation be re-examined in three to five years in order to assess progress. We also recommended improving data collection and analysis and developing a common performance measurement framework.
NSICOP also reviewed the government's response to the serious challenge of foreign interference. We found that the government's response to the threat was done on a case-by-case, even ad hoc, basis and that our engagement with other levels of government and the Canadian public was limited. In its review, the committee called for a whole-of-government strategy to counter foreign interference and build institutional and public resilience. We were specific in our recommendation about what such a strategy should include and we further recommended that the government support the strategy through sustained central leadership and coordination.
Finally, the committee reviewed the national security and intelligence activities of the Canada Border Services Agency. On the whole, we noticed that the powers that the CBSA has for conducting national security and intelligence activities are clear, well regulated and supported by several acts. However, the CBSA did not receive any instructions from the minister for conducting critical activities related to national security and intelligence. This situation was inconsistent with the practices of CSIS and the RCMP and, in the committee's view, represented a failure of ministerial accountability.
The committee recommended that the Minister of Public Safety provide CBSA directions in writing with regard to sensitive national security and intelligence activities.
That same year, the committee also prepared a special report on the collection, use, retention and dissemination of information on Canadians in the context of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces defence intelligence—