Mr. Speaker, I will be sharing my time with the member for Beauport—Limoilou.
I am pleased to rise to speak to a Conservative motion on this opposition day because it will give members of the Bloc Québécois an opportunity to explain our position on defence and especially on defence-related spending. I want to begin by saying that the Bloc Québécois intends to support today's motion.
However, I will be using some of my time to point out that there should be some caveats to this because, if all we do is vote yes or no to increasing the budget, as though this is a black-and-white issue with no real grey area, then we are not really addressing the main issues currently affecting the Canadian military.
If we are talking about increasing spending on national defence to 2% of GDP, which is what Canada promised NATO it would do in 2014, then the issue for the Bloc Québécois is not really “how much”, but “how”.
For the past several weeks, this issue has come up in different ways during the Standing Committee on National Defence's study of the various threats to Canada's security. On March 21, I asked a panel the following question with regard to the budget increase: “Should the question mainly be ‘how much’ or shouldn't it also be ‘how’?”
I would like to quote some excerpts from what three of the witnesses said in answer to that question, because they presented two caveats that I want to talk about.
First, James Fergusson, a professor at the Centre for Defence and Security Studies in the department of political studies at the University of Manitoba, said the following. The quote is a bit long, but I think it is quite relevant.
It's not really a question of increasing the defence budget per se. The question is, how much, over what period of time and, particularly, dedicated to what acquisitions independent of operations and maintenance, and independent...of the problems of recruitment.
If you want to punch this money into or funnel it into expanding the Canadian Armed Forces, recruitment and retention are a big problem, and you're probably in a real difficulty.
However, unless we know where they're going to invest, that becomes a different problem. It raises the question, which this government doesn't want to do—no governments want to do it once they do defence once—about the need for a defence review.
Mr. Fergusson went on to add the following:
Remember that National Defence, over the past many years—I think in every year I can remember—continues to give back money to the central agency. I might be wrong about the number, but I think last year it was $1.1 billion that was returned. Well, that's a problem. You can commit money, but the question is, where do you spend it...for what ends? That's an open question to this day in Canada.
Associate professor Robert Huebert of the Department of Political Science at the University of Calgary had this to say:
Let's recognize that the 2% increase, when it was created by NATO, is a political target. Once again, what we're really talking about is, what is the need for the effect of the Canadian Forces going into this new environment? It really comes down to the ability to deter growing aggressor states and fight in a collective security environment should that deterrence break down.
When we went into the immediate post-Cold War period, we of course went through what many democratic countries saw as the ability to save money on defence, because there wasn't a fear that we had to deter anyone and we weren't going to be called upon to fight. That has obviously changed since at least 2014—I would argue 2008.
The question is, okay, 2% sounds good in terms of making a commitment, but it's really getting to that capability...in terms of having the types of forces that you will be able to recruit and bring in to actually give effect to it.
It really gets to the heart of what you're asking, and that is that we need to have an ability to go beyond just simply saying, okay, 2% or 1.9%. Those are numbers.
Professor Stephen Saideman, who holds the Paterson Chair in International Affairs at Carleton University, said, and I quote:
I would just jump in here and say that we also have to think a little more about how we do our procurement, because it's often seen as a jobs program for electoral political benefit, as opposed to what is best for what we need.
For instance, we're seeing in Ukraine a variety of defence systems that are working really well.... Should we build our own anti-tank weapons when there are very good ones out there? Should we build our own anti-aircraft weapons when there are very good ones out there?
We need to be a little more realistic about what our own defence industry can do and what it should do, and this leads to a challenge that we've had in our country. We feel that once we start building up a defence industry, it must be kept busy with a variety of projects: “Well, we need to sell LAVs [light armoured vehicles] to Saudi Arabia.”
If we think about our defence industry for a minute, we need to think about whether it makes sense for us to have domestic producers of all the stuff, because it puts us in the difficult position of trying to find ways to keep them busy in between our own major projects. We need to think a little more about buying from other folks.
Essentially, when I asked at the meeting whether we should, or should not, increase the defence budget to 2% of the GDP, the three witnesses made it a point to take into account two important aspects, namely the human resources issue, which includes the pressing problem of personnel recruitment and retention, and the procurement issue, which is currently impacting the Canadian Armed Forces.
With respect to procurement, as James Fergusson mentioned in his testimony, year after year, National Defence generally returns more than $1 billion of its budget because it has not spent the money. This is symptomatic of a cumbersome, slow, inefficient and extremely politicized procurement system.
Broadly speaking, the Bloc Québécois is not particularly concerned about the Liberal government’s ability to spend, or, more aptly, to throw money out the window, and that is precisely what we do not want, spending for the sake of spending.
A recent example of the government’s ability to spend for the sake of spending is the dithering over the acquisition of the new fighter jets. After saying “anything but F-35s” seven years ago, the government spent hundreds of millions of dollars to extend the life of our old CF-18s. In the meantime, it paid a premium to purchase Australian F-18s that needed millions of dollars in upgrades. All that to finally go back to square one and announce the purchase of the F-35s.
In addition to spending, there are problems like the naval strategy, obsolete military equipment, the lack of air defence capability and the fact that the army was long unable to provide its members with something as simple as boots, asking soldiers to buy them themselves and then apply for a reimbursement. One of the questions we should ask the government in the future about the various procurement projects is whether the regional benefits have been maximized.
Given that, in the mid-2010s, the government abolished the “regional” aspect of industrial and technological benefit obligations, and that more than 50% of aerospace production comes from Quebec, it is to be expected that the Bloc Québécois would pay close attention to anything relating to the acquisition of military drones, for example, especially since this is a burgeoning industry in Quebec.
With respect to recruitment and retention, the Standing Committee on National Defence is currently examining that issue. This is a study the Bloc Québécois called for. The question that arises is the following: What is the point of increasing the National Defence procurement budget if it does not have the personnel needed to manage it?
For example, the Royal Canadian Air Force is paying a high price for its low personnel retention rate. It has a shortage of experienced pilots and technicians. Because of our old aircraft, each hour of flight requires more than 35 hours of maintenance. In 2018, the Auditor General released a devastating report on the state of the air force, revealing that it has only 64% of the qualified CF-18 pilots it needs and that 22% of technician positions are either vacant or filled by unqualified technicians.
The personnel shortage also impacts the support we can provide our allies, and Canada is becoming less and less of a credible partner in this respect. For example, NATO countries are currently taking part in Operation Cold Response in Norway. Some 30,000 allied soldiers are participating. Canada is sending a grand total of 10 people.
I asked Major-General Paul Prévost about this on March 9. Not only did he confirm that the fact that we were sending only 10 people had nothing to do with the situation in Ukraine, since the decision was made long before the conflict, but he also added something quite troubling. He said, “Currently in the Canadian Forces, some of the threats to our operational readiness are related to the number of people we have.”
In short, the National Defence budget cannot and should not be increased without a review of the procurement processes. We also need an in-depth review of the recruitment and retention issue. That is unavoidable.
I will make a brief aside here before concluding, because the question of how to finance the increase to the National Defence budget may be raised, since we are talking about an additional $16 billion per year if we want to reach 2% of the GDP.
My colleagues can decide whether it is fair to see a connection between the two, but I will simply mention that, on average, the federal government finances fossil fuels to the tune of $14 billion a year.
In conclusion, the Bloc Québécois is focused far more on the “how” than on the “how much,” and the “how” will inevitably require some serious soul-searching about the army’s procurement methods and short- and medium-term solutions to recruitment and retention problems.
