Debates of Oct. 23rd, 2023

Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 2023

[Mary Ng, Liberal, Minister of Export Promotion]

moved that Bill C-57, An Act to implement the 2023 Free Trade Agreement between Canada and Ukraine, be read the second time and referred to a committee.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in the House today in support of Bill C-57, an act to implement the 2023 Free Trade Agreement between Canada and Ukraine. This is not the first time I have stood in this House to introduce a new trade agreement, but this trade agreement is special. I rise today to enter into the record the story behind this agreement, because all members in the House, all Canadians and, especially, the 1.3 million members of the Ukrainian Canadian community, should know how it came about.

The story of this agreement begins with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's first visit to Canada back in 2019. During that visit, President Zelenskyy and the Prime Minister announced a mutual intention to modernize the existing Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement. Following that announcement, public servants in both countries went about doing their respective homework to prepare for renewed negotiations.

That homework often takes many months. It is just part of the routine for our respective civil servants and trade negotiators. However, there was nothing routine about the way these negotiations unfolded.

First came the pandemic, which stalled progress for over a year. Then, when we were finally ready to launch negotiations, Russian troops were massing along the Ukrainian border.

On January 27, 2022, I held a virtual event with Yulia Svyrydenko, Ukraine's deputy prime minister and minister of economy, to announce the start of negotiations on this agreement. Russia had not yet invaded Ukraine at that time, but it was already clear that the situation was reaching a precipice. The world was seeing that an invasion was imminent, and there was a lot of uncertainty.

A short time before that announcement, I asked my Ukrainian counterpart if she and her government were still willing and able to move forward with negotiations. Her answer was candid and unequivocal: She told me that her government was determined to move ahead, and she told me how much it mattered that Canada was showing confidence in Ukraine at a time when many were beginning to question its resolve.

Ukraine knew then which path it wanted to take for its future. Ukraine had chosen the values of democracy, openness and transparency, as well as a rules-based international order. A sovereign Ukraine was seeking to modernize its infrastructure, its economy and its laws. A comprehensive and progressive free trade agreement would be an important step toward modernization for Ukraine, and Canada would be its gateway.

One month after that announcement, on February 24, 2022, Russia moved in with its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and it invaded for all the reasons I just listed: Ukrainian territorial and economic sovereignty, values of openness and democracy, and a rules-based international order. Vladimir Putin despises all these things, and he could not stand to see Ukraine embrace them, uphold them and blossom into a great modern nation. That is why he invaded Ukraine.

On that day, I knew, the Prime Minister knew and the government knew what we had to do. As long as the government of Ukraine stood, we would stand with it. Since the war began, Canada has committed $9 billion in military, humanitarian, financial and development assistance to Ukraine. We also understood that standing with Ukraine meant that we would see these trade negotiations through to the end.

At the outset, it was not easy. The war made travel dangerous and even routine calls impossible for our Ukrainian counterparts. Negotiations had barely begun; suddenly, they came to a standstill. They stayed at a standstill for four months, until I travelled for meetings at the OECD in Paris. That is where I met Ukraine's chief negotiator, Taras Kachka.

It is important to understand that we did not plan a formal meeting that day. He and I, along with Canada's chief negotiator, simply sat in the cafeteria of the OECD building and talked. Mr. Kachka recounted the first 120 days of the war and the challenges he had to overcome just to make that one trip to the OECD. I again asked if Ukraine was able and willing to begin negotiations. Mr. Kachka said yes and I said yes, and negotiations began in earnest.

A few weeks later, at the G7 summit in Germany, I finally met Deputy Prime Minister Svyrydenko face to face. We revisited our earlier conversations and talked of how our earlier hope of avoiding the conflict had been so savagely dispelled. We reiterated our mutual intention to reach an agreement, and then we hugged.

The private conversations I had with my Ukrainian counterparts moved me in ways that are hard to describe. If they had told me that they were not yet ready to begin trade talks, of course we would have waited. Canada would have given Ukraine as much time as it needed.

Ukraine's quiet resolve to move forward was unmistakable and unbreakable. These negotiations were driven by the very values of openness and self-determination that Ukrainian soldiers were and are fighting and dying for. I can tell the House today that, even in the midst of an all-consuming war effort, Ukraine's commitment to those values never wavered and neither did Canada's.

I am proud to say that this agreement was achieved in record time, a mere 12 months from start to finish. That shows the resolve that Canada and Ukraine share on this crucial matter. This process reached its conclusion just a few weeks ago, when our Prime Minister and President Zelenskyy signed this agreement as part of President Zelenskyy's second visit to Canada. It is my true honour to speak to it in this House.

It is not just that we reached a deal in 12 months; it is that we reached an exceptional deal. In trade circles, it is known as a “high-quality agreement”. It includes provisions for trade in services and investments, a binding dispute settlement mechanism to ensure fair treatment, and labour protections. It recognizes the importance of small- and medium-sized businesses, women-owned businesses and indigenous-owned businesses, and it includes environmental protections that are the strongest of those in any of Canada's trade agreements currently on record.

In terms of its contents, it is on par with best practice agreements such as CUSMA, the CPTPP and CETA. With this agreement, Canada becomes the first country to sign a comprehensive trade agreement with Ukraine.

Ukraine has told us that this trade deal would serve as a model for further agreements with other prospective partners. That is one of the reasons I said this agreement is special.

Above all, this agreement is special because Canadians support Ukraine's fight against Putin's barbaric invasion. They demonstrate their support through their government with military, humanitarian and financial aid. However, support for Ukraine is not limited to government alone. Here in Canada, many individuals and organizations are helping by welcoming Ukrainian families fleeing the war. Many more Canadian organizations and businesses want to join that effort, both here at home and in the Ukrainian heartland.

This agreement opens up new avenues for Canadians to support Ukraine. It establishes the rules by which Canadian companies could invest in Ukraine's reconstruction, modernize its infrastructure and create jobs in Ukraine, as well as here in Canada. There are Canadian companies already active in Ukraine, and more are joining as we speak. The Canadian construction firm of Aecon is now forming partnerships in Ukraine under a memorandum of collaboration for the construction of a hydro power plant in Ukraine.

The presence of Canadian companies will help Ukraine persevere amid the strife of war. Thanks to this agreement, more can and will join them. Through all these activities, Canada and a victorious Ukraine will strengthen our shared values in our pursuit of peace, mutual success and prosperity. At the end of the day, trade is not just about business; it is about shared values.

Ukrainians and Canadians both want a free, modern and democratic Ukraine. This trade agreement is a manifestation of those shared values. I am truly proud to have been a part of it.

Today, I urge the House to reaffirm its commitment to those values and its support for Ukraine by ensuring the swiftest possible passage of this bill. Slava Ukraini.

[Kyle Seeback, Conservative, Dufferin—Caledon, ON]

Mr. Speaker, article 13.10 of the trade agreement, subsection 8(d) says, “promote the rapid transition from unabated coal power to clean energy sources.”

We know that the Russian war machine has been powered by energy exports. This certainly seems to contemplate the transition from coal to other less-polluting fuels. To me, this is a massive opportunity for Canada to work on exporting LNG from Canada, which many European countries have asked us to do.

This would not only to starve the Russian war machine of funds but also be good for the environment. Does the minister now admit that this is something Canada should do?

[Mary Ng, Liberal, Markham—Thornhill, ON]

Mr. Speaker, that is a very important question from my hon. colleague, the critic on the trade file.

We see in this agreement an effort to establish a framework that would not only enable Canadian businesses to participate in the reconstruction of Ukraine, but also, indeed, include the highest environmental protections of any trade agreement on record. It would very much allow Canadians to participate and allow Ukrainian businesses and investors to rapidly pursue that transition to a greener economy.

[Yves Perron, Bloc, Berthier—Maskinongé, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank the minister for her speech and for these negotiations, which are very important. I would like to ask her a two-part question.

First, supply management was included when the order to import products from Ukraine duty-free was adopted. The groups that were impacted and the opposition parties fought hard to have this removed when the order was renewed, and it was in fact removed. Can the minister assure me that supply-managed products are not covered by this agreement? That is the first part of my question.

Second, I would like to make a comment. The section on investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms puts multinationals and governments on the same footing. This means that, technically, it would be possible for a multinational company to sue a government that is hindering trade. I find that unacceptable.

Does the minister not feel that this would have been a good opportunity to make this clarification?

[Mary Ng, Liberal, Markham—Thornhill, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I want to thank my hon. colleague and all members in the House. At a time when Canada chose to unequivocally support Ukraine, there was a tariff-free ability for them to export into Canada, including the supply-managed sector. I know what a commitment that took for Canadians to permit that to take place, and that really did show the support that Canadians have and that my hon. colleague had, for Ukraine. Of course, in this agreement, it is clear, just like in our other trade agreements, that the supply-managed sectors are not, and are excluded from this agreement, just as they have been with others.

I believe that this is a very important and progressive agreement and a good agreement. It has provisions for investment protections. There is a chapter that deals with binding dispute settlements. Therefore, this is very much the modern agreement that we have negotiated with Ukraine, and it would facilitate what Canadians want to do, which is to participate in that reconstruction in due course.

[Richard Cannings, NDP, South Okanagan—West Kootenay, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the minister's speech on this important free trade agreement. The NDP supported the previous agreement, and we are looking into what this new agreement looks like.

One thing we do like about the old agreement is that it did not have the investor state dispute mechanism in there. That is something that we have held as essential for any new trade agreements going forward. CETA and CPTPP both have that in them, and we do not like that. The NDP supports free trade, but we do not like foreign corporations telling governments what to do.

One thing I am disappointed with is the speed at which this is coming before us. I have not had time to bring this before caucus to even have a basic discussion. Why was this being rushed through without following any of the standard procedures about introducing treaties and agreements before the House?

[Mary Ng, Liberal, Markham—Thornhill, ON]

Mr. Speaker, one of the things that I am really proud about in this agreement are the highest standards in environmental protections of any trade agreement that we have on record today. We would agree that is really important, particularly in the trade agreements that we negotiate today, in which we can indeed support an economy and protect the environment at the same time.

What is also remarkable about this agreement, which members heard me say in my opening remarks, is the speed at which we were able to reach an agreement with Ukraine and how much the Ukrainians participated in this, despite the fact that they have been and continue to be in a war effort.

I am encouraged by the work that we always do in ensuring good debate on something like this, which we all agree with, and is continuing to support Ukraine.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Mr. Speaker, the minister has rightly highlighted the unique nature of trade with a democracy on the front lines of the fight against totalitarian threats. This is important. Ukraine is not the only country in that situation. I wonder if she can share the government's position on Taiwan's application to the CPTPP?

[Mary Ng, Liberal, Markham—Thornhill, ON]

Mr. Speaker, the CPTPP is an excellent agreement and many Canadian firms and exporters have benefited. It is not just a good agreement because of its commercial success, but it also has some of those very high-quality provisions for the environment, for inclusiveness.

As my hon. colleague will know, CPTPP colleagues around the table, who party to that agreement, make those decisions about accession together. We are very pleased that the first accession candidate is the United Kingdom, another of Canada's trading partners. We have just finished that very important work.

No doubt we will continue to work, along with our partners, with all the other applicants for accession.

[Andréanne Larouche, Bloc, Shefford, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to return to a question asked by my hon. colleague from Berthier—Maskinongé that the minister did not have time to answer. My colleague asked her two questions. She answered the question about supply management.

However, concerning the fact that the government and multinationals are on an equal footing and that multinationals are therefore able to take legal action against states, would this not have been a good opportunity to reassert government jurisdiction over multinational corporations?

I think it would have been a good opportunity. What does she think?

[Mary Ng, Liberal, Markham—Thornhill, ON]

Mr. Speaker, in the other agreements, governments have the right to regulate within their jurisdictions. That is not different for this agreement.

[Mark Gerretsen, Liberal, Kingston and the Islands, ON]

Mr. Speaker, could the minister inform us as to how she sees this trade agreement being so important, given what has happened in Ukraine over the last year and a half. Once Ukraine ultimately wins this war, which we know it will, why will this be such an important trade agreement, not just for the benefit of Canada but indeed to help our ally, Ukraine?

[Mary Ng, Liberal, Markham—Thornhill, ON]

Mr. Speaker, Canada is the first country to have a comprehensive and progressive free-trade agreement with Ukraine. It is going to set the framework for Canadian companies, exporters and investors to very much be a part of the reconstruction when Ukraine wins the war. We have heard a lot from Canadian exporters and Canadians with respect to their support for an agreement like this with Ukraine.

When I reflect on the early days of the negotiations, before the war had begun, Canada was there, and continues to be there, with unequivocal support for Ukraine, showing confidence in it, especially in a matter like this, an economic trade agreement, which is so important. As Canada showed its confidence, we were also able to demonstrate that to others, which really did make a difference.

[Kyle Seeback, Conservative, Dufferin—Caledon, ON]

Mr. Speaker, Conservatives have a very long, storied and proud tradition of supporting free trade. We only have to look back to the negotiations of the original Canada-United States free trade agreement, which was, of course, something Conservatives were in favour of and that Liberals campaigned very hard against. I was a young lad back then, but I remember a commercial from the Liberal Party on this, talking about free trade. It said that there was only one more line that we had to remove, and then it erased the border between Canada and the United States. That was a long time ago, but I just want to talk briefly about how strongly Conservatives support free trade. We believe in free trade between free nations as an integral part of improving the prosperity of all people.

We were also the people who started the negotiations on CETA. The CETA deal is a Conservative deal that was started by Prime Minister Harper as part of our aggressive trade expansion. The same thing with the CPTPP, which was a Conservative initiative. Conservatives are very supportive of free trade.

This original free trade agreement between Canada and Ukraine was originated by a Conservative government under Prime Minister Harper. The member for Abbotsford, from the Conservative Party, was the lead negotiator on that. He will speak to this, and we will have some wonderful insights on this agreement.

When we talk about the importance of the Canada-Ukraine relationship, we have to talk about the 1.3 million Canadians of Ukrainian origin who live here in Canada. Many of them were integral in the development of western Canada. They are an incredible and important part of the social fabric of Canada, and their contributions to Canada cannot go unnoticed. As a result of that, in part, we have very strong people-to-people ties between Canada and Ukraine. Of course, we are strong supporters of Ukraine during the illegal invasion being prosecuted by Russia.

With respect to this agreement in particular, this modernization would build on the 2017 agreement, which updated or added 11 new chapters to the free trade agreement. The updated chapters included rules of origin and procedures, government procurement, competition policy, monopolies and state enterprises, electronic commerce, digital trade, labour, the environment, transparency, anti-corruption and responsible business conduct.

There is also a significant number of new chapters, 11 new chapters, in this trade agreement, and I will talk a little more about that later in my remarks. However, these are on investment; cross-border trade and services; temporary entry for business people; development and administration of measures; financial services; services and investment, non-conforming measures; telecommunications; trade and gender; trade and small and medium-sized enterprises; trade and indigenous peoples; and good regulatory practices. This is a substantial change from the original agreement that was signed in 2017.

On that, I would echo some of the comments made by the NDP, which is that this agreement is actually substantial. It is a very large trade agreement. Of course, we have to take our time to make sure we study free trade agreements in detail and thoroughly. However, it does seem as though the government is trying to rush this forward, and I am not sure that is necessarily the way Parliament should look at things. We should do our jobs as parliamentarians.

I would like to talk about the original trade agreement. In 2022, Canada's total merchandise trade with Ukraine was $420 million, $150 million in exports and $270 million in imports. The way the original agreement was designed, as it was negotiated by the Conservative government, was that this would be, in a sense, a bit of an asymmetrical agreement.

It was set up such that Ukraine would have a little more advantage in the early stages of the agreement, with the anticipation that there would be a final agreement in which more things would be added. Originally, this was primarily a merchandise agreement. We can see now that a lot of chapters have been added on the services side. I suspect that as a result of that, we will see the trade balance perhaps narrow between Canada and Ukraine, but in general increase the trade between the two countries.

After the ratification of the original agreement, exports to Ukraine, other than coal, grew about 28% between 2016 and 2019, which reinforces the view that trade, especially free trade, is good for both countries. We saw a significant increase in the two-way trade between two countries as a result of the free trade agreements, which goes back to why Conservatives absolutely and unequivocally support free trade agreements.

Interestingly enough, the top three exports to Ukraine were motor vehicles and parts, fish and seafood, and pharmaceutical products. The top imports from Ukraine were animal and vegetable fats, oils, iron and steel, and electrical machinery and equipment. Canadian businesses certainly have an opportunity to expand their trade with Ukraine.

I have undertaken to consult with industry with respect to this. I have spoken with agricultural companies, agricultural industries, etc. The challenge of course is the very condensed time frame, and I should explain this.

What we have before Parliament is the enabling legislation to implement the free trade agreement, but that is probably not what we are debating today. We are not actually going to look at and debate whether “subsection 42.1(1.1) of the act is amended by adding the following paragraph after (a).” I suspect that is not what we will debate here today.

The implementation legislation is how we implement the changes to relevant statutes and other things to implement the actual free trade agreement. This implementation bill's enabling legislation does not seem to have much in it that any of us will spend a lot of time debating in this chamber, although I could be wrong, as some members do enjoy debating those kinds of things.

The member for Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan might enjoy going through and deciding whether “paragraphs (b) and (c) of the definition Ukraine in subsection 2(1) of the act are replaced by the following” is a good or significant change, but that is not what I will talk about today.

What we can talk about are the general principles of supporting free trade and the free trade agreement itself. In that is some of the difficulty that was expressed by the NDP member. He said he had not had the time to discuss this legislation with his caucus and colleagues, which takes me back to discussions with stakeholders.

As part of looking at whether this will be a trade agreement that benefits Canada, we want to talk to stakeholders to see whether they view some of the changes to this free trade agreement as being good or bad. In particular, in the agricultural sector, we are going to be talk about things like sanitary and phytosanitary measures. We are going to look at whether the quotas that will be allowed, the products that are coming in without tariff, are appropriate. This could be in the beef sector, the pork sector or in a whole bunch of agricultural sectors.

Those consultations are ongoing right now. I have reached out to the industries that would be affected by that to find out where they stand on it.

When I attended law school, we had professors very clearly say that the devil was often in the details. I am not 100% sure that Parliament should just pass things without any scrutiny whatsoever. We have learned that when other trade agreements were put forward by the Liberal government and passed rapidly, we ended up with some challenges.

If we look at, for example, free trade with the European Union, we have all kinds of challenges now with the sanitary and phytosanitary measures surrounding beef and pork. It is a particular issue right now in our negotiations with the U.K. It is almost impossible for Canadian beef or pork producers to export into the United Kingdom. They also have great difficulty exporting into the European Union. Why? It is because there are sanitary and phytosanitary measures preventing those exports from taking place. We would think that after this amount of time that these things would be resolved. However, for both things, there are very complicated dispute resolution procedures in place to try to resolve issues of sanitary and phytosanitary measures.

Sanitary and phytosanitary measures are important. They are put in place to ensure the health of people consuming the products. They are also protections put in place to protect biodiversity, to ensure things are not contained within certain products that could harm biodiversity. These measures are important, but sometimes these sanitary and phytosanitary measures are used as non-tariff barriers, or NTBs. NTBs have become sort of the new way to frustrate free trade. As we look around the world, we see that NTBs are growing in number and there are challenges in resolving those free trade agreements.

I took the time to look at the section in this free trade agreement on sanitary and phytosanitary measures. I am pleased to see that this section sets out that they will be resolved within the rules set out by the World Trade Organization. That is quite a difference from the measures that have been put in place for the resolution of sanitary and phytosanitary measures within CETA, which the U.K. benefits from in the transitional agreement. Trying to resolve those issues through that process has proven to be, if not incredibly complicated, almost impossible. It is good to see that is in this agreement.

If we look at the opportunities for Canada, one of the things I raised in my question to the minister was that the agreement talked about the phase-out of coal. However, in Europe, we have seen the rise in the use of coal by a number of countries as a result of them trying to stop buying Russian gas. As we all know, the purchase of Russian gas is providing revenues and profits to Russia so it can use those monies to fund its illegal war in Ukraine.

Many European countries have asked Canada to export more LNG, and the United States has actually taken that up. It has built a number of LNG export facilities over the last number of years to take advantage of the demand for LNG, including that demand in Europe. Unfortunately, Canada has not taken advantage of that and, in fact, has lost all kinds of opportunities.

However, when talk about transition, we do not transition from coal to a solar panel. Those kinds of transitions generally do not work. We do not transition from coal to a wind turbine and solar. Those things do not work. Both of these things provide intermittent power. Intermittent power makes maintenance of the electric grid more expensive and it is unreliable when there are surges in demand. We need a strong baseload of electricity generation.

I hope that when I have the time to go through this agreement in full, I will see this addresses a great area of potential opportunity for Canada and Ukraine with respect to electricity generation. We have amazing expertise in the production of nuclear reactors, as does Ukraine. Canada has all kinds of uranium that it can export. I really hope there will be some things in the agreement that talk about furthering this kind of development and partnership. It would be both good for Ukraine and good for Canada.

However, transitioning from coal would be beneficial to the world. When we look at energy transitions, we know they do not happen rapidly. In fact, they take a long time. All we have to do is think about how coal was discovered 200 to 250 years ago. We have had gas, natural gas and nuclear for a much shorter period of time, but they have not completely displaced coal even though the power density for both gas and nuclear is far more dense than for coal. Therefore, it makes sense to transition to these things.

This is the challenge in suggesting we transition from coal to solar or wind, because the actual energy density is so much smaller. An electricity plant that would use LNG or nuclear would take up 20 acres, but to get a similar amount of energy from wind or solar, we would be looking at 10 to 100 times that amount of land. The suggestion that we can make those transitions quickly from coal to wind and solar is not feasible and it does not make sense. We should be exploring the opportunities that Canada has with LNG and nuclear.

The Conservative Party is 100% behind supporting Ukraine, supporting trade and free trade. Free trade between free nations is something we support 100%. I look forward to going through this agreement and to the debate on this agreement in the House.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I like how my colleague touched on the fact that when this type of legislation and these types of agreements come before the House, it is necessary for us, as parliamentarians, to do wide consultation with stakeholders.

I have been a member of the Standing Committee on Agriculture and Agri-Food for five and a half years now. One of the concerns brought up to our committee by Chicken Farmers of Canada was the Ukraine remission order that allowed Ukrainian poultry to come into Canada.

It is not that Chicken Farmers of Canada does not want to support our Ukrainian allies, but it felt that more time was needed to ensure that the high standards we have in Canada, especially with the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, were in place. Before we had such a system, it felt it was rushed too quickly.

Could my colleague expand on that one notable example? Perhaps there is more that he knows on why with these kinds of agreements, while we know they are being done in good faith and for good reason, we still, as parliamentarians, owe it to the Canadian public and to stakeholders to ensure we iron out all those very fine details because of the unintended consequences.

[Kyle Seeback, Conservative, Dufferin—Caledon, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I could not agree more. In the particular circumstances of that remission order, I agree. I was certainly consulted on that. Chicken farmers were not against supporting Ukraine, but it looked like that was rushed and not all details were looked at. I did talk about that in my speech.

I still remember my contracts professor in my first year of law school saying that the devil was always in the details. We do not look at things in broad strokes if we want to be a good lawyer. We have to get down into the nitty-gritty.

When we look at this agreement, which is somewhere in the range of 600 pages, and we are asked to rush this through, that is how mistakes happen. That is how we end up with agreements with unintended consequences by not scrutinizing them.

It is the job of parliamentarians to scrutinize this and reach out to stakeholder groups that will also be looking at this. They will ensure they look at those details. We should ensure that work gets done.

[Maxime Blanchette-Joncas, Bloc, Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to see such enthusiasm for this bill today. We know that there is no shortage of emergencies, including the housing crisis and the climate crisis, but these topics are not on the government's agenda.

My colleague mentioned several interesting things in his speech. We know that we are not reinventing the wheel today; we are modernizing the Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement, which has been in effect since 2017. The fact is that trade with our trade partner Ukraine has grown significantly.

I have a question for my colleague. There was a whole saga in the House about the standing ovation for a former SS soldier, in yet another blunder committed on the world stage by the federal government, or rather the Liberal government. That all happened in conjunction with the presidential visit, when he was here to sign the agreement on September 22.

It seems to me, or rather I am quite convinced, that the government deliberately waited for President Zelenskyy to come to the House before implementing the new agreement. We are hearing that it is really urgent for us to study this bill today as a priority, and that it must take precedence over the housing crisis, the cost of living crisis and the climate crisis.

I would like to hear my colleague's thoughts on something. Does he think the government could have done this sooner? Does he think the government deliberately waited for President Zelenskyy's visit to try to restore its image after all the blunders we have seen, such as Chinese interference and the conflict between Canada and India?

[Kyle Seeback, Conservative, Dufferin—Caledon, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I do not know what the motives are. I do know that this agreement was signed much earlier. If it had been tabled in Parliament earlier, we would certainly have had more debate and more time to scrutinize this particular piece of legislation.

The members of the Liberal Party were chirping when I was speaking about taking the time to study something. There is an old adage saying that a lawyer who represents himself has a fool for a client. A government that thinks it can do no wrong and has birthed the perfect agreement is also a fool because mistakes are made. We know that. We know that with respect to beef and pork access to the EU. The Liberals thought they had a deal with a side letter that was going to resolve all kinds of things, but in fact it did not. There is no access, effectively, for beef and pork.

Parliament should do its work. I wish this bill had been brought to Parliament sooner so that there would not be the rush the government is making to get it through Parliament.

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, let there be no doubt about the aggressive approach this government has had, virtually since 2015, in recognizing the importance of international trade and how it supports Canada's middle class. In fact, no government in the history of Canada has signed off on more trade agreements than this government. That is a fact.

The member opposite, at the beginning of his speech, said they did this, they did that and they had this in the making. It was this government that ultimately signed and brought to a conclusion a number of deals that have been critically important for fostering more trade between Canada and countries around the world, whether it is the United States, Mexico or those in Europe and Asia.

Would the member not recognize that this is yet another agreement modifying an agreement signed off by the current Deputy Prime Minister a number of years ago and is a positive step forward that both Canada and Ukraine will benefit from?

[Kyle Seeback, Conservative, Dufferin—Caledon, ON]

Mr. Speaker, eight out of 10 people know one can make up statistics about anything. That is effectively what this member is doing in saying they have done the most. Anyone can make up statements about anything.

It is great that they came to the trade party, but they came to the trade party late. I still recall their vehement opposition to free trade with the United States. I led in my speech with what they said about the one final line they would like to change, and they erased the border between Canada and the United States. The member is saying not to go back in time, yet every time we talk about things, they talk about former prime minister Harper, from 2006. It is typically Liberal: They want it their way one way but everybody else has to have it a different way.

I am glad this free trade agreement has been modernized. I look forward to looking at it, examining it and doing the due diligence that it seems like parliamentarians want to do, whether they are in the NDP or the Bloc. The only members who do not seem to want to study this agreement are the Liberals, because as usual, in their arrogance, they believe they have birthed the perfect child and nothing could be wrong with it. We want to verify if that is true.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Mr. Speaker, my colleague did an excellent job of highlighting the Liberal failure to support Ukraine in the area of energy security. European countries vitally need the natural resources that Canada is ready to produce and sell.

Last summer, we had emergency hearings at the foreign affairs committee because, instead of supporting the sale of Canadian energy to Europe, the Liberal government gave a sanctions exemption to allow a turbine to be sent to facilitate the export of Russian gas to Germany. We were more interested in facilitating the sale of Russian gas to Germany than in helping to relieve European dependence on Russian natural resources by providing Canadian resources as an alternative.

Could the member share more about the Conservative vision for Canada to be a leader in supporting global energy security by enabling our European allies to no longer be dependent on imports from Russia?

[Kyle Seeback, Conservative, Dufferin—Caledon, ON]

Mr. Speaker, that was a great question, the best one so far. The issue the member raised with respect to the export of those turbines was a shameful affront to Ukraine. The Liberal government and Liberal members should be ashamed of that.

If we look at LNG exports to the European market, the United States is at 26%, Qatar is at 24% and Russia is at 20%. Canada could absolutely fill that need if we had a government that recognized that LNG exports are good for lowering emissions, are good for the Canadian economy and would be very good at disrupting the Russian war machine.

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in the House to speak to Bill C‑57, which seeks to modernize the 2017 Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement, or CUFTA. I rise as the Bloc Québécois international trade critic, and I am pleased to speak on behalf of my political party today.

I just want to remind the House that our party is continuing a tradition, because Quebec's independence movement has been advocating for free trade since the 1980s with a view to exiting the Canadian economic framework, which is too narrow. It has been a quite a deal for our SMEs, whose expertise is as valuable as it is diverse. I should note, however, that our position is not categorical: A trade agreement may be bad, and it is what it contains that determines whether or not we support it. If an agreement is going to be harmful to our key sectors, commodify our public services to an unreasonable degree, give multinationals the upper hand or hurt the environment or workers' rights, we would not support it merely because we believe in the virtues of international trade.

In the present case, I will say right now that we will be voting in favour of the principle of the modernized 2023 agreement, since we are still at the principle stage. However, we have a major concern about something that I will talk about a bit later, something that we will be urging the government to commit to changing.

Let us first look at the context. We are talking about modernizing an agreement that dates back to 2017, but we could basically call it a new agreement. The 2017 CUFTA, which was essentially negotiated by Stephen Harper's Conservative government, was mostly about extending a hand of friendship to Ukraine, a symbolic stance, since trade with Ukraine was rather marginal at the time. The negotiations ended in the summer of 2015, just before the election, but the agreement was signed by the current government during the Ukrainian Prime Minister's visit to Ottawa in 2016 and it took effect in 2017. The Bloc Québécois supported that agreement. Given that we wanted to move forward quickly since Ukraine was looking for international support, the 2017 CUFTA was pretty bare-bones. More work could have been done, particularly with regard to the implementation mechanisms that were meant to ensure compliance with the agreement. They were rather weak.

What we have before us today is a real trade agreement. Bill C‑57 is 15 pages long and merely amends Canadian legislation to align it with the agreement's requirements so that the government can go ahead and ratify it. Bill C‑57's clauses are largely technical, as most of them change references to the 2017 CUFTA or other agreements, replacing them with references to the modernized 2023 agreement for consistency. It also authorizes the establishment, recognizes the authority and allows for the funding of the various institutional mechanisms provided for in the agreement, including the secretariat responsible for overseeing the agreement and the various dispute settlement bodies.

The modernized 2023 agreement is a comprehensive agreement. We are talking about 1,000 pages. It contains 30 chapters covering trade in goods and services—including special provisions in a number of areas—as well as investment, government procurement, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, labour law and environmental law. It also includes provisions to favour SMEs or businesses owned and operated by women and indigenous people. It casts the net wide.

For starters, we were pleased to see that the content of the June 2022 order was not included in this agreement. Countries in difficulty or at war are often exempted from Canadian tariffs, but this was the first time supply management was included. Ukraine became totally, or almost totally, exempt from supply management in relation to Canada and its borders. Chicken farmers were very concerned, and for a year, they suffered the ill effects of that access. It was unacceptable. There was no reason for this to happen, especially given the rather ridiculous reasoning behind it. For example, it was alleged, on the basis of studies from several years ago, that there is no bird flu in Ukraine. However, we know that viruses can mutate and that one of the main sources of bird flu in Europe is Poland, which is right next door. Until proven otherwise, birds, such as chickens, do not respect borders. They are not screened at the border. If there were a major outbreak in Poland, it would be surprising if there were no cases, contrary to what was being said in Ukraine.

In short, this agreement covers the components of trade and various related sectors likely to impact trade. Among its 30 chapters, 11 are new since the 2017 CUFTA. The “Cross-Border Trade in Services” chapter sets out the rules applicable to services. The chapter entitled “Development and Administration of Measures” ensures that administrative practices are predictable and consistent. The “Investment” chapter protects investments and replaces the 1994 bilateral agreement for the protection of investments.

The annexes on services and investment non-conforming measures complement the chapter on cross-border trade in services. They clarify its application in specific areas and list the exceptions that both countries wish to retain.

The “Temporary Entry for Business Persons” chapter is a necessary provision for business to occur between the two countries. It did not appear in the 2017 CUFTA.

Although the “Telecommunications” chapter does not completely open up access to the telecommunications market, it guarantees access to the telecommunications infrastructure. It does not cover broadcasting and therefore has no impact on cultural policy. Fortunately, the cultural exemption, as we call it, remains intact, and a good thing too, because we certainly would have fought this provision if it violated the cultural exemption.

The “Financial Services” chapter, which complements the chapter on cross-border trade in services, sets out the rules applicable to financial services without completely opening up the market. The Canadian banking market remains essentially protected. This chapter sets out the rules that facilitate the use of financial services in the other country and the simple flow of capital.

Three chapters are being added to the 2017 CUFTA concerning the participation of certain groups in trade, specifically SMEs, women and indigenous people. This allows preferential measures to be put in place.

There is also the chapter entitled “Good Regulatory Practices”, which codifies the manner in which regulations are adopted to ensure transparency and predictability.

Eight of the chapters in the 2017 CUFTA are being amended. The chapter entitled “Rules of Origin and Origin Procedures” relaxes the rules of origin for products containing materials that come from a country with which a free trade agreement has been concluded. The chapter entitled “Digital Trade” clarifies the rules that apply to electronically transmitted data to ensure more efficient flow. The chapter entitled “Competition Policy” clarifies the competition rules that could hinder trade, particularly in the case of Ukraine, where mass privatization occurred after the fall of the U.S.S.R. State monopolies were replaced by private quasi-monopolies that were difficult to break into. The agreement will help address that. The chapter entitled “Designated Monopolies and State-Owned Enterprises” includes the provisions of the 2017 CUFTA, but in a separate chapter to facilitate its implementation.

The chapter entitled “Government Procurement” was in the 2017 CUFTA, but in the form of a statement of intent only. The new agreement includes provisions from the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement, which takes it away from the WTO's dispute settlement bodies, which have been paralyzed for years, and gives it instead to the panels under the Canada-Ukraine agreement. This chapter is very important, considering the huge contracts that will be awarded for rebuilding Ukraine, presumably in the near future, as soon as the war is over, which we hope is not too long from now.

The chapters on the environment and labour, which were also statements of intent in the 2017 CUFTA, will now be binding.

Now let us talk about the chapter entitled “Transparency, Anti-Corruption, and Responsible Business Conduct”. The 2017 CUFTA contained anti-corruption measures. The 2023 agreement adds provisions on responsible business conduct. We know that the government is boasting about this chapter. This section encourages businesses to adopt internationally recognized guidelines and principles of responsible business conduct and corporate social responsibility, but these codes are purely voluntary. It is merely a fine principle. It is completely empty. There is nothing in it but encouragement to follow lofty principles. There is no body to oversee or verify compliance with this chapter.

In other words, we should disregard the siren songs of the Liberals, who are bragging that this chapter will do even more to help in the fight against corruption in Ukraine. That concludes the overview of the new and amended chapters.

Now, there are some potentially predictable effects that would encourage us to support the principle of this agreement. Even though trade between Canada and Ukraine is up by one-third since the 2017 agreement was signed, Ukraine remains a small trading partner for Canada. In 2022, the value of Canada's merchandise exports to Ukraine was $150.2 million, or 0.02% of the $760 billion in goods Canada exported last year, even in the context of a country at war. The top three exports to Ukraine were motor vehicles and parts, fish and seafood, and pharmaceutical products. Again in 2022, imports from Ukraine were valued at $271.2 million, or 0.04% of the $780 billion in Canadian imports. Canada's top imports from Ukraine were animal and vegetable fats and oils, iron and steel, and electrical machinery and equipment.

The trade impact of this new agreement will therefore be marginal, especially given that most of the goods and services are already subject to free trade, because, until proven otherwise, like Ukraine, we are still part of the World Trade Organization. However, this agreement will bring greater predictability than the previous 2017 agreement, which should make things easier.

I will point out that the 2023 agreement provides one extra year of guaranteed access to the Ukrainian market for 20,000 metric tonnes of Canadian pork, a major production sector for Quebec. These provisions should please pork producers. The chapter on government procurement could also become very important during Ukraine's post-war reconstruction, especially for Quebec engineering firms, some of which are very successful internationally. They could be enlisted to help rebuild the country's infrastructure. Dam building, for instance, is an area where our expertise is internationally recognized.

I will now address the concerns we have. As usual, the main one is transparency. Parliament's ability to amend Bill C-57, the subject of today's debate, is fairly limited. Amendments must relate only to the bill and cannot affect the agreement itself. This limitation of parliamentary powers is not exclusive to the Canada-Ukraine agreement; indeed, the people's elected representatives in this House, the issue of a monarchical culture, have very little involvement in international treaties. Their power is limited to saying yes or no to whatever the government has signed. We have this agreement before us and there is very little we can do. We cannot say that one item or another needs to be improved or that we are opposed to certain aspects. It is just not possible. We cannot influence the contents of these agreements in any way. By the same token, while provinces are responsible for implementing the parts of the treaty that pertain to their jurisdictions, they are not involved in the negotiations, as opposed to what is done in Europe, for instance, where member states play an integral part. Even if the treaty is with the European Union, negotiations happen with the parliaments of member states.

Again, these democratic shortcomings are not exclusive to the Canada-Ukraine agreement. The entire Canadian approach to signing treaties has to be reviewed. Regardless of the issue or political stripe, governments do not really appreciate it when their opponents look too closely at what they do. When it comes to trade agreements, secrecy is in order. Canada, with its deep-seated monarchical traditions, keeps the treaties it signs in the dark, afraid that they might turn to ashes like vampires if they see the light of day. As a member of Parliament, I have had the unfortunate opportunity to experience that first-hand. In November and December 2020, at the Standing Committee on International Trade, we were forced to examine the Canada-United Kingdom free trade agreement without seeing the text of the agreement. During that sad bit of absurd theatre, we had witnesses, experts and groups telling us about an agreement about which they knew as much as we did as elected representatives, which is nothing at all.

When Canada's foreign affairs department was created in 1909, the minister was supposed to table before Parliament an annual report on the department's operations. This report would logically include an overview of Canada's international discussions and commitments.

In 1995, when globalization was in full swing, the legislation governing the department was amended to give the minister a freer hand by granting him jurisdiction over international trade to the detriment of the institution of Parliament. The requirement to submit an annual report was abolished. A Parliament worthy of its name should have procedures to increase democratic control over agreements. The Bloc Québécois tabled seven bills on this between 1999 and 2004.

The other irritants in this agreement are the investor-state dispute settlement provisions. They are in there. This mechanism allows foreign multinationals, foreign investors to sue a state if a policy hampers their ability to turn a profit. This is extremely serious. These types of dispute settlement mechanisms found their way into each and every agreement when signing such agreements was all the rage during the aggressive, triumphant neoliberal years, but it is very serious that Canada is continuing to persistently accept, negotiate and encourage these kinds of agreements.

There are a few things we need to remember about this. These are clauses that have enabled multinationals to sue governments over increases in minimum wage, environmental measures, taxes on soft drinks to counter obesity epidemics in certain countries and moratoriums on drilling. These are protection clauses, a legal tool available to foreign investors to undermine the government's ability to act by leaving the perpetual threat of legal recourse from foreign companies dangling overhead. It is a threat to national sovereignty. It makes it increasingly difficult for governments to legislate on issues such as social justice, the environment, working conditions and public health if a transnational company believes its right to profit has been infringed. This is censorship of the democratic will.

According to a 2013 UN report, states won these suits 42% of the time and corporations, 31% of the time. The remaining disputes were settled out of court. This means that plaintiffs were able to override the political will of states in 58% of cases either in part, through agreements, or in whole, by winning their case. This quantitative figure, however, overlooks one important factor, namely, the pressure put on states by investor protection clauses. States give up on certain policies early in the discussion and decision-making process to avoid being sued. They self-censor for fear of ending up in court.

In 2014, a report by the European Union's Directorate-General for External Policies stated that these investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms were indeed a public policy roadblock. I remind members that this is the Bloc Québécois's fight. In 2021, I presented a motion that led my committee to undertake a study on the impact of these mechanisms. At our last convention, opposing these mechanisms became part of our platform.

After a health crisis, there is no reason for Canada to stubbornly continue to support such provisions, especially since they were removed from the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement, or CUSMA. They were included in NAFTA, but removed from CUSMA. Why continue to defend the sovereignty of multinationals and the right to profit, rather than democratic rights and the sovereignty of states?

In the specific case of Ukraine, let me first point out that it will be a rather fragile post-war state. Even though there are opportunities for Quebec and Canadian companies, do we want to colonize that country with a mechanism that could be embarrassing for Ukraine and could incite it to adopt certain measures, because it would be afraid of the backlash from Canadian and Quebec companies looking to make a profit?

At the same time, allowing a company to sue a foreign country directly without obtaining the consent of its home country could have consequences for us. In the case of Ukraine, we know that it has sanctioned several of its own citizens for collaborating with Russia. These sanctions could go as far as seizing their assets. If these Ukrainian citizens who collaborated with Russia also have investments here, and Ottawa decides to mimic the Ukrainian government and seize their assets here, the federal government could be sued for discriminatory expropriation under the agreement.

I will close by urging the government to move forward with an exchange of letters if this agreement is adopted in order to remove this dangerous and unique provision.

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, this is much like the legislation a few years back that was signed off on. It seemed to have received virtually unanimous support of the House, very close to it, and there was a high sense of co-operation in trying to get that legislation through. The legislation now before us would be a modernization of that legislation.

The member talked about how the province of Quebec could really benefit by this, and jurisdictions all over Canada would, in fact, benefit. The member made reference, for example, to the pork industry. Manitoba is very much into the pork industry and also would benefit, not only in that sector but also in other areas. In Canada, there are 1.3 million-plus estimated people of Ukrainian heritage, not to mention the hundreds of thousands, perhaps into the millions, of other Canadians who are following what is taking place in Ukraine today.

My question to the member is this: Would he not agree that this legislation would be in good part a win-win for both nations? Now is a great time to try to see this legislation pass, before the end of the year. Would he not agree that this would be a good thing to see happen?

[Simon-Pierre Savard-Tremblay, Bloc, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot, QC]

Mr. Speaker, in response to my colleague's question, I can say that there is indeed some good. We support the principle and we have no interest in dragging out or disrupting the natural process. Indeed, sooner would be better.

However, I want to reiterate what I was saying at the end: I do not want our reservations to be diminished. I am calling on the government to commit to us, whether through an exchange of letters or through other means, that it will remove the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism, as worded in the agreement.