Debates of Oct. 24th, 2023

Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 2023

[Jean-Denis Garon, Bloc, Mirabel, QC]

Mr. Speaker, in his excellent speech, my colleague noted the more general aspect of relations between multinational corporations and the state and how they are put on an equal footing. We know that the Liberals and Conservatives are obsessed with exporting oil, the dirtiest oil in the world. When we put multinationals on an equal footing with governments, it is a bit like telling Ukraine and our other trade partners that we want to export to their country as much of the dirtiest oil in the world as we can, implying that if, some day, these countries impose environmental regulations that are good for the planet, they will be seen as enemies of free trade.

I would like to know whether my colleague has any thoughts to share on the right of countries to respect the environment, even in the context of free trade.

[Yves Perron, Bloc, Berthier—Maskinongé, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my distinguished colleague from Mirabel for his intelligent question.

I agree wholeheartedly. That is why I addressed the issue in my speech. It requires urgent action. It reflects a trend we are seeing not only in Canada and Quebec, but also around the world. Governments are increasingly off-loading their responsibilities onto private states. The gene editing regulations that I recently spoke about in the House are one example that comes to mind.

After realizing that the private sector provided the studies and wrote most of the documentation, or almost certainly suggested the wording, at the very least, we should be hearing alarm bells. I think that the state has to assume its responsibilities and, above all, limit the power of private corporations. We must never lose sight of the fact that the government represents the people.

[Julie Vignola, Bloc, Beauport—Limoilou, QC]

Mr. Speaker, it is always difficult to speak after my colleague from Berthier—Maskinongé, since he is so brilliant and knowledgeable on this subject.

To begin with, I want to recall the historical context of the agreement, which Bill C-57 will implement without actually modifying. It was first negotiated under the Harper government and finally signed in 2017 by the current government. In 2023, various aspects of the 2017 Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement were improved. That is what I am going to cover in my speech.

Essentially, the 2023 agreement codifies in a treaty the idea that the territory of Ukraine also includes the Donbass and Crimea, two regions that have been invaded by Russia over almost the entire past decade. The 2023 agreement is more comprehensive than the one signed in 2017. The latest agreement was signed by President Zelenskyy on September 22, during his visit to Canada.

Bill C-57, the Canada-Ukraine free trade agreement implementation act, is about 15 pages long. It is an implementation bill, not the agreement itself. It essentially contains provisions that change the names of certain references, from 2017 to 2023, for consistency. The bill authorizes the establishment, recognizes the authority, and allows for the funding of the various institutional mechanisms provided for in the agreement, including the secretariat responsible for overseeing the agreement signed on September 22, For example, it creates a secretariat responsible for the smooth running of this trade agreement.

How can anyone be against apple pie? How can any Quebecker be against poutine? Generally speaking, trade agreements are good. However, the agreement we are talking about is 1,000 pages and 30 chapters long. It is more than apple pie. It is more complicated than making a really good poutine.

This agreement covers goods and services, investments, government contracts, sanitary and phytosanitary measures and labour and environmental law. There are even provisions that favour small businesses, women and indigenous entrepreneurs. There really is a lot of complexity to this agreement, and it calls for a close look. As my colleague from Berthier—Maskinongé said, Bill C‑57 should take a much deeper dive into the substance of the agreement than it does.

Not only are there questions about supply management, but we have already seen in the past that Quebec aluminum was not protected under the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement, while Ontario steel was. Is that still the case? That is why we have to take the time to carefully study agreements before signing them. That is just one of many examples.

The 2023 agreement contains 11 new chapters, relative to the 2017 agreement. It addresses cross-border trade in services by specifying the rules applicable to services. Measures are being developed and administered to ensure predictability and consistency in administrative practices. That is important. Entrepreneurs often talk to us about the predictability of future events. This agreement clarifies that. The 1994 agreement on investment protection is being improved, particularly with respect to the definition of direct or indirect expropriation. The definition has been tightened up to ensure that there is no unjustified expropriation.

Then again, the current agreement opens the door to a rather serious problem by allowing investors to sue a foreign state. This is a problem, because an international agreement is an agreement between nations, and now corporations are being put on the same footing as states. This is not a good precedent to set. We can certainly discuss ways of protecting our states in committee. We are negotiating nation to nation, not investor to nation. Is there a solution? As I said, we can discuss this in committee, but the simplest solution is to bring multinationals back under the state umbrella, rather than putting them on an equal footing.

With regard to trade, this agreement completes the chapter on cross-border trade in services. I have already talked about this. It clarifies how it is to be applied in various areas, as well as the exceptions that Canada and Ukraine want to preserve. There is also a chapter on including business people and one on telecommunications. The agreement guarantees access to infrastructure, but does not affect broadcasting and cultural policies, which is great. While we may share certain similarities with various aspects of Ukrainian culture, their culture is quite different from ours. Even within Canada, we have cultures that are very different from one another and that we want to protect, particularly francophone culture and indigenous cultures.

The current agreement defines the rules applicable to financial services by immediately establishing rules that facilitate the use of financial services and the simple flow of capital in both countries. There are three chapters on the participation of SMEs, women and indigenous peoples that make it possible to implement preferential measures. Finally, the agreement codifies the regulations adopted to ensure that they are transparent and predictable. Those are two important things for both the public and business people.

The new 2023 Canada-Ukraine free trade agreement amends eight chapters of the 2017 CUFTA, including “Rules of Origin and Origin Procedures”, “Digital Trade”, “Competition Policy”, “Designated Monopolies and State-Owned Enterprises” and “Government Procurement”. The “Environment” and “Labour” chapters, which used to be statements of intent, will now be binding, so these chapters represent progress. Finally, the chapter entitled “Transparency, Anti-Corruption, and Responsible Business Conduct” is amended and improved.

In short, Bill C-57 implements an agreement that is more comprehensive than both the 2017 and 1994 agreements. However, as with every other free trade agreement, we had practically nothing to do with the content of this 1,000-page agreement, even though it will impact ordinary people, since they are the ones producing the goods and services. We, who represent the people, have almost no say in the matter, except to indicate whether the agreement should be implemented or not. Basically, that is what Bill C-57 does. We did not have much say in regard to the content of the 1,000-page agreement. This is problematic, but it does not have to be this way. The government could hold consultations with the provinces, businesses and parliamentarians.

What is more, we are rather limited in the amendments we could propose for Bill C‑57. We can amend the bill, but not the agreement. That is why we are limited in what we can amend. As I was saying, the provinces are not really involved in the process, which means the agreement can affect the constitutional jurisdictions of Quebec and the Canadian provinces, given that they were not consulted. Quebec and the Canadian provinces will essentially suffer the consequences, when it is their jurisdictions that are involved and it would be up to the provinces to manage them. That is something that needs improvement.

We will vote in favour of this bill because this free trade agreement is good not only for Canada, but also for Ukraine, essentially because it will contribute to the economic and physical rebuilding of Ukraine.

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, I want to reflect on the member's concerns with the consultations.

I am sure she can appreciate the fact that we have a negotiating team representing Canada. This is a team of individuals who have great experience. They have an understanding and, no doubt, have had considerable dialogue with respect to all the different issues, including what has happened in some of the debates that have occurred in here in the past with respect to trade agreements and the concerns about them.

A good example of that would be the issue of supply management. These individuals know full well how political entities and others feel about supply management. The general feelings of Canadians are reflected at the beginning of the negotiations and throughout the negotiations to ensure that Canadians are best served.

Would the member not agree that at some point we have to allow the Canadian negotiators to actually get the agreement, so that the heads of both governments are able to sign off and we are afforded the opportunity to have further ongoing discussions?

[Julie Vignola, Bloc, Beauport—Limoilou, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I have faith in the negotiating skills of our professionals, in that they speak for Canada. That being said, sometimes there are some blind spots. I would point to what happened with aluminum during CUSMA. We had to fight for it in the House. We were told that it was protected just as much as steel was, only to realize later that it was not. A letter had to be added in a schedule. I would also mention supply management, which is essentially our farmers' income pool, and that gets dipped into a bit more time after time.

The negotiators are indeed skilled, but there are blind spots. That is what I am talking about. Those blind spots include the jurisdictions of Quebec and the Canadian provinces because “federal” seems to be the default mindset, and the details are not necessarily considered.

[Jean-Denis Garon, Bloc, Mirabel, QC]

Mr. Speaker, once again, I thank my colleague for an excellent speech.

This is a good agreement, but the federal government negotiated it without consulting the provinces. Parliament is somewhat superfluous in this matter. As everyone knows, these agreements are temporarily in effect while we vote on implementing them.

We are obviously sovereignists, and there are a lot of sovereignists in Quebec. These people are told that if Quebec became a country, it would have to negotiate everything. It would have to negotiate free trade agreements. However, today we have proof that agreements can be negotiated, modified and renegotiated.

Does my colleague think that an independent Quebec could have negotiated a free trade agreement with Ukraine on its own?

I would also like to know if she thinks that Ukraine would have turned its back on us or if it would have wanted to trade with Quebec.

[Julie Vignola, Bloc, Beauport—Limoilou, QC]

Mr. Speaker, that is an interesting question. In an independent Quebec, Quebec would negotiate for itself.

Some might say that Quebec is far too small to negotiate for itself, that it is not big enough or important enough. Quebec is never “enough”. It is always too small for someone.

Geographically speaking, Quebec is bigger than Ukraine. Demographically, it has roughly the same population. If Ukraine is capable of negotiating on its own, like a big country does, an independent Quebec would be very capable of doing so too.

[Niki Ashton, NDP, Churchill—Keewatinook Aski, MB]

Mr. Speaker, in her speech, my colleague gave us some good examples of sectors and workers that were forgotten during our free trade negotiations.

I would like to ask her once again how important it is to take our time and make sure we are protecting important economic sectors here at home along with good jobs in our communities.

[Julie Vignola, Bloc, Beauport—Limoilou, QC]

Mr. Speaker, when we enter into free trade agreements, the ultimate goal should be not only to come out ahead as a country but also to help another country come out ahead. We cannot come out ahead if we do not protect our own economy and if we allow another country, any other country, to get the upper hand. A free trade agreement has to be equitable and egalitarian. It has to protect the jobs and economic resources of both countries. Elements of the trade relationship have to be complementary.

[Julie Dzerowicz, Liberal, Davenport, ON]

Mr. Speaker, it is always a pleasure to speak on behalf of the wonderful residents of my riding of Davenport.

Today I will be speaking to Bill C-57, an act to implement the 2023 Free Trade Agreement between Canada and Ukraine, but before I begin my formal written remarks, I want to take a few minutes to make a few comments.

First, I am happy the bill has been introduced in the House. I am also grateful to the Minister of Export Promotion, International Trade and Economic Development for her leadership and work. In a time of war, it is really important for us to be thinking about the Ukrainian economy, both today and tomorrow. Therefore, a huge thanks to her for this.

I am very grateful to my colleagues on the Canada-Ukraine Friendship Group for their focus and attention on this, particularly my colleague, the member for Etobicoke Centre.

I also want to express how grateful I am to a number of key stakeholders who have helped to shape this agreement, including the Ukrainian Canadian Congress, the Canada-Ukraine Chamber of Commerce, the Ukrainian Canadian Professional and Business Association of Toronto, the Ukrainian Canadian Social Services of Canada and the Ukrainian Canadian Bar Association. I thank all of them.

I also want to acknowledge the context in which we are living today, one in which we are introducing this modernized trade agreement.

As we all know, something that troubles us every day are the major wars under way in the world today. In February of 2022, Russia started the unprovoked and illegal brutal war in Ukraine, which continues today. More recently, on October 7, Hamas initiated a brutal and violent war against Israel, which, unfortunately, also continues today. Both are clear illustrations of an attack on our democracies using war and terrorism.

I put out statements to my constituents constantly to update them on what is happening. In my latest update on Friday, I said the following, “We are in a struggle to defend our values, our humanity, and to stand up against these attacks on democracy. There is no simple solution to the conflict, but the work to find a humanitarian path to end the violence should be driven by one basic principle, and that is the most basic value of all, to protect and cherish human life.”

Some will ask me why I am mentioning this during a speech on the modernization of the Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement. It is because in a time of war, when we are fighting for our values, for democracy, for the right to continue to choose the way we live, real, everyday life continues. It is important to not only support the current economy in Ukraine but also the one it is trying to build after the war it is fighting eventually ends. I am really glad Canada is there.

I have one other aside. It is my privilege to currently serve as the chair of the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association. At the international meetings where NATO parliamentarians assemble, we talk about rebuilding Ukraine after the war. We know that the work begins now. I am very proud that Canada is stepping up and very much playing its part.

It is a true honour for me to rise in the House today in support of legislation to implement the modernized Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement, otherwise known as CUFTA.

As we all know, Canada and Ukraine have enjoyed very close bilateral relations since 1991, when Canada became the first western country to recognize Ukrainian independence, an issue that we are sadly still fighting for to this day. These bilateral relations are strengthened by shared values and warm people-to-people ties rooted in the Ukrainian Canadian community of nearly 1.3 million people. My family is very much part of this community.

Recently, the Canada-Ukraine bilateral relationship has been marked by Canada's steadfast support to Ukraine independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity in the face of protracted Russian aggression. Whether it was in 2014 when Russia illegally occupied Crimea or, today, following Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022, Canada has stood steadfast beside our Ukrainian allies to support them as they fight for their independence, democracy and freedom.

As such, since the beginning of the conflict in February 2022, Canada has committed almost $9 billion in multi-faceted support to Ukraine, which includes $5 billion in financial assistance, including $4 billion in loans through the International Monetary Fund's administered account for Ukraine, as well as $500 million through a Canada-Ukraine sovereignty bond; over $2 billion in military assistance and defence, of which I know that our Minister of Defence has recently made an additional announcement; $352 million in humanitarian assistance, a lot of which goes to the Ukrainian Women's Fund, which is for much-necessary work in the country; $147 million in development assistance; $102 million in security and stabilization assistance; and $4.8 million in cultural protection.

Additionally, Canada has established new immigration measures for Ukrainians fleeing Russia's invasion, for which we have committed $1.2 billion.

Today we have yet another opportunity to demonstrate our continued support to Ukraine through other means, means that will not only offer assistance in the short term but will extend well beyond the current unfortunate situation and will form the basis on which Canada can support the reconstruction of Ukraine for years to come. I am, of course, referring to the modernized CUFTA, which is the reason I am addressing members today.

The original CUFTA entered into force in August 2017 and immediately eliminated tariffs on 99% of imports from Ukraine. Similarly, the 2017 CUFTA immediately eliminated tariffs on 86% of Canadian exports to Ukraine, with the balance of tariff concessions to be implemented over a seven-year period, or by January 1, 2024.

While reductions in coal supplies from Canada caused a slight drop in total trade following the 2017 CUFTA's entry into force, non-coal exports grew at a rapid pace and, in 2021, total bilateral trade reached its highest point ever at $447 million before dipping to $421 million in 2022 due to Russia's invasion.

In 2022, top Canadian exports to Ukraine included armoured vehicles, fish, medicine, motor vehicles and parts, and pet food. Top imports from Ukraine included fats and oils, iron and steel, electrical machinery, and processed foods. Canadian investment in Ukraine in 2022 amounted to $112 million.

While comprehensive from a trade-in-goods perspective, the 2017 CUFTA did not include chapters on trade in services or investment. These areas were left out of the agreement due to divergent approaches at the time. Rather, the CUFTA contained a clause committing Canada and Ukraine to review the agreement within two years of its entry into force, with a view to expanding it. The review clause specifically identified services and investment as potential additions, but did not restrict the parties from exploring other areas.

Pursuant to this review clause, in a visit to Ottawa in July 2019, our Prime Minister and the Ukrainian president, President Zelenskyy, announced their intention to modernize the CUFTA. Our federal government then held formal public consultations on the modernization of the CUFTA in the winter of 2020. Submissions supported the initiative as a means of strengthening the bilateral relationship, building on Canada's commercial engagement with Ukraine, and further promoting an open, inclusive and rules-based trading environment for our businesses and investors.

The Government of Canada also received positive feedback from the provinces and territories, several of which were particularly supportive of the potential inclusion of new or modernized chapters on cross-border trade in services, financial services, investment, digital trade and additional commitments to support small and medium-sized enterprises. All of these areas have been successfully included in the modernized CUFTA, as well as new chapters or provisions on trade and gender, trade and indigenous peoples, digital trade, transparency, labour and environment, among many other areas.

Following these internal consultations, and delays due to the COVID-19 pandemic, we know there was an announcement to launch the negotiations for a modernized CUFTA in January 2022.

Unfortunately, only weeks later, on February 24, 2022, Russia began its full-scale illegal invasion of Ukraine. This caused another delay in progress, with Canadian trade officials relaying to their Ukrainian counterparts that they stood ready to proceed with CUFTA modernization discussions in accordance with Ukraine's capacity and willingness to do so.

Negotiations started in June 2022 and, despite compressed timelines and difficult circumstances for our negotiating partner, they were highly constructive. Both sides demonstrated an eagerness to reach an ambitious and high-standard agreement that would be on par with Canada's most comprehensive trade agreements. This was done with the aim of facilitating increased trade between our two nations long into the future.

During a visit from the Prime Minister of Ukraine on April 11, 2023, he and our Prime Minister announced the conclusion of negotiations for the modernized CUFTA. Each committed to undertaking their respective domestic processes to facilitate its signature and entry into force as soon as possible.

During his most recent visit to Ottawa on September 22, 2023, President Zelenskyy and our Prime Minister signed the final modernized CUFTA text. This was a historic milestone in the Canadian-Ukrainian bilateral relationship, and it served as another clear demonstration of Canada's unwavering support for Ukraine's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. With the final agreement officially signed, both sides are now taking the next steps to bring the agreement into force as early as January 1, 2024. That is why we are here today.

If I may, I will say a few words about the modernized agreement and some of the benefits and opportunities it presents for Canadians and Ukrainians alike.

Substantive negotiations have resulted in a modernized CUFTA, which includes nine dedicated new chapters and upgrades to nine existing chapters from the 2017 CUFTA. I will begin with an overview of the new chapters that have been added.

First, the agreement includes a dedicated new chapter on cross-border trade in services, which puts both Ukrainian and Canadian service suppliers on a comparable footing vis-à-vis our main services trading partners. Additionally, this chapter includes provisions on the recognition of professional qualifications that would facilitate trade and professional services, which are strategically important for both parties in a knowledge-based and digital economy.

The parties have also added a new chapter on investment that would replace the Canada-Ukraine FIPA. It features modern drafting to ensure investment obligations operate as intended and provide necessary flexibility in key policy areas. The new chapter includes a modern dispute settlement mechanism that would help Canadian investors participate with more confidence during Ukraine's reconstruction and beyond.

The modernized CUFTA has a financial services chapter, which includes core obligations related to market access, national treatment and most-favoured nation treatment. It would also maintain flexibility for regulators to preserve the stability of their financial systems. The financial services chapter would support a predictable, stable and transparent investment environment for investors, and it would allow Ukraine a 10-year period to transition from its existing World Trade Organization commitments to those included in this agreement.

There is also a new chapter in telecommunications, which would promote competition and provide enhanced certainty for telecommunications service suppliers when operating in Canadian and Ukrainian markets. The chapter also includes commitments to ensure that regulators of the telecommunications sector would be independent, impartial and transparent.

The parties have also added a chapter on temporary entry for business persons, which would provide new access for Canadians and Canadian companies to do business, invest and work in highly skilled occupations on a temporary basis in Ukraine while providing Canadian employers with easier access to highly skilled Ukrainian workers.

New chapters on inclusive trade, including trade and gender, trade and small and medium-sized enterprises, and trade and indigenous peoples, seek to empower and create opportunities for these under-represented groups, increasing their participation in and expanding their benefits from the modernized CUFTA. Notably, the trade and indigenous peoples chapter is the first of its kind included by either party in a free trade agreement.

Lastly, there is a chapter on good regulatory practices. It demonstrates to current and future trading partners that Ukraine is able to take on commitments that support a regulatory environment conducive to trade.

In addition to the new chapters I have outlined, we have also agreed with Ukraine to update nine chapters from the existing agreement. This includes rules of origin and origin procedures, where Canada and Ukraine have agreed to activate an article from the 2017 CUFTA on cumulation of origin.

This would allow materials of any non-party with which both Canada and Ukraine have an existing free trade agreement, such as the European Union, to be taken into consideration by the exporter when determining whether a product qualifies as originating under CUFTA, which would make it easier for Canadian and Ukrainian businesses to participate in regional value chains. It reflects a shared desire to support trade among like-minded partners.

The new digital trade chapter aims to improve regulatory certainty for businesses seeking to engage in the digital economy in both markets, as well as those specifically looking to engage in cross-border digital trade between Canada and Ukraine. The modernized CUFTA also includes a stand-alone competition policy chapter, which would enhance both parties' objective for a fair, transparent, predictable and competitive business environment through enhanced obligations for procedural fairness, and the identification and protection of confidential information by authorities.

The monopolies and state enterprises chapter has been upgraded to include important definitions for state-owned enterprises and designated monopolies, and updated commitments on transparency and technical co-operation. In the modernized government procurement chapter, Canada and Ukraine have agreed to provisions clarifying that the parties are not prevented from undertaking policies and programs to support domestic initiatives, such as green and social procurement.

The modernized CUFTA also includes perhaps the most comprehensive and ambitious environment chapter ever achieved in a Canadian free trade agreement. The updated chapter seeks to promote robust, ambitious and transparent environmental governance, and for the first time, includes a dedicated article reaffirming the parties' commitment to addressing climate change.

There is also an updated labour chapter, which shows that Canada and Ukraine are committed to the highest labour rights standards. Fully subject to the dispute settlement mechanism of the agreement, the chapter commits Canada and Ukraine to implement, in their labour laws, the content of the core conventions of the International Labour Organization.

The transparency, anti-corruption and reasonable business conduct chapter promotes transparency and integrity among public officials, private sector and society, and it advances enforceability of anti-corruption laws. It includes a new section to encourage responsible business conduct.

These negotiated outcomes would not only position Canadian firms to better participate in the economic reconstruction of Ukraine, but also support Ukraine's trade policy interests globally. Our Ukrainian colleagues have already expressed to us the value of the modernized CUFTA as the model of a modern, comprehensive and high-standard agreement with prospective trading partners around the globe. Domestically, the modernized agreement would reinforce the regulatory framework of a more inclusive, predictable and transparent trading and investment environment, which would benefit Canadian workers, businesses and entrepreneurs.

While the war continues to hinder trade both globally and bilaterally between Canada and Ukraine, the benefits and opportunities our countries have secured through this FTA are varied and long term, and would support growth in our commercial relationship now and for years to come.

During President Zelenskyy's recent visit, he and Prime Minister Trudeau had the opportunity to participate in a business round table in Toronto. At this event, we heard from business leaders from across Canada about the scope of commercial trade and investment interests in Ukraine, the risks associated with doing business in Ukraine and how to overcome these risks to ensure the private sector in Canada is well-positioned to invest and support Ukrainian reconstruction. Indeed, Canadian reconstruction companies, such as Aecon, are already moving forward to form partnerships with Ukrainian companies and to aid reconstruction.

This agreement is not just about economic gains. It also represents a landmark in the Canada-Ukraine relationship and serves as another clear demonstration of Canada's unwavering support to Ukrainian sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. We stand with Ukraine, and this agreement is another bond between us.

To that end, I urge all hon. members to support the legislative amendments contained in Bill C-57 and support this legislation.

[The Deputy Speaker, Conservative, Chris d'Entremont]

I would just like to give a quick reminder that, when referring to members of the House of Commons, members are to use their title or riding name.

We will move on to questions and comments with the hon. member for Courtenay—Alberni.

[Gord Johns, NDP, Courtenay—Alberni, BC]

Mr. Speaker, there is one thing that we have seen in previous trade deals, and I am thinking of the free trade agreement with China that the Harper government signed back in 2014. While I am being heckled by Conservatives, I will just remind them that they signed a trade agreement with China for 31 years. That trade agreement—

[An hon. member]

It's not a free trade agreement.

[Gord Johns, NDP, Courtenay—Alberni, BC]

Mr. Speaker, if the member wants to get up on a point of order, he can clarify. While he is heckling me, I will remind him that they signed a trade agreement with secret tribunals, and even Canadians do not know about what is in those secret tribunals when there is an appeal from the Chinese government that wants to override, say, Canadian rights.

There was a woman in my riding, Brenda Sayers, a lawyer, an esteemed lawyer from the Hupacasath First Nation, who took the Harper government to court and appealed that this was violating indigenous rights. One thing I like in this agreement is the chapter on trade and indigenous peoples. It reaffirms the parties' commitment to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

Does my colleague agree that focussed chapters should be included in all free trade agreements moving forward so that we do not end up in the same position we are in because of the Conservatives and their trade agreement with China and the other trade agreements they signed?

[Julie Dzerowicz, Liberal, Davenport, ON]

Mr. Speaker, on my side of the House I heard some of my colleagues say that that was a good question, which is really great.

As I mentioned in my speech, there is a chapter that includes trade and indigenous people, which seeks to empower trade opportunities for this under-represented group. I think it is the first of its kind that either Ukraine or Canada has ever included in a free trade agreement. I think we included that because we think it is important. I do think it is something we should be considering for all other future trade agreements moving forward.

[Ed Fast, Conservative, Abbotsford, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I just following up on the previous question from my NDP colleague, who has suggested time and time again that Canada has a free trade agreement with China. That is patently false, and I think he knows that. What he is actually referring to is a foreign investment promotion and protection agreement, or FIPA.

I would ask the member, who just gave a very good speech on Ukraine, if it is her understanding that Canada has gone so far as to sign a trade agreement with China and why it is that Ukraine is the priority right now when it comes to negotiating free trade.

[Julie Dzerowicz, Liberal, Davenport, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I will keep my comments to the current trade agreement.

We have stood with Ukraine forever. The Ukrainian diaspora is one of the largest diasporas here in Canada. We stand with them, as Ukraine fights this brutal and illegal war against Russia in their fight for democracy, because it is a fight they are also fighting on our behalf.

For us, this is our way of helping to support their current economy and to create a foundation for their economy from which to build once the war is over. We stand with Ukraine today. We stood with them yesterday, and we will stand with them for as long as it takes after this war. We will be there as they are growing their economy after this war, moving forward.

[Xavier Barsalou-Duval, Bloc, Pierre-Boucher—Les Patriotes—Verchères, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I commend my colleague on her speech and my other colleagues on their questions.

Today, we are debating Bill C‑57, an act to implement the 2023 free trade agreement between Canada and Ukraine. I think this is a subject on which everyone in the House agrees. It does not seem as though many members will oppose the bill when we vote on it. However, this is still an opportunity to talk about Ukraine and the importance of free trade agreements, as well as to reflect on those agreements. Obviously, we hope that Ukraine will recover as quickly as possible. I think that having a free trade agreement that normalizes our trade with Ukraine will only help with that.

I am wondering why these free trade agreements are negotiated behind closed doors without any real mandate. The executive branch, or government, is the one responsible for those negotiations, and Parliament can only say “yes” or “no” to the final agreement. Does my colleague think it is right that we have almost no say as to the content of the agreement, whether it is good or not?

I think that everyone agrees that we want a free trade agreement with Ukraine. However, it would be worthwhile for parliamentarians to have more of a say as to the agreement's content. That is why we were elected, to represent the people and defend their interests, but the government is preventing us from doing that to some extent.

[Julie Dzerowicz, Liberal, Davenport, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I do not agree with the hon. member. I think there are a number of opportunities for members to provide their input.

If the bill manages to get a vote in this House to move it to committee, there will be an enormous opportunity for comments from members of all sides of the House at that point in time. I will also say that none of these negotiations are ever conducted in secret. I think there are many opportunities, such as through the various different stakeholder groups I had mentioned at the onset of my speech, for there to be input.

The minister is always open to feedback from anyone in this House. For us, it is important to have the best agreement possible, and we will take the best ideas. It does not matter where they come from.

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I am really pleased to get in on this round, because there has been a very interesting discussion between the member for Courtenay—Alberni, the member for Abbotsford and the hon. member for Danforth about investor protection agreements.

They are not trade agreements, so the member for Courtenay—Alberni is correct that the previous government under Stephen Harper executed a secret agreement. It never came before Parliament for a vote but was done as an order in council, committing Canada not to a trade agreement with the People's Republic of China, but to an investor protection agreement, as the member for Abbotsford referred to, a FIPA, that binds Canada for more than 31 years and in which challenges against Canadian law by corporations of the People's Republic of China do not require any public notice to Canadians and can proceed in secret.

I want to ask the hon. member for Danforth this. The current Canada-Ukraine agreement includes an investor protection agreement. When Canada renegotiated NAFTA with the U.S., it removed chapter 11, the investor protection agreement. Was any thought given, when renegotiating the agreement with Ukraine, to remove this quite anti-democratic provision? It is almost ubiquitous across the globe in trade agreements these days to include an investor protection agreement. Was any thought given to removing it from the Canada-Ukraine agreement?

[Julie Dzerowicz, Liberal, Davenport, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I want to correct the record. I am the member of Parliament for Davenport, which I am very proud of. I do not mind being confused with my wonderful colleague, the member of Parliament for Toronto—Danforth, as our ridings are often confused, but I wanted to correct the record on that.

Canada and Ukraine I believe already had a foreign investment promotion and protection agreement. The new investment chapter in the modernized agreement features modern drafting to ensure that parties remain flexible from a policy perspective and to ensure their right to regulate in key areas. It also includes a new chapter with a modern dispute settlement mechanism, which will, among other important updates, strengthen alternatives to avoid arbitration and enhance the transparency of proceedings and commitments.

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, can I get the member's comments on how trade agreements are to the economic advantage of both Canada and Ukraine? Obviously, the war is on all of our minds. What are the impacts of having a trade agreement, whether for morale or just to make a very strong political statement at the same time?

[Julie Dzerowicz, Liberal, Davenport, ON]

Mr. Speaker, the introduction of this legislation is an important milestone in the implementation of a modernized Canada-Ukraine free trade agreement. It is the first trade agreement Ukraine has signed since the onset of Russia's illegal war. I know it wants to use this as a model for signing other trade agreements, as it is trying to support its economy while undergoing an illegal, brutal war. It wants to set itself up for a good economy once the war is over. Canada will be with Ukraine and will support it with whatever it takes, for as long as it takes.

[Gerald Soroka, Conservative, Yellowhead, AB]

Mr. Speaker, I will be sharing my time with the hon. member for Mission—Matsqui—Fraser Canyon.

[Brad Vis]

It's Canada's number one riding.