It is not a unanimous consent motion. It is a substantive argument on a point of order about how the House will treat this. It is not terribly lengthy.
Madam Speaker, I am rising on a point of order concerning the management of the debate on this motion of non-confidence in the Speaker. It is my view that this motion should be treated as a privilege motion, thereby taking priority over the orders of the day. Such motions are rare in the Canadian House of Commons, but we do have some precedence to guide us.
On May 28, 1956, Mr. Speaker Beaudoin in a ruling found at page 647 of the Journals said, with respect to motions of censure against Chair occupants, “We are talking about a very serious type of motion which is a preferred one, one which is of a privileged character, and that is to challenge the conduct of an officer of this House.”
The following week on June 4, 1956, the leader of the opposition, George Drew, moved a censure motion concerning Mr. Speaker Beaudoin. The prime minister, Louis St-Laurent, moved a motion to adjourn the debate, which was carried. The next day, the House simply resumed debate on the censure motion, as is what naturally occurs with an adjourned privilege debate, a debate which continued day to day until the House voted on June 8, 1956.
In a subsequent case on March 18, 1964, the Ralliement Créditiste brought a motion of censure against Deputy Speaker Lucien Lamoureux, which the House debated that day and simply resumed the next day until the House voted. Again, that is behaviour consistent with the management of a privilege motion.
Much more recently on March 15, 2000, Deputy Speaker Peter Milliken said at page 4706 of the Debates, in respect of a motion on notice concerning confidence in Mr. Speaker Parent, “Until we get to motions, however, this is only a notice of motion and the motion is not before the House. If it is put before the House, it will no doubt be a motion of great importance, with a certain priority over other matters we may discuss.”
In that 2000 example, a review of the Debates for both March 15 and 16, 2000, and specifically concerning points of order related to government motions to proceed to the orders of the day, will reveal that all the parties appear to be operating under the presumption that such a no-confidence motion would be treated as a privilege motion.
For example, on March 16, 2000, a Thursday, government House leader Don Boudria spoke about his concerns about ensuring the opposition day scheduled for that sitting proceeded. To be clear, he was concerned about the day happening at all, not that it would be an abbreviated day starting after question period following the usual interruption of Routine Proceedings at 2 p.m.
For his part, the NDP House leader, Bill Blaikie, offered this contribution:
Rather than creating the impression that there is any anxiety about that debate, it would be better in terms of precedent, procedure, the relationship between the Chair and the House, the prerogatives of the House itself and finally the perception of the Chair itself, to deal with this at the earliest possible moment pursuant to the procedures that we have established for this, that is to allow us to go through Routine Proceedings. It will be inconvenient for all concerned, but democracy is sometimes inconvenient, as we found out to our sleep deprivation in the last few days.
As I said, we have few precedents to guide us. Standing Order 1, however, does oblige us to look elsewhere for guidance in such circumstances. The United Kingdom's Erskine May, at page 348 of the 18th edition, offers this insight: “The priority of a notice of motion, or order of the day relating to a matter of privilege, is not prejudiced by the fact that the day on which it is to be raised is a day on which, under an order of the House, government business has precedence.”
Under our own Standing Orders, Government Orders, of course, has precedence at certain times of every single sitting day, and, as we know, privilege debates do take priority pursuant to Standing Order 48.
In the Australian Senate, an elected body, a motion of this nature would have priority according to Odgers' Australian Senate Practice, 14th Edition, at page 636, “While there are no special provisions in the Senate standing orders concerning censure motions, it is the usual practice for such motions to be accorded immediate precedence or for the debate to be adjourned to a later hour the same day.”
That situation, where the Standing Orders make no special provision about motions to censure the Speaker, is analogous to our own House.
Finally, I would refer the Chair to the words of Josef Redlich and his famous treatise, The Procedure of the House of Commons, at page 146 of volume 2, about just what a rare event this type of motion is. It states:
The rules prescribe that due notice of motion must be given that on some future day a vote of censure upon the Speaker will be moved. It need hardly be said that such an event is abnormal and happens but rarely, and that such a motion would only be acceded to by the House if the circumstances fully justified it.
Something of this rarity, indeed something of this gravity, really ought to be a matter handled with priority, just as any privilege motion, because indeed it is. Therefore, I would respectfully submit that the debate of a non-confidence motion, if it does not come to a vote today, must continue until the ordinary hour of adjournment, unless, of course, members are ready to proceed to the vote.
I implore members to err on the side of safety. Let us allow the debate to collapse today and have it come to a vote, and then the House can move on with a decision that all members of Parliament have had a say in.