moved:
That Bill S‑8 be amended by deleting the long title.
Madam Speaker, I appreciate the opportunity to address Bill S-8 today. This is important legislation that Conservatives have been supportive of. It is also an opportunity to discuss the significant problems with the sanctions regime that we have seen under the government, including the failure to move quickly enough to sanction perpetrators of violence around the world, the failure to be consistent and the failure to apply sanctions in some critical cases where that is required.
I want to focus my remarks today on expressing support for the modifications, as we supported them at committee, around inadmissibility to Canada being tied in with sanctioning. I also want to highlight the gaps, in terms of the government's responses when it has come to sanctioning.
The trend we are seeing overall, in terms of sanctioning, is to try to be as precise and as targeted as possible. This is done to minimize the harm to a civilian population in association with sanctioning and to have sharp sanctions against perpetrators of violence to hold them accountable for their own actions, as well as to sanction those institutions that are involved in violence and the flow of resources that allows violent regimes to hurt their own people and people in other countries.
More and more precise sanctions, broadly speaking, are a positive development. However, as we move in this direction, we need to ensure precision and enforcement, as well as that we are not missing things or allowing holes in the process that render the sanctions that have been put in place ineffective. We also need to ensure that enforcement is in place as required and that it is effective.
Another trend we have seen is the adoption throughout the world of Magnitsky sanctions legislation, which is part of that trend of narrowing in precision and targeting those responsible for violence. In particular, it aims sanctions at those involved in gross violations of human rights.
In the past, those involved in violations of human rights in other parts of the world would generally have stayed in their own countries. However, in the globalized world we live in today, it is much more common for oppressors, oligarchs and maybe their family members to take their ill-gotten gains and try to use them to vacation, attend school and do other things in various other parts of the world, including the United States, Canada, Europe, etc. Magnitsky sanctions provide us with a unique opportunity to try to deter human rights abuses by saying to those who are involved in gross violations of human rights that they are not going to be able to engage in this kind of travel, move their money or spend time in Canada or other parts of the world if they cross certain thresholds in terms of violations of human rights.
Another reason these types of sanctions are very effective is that, when people are part of violent autocratic regimes, they often realize that these regimes can turn on those within them. As the saying goes, “Sometimes the show trial comes for you.” These corrupt officials who have been involved in violence are often thinking in the back of their minds, “What is the escape hatch that I could have if I need to leave my country at some point? Can I move my money? Can I create a kind of golden parachute that would allow me to leave the regime I am a part of, if I need to?”
Magnitsky sanctions, by sanctioning individuals who are involved in human rights abuses, are a way of saying that if individuals cross a certain threshold in terms of violation of fundamental human rights or if individuals are identified as being involved in violence against civilians, human rights violations or threats to international peace and security, they could be sanctioned and therefore prevented from finding that escape hatch. One corollary to the point of people maybe wanting to escape at some point but being told that they would not be able to escape and using that as a way of deterring human rights abuses is that, in order for these sanctions to be effective, they have to be imposed in coordination.
If Canada, the U.S. and our partners in Europe are sanctioning different people, then those who may be sanctioned in one place but not another would still have that escape option available to them. However, if like-minded countries are coordinated, then it shuts off the potential options of escape for those involved in human rights abuses. Therefore, it puts pressure on them to stop or at least to limit their violations of fundamental human rights.
They know there will be significant consequences for them if they persist in this direction. I think we have a big problem with impunity right now. People who are involved in human rights violations believe they will get away with it, because we do not have effective systems to hold people accountable. Magnitsky sanctions are a key tool for countering that.
It is in that spirit that Senator Andreychuk and, in this place, my colleague from Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman put forward the Magnitsky sanctions bill. It initially received a cold response from the government, but eventually, it was passed unanimously. With Bill S-8, if an individual is subject to sanctions, including under the Magnitsky act, they are also considered inadmissible to Canada. It lines up inadmissibility provisions with sanctions provisions. This is positive.
The problem is that the Magnitsky act and other sanctions tools give the government tools to use for sanctioning individuals, but unfortunately, the government has been reluctant to use them. For a number of years now, the government has not used the Magnitsky sanctions tool. When it was passed, the Magnitsky act provided the government with tools for sanctioning human rights abusers under the Special Economic Measures Act, and some of that has been done.
However, the absence of the use of the Magnitsky act is troubling, especially because the act is an important mechanism of coordination among allies. Multiple countries have a Magnitsky act, and if we are able to use our Magnitsky act and coordinate with other countries' use of their Magnitsky acts, we can send a stronger, clearer message of deterrence to human rights abusers.
The government has been very reluctant to use a tool that it has been given by Parliament and encouraged by Parliament to use. Recognizing the failure of the government to use the Magnitsky act sufficiently, we have actually put forward a new private member's bill. It just passed this place, and it is on its way to the Senate.
Bill C-281 would create a parliamentary trigger mechanism that would allow a committee, in the House or in the Senate, to pass a motion calling on the government to list an individual under the Magnitsky act. The government would then have to provide a response to that committee within a time frame consistent with the time frame for responses to committee reports in the Standing Orders. It would have to provide that response regardless of, for instance, whether there is a prorogation.
We recognize the value of the coordination that we are seeing in Bill S-8, but like any other sanctions tools, it is only as good as its use. If the government is failing to use that tool, then we are still going to have a significant problem.
I want to use this opportunity to call on the government to use more sanctions and more effective targeted sanctions against the military junta in Burma. I have met with various communities from Burma recently. There is an urgent need to support pro-democracy and opposition movements in Burma, as well as to apply tighter, more rigorous and more effective sanctions against the Burmese regime.
That is the case for a number of reasons. One is that the Burmese regime is supporting and co-operating with the Putin regime. We see increasing collaboration among countries that are seeking to violently upset the international rules-based order, as well as a sharing of weapons and technology among them. If we want to effectively sanction the Putin regime and deter further violence by that regime, then we also have to be sanctioning the partners that are supplying them with military technology; that includes the government of Burma.
The government of Burma has also been involved in horrific violence against civilians. It is undertaking a campaign of air strikes targeting civilians that is horrific in its proportions. It follows, of course, the Rohingya genocide that we spoke extensively about in the House a number of years ago. It has been positive to see an increasing collaboration or reconciliation among various ethnic minority communities and the pro-democracy movement, including Rohingya in that process, of course.
More work needs to be done there, and Canada needs to stand with opposition groups. That includes sanctioning the Burmese regime. In particular, the government should be applying tough sanctions to prevent aviation fuel from getting into Burma. Aviation fuel is what is allowing the military junta in Burma to undertake these horrific air strikes against civilians. Sadly, until now, this has been a gap in terms of government sanctions, but I hope it will step up and improve in that respect.
Overall, we are supportive of Bill S-8, but we are very concerned about the government's failure to use the tools that are available to it on sanctions. We call on it to apply those tools more effectively.
