Debates of May 29th, 2024

(Return tabled)

Question No.2539—

[Gerald Soroka, Conservative, Yellowhead, AB]

With regard to the Public Health Agency of Canada's procurement of ventilators from Canadian Emergency Ventilators Inc. in April 2020, and the subsequent sale of many of these ventilators as commodity code "9500 - Scrap metal" through the GC Surplus auction: (a) why were the ventilators classified and sold as scrap metal; (b) did the government offer these ventilators to the (i) provincial health authorities, (ii) National Emergency Strategic Stockpile, (iii) Department of National Defence, (iv) International Development section of Global Affairs Canada; (c) for each entity in (b) that received an offer, what reason was received by the government for the entity not accepting the ventilators; (d) for each entity in (b) that did not receive an offer, why did the government not offer the ventilators to them; (e) for the ventilators that have been disposed of to date, through either GC Surplus or other means, who was the recipient of the ventilators, what quantity did each recipient receive, and how much payment did the government receive; (f) have any of these ventilators ended up in private or for-profit health care entities, either in Canada or abroad, and, if so, what are the details; and (g) if the government does not know the answer to (f), why does the government not have that information?

(Return tabled)

Question No.2541—

[Dan Albas, Conservative, Central Okanagan—Similkameen—Nicola, BC]

With regard to the granting of government security clearances between January 1, 2023, and April 1, 2024: (a) how many individuals (i) applied for, (ii) were denied (not as a result of retirement or resignation), security clearances; (b) of the denials in (a), how many were due to the individual spying or otherwise acting on behalf of a foreign government; and (c) what is the breakdown of (a) and (b) by department, agency, Crown corporation, or other government entity and level of clearance applied (secret or top secret)?

(Return tabled)

Question No.2542—

[Tracy Gray, Conservative, Kelowna—Lake Country, BC]

With regard to the Canada Digital Adoption Program: (a) how many of the 29,532 businesses which applied to the Boost Your Business Technology Stream were successful and received funding; (b) what was the total amount of funding given to businesses through the Boost Your Business Technology Stream; (c) what is the breakdown of the $13 million provided in the contribution agreement with Magnet for project implementation and administrative costs; (d) what are the details of third-party contractors who received money from the $13 million, including, for each, (i) their name, (ii) the amount received, (iii) the goods or services provided; (e) what are the names of all third-party contractors who received funding through this project implementation and administrative cost stream; (f) what were the amounts paid to each third-party contractor who received funding through this project implementation and administrative cost stream; (g) what were the work descriptions of each third-party contractor who received funding through this project implementation and administrative cost stream; (h) what is the breakdown by school of the 1,954 students who were hired as of December 31, 2023, as E-commerce Advisors; (i) what is the breakdown of the advertising used to advertise these positions; (j) what were the work descriptions of these positions; (k) what is the breakdown by school of the 1,255 youth who were hired to support participating Canadian small and medium enterprises in the implementation of their digital adoption plans; (l) what is the breakdown of the advertising used to advertise these positions; (m) what were the work descriptions of these positions; (n) how many E-commerce Advisors and youths who were hired to support businesses with the implementation of their digital adoption plans were the same person; and (o) what is the breakdown by school of these individuals?

(Return tabled)

Question No.2543—

[Tracy Gray, Conservative, Kelowna—Lake Country, BC]

With regard to travel expenses related to the Benefits Delivery Modernization Programme, since January 1, 2017: (a) what is the total number of travel expenses filed; (b) what is the total cost of travel expenses filed; (c) what is the cost of travel expenses filed by public servants; (d) what is the cost of travel expenses filed by third-party contractors; (e) what is the cost of flights expensed by public servants; (f) what is the cost of lodgings expensed by public servants; (g) what is the cost of per diems expensed by public servants; (h) what is the cost of flights expensed by third-party contractors; (i) what is the cost of lodgings expensed by third-party contractors; (j) what is the cost of per diems expensed by third-party contractors; and (k) what is the breakdown of (a) to (j) by month and by quarter?

(Return tabled)

Question No.2545—

[Kirsty Duncan, Liberal, Etobicoke North, ON]

With regard to cancer in Canada: (a) what are the top 10 cancers annually since 2010, broken down by province and territory, and, for each cancer, what is the (i) morbidity rate, (ii) mortality rate, (iii) five-year net survival rate; (b) how do the rates in (a)(i), (a)(ii), (a)(iii) compare to the United States; (c) for the rates in (a)(i) and (a)(ii), what is the (i) number of people affected, (ii) cost to the health care system, (iii) total investment compared to the United States; (d) are there any types of cancer on the rise in Canada, and, if so, what are they, broken down by province and territory; (e) what percentage of new patients are offered a diagnostic molecular test in Canada; (f) what percentage of patients are offered a clinical trial in Canada; (g) what percentage of patients are enrolled in a clinical trial in Canada; (h) how many clinical trials have been initiated in Canada annually since 2010; (i) what cancer prevention programs, by cancer type, are funded by the government; (j) how much has the government invested since 2010 in the top 10 cancers, broken down by (i) cancer diagnosis, (ii) treatment, (iii) research, (iv) prevention, (v) federal transfers, and the specific amount, (vi) direct investment in cancer programs, and the specific amount, (vii) research funding, and how does the total investment compare to the United States;

(k) how much has the government annually invested since 2010 in pediatric cancer, broken down by (i) diagnosis, (ii) treatment, (iii) research, (iv) prevention, (v) federal transfers, and the specific amount, (vi) direct investment in cancer programs, and the specific amount, (vii) research funding, and how does the total investment compare to the United States; (l) how much has the government invested since 2010 in rare cancer, broken down by (i) diagnosis, (ii) treatment, (iii) research, (iv) prevention, (v) federal transfers, and the specific amount, (vi) direct investment in cancer programs, and the specific amount, (vii) research funding, and how does the total investment compare to the United States; (m) does the Scientific Advisory Committee on Oncology Therapies still exist, and, if so, (i) what is its membership, (ii) when did it last meet, (iii) what was on the agenda of all meetings since 2019; (n) what is the average approval time for phased clinical trials for the top 10 cancers in Canada, broken down by (i) phase I clinical trials, (ii) phase II clinical trials, (iii) phase III clinical trials, (iv) phase IV clinical trials, and how do the approval times in (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) compare to the United States; (o) what percentage of Canadian children undergoing cancer treatment have access to a clinical trial; (p) what is the average approval time for phased clinical trials for rare cancers in Canada, broken down by (i) phase I clinical trials, (ii) phase II clinical trials, (iii) phase III clinical trials, (iv) phase IV clinical trials, and how do the approval times in (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) compare to the United States;

(q) how many new cancer treatments has Health Canada (HC) approved since 2010 and what percentage have been precision treatments; (r) what are all cancer drugs approved in Canada, and the dates of approval since 2010, broken down by the (i) date the drug was approved in the United States, (ii) provinces and territories where the drug is available, (iii) provinces and territories covering the entire drug cost, (iv) provinces and territories requiring patient payment, (v) additional cost per treatment; (s) how many new cancer treatments has HC approved since 2010 for the top 10 cancers, what percentage have been precision treatments and how do the approval rates and times compare to those in the United States; (t) how many new pediatric cancer treatments has HC approved since 2010 and what percentage have been precision treatments; (u) how many new rare cancer treatments has HC approved since 2010 and what percentage have been precision treatments; (v) on what date was the special access program for drugs first put in place, (i) how many applications have been made for chemotherapy drugs since its creation, (ii) how many times have approvals been made for chemotherapy drugs since its creation, (iii) what is the average approval wait time for a chemotherapy drug, (iv) is there a process for re-application, and, if so, what is the average approval time for re-application of a chemotherapy drug;

(w) what are the top 10 pediatric cancers since 2010 annually, broken down by province and territory, and, for each cancer, what is the (i) morbidity rate, (ii) mortality rate, (iii) five-year survival rate by stage, (iv) cost to the healthcare system; (x) for each rate in (w)(i) and (ii), what is the number of people affected; (y) what is the list of all rare cancers in Canada, how many people are affected by rare cancers, and what investments has the government made in their research; (z) what is the process for a clinician to access off-label chemotherapy options for a patient with a rare cancer, including (i) the average approval time, (ii) the re-approval process, and, if any, the average re-approval wait time, (iii) the approval success rate for application, (iv) if relevant, the approval success rate for re-application, (v) the approval success rate when a drug is already approved for use in another country; (aa) what is the average time to diagnosis for each of the (i) top 10 cancers, (ii) pediatric cancers, (iii) rare cancers, and what is the average cancer stage at diagnosis and the cost to the healthcare system, since 2010, broken down by province and territory; (bb) what was the average time to diagnosis for each of the (i) top 10 cancers, (ii) pediatric cancers, (iii) rare cancers, and what is the average cancer stage at diagnosis and the cost to the healthcare system, broken down by province and territory, and annually from 2019 to 2023;

(cc) how many people had to seek diagnosis outside of Canada due to either wait time or lack of diagnostic technology or procedure, and what was the cost to the healthcare system, broken down by province and territory annually since 2010; (dd) how many people had to seek treatment outside of Canada due to either wait time or lack of treatment that was available elsewhere, and what was the cost to the healthcare system, broken down by province and territory annually since 2010; (ee) how many people could not get a recommended chemotherapy because (i) they did not have health insurance, (ii) their health coverage did not cover a chemotherapy drug, (iii) their insurance covered only part of the drug cost, broken down by province and territory; (ff) broken down by province and territory, how many times has the federal special access program been accessed since its inception, (i) how many approvals have been made since its inception, (ii) what is the average approval time, (iii) is there a process for re-application, and, if so, what is the average approval time for re-application; (gg) what has each government invested in cancer treatment since 2010, broken down by province and territory; and (hh) how much has the Canadian Institutes of Health Research invested annually in cancer research since 2010, and specifically what has been invested in (i) the top 10 cancers, (ii) pediatric cancers, (iii) rare cancers, and how does this annual total investment compare to the United States?

(Return tabled)

Questions Passed as Orders for Returns

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Winnipeg North, MB]

Mr. Speaker, I would ask that all remaining questions be allowed to stand.

[The Deputy Speaker, Conservative, Chris d'Entremont]

Is that agreed?

[Some hon. members]

Agreed.

Motions for Papers

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, I would ask that all notices of motions for the production of papers be allowed to stand.

[The Deputy Speaker, Conservative, Chris d'Entremont]

Is that agreed?

[Some hon. members]

Agreed.

Countering Foreign Interference Act

[Dominic LeBlanc, Liberal, Minister of Public Safety]

moved that Bill C‑70, An Act respecting countering foreign interference, be read the second time and referred to a committee.

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to have the opportunity to rise in the House today to speak to Bill C‑70, which will enable the government to take other measures against the growing threat of foreign interference.

The countering foreign interference act will strengthen the government's ability to detect and disrupt foreign interference and to better protect all Canadians against the threats posed by hostile states. As an open and free democracy, Canada has long been the target of hostile states that are seeking to obtain Canadian intelligence to defend or advance their own interests. Foreign interference is a deliberate attempt to undermine the fundamental values and freedoms that we cherish as Canadians and that are at the very core of our free and open society. By so doing, hostile states seek to promote their national interests to the detriment of our own.

Today, foreign interference poses one of the most important threats to our Canadian way of life, our economic prosperity, our national security and our sovereignty. As stated by the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, “foreign interference threatens the fundamental values of our country” and our national security.

Over the years, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service has observed and investigated multiple instances of foreign states targeting Canada and Canadian interests. We know that foreign states target our country using any means possible. This includes, of course, human intelligence operations, state-sponsored or foreign-influenced media and sophisticated cyber-attacks to name just a few. These hostile actors also engage in other activities, such as spreading misinformation and disinformation to undermine public confidence in public institutions, in mainstream media or in electoral processes. How do they accomplish this? They do so by cultivating witting or, in some cases, unwitting individuals to assist them. This not only helps to achieve their aims, but also enables foreign states to operate with plausible deniability on Canadian soil.

We have also heard this recently at the public hearings of the Hogue commission, the Foreign Interference Commission, which was set up with the support of all recognized parties in the House. We heard from witnesses that some foreign state actors monitor, intimidate and harass diaspora communities in Canada. They attempt to silence dissidents and to promote narratives that are favourable to their own autocratic regimes. Members from diaspora communities testified that either they have directly experienced, or they know others who have experienced, the effects of foreign interference. This includes threats to them or to their families back home.

While traditional interference in human intelligence operations remains the greatest danger to Canada, interference through hostile cyber activities is of growing concern.

Thanks to the work of the security and intelligence community, we know that an increasing number of states have built and deployed programs dedicated to online influence as part of their day-to-day operations. For example, the 2022 CSIS public report indicates that foreign states “exploit social media to influence their intended targets. For example, state actors leverage it as a means to spread disinformation, divide public opinion and generally interfere in healthy public debate and [public] discourse.”

Some foreign states are using these malicious activities to try and delegitimize the concept of democracy and other values that may run counter to their own ideological views.

These are fundamental values that we hold dear as Canadians and, of course, as parliamentarians.

Through their various attempts to influence Canadian elections and opinions, these hostile states seek to bias our policy development and our decision-making. In so doing, they also seek to divide Canadians and to sow discord in Canadian society. As parliamentarians, we all know that we are vulnerable to these very attempts as well.

As we have heard during many debates in the House on this topic, foreign interference is a non-partisan issue that is of deep concern to all parliamentarians. Indeed, foreign interference is a cross-cutting issue for all members of the House, not simply as parliamentarians, but as Canadians, and I want to thank the many colleagues in the House who have worked with me and who have talked to me about how we can collaborate, not only on this legislation, I hope, but on other issues as well that would strengthen our democracy and the ability of our security and intelligence agencies to protect Canadians.

These activities threaten the integrity of our political systems, democratic processes and social cohesion. While the threat of foreign interference is not new, these activities have increased in recent years, and as we know, all too well, they continue to grow. The former national security and intelligence adviser to the Prime Minister, Jody Thomas, said, “We cannot paint an overly optimistic picture. Things change. Tools and methods change. Our adversaries adapt quickly and find innovative ways to interfere in our affairs”.

With a quickly changing landscape, we must ensure that Canada is in a position to keep up with those who wish us harm, and we must ensure that we can hold accountable those individuals who threaten Canada, our national security or Canadian sovereignty.

All the examples I have given today show that this is a matter of the utmost urgency.

For all these reasons, I am pleased to rise to speak to Bill C‑70, an act respecting countering foreign interference for the first time. This new legislation will enable us to further strengthen Canada's tool kit against foreign interference. Combatting this threat while defending Canada's interests, values and principles is a top priority for our government and, I believe, for all parliamentarians. Transparency is a top priority in our government's approach to combatting foreign interference.

To further increase transparency, this legislation would create a foreign influence transparency registry. Through this registry, all individuals or entities who enter into an arrangement with a foreign principle and who undertake activities to influence a government or political process in Canada would be required to publicly register these activities. By registering, individuals and entities would be more transparent about their connections to foreign states, and this would obviously support Canada's national security objectives.

The goal of a foreign registry would be to promote transparency from all people who advocate on behalf of a foreign government or entity as well as accountability from those who would seek to do so in a non-transparent or clandestine way. Under Bill C-70, the government proposes to have Canada's registry overseen by an independent foreign influence transparency commissioner. This commissioner would be responsible for independently administering and promoting compliance with the act.

Foreign interference is a complex national security threat that requires a multi-faceted response.

We recognize that the registry is just one more tool to help Canada adopt an approach to combat this interference. A foreign influence registry would build on our government's long-standing and ongoing efforts to protect our democratic institutions from this threat.

CSIS continues to investigate threats and to advise the government on appropriate actions. Many members here today have benefited from briefings from CSIS officials, which continue to be held with different caucuses, both in this place and in the Senate. These briefings are delivered to all parties at the federal level, and we are working with provincial and municipal orders of government to ensure that the best practices and defensive postures can also be adopted by these legislators as well. The RCMP continues to play an important and effective role in investigating criminal offences related to foreign interference, including those targeting democratic institutions.

To equip CSIS to combat emerging global threats and to keep pace with technological developments, further investments in intelligence capabilities and infrastructure are also being made. Budget 2024 proposes to provide $655 million over eight years, and $114 million ongoing, to CSIS to enhance its intelligence capabilities. The previous year's budget, budget 2023, also provided almost $50 million to the RCMP to protect Canadians from harassment and intimidation by foreign actors, to increase its investigative capacity and to co-operate more proactively with communities that are obviously at the risk of being targeted.

I have a lot of confidence in the work that the RCMP and CSIS do with their partners across the country, but I think we can all do more to continue to support these brave women and men who serve our country in this important way. We have also made investments of $5.5 million to build capacity in civil society partners to prevent disinformation, to promote democratic resilience and to raise awareness about foreign interference.

Bill C-70 is the result of consultations with Canadians. Obviously, that includes community organizations, diaspora communities, academics, the private sector, indigenous governments and provincial and territorial stakeholders.

One of the key themes emerging from these consultations was that a registry is no panacea. It has to combine other initiatives that strengthen Canada's response to foreign interference.

For example, targeted amendments to the CSIS Act would better equip the Government of Canada to build resilience and to counter modern threats that Canada and Canadians face. The CSIS Act was enacted in 1984 at a time when the prolific use and the expansion of technology may have meant someone had two fax machines: one for incoming faxes and one to send faxes. Today, digital technologies are part of every aspect of our lives and the critical infrastructure of our country. CSIS must be able to operate in a digital world that is constantly and rapidly changing.

This legislation would also increase CSIS's ability to be more agile and effective in investigations by introducing tailored warrants for specific investigative techniques. It would also enhance CSIS's capacity to collect and to use datasets. Among other changes, it would enable a broader disclosure of CSIS information to key partners outside the Government of Canada. With the appropriate safeguards, this information would help our partners, provincial governments, universities and the private sector to build resilience to emerging national security threats.

It is important to underscore that these legislative amendments would continue to respect Canadians' fundamental rights and freedoms, with strong review, oversight and transparency measures still in place and unchanged. Judicial oversight remains unchanged, including for all new authorities that we are asking Parliament to consider. These proposals have been developed while also considering the high expectation of privacy that the people of Canada properly have, including respecting all of their protections under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians also play an important role in the activities of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. Some activities, like dataset collection and retention, are subject to review and approval by the intelligence commissioner as well.

While Canada may be no stranger to foreign interference, Canadians can rest assured that our government is using every tool at its disposal at every opportunity to protect them.

The government remains committed to enhancing a whole-of-society resilience against malicious foreign interference and hostile foreign state actors. We will do so through continued transparency and by upholding the confidence of Canadians in our democratic institutions.

This is, I hope, a moment when the House and our colleagues in the other place can come together to work in a non-partisan, constructive way to reinforce the legislative instruments that the national security agency should have to properly protect the national security of Canadians and to detect, disrupt and defeat attempts at foreign interference.

We think that the legislation would benefit from, obviously, the study in a committee of the House and in the other place. I have said to colleagues on both sides of the aisle here who have talked to me that we would work collaboratively with colleagues in terms of amendments that might strengthen the legislation. Canadians, I think, are expecting us to act in the national interest. It is certainly our intention to work in an collaborative way with all parties in the House and our colleagues in the other place to see whether we can take a significant step forward in terms of modernizing the legislative tool kit to counter foreign interference.

We are moving forward with clear hindsight and a clear-eyed view of the road ahead. I look forward to the debate in the House and the discussion in committee. I look forward to working, obviously, with all those who are interested, in a constructive and positive way, so that we can reinforce national security institutions.

I will conclude by saying that it has been, for me, as the public safety minister, an extraordinary privilege to see the remarkable work done by the women and men who currently serve in CSIS, who work for the RCMP, who work at the public safety department and who work at the border services agency. These are agencies that are focused on national security and the security of Canadians.

They are doing very effective work to detect and disrupt foreign interference. They have worked with our government and will be happy to work with parliamentarians, of course, if there are ways that we can modernize and strengthen the legislative instruments that govern their important work. I think that today's discussion is an important start of that process.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Mr. Speaker, part 2 of the bill would amend the Criminal Code to broaden the scope of the sabotage offence to include essential infrastructure such as transportation, information and telecommunication technology, water and waste water, energy, utilities, health care, food supply, government operations and financial infrastructure.

My simple question for the minister is this: Does the definition of essential infrastructure include, in his view, the construction of essential infrastructure?

[Dominic LeBlanc, Liberal, Beauséjour, NB]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for focusing on what we think is also an important element, strengthening the Criminal Code provisions, as he properly noted, around sabotage. We are obviously conscious of the fact that with respect to lawful and peaceful protests, there has to be an intent to harm as part of the criminal amendment we are suggesting.

From my perspective, if the attempt in the particular amendment is to strengthen protections for critical infrastructure, the building of that critical infrastructure, which is always a source of concern for national security institutions, should also properly be protected. I would be happy to work with the committee, should this legislation make it to committee, to find the right way to define that in the appropriate context.

[Martin Champoux, Bloc, Drummond, QC]

Mr. Speaker, the Bloc Québécois is in favour of sending Bill C‑70 to committee.

I heard the minister talk in his speech about the broad consultations with Canadians on this issue and his intention to work in a very inclusive manner with the opposition parties in the House. My colleague from Trois-Rivières introduced a similar bill to protect Quebec and Canada from foreign interference. There are two things that I feel are particularly important and should be included in Bill C‑70.

One of them is that public office holders should not be allowed to work for a foreign government after they leave office, especially if their new job is to influence decision-makers on site. I wonder why that is not in the current bill.

The other thing we feel is very important and would be very interesting to debate in committee is two-party registration. Foreign agents must disclose their contact with public office holders in Canada. Should Canadian public office holders not also have to disclose their contact and relationships with foreign agents in the course of their duties?

I would like to hear the minister's opinion as to whether there are any amendments he would be open to supporting if the bill goes to committee.

[Dominic LeBlanc, Liberal, Beauséjour, NB]

Mr. Speaker, I thank the member for Drummond, and I commend him and our Bloc Québécois colleagues for being open to working with the government to send the bill to committee so that we can look into exactly the kinds of issues that my colleague raised. Obviously, we took note of the bill introduced by our colleague from Trois-Rivières.

It seems perfectly reasonable to me to find a way to ensure that public office holders abide by the requirements set out in the Values and Ethics Code for the Public Sector and the Conflict of Interest Act after they leave office. We need to look at whether we can expand on that and cover working for foreign states.

However, it is important to note that many current public office holders, as part of their official duties, have completely appropriate relationships with the diplomatic corps, those who are accredited to Canada and who represent foreign countries.

I am no expert when it comes to finding the right balance so that foreign diplomats, who are accredited to serve their country in Canada, are able to do their work and so that government can have these types of international relationships, while increasing transparency when it comes to agents of foreign entities. I would be very open to examining this issue with our colleagues in committee at the right time. I am assuming and hoping that this bill will be sent to committee, where we can find the best way to resolve these completely appropriate issues raised by the member for Drummond.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I want to let the minister know that the NDP will be supporting the bill at second reading. In fact, the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security unanimously agreed to start a prestudy of the bill tomorrow morning because we do want to get important work under way.

I want to note a couple of things. First, the amendments to the CSIS Act, especially with respect to the dataset regime, follow a fairly scathing National Security and Intelligence Review Agency report that had found that CSIS had repeatedly breached the statutory authorities given to it with respect to handling datasets. Therefore, again, it is good to see legislation bringing analog laws up to speed in a digital age.

Second, I totally agree that foreign interference is very real. In fact, it has affected members of our caucus. That is publicly known and is something that we have to watch out for not only at the federal level but also at the provincial level and, indeed, at the municipal and indigenous levels.

Creating a registry is one thing, but I can only surmise that in Canada, as elsewhere in the world, there are serious clandestine efforts under way to do this kind of interference. I know that the actors are not going to be paying attention to a registry. Under existing laws, what success has Canada had, both in terms of charges and convictions against actors who are going to completely ignore this type of registry? We want to make sure that we are being effective on the whole spectrum of dealing with the problem.

[Dominic LeBlanc, Liberal, Beauséjour, NB]

Mr. Speaker, I salute the committee's decision to do a prestudy. We think that is very positive and will help our colleagues on the committee be able to judge what amendments are appropriate and how to deal with what is a series of complex legislative amendments.

I certainly share the concern of our colleague from the NDP around the appropriate handling of the datasets to move a national security institution from an analog era to a digital era. That obviously comes with the required and appropriate safeguards that need to be increased. They need to be understood and applied by CSIS at all times. I am happy to work with the service and with colleagues in this place to make sure the understandable concern around the appropriate handling of the data, and the privacy rights of Canadians in particular, is respected.

I am glad the member acknowledged that members of the House from all caucuses have themselves been targeted or affected by foreign interference, and it is a source of concern for every member of the House.

I also note his question around clandestine work. It goes without saying that some people are prepared to take injurious actions against the national security of our country. Some of the briefings I have from CSIS officials give me perhaps a unique perspective, or a perspective that not many people can have, about the nature of the threat some of the hostile state actors present to the security of our country. Therefore, I take his comments around their desire to comply with a registry with the seriousness in which he made them. The committee may have reflections on how the penalties might be strengthened. We think they are significant and severe, but we, again, will work with parliamentarians in this regard.

The member's comments around how we disrupt and ultimately prosecute some of the very hostile, threatening actors who may be operating in Canada today are ones every government has struggled with. The ability to take intelligence information and turn it into evidence in a criminal trial is something Five Eyes partners struggle with. I have had those conversations with our colleagues from the Five Eyes community.

We are always looking at ways the RCMP, which would have the investigative authority in terms of criminal activity in Canada, is able to work with its partners. However, often the very intelligence information CSIS would get from partners comes with caveats; therefore, the ability to turn it into a criminal prosecution remains a challenge, but we are very much focused on what we can do in that regard as well.

[The Deputy Speaker, Conservative, Chris d'Entremont]

It is my duty pursuant to Standing Order 38 to inform the House that the questions to be raised tonight at the time of adjournment are as follows: the hon. member for Lanark—Frontenac—Kingston, Correctional Service of Canada; the hon. member for Spadina—Fort York, Diversity and Inclusion; the hon. member for Victoria, Oil and Gas Industry.