Mr. Speaker, speaking of misleading, I rise with respect to the notice that I provided to you under Standing Order 48, concerning the statements that the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources made in a committee of the whole on Wednesday evening.
In brief, the minister repeatedly denied, when questioned, that politicians would be empowered to pick projects of national interest under the Liberal government's project development legislation that is now before Parliament. However, that is the very essence of what Bill C-5 proposes to empower the government to do. As we know, it is a contempt to mislead the House of Commons or any of its committees deliberately.
I will therefore argue that the minister misled the committee of the whole, giving rise to a prima facie contempt. First, the minister's statements during the committee of the whole on Wednesday evening flatly contradict Bill C-5 itself.
I asked the minister, “how do political, hand-picked projects give investors certainty?” The minister replied, “the politicians do not pick the projects.”
I asked again, soon after, for clarity, “the minister said earlier, and kept trying to claim, that he does not approve projects, but his own bill says he does. Is that not true?” The minister answered, “I think what we said is that we do not pick the projects.”
These responses were clear and direct. They were answers to very specific questions about whether the minister himself would select projects deemed to be in the national interest through Bill C-5, and the legislation shows that he would.
Bill C-5 would explicitly give the minister the authority to approve or deny projects. This authority appears in several key provisions of the bill.
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requires the minister who is designated under that Act to issue to the proponent of a project, if certain conditions are met, a document that sets out conditions that apply in respect of the project and that is deemed to be the authorizations, required under certain Acts of Parliament and regulations, that are specified in the document.
Further, clause 5(1) of the bill grants the Governor in Council and cabinet the authority to designate projects as being in the national interest, but only on the recommendation of the minister. It states:
If the Governor in Council is of the opinion that a project is in the national interest, the Governor in Council may, on the recommendation of the Minister, by order, amend Schedule 1 to add the name of the project and a brief description of it, including the location where it is to be carried out.
The minister also holds the authority to remove projects from schedule 1. That power is set out in the deletion clause:
If the Governor in Council is of the opinion that a project named in Schedule 1 is no longer in the national interest, the Governor in Council may, on the recommendation of the Minister, by order, amend that Schedule to delete the name and the description of the project.
These provisions, directly from Bill C-5, make it absolutely clear that the minister and the Governor in Council do pick the projects. That is the fundamental mechanism of the bill.
House of Commons Procedure and Practice, third edition, on page 82, provides a list of established grounds for contempt, including “deliberately attempting to mislead the House or a committee (by way of statement, evidence, or petition)”. This point is reiterated at page 112.
The importance of accurate information being provided to Parliament has been underscored in a number of rulings, including that made by one of your predecessors on March 3, 2014, at page 3430 of the Debates:
This incident highlights the primordial importance of accuracy and truthfulness in our deliberations. All members bear a responsibility, individually and collectively, to select the words they use very carefully and to be ever mindful of the serious consequences that can result when this responsibility is forgotten.
Speaker Milliken shared a similar view in a ruling on February 1, 2002, on page 8581 of the Debates, when he said, “The authorities are consistent about the need for clarity in our proceedings and about the need to ensure the integrity of the information provided by the government to the House.”
There is a well-established test for determining whether deliberately misleading information has been provided, which, for example, the Speaker explained in his February 15, 2024, ruling, at page 21146 of the Debates: “It must be proven that the statement was misleading; it must be established that, when making a statement, the member knew it to be incorrect; and finally, it must be demonstrated that the member intended to mislead the House.”
In the circumstances, I would respectfully submit that all three branches of this test can be made out. First, the content of Bill C-5, which I cited earlier, plainly contradicts the minister's answers.
Second, the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources has been held up by the Liberal government ever since the spring's election as the man who is supposed to get major resource projects launched. There can be no way that he is not intimately familiar with the details of Bill C-5, the policy for which it stands and the government's intentions for how to put it into effect.
Third, we must recall the context of the minister's answers. He was intensely questioned on the floor of the House of Commons for four hours, on the Liberals' terrible record over the last 10 years in the resource sector and trying to defend and spin his Prime Minister's signature bill, which had already been attracting a significant degree of scrutiny from all corners.
In any event, intention is not something that, I would respectfully submit, requires ironclad proof like a confession. Indeed, the procedure and House affairs committee, at paragraph 15 of its 50th report, presented in March 2002, acknowledges that intention may well be a matter for committee investigation:
As [then clerk of the House] Mr. Corbett explained to the Committee, it is not uncommon for inaccurate statements to be made in the course of debate or Question Period in the House. The issue is whether the statements were made deliberately, with the intent of misleading the House or its Members. In the case where a Member later admits to having knowingly provided false information – as in the Profumo case – the issue of intent is clear. In the absence of such an admission, however, it rests with the Committee to examine all of the circumstances and determine whether the evidence demonstrates an intention to mislead.
Finally, there is just one further procedural point I should add. Generally speaking, questions of privilege that arise in a committee setting are supposed to come before the House only by way of a report from the committee first, but the nature of committees of the whole, which are single-event bodies, complicates the ability to raise concerns that arise out of their deliberations.
You will recall that in the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, the House frequently sat in committees of the whole. A similar question of privilege arose, on which Speaker Rota addressed this procedural angle in his July 22, 2020, ruling, at page 2701 of the Debates, “I accept that the particular circumstances of this situation, notably the challenge surrounding the committee of the whole format, do make it appropriate to bring the matter to the Speaker.”
In conclusion, I would submit that the necessary thresholds have been met here, allowing for you to make a prima facie finding. Should you agree, in order to allow for the error to be fully and properly cleared and to ensure appropriate respect for the overarching importance of government accountability to Parliament, to all of us who represent the people, I intend to propose referring the matter to the procedure and House affairs committee for further consideration.