Mr. Speaker, it is a pleasure for me rise tonight to be part of this very important debate. I lend my qualified support for the international action to end the suffering in this region of Kosovo.
Canada has a very undeniable obligation to its allies, NATO allies in particular. We also have a proud history of international engagement and involvement in supporting our allies as well as those who may be in regions of severe conflict and suffering.
If the alliance decides to take military action I do not believe Canada can step aside. We certainly have a moral obligation to take action against ethnic cleansing. There has unfortunately been quite a history in that region of such terrifying conflict and Canada has always played a role, sometimes a minor role but we have been there. We have that moral obligation to take action against the systematic murder and torture of innocent civilians.
There is no doubt that the international community must not stand idly by while Serbian forces commit flagrant human rights atrocities against Kosovars. Ultimately we must support our allies. Canada cannot shirk its responsibility in this regard.
Nevertheless, quite frankly there are some serious questions concerning possible military action which give us cause for serious concern. We have a duty to ask these questions because we have an obligation to the Canadian troops whose lives will be put on the line.
These are the questions. Have all diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis failed? What are the dangers and possible implications of military action? Is there true multinational support for this mission? Is there a workable plan for military action? What precisely is Canada's role to be? Is the role realistic in terms of Canada's military capability? Who will command the Canadian troops?
I will now go through these questions and maybe put a little of meat to them. Have diplomatic efforts failed? We will see but the answer to date appears to be yes, they have. The Serbs have dragged their feet in agreeing to all the terms of UN security council resolution 1199 passed on September 23. History has certainly shown that the threat of massive military action has frequently been the very thing that brings aggressors to the bargaining table. I think we can all hope this will be a similar case.
However, at the same time, we cannot be certain the Serbs will comply. Serbia has a deep historic attachment, however misguided it may be, to the Kosovo territory. It was in Kosovo that the Serbs lost their independence to the Turks in 1389. Given their attachment to Kosovo, the Serbs may not roll over if they just face a few pinprick air strikes. The sobering fact is that they may well be in for a long and possibly difficult struggle.
With regard to the second question, there are obviously deep concerns that fighting in Kosovo could escalate into the neighbouring countries. Kosovo is a pivotal territory and it has always been seen as a linchpin for both stability and instability in the Balkans. NATO must make every effort to ensure that war does not spread beyond the borders of Yugoslavia to engulf neighbouring states.
We must be prepared for the fact that the Serbs may make an effort to escalate the war. In other words, we should be looking at the worst case scenario. Perhaps they will attack NATO troops, including Canadians serving in Bosnia. NATO has to be prepared for that eventuality.
The answer to the third question appears to be clear. The very fact that this will be a NATO sanctioned operation implies that it will have multinational support. Nevertheless, on October 5 the European Union's Council of Ministers failed to agree to use rapid force in Kosovo. Obviously some concerns remain among the European members of the alliance.
Is there a workable plan for military action? I believe that this is absolutely the most fundamental question which remains largely unanswered and the reason I put the question to the government side, specifically to the member for Scarborough—Rouge River. Granted, the member may not have been briefed on that. Maybe there is a plan, but Canadians should know. We are possibly sending Canadian troops into an area of conflict. Why should Canadians not know exactly what is going to happen?
United States senate majority leader Trent Lott stated that he was shaken after the Clinton administration briefed Congress on its plans last week. He said “There is no real plan on how to carry this out” and “There is no plan B if that should go wrong”.
Does the plan, if any, entail only air strikes or does it include ground troops? If ground troops are required, then we had better brace ourselves for a much larger number of casualties. Would ground troops be necessary as part of a subsequent peace enforcement operation? How long would they be there? Will the UN Security Council approve the action?
If the six to ten Canadian CF-18s already stationed at Aviano are to be involved, are they the same aircraft which were recently upgraded to carry precision guided munitions, or are they a mixture of upgraded and non-upgraded aircraft? Are they compatible with the system that is in force right now under the Americans and the British? Our planes are moving back and forth. Are all of them upgraded to the point where they can fit into the program that is already there?
A myriad of questions remain unanswered. Does the government know the answer to any of these questions? I have not heard much debate in that regard. The debate has been more philosophical.
Preparation is essential. Has the government asked NATO what will be required? It is impossible to address the question of whether or not our military has the capability of doing this job given that we do not know the job they are going to be doing. If ground troops are sent in, how will they get there? How many ground troops can we send? The Canadian army is already stretched to the limit.
Despite the claim made in the government's 1994 white paper on defence, we cannot send a combat capable brigade overseas. All we can send is a smaller battalion group force. Even that would be a severe strain on our capabilities given the present task. What equipment do they have? I could give a list of what equipment we do not have, but what equipment do we have to send over there that will support our troops?
A number of questions remain unanswered, but in conclusion we must ultimately support the alliance and support our troops once committed. We must however be clear and realistic about Canada's role. That should be spelled out in the House and spelled out to the people of Canada.
We must not send our troops anywhere without reflecting on the practical implications of the mission. We must support our allies, but we must also support our troops.