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Crucial Fact

  • Her favourite word was offences.

Last in Parliament September 2008, as Liberal MP for London West (Ontario)

Lost her last election, in 2008, with 35% of the vote.

Statements in the House

Points of Order November 3rd, 2006

Mr. Speaker, I rise on a point of order. Yesterday the Minister of Public Safety, in response to a question, implied that the Liberal Party did not support the age of consent legislation that was announced. I am sure he needs the opportunity not to misdirect this House in what he said yesterday and to correct the record because he knows that is part of the Liberal justice plan.

Public Safety November 3rd, 2006

Mr. Speaker, apparently being a Conservative means never having to say, “I am sorry”.

First the government told us that arming border guards would cost $100 million. Now the department is telling us that it will cost $1 billion to fund this poorly conceived campaign promise.

Could the minister tell the House who has their facts wrong, the minister himself or his departmental officials?

Public Safety November 3rd, 2006

Mr. Speaker, it is becoming increasingly clear that during the last election the Conservative Party was willing to say anything to anyone to get a vote.

Yesterday, before the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, department officials exposed the minister by admitting that it will cost $1 billion to follow through on his plan to arm border guards.

Will the minister admit that he made a mistake during the campaign and take the advice of the RCMP Commissioner who said that arming border guards was “not the optimum answer”?

Criminal Code November 1st, 2006

Mr. Speaker, I think the stats that the member has given are accurate. I regret that so much of what we are getting as justice legislation is based not on the evidentiary research that we know is there, but on anecdote and the ideology--

Criminal Code November 1st, 2006

If the member needs to be told, Mr. Speaker, the government's street racing bill went through less than an hour ago on a fast track that we initiated.

The Halloween example was probably not the best example I could have given. I will say publicly that I did not mean to demean anybody. I apologize to any Canadian who took offence by my giving the Halloween example. I really do apologize because I did not mean to cause any offence.

I was trying to impart that when people are given conditional sentences, it does not mean that they have the freedom to leave their homes. They can only go where the court dictates. They are allowed to go to their place of employment or to a church, but really very little else. I was trying to get the fact across that there are consequences to the children and other family members in the home. I was not trying to be disrespectful to anybody. There was a B and E at my house and I know how it feels.

I do want to make the serious point that this is just one of the tools and I do not think in every case we have to take it away. If the government had come forward last year with a bill that looked more like the amendment that we received a couple of hours ago, we probably could have worked through that, but it just stonewalled and would not consult with the opposition. It would not accept any amendments, even when we told the government upfront what we were talking about. The way the government chose to take the bill to committee made it very difficult to work through amendment procedures. I even have questions of how the government managed to get the list in, but I will take that up with the people who legally advised us at a later date.

It is important that the House realize that the sentencing principles in the Criminal Code have to be lived up to. If the government had removed the sentencing principles about the various areas of section 718, it would be a different matter, but it did not do that even in its bill. Proportionality has to be respected. The person who measures that proportionality is the judge at the sentencing.

Criminal Code November 1st, 2006

Mr. Speaker, we are trying to be smart with our justice policy. We have offered to fast track seven of the minority Conservative government's 11 justice bills. No one can tell me that we are not trying to cooperate. We have and will cooperate wherever we can. One justice bill went through today.

Criminal Code November 1st, 2006

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate that because I would like to be able to get some time at my committee this afternoon to listen to the Law Commission of Canada. However, every day we are here at the same time that we are supposed to be at committee.

In any event, last spring in my original speech in the House on Bill C-9, conditional sentencing, I spoke about the need to have some change and some narrowing in the conditional sentencing regime. Many of those people who were in the House before the House was brought down for the last election recall that Bill C-70 was a bill from the former Liberal government that used these three areas that we have, in committee, amended the bill on: serious personal injury as in section 752, the area of organized crime and terrorism offences. Each of these categories would incorporate broad numbers of areas in the Criminal Code in respect of the availability of the conditional sentence in those areas.

The only difference with this amendment, other than the one clause that was not admissible because it talked about denunciation and introduced another thought that was also inadmissible, was the fact that we still allowed the judge discretion. The opposition members in the House think it is important that the judge in the courtroom hearing the facts of the individual case and seeing the individual person before the court has the discretion to choose amongst a large tool kit of available options of sentencing, anywhere from suspended sentence to incarceration, to probation, or to conditional sentencing.

Conditional sentence, under the Supreme Court of Canada, is said to be a real sentence. Members think house arrest, as they tend to call it, is some joke, that it is a comfortable zone. Try telling that to one's kids if one is under house arrest on Halloween and cannot go out and distribute candy, or cannot go to a family reunion. The person is told he or she can go to work with very restricted conditions or perhaps for treatment for an addiction. That is when a judge will tailor the offence.

Let us take the offence of robbery. In the Criminal Code robbery has a wide range. It can have a maximum term of imprisonment, but a robbery by definition is charged under the same section of the Criminal Code, whether it is a kid stealing a bicycle worth $100 or a person robbing a bank. There is a different and wide range of possibilities. It is the judge hearing the case who will determine how serious it is.

The law on conditional sentencing and the sentencing principles currently part of the Criminal Code say it has to be proportional. It says judges have to pay attention to who is before them and the facts in the individual case. It says they should do the least amount of restraint of the individual as is necessary. However, they cannot even use a conditional sentence unless the punishment is in a provincial situation of less than two years. They cannot even use it further unless the judge has determined that the protection of the public will be there. In other words, judges have to ensure that putting them into the public domain is safe for the community. That is what conditional sentencing is about. Judges can put in many things as conditions to go along with those sentencing principles.

What has happened in this bill? I remind everyone that the minority Conservative government dealt with the bill not by sending it to committee after first reading, so that there would be a wide scope for amendment and we could work collaboratively together, which I put on the record in my first speech last spring, but it sent it after second reading. It was a one paragraph bill that had many offences in the Criminal Code covered.

There were days in the House when all parties asked the government, especially on the property offences, why are they there, why does the government have this long list of offences that are property offences and not personal injury offences or not violence offences?

It is incumbent on the government, when it wants to restrict liberty, to justify and explain to Canadians its reasons for including so many offences that would not qualify in its opinion for a conditional release.

It is true that opinions differ among the parties in the House. We see the justice system differently than the Conservative government does. We want a judge to be able to deal with the situation of a sentence of less than two years and be satisfied that an offender serving a sentence in the community would not endanger the safety of the community and would be consistent with the fundamental purposes and principles of sentencing set out in section 718 and section 718.2 of the Criminal Code of Canada.

On September 19, 2006 I asked the Minister of Justice when he appeared before the justice committee if the government would amend its own bill. I was told no. Throughout the committee process the government did not take one thing out of its bill until today, a couple of hours ago. It offered no amendments. The opposition, on the other hand, amended the bill at committee based on good evidence presented by a number of witnesses to include the terrorism, organized crime and serious personal injury offences that we discussed.

Bill C-9 was amended by the majority of committee members who listened to the evidence of Gladue courts. Gladue courts allow people on a conditional sentence, the aboriginal people in downtown Toronto who have addictions and are involved in criminal activity to support their addiction, to get treatment under a conditional sentence. We heard that evidence. Some of those people are addicted to serious drugs but they are not there because of trafficking in drugs. Trafficking is not by an individual; the organized crime section of the bill talks about three or more people being involved. They will pick those things up so that is the part not being heard.

Bill C-9 was amended by a majority of members on the committee after listening to the evidence of those people who operate diversion and treatment programs. We listened to Julian Roberts who gave the best empirical evidence on data collected. He came in from his current post in England to tell us the work he had done inside the justice department to fix this area where it needed amending, but not to the width and breadth that was there. What happened then?

We even kept in the notion that if there was a conditional sentence, it would not be available if there was a mandatory minimum. Therefore, for some of the driving charges, in the case of second and third offences, there are mandatory minimums. Conditional sentencing will not be there.

Just in case anybody thinks that the courts are running wild on some of these things, I have some numbers from Juristat.To hear the other side, one would get a conditional sentence as though it were mandatory. What happens? Let us just take a look at the total cases sentenced in 2003-04. Under impaired driving, operation causing death, there were 9,477 cases, terrible situations, and 98% did not get a conditional sentence. Under impaired operation causing bodily harm, there were 9,763 cases. Again, 98% of them did not get a conditional sentence. In other words, judges are still using their discretion.

There was a last minute change today. If the bill had been tabled last spring in the form that it is being presented here today, maybe we could have worked with it. When I ask the justice minister why he does not meet with the critics, there is no reason. It is not their way or the highway. We do have some expertise in this chamber, members who actually want to work to get things done.

The list presented today is an amalgam. It seems to have been hastily put together over the last couple of days. It has some of the sex offences, terrorism offences and organized crime offences that are already in our amendment. Some property offences have been kept and drug offences have been added. There is no available treatment for the few people in this country who might be willing to get treatment if they were given the opportunity. Granted, there are not that many of them, but the ones who do, do not have to spend time in prison, and maybe if they are fixed, they will be more productive members of society.

The Conservatives did not think of the provincial partners. We asked for the cost of their program, but they did not give it to us. They said they were working on it. Guess what? That is downloading to the provinces and that is not responsible.

We have a responsibility here. We have heard about some of the costs of the government's justice bills. We have it from the provincial ministers. We know that the government is looking at about $1.5 billion in infrastructure costs and about $300 million annual cost. We do not need to do this and we are going to reject--

Criminal Code October 31st, 2006

Mr. Speaker, I have respect for this member and the work he did in his past life, as I hope he has for me. I served for six years on the Ontario Criminal Code Review Board dealing with murderers, rapists and some of the worst situations for not criminally responsible. I understand that we are all concerned. It is not a question of feeling more or doing more. We all care about this.

To put that message that someone is soft, no. We all want a smart system that works. The member has touched on that reverse onus section and I will quote him the subsection right below that. The member has probably not read the bill as I have and most people do not read the bills. They get the messaging as opposed to reading the bills. What the bill says after the reverse onus is:

Despite subsection (1),--

And that is the reverse onus section:

the court shall not find the offender to be a dangerous offender if it is satisfied by the evidence adduced during the hearing of an application under that subsection that a lesser sentence — either a finding that the offender is a long-term offender or a sentence for the offence for which the offender has been convicted — would adequately protect the public. Neither the prosecutor nor the offender has the onus of proof in this matter.

What we find here is the least restrictive sentencing principle in the Criminal Code captured by section 718 coming into play and adding to that the case result of Regina v. Johnson.

Why go through the reverse onus? That is the deceptive part of this bill. It is not about the law. One section is actually put up there and then it is reversed with this section. It is messaging to a public while doing something totally different. The something totally different is actually what I think will be the saving part because that is what would be codified as a result of Regina v. Johnson.

We have it in case law right now. It is very important to understand here that there are people who have drafted this who obviously knew the constitutional tests to be made.

I do not like standing here talking constitutional law any more than anyone else, but others in this chamber will give the evidence about longer terms not being deterrents. What we need here and what absolutely happens many times is that the reverse only section only talks about a certain list of designated offences. What really happens in real life, as this member would know, is that there might be a crime committed down at the provincial level that is part of and should be going for a dangerous offender hearing, and should not be waiting for this--

Criminal Code October 31st, 2006

Mr. Speaker, I want to address Canadians on this. Why should this concern Canadians? Because the law needs to be constitutionally valid to protect them. Bills on the order paper are not valid laws. At best, they are works in progress, and sometimes they are failures if the proper homework has not been done in advance. Protection of the public should not be dealt with in this disrespectful manner.

This bill, while it is complex, is full of unenforceable and constitutionally suspect provisions. It will have unintended and very costly implications for the justice systems administered by the provinces. It will even impact on the resources of the provincial mental health systems, in which there are delays now for mental health resources required for these assessments.

I submit that the bill should be redone properly from the start. I know that there are many inside the justice department who are very capable of doing this job and who must be very concerned with following a more ideological than legal directive. Canadians do deserve better. So do our hard-working systems of justice in this country. I would remind the Conservatives that they are in a minority government without the authority for this type of action, for changing a legal system and deceiving the public in this way, because what is important is that we have a working dangerous offender system.

Yes, there were cases and it would have been good to codify them, but it would have been better to do it in a manner that potentially does not affect the safety of Canadians by making them less safe, because we do not need a part of or the full dangerous offender provision thrown out. We have the Minister of Justice doing this, but we also have David Paciocco, who knows this stuff inside out, giving interviews to journalists and saying that this is constitutionally suspect.

I am concerned that instead of protecting victims we are setting them up for having long trials from the first offence forward. I am concerned about the impact on legal aid systems. Mostly, though, I am concerned with doing the job properly. If the Conservatives had put a proper bill in here, without some of the things they have done in this bill quite intentionally, I am sure that every party in the House would be supporting it, because there is no one party that has ownership of protection of the public.

In his messaging, we have the minister's office full of communications experts as opposed to legal experts. That is all about messaging. This House is better than that. The members in this House want to do serious work. I find it distressing that we have a Minister of Justice who would deliberately put forward provisions that he knows will be challenged.

Criminal Code October 31st, 2006

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to speak to Bill C-27, which was recently introduced by the Conservative government. We will now debate the bill and I will provide a context of the current established law already existing in the Criminal Code.

Under the dangerous offenders and long term offender provisions of the Criminal Code of Canada, the Crown may trigger an application where the offender is convicted of a predicate serious personal injury offence. This prerequisite is defined in section 752(b) as being a specific sexual assault offence, sections 271, 272 or 273, or alternatively as meeting the criteria in section 752(a), which requires a finding that the particular offence was essentially violent or potentially violent and which carries a potential maximum sentence of at least 10 years or more. All part XXIV Crown applications must be directly approved by the provincial attorney general in writing. The dangerous offender designation now carries an automatic indeterminate term of imprisonment with no parole application for seven years.

The 1987 case of R. v. Lyons has held that the imposition of a sentence of indeterminate detention as authorized by this part does not offend sections 7, 9 and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Section 7 states, “everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice”. Section 9 states, “everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned”. Section 12 states, “everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment”.

Currently, before the accused can be found to be a dangerous offender, it must be established to the satisfaction of the court that the offence for which the accused has been convicted is not an isolated occurrence, but part of a pattern of behaviour, which has involved violence, aggressive or brutal conduct or failure to control sexual impulses. Further, it must be established that the pattern is very likely to continue. Even after this, the court still has discretion not to designate the offender as dangerous or to impose an indeterminate sentence. Thus the existing legislation meets the highest standard of rationality and proportionality in legal terms.

In other words, the dangerous offender section we currently have in the country, which has put behind bars 360 offenders as dangerous offenders, is charter proof and is working.

As further context, the former Liberal government in 1997 created the long term offender designation, which was targeted at sexual and violent offenders, in response to concerns that many sexual and violent offenders required specific attention even if not meeting the criteria for a dangerous offender. This change was needed as now we have, as of June 2005, 300 offenders under the long term offender designation in Canada.

This long term offender designation allows individuals convicted of a serious personal injury offence, who on the evidence are likely to reoffend but who can likely be managed through a regular sentence along with a specific term of federal supervision in the community, to be given a long term offender supervision order of up to 10 years after their release from serving their original court imposed sentence. Once released the offenders are subject to any number of supervisory conditions ordered by the National Parole Board. These can include orders to stay away from areas where children congregate, 24/7 monitoring, regular reporting to police or other agencies and include conditions which would affect their liberty, such as residing in federal halfway houses. A breach of a long term order condition itself is an indictable criminal offence punishable by up to 10 years imprisonment.

There has been developing case law in the areas of both dangerous offenders and long term offenders designation. In September 2003 the Supreme Court of Canada held that a sentencing judge must consider fully the prospects of control of an offender under a long term offender designation before a dangerous offender designation could be made. That is part of R. v. Johnson. If the court has a reasonable belief that the risk that the offender poses to the general public can be controlled under a long term offender designation, then the offender must be given this lesser sentence, even if he or she otherwise meets all the criteria for a dangerous offender designation.

Currently, procedure for and criteria for finding a person to be a dangerous offender is set out in sections 753, 754 and 757 of the Criminal Code of Canada. Procedure criteria for and consequences of finding a person to be a long term offender are set out in sections 753.1 to 753.4 and 757. The rights of appeal are found in section 759 of the Criminal Code of Canada

The Liberal Party strongly supports legitimate efforts to protect Canadians and punish offenders who represent threats to the safety of our communities across Canada. When changes are made to the current working system, they should be done in a manner that would not jeopardize this working system. Changes proposed must meet the constitutional muster and not risk successful constitutional challenges, which could undermine protections that we already have in this country.

We also think it is important to codify the Supreme Court of Canada decision in R. v. Johnson. Reforms must ensure that offenders who should be designated as a dangerous or long term offender do not slip through the cracks of the judicial system, while at the same time the reforms must in no way violate the rights of fundamental justice ensured to all Canadians. To do so would have the unfortunate effect of being more messaging to a law and order imperative of the current minority Conservative government rather than responsibly governing for all Canadians. Victims themselves will not be happy when they discover a flawed law, not a strong one.

In the short term since this bill was tabled, serious concerns have already been raised by those knowledgeable in the legal community with respect to the constitutionality of some of the proposed changes in Bill C-27. These are not restricted just particularly to the provisions that shift the burden of proof from the Crown to the defendant and certain dangerous offender hearings. Justice officials have already confirmed publicly and privately that they expect the legislation will be challenged.

The Supreme Court of Canada has upheld the existing dangerous offender sections of the Criminal Code and has, by case law, clarified the use of the long term offender legislation. What will happen when unconstitutional elements are grafted on to those existing sections? Would it put in jeopardy the entire regime? Could anyone guarantee, even the Minister of Justice, what the court would do? We know that there will always be divergent legal opinions, but more important, we do not want to lose the ability to designate a dangerous offender for this would make Canadians less safe, not more safe. Perhaps the government hopes for unconstitutional elements of this legislation to be severed by the court, but nobody can guarantee a court's response.

This is why in the normal course of events with governments in the past, legislation was widely consulted before introduction. No change to such an important and needed part of the Criminal Code should be undertaken without both empirical evidence-based studies and broad-based consultations to help ensure that the legislation is the best it can be before bringing it to Parliament. Justice officials have confirmed to me that neither was done here.

Under the former Liberal government, I believe discussions were ongoing with respect to the Johnson decision and the needed clarification and the subject matter of peace bonds. There are ways to bring in a number of reforms to the dangerous offender and peace bond provisions to enhance the protection of all Canadians from high risk and violent offenders. Any proposed changes should take into account, in advance, the potential impact of those changes, especially in a minority Parliament. These changes should have been approached in a serious non-partisan manner. The potential for negative unintended consequences related to Bill C-27 is great and not confined to constitutional issues.

This proposed legislation, in part because of the large widening of designated offenders, could impact everything from the charges that are laid to the way Crown attorneys prosecute the cases and how defence lawyers defend their clients. I have been strongly warned by both defence lawyers and prosecutors that with Bill C-27 the end result is likely to be more costly in trials, fewer plea bargains and a greater backlog of cases in our already overburdened judicial system. That is to say nothing of the re-victimization of victims who have to go through a trial.

We should also be wary of the Askov effect where we could lose prosecutions because of court delays. This is not just because of the number of new dangerous offender and long term offender hearings. It is because whenever an artificial number is used, for example three, it will have an effect on charges one, two and three. What is the true potential cost and impact of the bill? Has it really been properly assessed with this hasty legislation? The legislation will affect the financial and time burden upon the justice systems in Canada. The expense of these changes is downloaded to the provinces that administer the system of justice for us in Canada.

The dangerous offender designation is among the most severe penalties--some say the severest--because it involves incarceration for an indeterminate period. As a result, a dangerous offender hearing is one of the most legally complex and time consuming procedures in our criminal justice system, often including not only psychiatric but other testimony that is complicated.

The system is undermined if the dangerous offenders do not have any counsel during the process. A significant number of criminal defendants rely on legal aid programs for representation. Unrepresented accused in these situations would not save costs but add them and perhaps would provide later challenges on designation.

I raise the point because legal aid is an area to which the government is not paying sufficient attention. Some provinces, including my own, are currently experiencing severe problems. There is a pattern with this minority Conservative government, that of messaging to the public before introduction of a bill. Without the benefit of the real details of the legislation, the government wants its messaging delivered to the public even if it is the incorrect message.

Here, the government desired a message of a U.S. style “three strikes and you're out” law. It wanted people to believe that this law would strengthen the ability to catch problematic situations. The Prime Minister even cited a case currently before the courts in his press conference and photo opportunity. As the bill was not even tabled at that time, the people lined up to support the announcement had not seen the details of Bill C-27.

Where are the challenges that the bill presents? Many Canadians have already started to speak out. I will share with the House some of the concerns raised with me by others who are more expert than I in this field of specialized criminal and constitutional law.

The new proposed section 752.01 in Bill C-27 reads, “If the prosecutor is of the opinion...” In essence, new section 752.01 would require prosecutors to notify courts as soon as feasible after a finding of guilt, whether the prosecutor intends to make an application for dangerous offender status.

First, existing subsections 752.1(1) and 752.1(2) already deal with timing of applications, so this new section is not needed to control notice to the courts. The more unusual and very probably unenforceable situation is the wording of this new section. How does one, in law, enforce this kind of notice provision without making findings about a prosecutor's opinion? Are we going to have hearings in which a prosecutor gives evidence as to his or her opinion? I do not think so.

Is this the federal government's clumsy attempt to direct provincial prosecutors to turn their thoughts and actions to the dangerous offender provisions and bring more frequent applications? If so, the lengthy listing of offences set out in the bill as designated offences are primarily offences prosecuted by provincial, and not federal, prosecutors.

Is the federal Minister of Justice really trying to give policy directions to provincial prosecutors about when to bring dangerous offender applications? Again, the administration of justice is provincial. If this is the intent, it is likely to be ultra vires or out of the federal government's jurisdiction, especially if the intention is to impose statutory duties on provincial prosecutors, especially in areas of prosecutorial discretion. One could ask also what the consequence is for prosecutors who fail to notify the court as soon as feasible.

So just in this section, we have issues not only of jurisdiction but of an unenforceable standard and no consequence for not doing the action.

I will now address the reverse onus situation found in new subsection 753(1.1). While some commentators have felt that the protections about presumption of innocence found in section 11(d) of the charter would apply only to persons charged with an offence and only until they have been found guilty, arguably this section could apply to a sentencing process.

However, the principles of fundamental justice in section 7 of the charter are more likely to place the burden of proof on the prosecution, even at the sentencing phase, which would include hearings on dangerous offender sentences.

The appropriate standard of proof in criminal law is “beyond a reasonable doubt”. In proposed subsection 753(1.1), the standard is lowered to the balance of probabilities, at the same time--and I emphasize at the same time--as the onus is reversed in the same section. The reality is that the dangerous offender hearing is predicated on the fear of possible future offences and not on the current offence before the court. That is important to understand.

What is being essentially changed here is now a presumption that the risk posed by a three strikes offender is the equivalent in every case of the category now defined in the legislation as dangerous offending to be presumed to possess the kind of risk that a dangerous offender is to a society. In other words, do they really pose the specific kind of risk that the dangerous offender provisions require? They are different tests in law.

On the face of it, this would be a violation of the charter, but now we must examine whether there is a justifiable limitation on the presumption of innocence under section 1 of the charter. Is it demonstrably justifiable to limit or compromise the values we hold in the presumption of innocence during the situation of a dangerous offender hearing? In constitutional terms, what is the documented need for changing the onus in this way?

The justice official could not answer this question when specifically asked by me. Why taint this area unnecessarily? Obviously it was a choice of the political master. The provision requires that the courts assume a fact of future dangerousness even in cases where that might not be proven or be capable of being proven or, as one expert said to me, in fact may not be true.

Proposed subsection 753(1.1) puts the onus on the individual before the court to prove a negative: that he or she does not represent the kind of threat the dangerous offender provisions were looking to address. Under section 1 charter challenges, there must be a pressing and substantial need for a legislative provision that infringes on charter rights. Does a political need to be seen to be acting qualify for this?

As was pointed out by an early Globe and Mail editorial, most offenders that the public would be concerned with in recent newspaper stories would not have been caught under this section because the sentences of prior convictions were not federal sentences, but provincial sentences of less than two years. Thus, we have a provision inserted not because of a pressing and substantial need in law to do this, but to show political action even if it does not solve the issues.

What if the court, in examining this section, instead decides that the use of a reverse onus, based on the factors identified, does not lead to the rational inference that the absence of restraint posing a likelihood of future death or injury, substantial general indifference to foreseeable consequences or incorrigible brutality, follows? Here is where the government could have just stayed with making it easier for the Crown with the use of the lower evidentiary burden.

Instead, the government has chosen to impose a legal burden of proof on those with three strikes. What this means is that a judge will be forced to find an accused poses the kind of threat that a dangerous offender does not only when the judge has a doubt about that, but even where the judge thinks it is as likely true as when he does not pose that danger. This is vastly different from just lowering the onus on the Crown when the Crown holds the burden of proof.

I spoke to one provincial minister of justice who thought “the three strikes” adds nothing to the bill. In existing paragraph 754(1)(a), the provincial attorney general still has to consent to each application for a dangerous offender designation, and there is nothing in the bill removing this consent from the Criminal Code.

The way Bill C-27 reads, it raises the question of whether the bill is minimally impairing in the constitutional context. There are many technical constitutional aspects of the bill that would engage experts. One, Professor David Paciocco, has provided me with his analysis in relation to the bill. I have tried to capture some of his and others' ideas in my limited time. I cannot do justice to all the arguments.

However, I do need to talk about the need to insert or codify R. v. Johnson. Proposed subsection 753(1.2) is found in clause 3 of Bill C-27 beside the margin note limitation. After adding the reverse onus provision just discussed, we now have a section that would seem to effectively disregard this same reverse onus section and disregard the initial findings of threat of dangerousness that proposed subsection 753(1.1) forces in the bill, and states that the court can apply an ordinary determinant sentence, the indeterminate sentence, or the long term offender sentence if it wishes.

This, in other words, is judicial discretion. I will not have time to quote the section so I will leave it for members to read, but it states “despite subsection (1)”. Here is the least restrictive sentencing principle--and I just have a couple of paragraphs more--in the Criminal Code captured by 718 coming into play, clarified in R. v. Johnson.

Why go through the reverse onus? This is deceptive. The Minister of Justice has concentrated not on the law but on a message in the first subsection about being tough on crime and then has placed in the second subsection the findings of the court decision and the existing law. The burden of proof in this subsection is missing. This is unusual. What is the intention?

Somebody knew what they were supposed to do here, and they made it look like it would all work, but I think it is smoke and mirrors--