Réal Ménard

[Public Health Agency of Canada Act, June 16th, 2006]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to participate in this debate on a warm and sunny Friday afternoon. I am sure that none of us would rather be anywhere else but here and that we feel most privileged to discuss this bill. I thank the whip's office for giving me the opportunity to do so.

That said, it is with great concern and surprise that we find the Conservative government is carrying on the Liberal-trademarked tradition of interfering with and disregarding provincial areas of jurisdiction. We are well aware that when it comes to centralization and constitutional arrogance, there is unfortunately a rather synonymous relationship between the former Liberal government and the concept of disregarding areas of jurisdiction.

This is even a paradox within the Department of Health. As we know, Monique Bégin was Minister of Health and Welfare at the time under Pierre Elliott Trudeau, who was not himself particularly sympathetic to decentralization. It was she who introduced in this House a Canada health act that included a number of principles, such as universality, comprehensiveness, portability and, of course, public health.

When Monique Bégin introduced the Canada Health Act in 1983 or 1984, even doctors agreed that it seemed to thoroughly disregard provincial jurisdiction. I was rereading some documents at the time of the Romanow report, which I will come back to shortly. When Monique Bégin tabled the Canada Health Act, Ontario doctors went on strike to protest it. Typically, Ontario has not been fertile ground for socialism, revolution and overthrowing the established order.

All of this shows how difficult it is to understand how the federal government sees its responsibilities in the area of health. I was discussing this with my colleague from Laval, and I find it even more paradoxical and quite incredible to see that while the federal government fails to do what is expected of it, it goes barging in where it should be exercising considerable restraint.

Constitutionally, of course, the federal government has responsibilities, including one on epidemics. When the previous health minister introduced the quarantine bill—that work had begun with Pierre Pettigrew and continued with his successor in that department—the Bloc Québécois worked very seriously in committee. Indeed, we agree that it is the federal government's prerogative to determine certain situations where the risk of contagion or epidemics is such that quarantine zones must be established. Of course, the bill was not perfect. We would have liked it to provide for advance notice and compensation mechanisms when people are deprived from their right to go to work. Nevertheless, essentially, we did not challenge the fact that the federal government was solidly rooted in its jurisdiction.

With regard to the patent issue, the whole issue of intellectual property is an extremely important consideration. In fact, this began with the Conservatives. We will remember that, in the 1960s, there was a royalty system. Licences and patents were protected. However, it was possible for companies to copy patents on payment of a rebate. They would pay a certain percentage on what was called royalties.

We realized that this system was not beneficial to Canada—and I will get back to the special character of Montreal, that beautiful city, Greater Montreal, where 50% of the population is living, where we can see a different movie every day, where cultural opportunities are extraordinary.

It has the Olympic Stadium, the Planetarium, the Botanical Garden—

[Public Health Agency of Canada Act, June 16th, 2006]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for his speech. I had the opportunity to sit with him on the health committee for a few years. I know that these issues have concerned him for a long time. I remember that when we were both on the committee, we studied the issue of fetal alcohol syndrome. He also took part in the study of the federal tobacco control strategy. We also examined together in committee the Canadian Institutes of Health Research and we recently studied the issue of the Public Health Agency of Canada.

For those who are watching us, I will say that this initiative was launched under the Liberals and the Conservatives decided to maintain it. It is a bit surprising that we are studying such a bill today.

Health and public health, terms that we see in the title of the bill, are clearly not under federal jurisdiction.

I remind the House that we have modernized the Quarantine Act. The Bloc Québécois, in its usual positive spirit, which all hon. members in this place can confirm, worked extremely hard. In fact, we agreed that quarantine did indeed come under federal jurisdiction.

Does my colleague believe that the creation of the Public Health Agency of Canada constitute an encroachment on a provincial jurisdiction?

Would he not agree that federal epidemiological objectives as a whole could very well be reached under the Quarantine Act which is clearly under federal jurisdiction?

[First World Outgames, June 16th, 2006]

Mr. Speaker, does the Prime Minister realize that his refusal to participate in the opening of the Outgames sends a negative message to the whole world with regard to respect for this very important event?

[First World Outgames, June 16th, 2006]

Mr. Speaker, from July 29 to August 5, 2006, the World Outgames will host 12,000 athletes and sports enthusiasts from the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender communities. In a spirit of inclusivity, these first World Outgames are first and foremost a celebration of sport, culture and human rights regardless of sexual orientation.

These games will be the most important sports event held in Montreal since 1976.

Does the Prime Minister intend to participate in the opening ceremonies of the Outgames to be held at Olympic Stadium on July 29, together with his Quebec counterpart, Jean Charest, and the mayor of Montreal, Gérald Tremblay, and to welcome the athletes participating in these games?

[Criminal Code, June 14th, 2006]

Mr. Speaker, that was not a point of order, and I hope my colleague will show the courtesy of letting me finish my speech. First of all, his bill is unconstitutional. He should at the very least have the decency to listen to his fellow parliamentarians.

Yes, there are similarities between the infraction he is proposing, which relates to killing an unborn child, and abortion. All the same, I think it is my prerogative in this House to express the point of view I wish to air on behalf of my party.

In the current state of the law, the fetus has no rights while in its mother's womb. That decision was handed down by the Supreme Court of Canada, is reflected in the Criminal Code, and is the state of the law. That means that a parliamentarian cannot question that definition through a private member's bill. I think it would have been interesting if our colleague had provided us with a legal opinion submitted by the Minister of Justice, who acknowledges that the bill is unconstitutional. It is worth noting that the minister has the same background as the member who introduced the bill.

That said, I do not wish to deny our colleague's right to draw the attention of this House to such a question. He is entitled to his point of view, and all of the members of this House have heard it. This is how things should be done in a Parliament like ours.

On the topic of rewriting history on the question of when life begins, with respect to the rights of the unborn and abortion rights, I was saying that, since 1777, there have been provisions that did not appear in the Criminal Code—since the Criminal Code did not exist until the end of the 19th century—but that protected the sanctity of human life. Later, certain changes were made. The most important change was made in 1969. At that time, we maintained criminal sanctions against abortion, except if a therapeutic committee, made up of three doctors, authorized an abortion for health reasons, linked to the mother's health.

As several members have said so far, there were a number of court challenges.

Therefore, in 1969, Parliament made several important amendments to the Criminal Code, at the time referring to section 273, which specified the time when an abortion could legally be performed. Then it could be performed with the recommendation of a therapeutic committee made up of three doctors.

The section set out criminal sanctions for doctors who did not respect the strict rules that I outlined. These rules required authorization from a therapeutic abortion committee at an accredited or approved hospital and that the abortion had to be performed at an accredited or approved hospital.

The therapeutic abortion committees had to consist of at least three doctors, none of whom could be performing abortions. That very year, in 1969, Dr. Henry Morgentaler opened his first clinic in Montreal where he performed abortions without approval from a therapeutic abortion committee. As we all know, this resulted in a legal drama—probably the most famous controversy ever.

Then 1982 saw the advent of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which included an article on the right to physical integrity, the right to life, liberty and, of course, security of the person. This is from article 7 of the charter, which talks about life, liberty and security of the person. This would be the legal recourse by which it would be decided, in a legal manner, that women must have control over their own bodies, and that it is not in keeping with the values in the charter to restrict the right to abortion, as the provisions in 1969 did.

That is why decisions have been handed down, which prompted the lawmaker to define what life is, when a fetus becomes a fetus, and at what point a fetus must be recognized as having rights.

I will remind the hon. members that neither the Quebec civil code nor the major existing statutes respecting women's health recognize that, as long as it is in the mother's womb, the fetus is not considered a human being. Whether we agree or not, the fact remains that such is the current state of the law.

Our colleague's bill was deemed unconstitutional because clause 2, as amended, states, “It is not a defence” to a person charged with an offence set out in the Criminal Code, namely causing the death or injuring the unborn child of a pregnant woman, “ that (a) the child is not a human being; (b) the accused did not know that the person was pregnant”.

Can hon. members see how profoundly incompatible this bill is with the Criminal Code and the courts of law—

[Criminal Code, June 14th, 2006]

Mr. Speaker, I would also like to add to the debate by saying that all parliamentarians must keep in mind that our colleague's bill is unconstitutional. Regardless of whether one is for or against abortion, at the moment, that is the state of the law. The Supreme Court has handed down decisions and it is not possible—it is not within a parliamentarian's prerogative—to change that through a private member's bill. Of course, our colleague has the right to a debate on his bill, but we must nevertheless keep in mind that this bill is unconstitutional.

Why is it unconstitutional? Because the state of the law indicates that the first rule in right-to-life issues is that a fetus is not a human being until it is out of the womb, has drawn its first breath, and is deemed living and viable. That is the legal situation; that is what the Supreme Court has said. And what the Court has said is in line with the definition in section 223 of the Criminal Code.

Naturally, we can review the history, recall the battles fought. Nevertheless—and I invite all parliamentarians to be seized of this reality—section 223 of the Criminal Code states and declares as follows:

223. (1) A child becomes a human being within the meaning of this Act when it has completely proceeded, in a living state, from the body of its mother,

As an aside, in jurisprudence “proceeded in a living state” means that the first breath has been drawn.

—whether or not (b)it has an independent circulation;

whether or not (c) the navel string is severed.

That is the position of the law. It is not possible for a member of parliament, no matter what his or her beliefs, to table a bill that is not compatible with the provisions of the Criminal Code, which are based on a ruling made after the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was proclaimed.

Let us look at the history of abortion in Canada. In 1969, the provisions of the Criminal Code were slightly different in their approach. The 1969 provisions criminalized abortion, except in cases where approved by a therapeutic committee comprised of three doctors. There have been provisions dealing with abortion since 1777, even before the Criminal Code came into being. Since the 18th century, we have followed the practices of Great Britain and those found in common law. Since 1777, provisions have protected what we would call today the sacred nature of life.

In 1969, a legislative decision has continued to prohibit abortion, which is punishable—

[Criminal Code, June 13th, 2006]

Mr. Speaker, I would first like to congratulate our colleague for introducing his bill, even though when we first read it in the Bloc Québécois, my colleagues and I and our research service were somewhat concerned about the possibility that it might be criminalizing some behaviour for no reason. I will provide more examples later. However, I know that the member for Edmonton—Leduc has been a serious member in the past, that he has served this House well, and I do not doubt that his motives are noble. Nonetheless, we have some concerns.

One of Quebec's premiers whom we hold in high esteem was called René Lévesque and was a powerful communicator. In the early 1960s, he said—and think how true this is today—that information was power. Obviously, the more information one has, the better a citizen one can be, and obviously, the better a member of Parliament.

The member for Edmonton—Leduc, who also chairs the Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, is asking us to consider the extent to which the circulation of nominative information can be used for fraudulent purposes. Personal information about our identity, access to our credit, our telephone number—that is the example the member gave in his remarks—is what is called, generically, nominative information. If I understand correctly, the member is afraid that nominative information might be used for fraudulent purposes.

Certainly, in a world where networks, computers, communications and even cybernetics are burgeoning sciences, this question is a very relevant one.

The member told us that section 403 of the Criminal Code—and I will come back to this—is not completely adequate when it comes to a number of wrongful acts that he is afraid will occur. He therefore wants better protection. He is concerned about the reality of impersonation by telephone.

It is true that as potential consumers we are all very often solicited over the phone. You are familiar with my fundamentally generous nature and my propensity for communicating. I respond to every telephone survey that comes my way. Obviously, when there are political questions, I do have the ethics and honesty to say that I am a member of Parliament. Often it is young students who are earning their living by telemarketing, and I would not want to do wrong by them. Perhaps there are even some of our young pages who have done this in the past.

It is true that we are constantly at the mercy of this kind of solicitation, of being preyed on by telemarketers. The member for Edmonton—Leduc explained to us that there is unfortunately no real recourse, that the Criminal Code was powerless and that it was possible to obtain nominative, personal and confidential information over the phone.

That being said, our colleague’s objectives are extremely noble and we are prepared to look at how far we must go in amending the Criminal Code, but we have some concerns. The member can perhaps tell me whether our concern is warranted.

Let us imagine the following situation. Hon. members know what a powerful motivation love is in life—there is nothing grander and more beautiful than love—and how great we feel when we are in love. Now, let us imagine the situation where a person meets someone, a new love interest. You know how it is. But the truth of the matter is that we never know exactly how the relationship will turn out. So, this person calls the workplace of the someone in question to get his or her telephone number or information about this person he or she hopes to have a date with.

In the opinion of the hon. member for Edmonton—Leduc, who believes in love and in interpersonal relationships, is this a case for summary conviction, where a person might be liable to a sentence?

My colleagues in our caucus and our research staff were wondering how far-reaching this bill was. I am convinced, of course, that the hon. member for Edmonton—Leduc does not wish for such behaviour to be criminalized.

We are asking ourselves this question: How far should we go in our quest for privacy protection? We would have been more comfortable if the government had amended the Access to Information Act instead, as promised during the election campaign. We were also expecting Bill C-2 to be amended in a more fundamental way than it has so far.

Once again, we are starting from the premise that the member is serious, that he has served this House well, that his objective is honourable, and that he is worried about the networks, about computers. In his speech, the member talked about data brokers. When I was health critic, I remember having met people who specialized in managing information, computer data, for example, concerning what type of citizen was more likely to develop certain types of illnesses over others. As an MP, I have even met people from companies that specialize in the kind of billing used by general practitioners, since these doctors are statistically more likely to recommend certain types of medication over others.

Protecting personal data is a very worrisome topic. We must ask ourselves if this is not something that could lead to harm, a barrier that society does not want to breach.

Our fellow citizens should know that there exists at this time, in the Criminal Code, a section that provides for prosecution of anyone who personates a third party or against anyone who attempts to obtain information for more or less malicious purposes. I will take the time to read this entire section of the Criminal Code because I believe that sharing information is important. I would very much like to discuss with the member for Edmonton—Leduc the scope of his bill.

Section 403 of the Criminal Code states:

Every one who fraudulently personates any person, living or dead...is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years or an offence punishable on summary conviction.

There is intent to personate that is punishable as a criminal offence. The Criminal Code adds—and that is what we refer to as mens rea in legal language—:

(a) with intent to gain advantage for himself or another person,—

Obviously, telemarketers and others would fall under this provision of the bill.

Section 403 of the Criminal Code also states:

(b) with intent to obtain any property or an interest in any property,—

In addition to the intent to personate, there is a gain, a more pecuniary interest. There is an interest in a property or the intent to obtain it.

Section 403, which deals with both personation and obtaining a property, adds:

(c) with intent to cause disadvantage to the person whom he personates or another person.

Earlier I was talking about malicious intent; I think we find it synthesized in section 403(c):

with intent to cause disadvantage to the person whom he personates or another person.

I have only a minute left? Time flies. In that case, I will wrap up.

From the outside it seemed that the provisions of section 403 offered some protection. However, the hon. member seemed to be saying that it was not sufficient for cross-border trade or for telemarketing.

Again, in closing, we have concerns about using criminalization because we are nonetheless talking about 10 years in prison. We fear this is a bit excessive, but I would be pleased to discuss this with my colleague and ask him about his true intentions. I am not questioning his intention to serve the House well, with the serious—

[Criminal Code, June 13th, 2006]

Mr. Speaker, I am always pleased to participate in private members' business. I hope that one day, we will witness a reform that will allow us to dedicate every Friday to debates among parliamentarians on private members' bills.

When I read our colleague's bill and when my party and I analysed it, we asked ourselves why our colleague wanted to add a new infraction to the Criminal Code—that is the crux of my question—when, quite frankly, it seems that his objectives would be reached quite effectively through section 403 of the Criminal Code?

Can he explain why we should amend the Criminal Code? Why create a new infraction from scratch? Why not use section 403? It clearly states:

Every one who fraudulently personates any person, living or dead,

(a) with intent to gain advantage for himself or another person,

(b) with intent to obtain any property or an interest in any property...

is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years or an offence punishable on summary conviction

I would like an answer, because I really do not understand why we need this bill, but I know he must have had a good reason for introducing it.

[Antipoverty Act, June 13th, 2006]

moved for leave to introduce Bill C-322, Antipoverty Act (amendments to the Canadian Human Rights Act and Criminal Code).

Mr. Speaker, I am introducing this bill, which is made up of four measures: adding “social condition” to the list of prohibited grounds of discrimination in the Canadian Human Rights Act; establishing a new prohibited grounds for discrimination in the Canadian Human Rights Act in cases where financial institutions refuse to provide basic banking services; asking this House to debate poverty for six hours per year; and amending section 347 of the Criminal Code to limit the legal interest rate for lending money in Canada by lowering it from 60% to 35%.

I hope that this bill will be adopted as quickly as possible.

(Motions deemed adopted, bill read the first time and printed)

[Criminal Code, June 7th, 2006]

Mr. Speaker, while I have a great deal of respect for the member, surely you will agree that his question smacks of demagoguery. Unfortunately, that kind of talk will get us nowhere.

If somebody tried to kill one of my loved ones, or hurt them in any way—obviously I would never want that to happen, but it has nothing to do with the bill before us. What we are saying is that the Criminal Code already contains provisions for incarcerating people who commit crimes with firearms. Mandatory minimum sentencing does not stop people from committing these crimes. When a person commits a crime, they are not deterred by minimum sentences, but by the real possibility of ending up in court. This is not about innocent victims.

Is my colleague holding American society up as an example? Does he think we should resort to incarceration as much as they do? In the past two years, Americans have jailed 717 people and 723 people per 100,000, yet there are three times more murders in the United States than in Quebec. Does the member agree that his logic breaks down completely here? Mandatory minimum sentences and more people in jail do not make for a less violent society.

If he were to ask me what we can do, I would tell him that I would be most interested to hear about the Conservative government's strategy for fighting poverty.

Next week, I will table an anti-poverty bill, which I hope will receive the support of all of my colleagues in this House. Canada is the only jurisdiction that does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of social condition. Eight provincial governments have it, but the federal government does not—