Richard Marceau

[Supply, September 16th, 2003]

Mr. Speaker, first, I thank the hon. member for her great speech. She has, however, only partially answered the question put to her by my colleague from London—Fanshawe. I would like her to explain to this House what her response is when someone invokes natural moral law and what she thinks of it.

Whose moral law are we talking about? Does a single moral law apply universally or would it not be a slippery slope to embark on to speak of moral law and impose the morals of one person or group of persons upon another person or group of persons?

[Supply, September 16th, 2003]

Mr. Speaker, I thank the hon. member for Burnaby—Douglas for his kind words and for his question.

I was 11 years old in 1981, so certainly not much concerned about such things at that time. He is right, and has pointed out what was said at that time. Being a sovereignist, I will not conceal the fact that I want to get Quebec out of Canada. Nevertheless, we do have a Constitution in the meantime, and we are under the jurisdiction of that Constitution. According to a decision that dates way back to the 1930s, this Constitution is like a living and growing tree, not something that is rigidly frozen in time. It evolves and adapts to society. If it did not it would not survive for long.

The most admired constitution in the world, for a variety of reasons, and the oldest, is the Constitution of the United States. It has evolved with the times, in response to jurisprudence. The same thing goes for the Canadian Constitution. There are several things, moreover, that were not included in the Constitution of 1867, but are now in place.

To simply state that, because the words are not in section 15 of the 1981-82 Canadian Charter of RIghts and Freedoms, the Charter could never be interpreted as including them, is to make this into a rigid legal document incapable of adapting to the times, one with a very short life span.

[Supply, September 16th, 2003]

Mr. Speaker, once again, I must express my surprise at this kind of reasoning, “If it is not done in other places, it cannot be done here.” The way the result is achieved is not as important as the result itself.

Although Belgium and the Netherlands made their decisions to permit marriage between same sex couples on a different basis than ours, they are now examples of respect for minority rights when it comes to homosexual marriage.

And that leads me to say a few words about the consequences of allowing same sex marriages. In fact, people have been saying that if we permit such marriages, society will self-destruct, morality will fly out the window and grave danger will threaten our society.

But when we look at the figures—they are recent but they are the only ones available for same sex marriages in the Netherlands—there has been no decrease in the number of heterosexual marriages nor has there been a drop in the birth rate. Holland is still there and the Earth still turns.

Thus, despite all those who point to same sex marriage as a threat to the rest of society, we can see that society continues to function.

Moreover, to everyone who says that the fact of allowing or recognizing rights for homosexuals leads to societal decadence, I would like to remind them that the examples of Greece and Rome were often mentioned in committee. First of all, when Greece was in its golden age, homosexuality was very widespread. Secondly, Rome was first sacked in the year 410 A.D. and fell in 476, not while it was pagan, but when it was Christian.

Thus, the survival of a civilization has nothing to do with the rights of a minority, even a homosexual minority. On the contrary, I stand with those who believe that a society is judged on its treatment of its minorities.

[Supply, September 16th, 2003]

Mr. Speaker, I cannot help but express disappointment with the performance of the hon. member for Calgary Southeast, with whom I often disagree but whose intelligence I respect and, normally, his consistency as well.

What he fails to mention and should mention in quoting the Egan decision and Justice La Forest's comments is, first, that the decision deals with same sex benefits, and not marriage. He fails to mention that Justice La Forest does not speak on behalf of the majority.

When quoting a decision—I do not know if he studied law but I did—one must not quote what was quoted, which constitutes an obiter dictum , that is to say a statement by a judge which is beside the point and cannot be used as a precedent in a subsequent decision.

[Supply, September 16th, 2003]

Mr. Speaker, it is a pleasure for me, as the Bloc's justice critic, to speak in the House today on the motion by the Canadian Alliance.

The motion under debate today does not concern exclusively the rights of gays and lesbians in this country, any more than the right of women to vote or equal rights for women concerns only women, or anti-Semitism concerns only Jewish people or racism concerns only Black people or the Muslim community in Quebec and Canada since September 11.

It concerns social justice and human rights, and it affects society as a whole, meaning each and every one of us.

It is important to establish the context surrounding this debate. Why, today, are parliamentarians being asked to debate such an important issue? It is because various courts have ruled on the matter. The Court of Appeal of British Columbia, the Court of Appeal for Ontario and the Superior Court of Quebec all ruled that the definition of marriage, which states that marriage is the union of one man and one woman for life to the exclusion of all others, was discriminatory.

These same three courts also ruled that, in a free and democratic society, changes to this definition could not be prevented. In a society governed by the rule of law, such as our own, the legislative branch's powers are limited by other powers, including the weight of the judiciary.

In a country or society with a charter or charters, such as the Quebec charter of rights and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the elected representatives must take great pains to carefully weigh what the courts say in their interpretation of the documents our societies are founded on.

The justice committee crossed Canada to listen to Quebeckers' and Canadians' opinions on this issue.

From Vancouver to Halifax to Nunavut, in all the regions of Canada, we listened, discussed, debated and worked with these people. At times, I felt extremely uncomfortable being a member of this committee.

It was uncomfortable for me, as a young heterosexual man, married for nearly ten years, with two kids, to be judging the relationship shared by two individuals testifying before us to say they wanted to get married, two men or two women who wanted to get married, who had been together for many years and who, in some cases, had children. Some would have me say that their love is not as good as mine, that their relationship is not as valid as mine.

I refuse to judge as not as good, right or valid as mine the relationship between two individuals who love each other.

Besides, and I have put this question to many witnesses, what difference does it make if my neighbour happens to be a homosexual and has the right to get married? What difference does it make in your own relationship? What difference does it make in my marriage, I having been married for ten years, as I said earlier?

If my best friend, my brother and perhaps someday my son, who knows, were to marry someone of the same sex, would that take anything away from the spousal relationship I have been in with my wife Lori for nearly ten years now? The answer is no.

To allow same-sex partners to marry does not take anything away from anybody. On the contrary, it affords more people an equal chance to celebrate the love they have for each other.

Our committee looked at four options. It is important that we consider these four options. These were: to keep marriage as the union of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others; to allow a form of civil union; to leave marriage up to organized religion; or to allow same-sex marriages.

Only one of these four options is in keeping with the Constitution. It is important that we, as lawmakers, base ourselves on legislation to find a solution that is consistent with this country's basic laws.

First, as I said at the beginning, the definition of marriage as the union of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others was found to be discriminatory by all three courts I mentioned earlier. When voting on such a major issue, parliamentarians will have to take that into account.

It was suggested by some that the federal Parliament approve some kind of civil union, of registered partnership or something of the sort.

Parliament cannot do that because family law comes under provincial jurisdiction. In matters of family law, the only things that come under federal jurisdiction are marriage and divorce. Any attempt by this Parliament to create another form of union under family law would be unconstitutional because it is ultra vires the authority of Parliament. In other words, this would go beyond the authority of Parliament.

We have heard this many times, not only from our researchers but also from several constitutional experts who appeared before us. I asked each of these constitutional experts from various universities if this were the case and they unanimously agreed.

The third point, or the third possibility that we examined, was to leave marriage in the hands of religious bodies. In other words, all couples would have access to a form of civil union and churches would perform marriages.

That is something else Parliament cannot do. The authority that decides who may be married is the province. Parliament cannot say that a certain priest, rabbi or imam can or cannot marry two people. Members of the clergy can celebrate a marriage if at some point, within their religious order, they become civil status officers.

Again, on the basis of shared jurisdictions, Parliament must leave marriage up to the churches and create another type of union.

Finally, the only other option would be to allow same sex marriage.

I would like to come back to civil unions for a few moments if I may. Not only would they be unconstitutional, but this also raises two points that, in my view, should stop anyone who is in favour of this option, even if it is unconstitutional.

The first is that we would be accepting the separate but equal doctrine north of the 45th parallel. As we know, this doctrine was rejected in the United States many years ago. Accepting this doctrine would be a major step backward for Quebec and Canadian society.

The other question is simpler: if this type of civil union conferred the same rights and responsibilities as for a married couple, why not call it a marriage? Why complicate matters?

It is essential to remember that we are discussing civil and not religious marriage. Because freedom of religion has been mentioned many times in this debate, permit me to add a few words.

The concept of freedom of religion is part of this debate in two ways. The first is to ensure that churches, synagogues, temples and mosques are free not to marry same-sex couples. With freedom of religion already protected in the Quebec and Canadian charters, it seems to me that this is has been established.

We can make the analogy in two ways. To Catholics, we can say this. When people who marry in the Catholic faith get divorced, they cannot be remarried in the Catholic church. The Catholic church cannot be forced to remarry divorced persons because that is part of its dogma and its dogma is protected by freedom of religion.

It is the same thing, for example, in the synagogues. Most rabbis refuse to marry a Jew and a non-Jew. That is perfectly acceptable even if it appears discriminatory at first glance, because it is part of the Jewish religion and the rights are protected.

Thus, it is important to point out that permitting civil marriage between persons of the same sex will in no way oblige churches, temples, mosques or synagogues to marry same sex couples.

The other way freedom of religion enters this debate is this: There are denominations whose interpretation of the scriptures allows them to marry same sex couples. We could mention the United Church, the Unitarian Church and liberal Judaism, for example, which would like to marry same sex couples, but cannot because of the so-called traditional definition of marriage. Their freedom of religion is violated, because a religious definition of marriage that does not correspond with their own is being imposed on them.

Why impose on the United Church, which is, after all, the largest Protestant denomination in Canada, the Catholic, Evangelical, or Orthodox Jewish vision of marriage? That is unacceptable and infringes upon their freedom of religion.

Let us reverse the roles and reverse the problem. If civil marriage were permitted between same sex spouses, thus allowing these denominations to marry same sex couples, it would protect the religious freedom of the Catholic Church, the Evangelical church and others not to marry same sex couples.

With this second solution, the religious freedom of all denominations is protected. Is that not the best solution when talking about freedom of religion?

Furthermore, I heard the leader of the Canadian Alliance say earlier that all Canadians of all origins who came here recognize or adopt or have adopted the so-called traditional definition of marriage, meaning the union of one man and one woman. Unless his comments and intentions aim to exclude members of the United Church, the Unitarian Church, the Metropolitan Community Church of Toronto and the Liberal Judaism of the corpus politis in Quebec and Canada, I think he should come back to the House and say that this is not true. A great many denominations are in favour of this.

Also, I have rarely, if ever, heard a valid and strong argument against allowing same sex marriage. Who can say that two spouses of the same sex have no feelings for one another and cannot promise mutual support and fidelity to one another? Furthermore, I do not believe that, if they are unfaithful, they are any more or less unfaithful than heterosexuals.

We often hear that a man and woman who are a couple complement one another.

Take my own marriage as an example. When I got married, I did not sign a collective agreement. No one said, “this is women's work and that men's work”. How each half of the couple complements the other half will vary from one couple to the next, and this is true of both heterosexual and homosexual couples.

I have a very simple example. At my house, the tools belong to my wife. It might seem unusual, but many people think that complementing each other means that the man does the manual labour and the woman does other things. But I am all thumbs. I am horrible at fixing things. My wife, however, is not bad at it.

So, how we complement one another is not based on the fact that she is a woman and that I am a man, but simply on the fact that we are two people who love each other and who want our marriage to work. This includes dividing the labour between us. How the labour is divided varies from one heterosexual couple to the next, and I am sure that it varies from one homosexual couple to the next. Sexuality has nothing to do with it.

Then there is the argument of procreation, which has been raised so often. First of all, it is incorrect to say that homosexual couples cannot have children, because they are able to adopt. Second, there are technologies that can enable them to have children.

Yesterday we met a charming young man at the press conference of the Quebec Coalition for Same-sex Relationship Recognition. Robby has two mothers and yet has absolutely no psychological problems. Some claim that children with two parents of the same sex will have all kinds of problems. This is a well-adjusted young man, intelligent and well-spoken, who strikes me as being perfectly healthy. I mention this just to show that now same sex couples can have children.

The other issue raised by this matter of procreation, or reproduction, is whether this is the primary objective of marriage. If so, what about heterosexual couples who cannot have children? Would women past menopause or heterosexual men who are impotent not have the right to marry also? No one would want to take away their right to marry because they cannot have children.

So it is wrong to say that the primary objective of marriage is reproduction, procreation, unless consistency is applied and an expiration date is assigned: “If you have no children by such and such a date, your marriage is invalid.” There must be consistency.

In conclusion, contrary to what the leader of the Canadian Alliance says, it is a matter of human rights. It is a matter of fundamental justice. The only way parliamentarians can prevent same sex couples from marrying is to do away with their rights, and those rights are recognized by the courts.

It is all very well to skate around the issue, but the crux of the matter is this: are we prepared, as parliamentarians—regardless of what we think of homosexuals and their relationships—to do away with their fundamental rights. If we go that route, and do away with the rights of that minority, then which minority will be next?

My wish in closing is for my five-year-olds to grow up in a society that is open and generous, not merely tolerant, a society which accepts and embraces difference. In voting against this motion, we will make it possible for them to grow up to vote in such a society.

[Criminal Code, September 15th, 2003]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to initiate, on behalf of the Bloc Quebecois, the debate on Bill C-45 sponsored by the Minister of Justice and dealing with criminal liability of organizations.

Hon. members will recall that this bill was introduced at the very end of last spring's session, when the leadership crisis within the Liberal Party of Canada was at its peak.

At that time, people may have wondered just how far the government might go to get its bills through. The answer to that question provided today is pretty revealing.

It seems that the government will try anything it can to curb controversy, in order to keep a lid on the tensions within the Liberal caucus and the divisions within the government. As a result, it will opt as much as possible for passing legislative measures that will gain the support of the House and not stir up any debate.

That said, the odds are pretty good that the government leader will attempt to minimize the untenable situation his party finds itself in, and it is possible that we will not sit beyond November 7, the date of the coronation of the member for LaSalle—Émard as leader of the Liberal Party of Canada.

In the meantime, however, it is important for us to do our jobs conscientiously, because the Liberals do not seem to be on top of their game, and they have lost sight of our primary role: to legislate.

Coming back to the bill of concern to us today, I will state at the outset that the Bloc Quebecois will be supporting this amendment to the Criminal Code, and will also be in favour of its prompt passage in order to address an important ethical aspect in the role of corporations and organizations.

The objective of Bill C-45 is, in fact, to carry out an indepth review of the principles of law governing the liability of corporations and other associations of persons for all criminal offences.

It must be kept in mind that Bill C-45 is the outcome, first and foremost, of the efforts of ordinary members of this House and not an initiative by the government, which has put off taking action for a long time, too long we might say.

Before offering a historical overview, it would be worthwhile making reference to the findings of the public inquiry into the causes of the explosion that took place at the Westray mine in Nova Scotia.

This explosion, which took place several years ago, as hon. members will recall, left 26 men dead. The public inquiry revealed that the tragedy was in large part caused by the negligence of the bosses, who had turned a blind eye to some serious safety problems.

Thus, as I said, the government's inertia in enacting legislation is balanced by the tenacity of some members in trying to get substantial legislative changes passed so that such a situation cannot happen again, or, at the very least, there is a form of criminal recourse if a similar unfortunate tragedy were ever to take place.

The purpose of these private members' bills was to establish and clearly set out, under certain circumstances, the criminal liability of corporations for the errors of neglect or criminal intent committed by their directors or employees, and to create a new category of offence in the Criminal Code, with respect to companies that fail to provide a safe workplace for their employees.

Similarly, in June of 1999, a motion was brought forward to amend the Criminal Code and other federal legislation so that the directors and officers of a company would be held responsible for workplace safety.

At that time, the Bloc Quebecois supported the motion, but when Parliament was dissolved the motion was deferred. Since then, similar motions have been presented three times to the House, but the government, unfortunately, has dragged its feet until now.

Many similar bills have been introduced in recent years, and I think it is important to remind the House of the position taken in 2001 by my hon. colleague for Laurentides, with respect to Bill C-284.

In fact, the Bloc Quebecois supported passage of Bill C-284, but we also pointed out that in Quebec, an organization already exists, called the Commission de la Santé et de la Sécurité au Travail, or CSST, whose mandate is to ensure the safety of employees in the workplace.

Similarly, also in relation to that bill, we maintained that it was essential to adopt the proposal so as, legally, to establish a method of redress and to strengthen the Criminal Code, in order to prevent loss of life among workers.

The Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights also held public hearings on this matter in the spring of 2002; it recommended and I quote:

That the Government table in the House legislation to deal with the criminal liability of corporations, officers and directors.

The government's concrete response to the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights and the ongoing efforts of members have resulted in Bill C-45, of which we are proud. We regret the delay, but the adoption of Bill C-45 will be our just reward.

This bill to amend the Criminal Code before the House contains eight key points that I want to list for my hon. colleagues and those interested in this matter.

The main changes pertain, first, to the use of the term “organization”, rather than “corporation”. This will broaden the definition, thereby affecting more institutions.

Second, companies can now be held criminally liable for the acts of their employees who are not necessarily in positions of authority or, as they are commonly referred to, the “higher ups”.

Third, the material aspect—the act of committing a crime—and the moral aspect—the intent to commit a crime, the mens rea —of criminal offences attributed to companies and other organizations no longer need be the work of the same person.

Fourth, the category of persons whose acts or omissions can constitute the material aspect, meaning the criminal act which can be attributed to a corporation or any other organization, is broadened to include all employees, representatives or contractors.

Fifth, with regard to crimes resulting from negligence, generally referred to as criminal negligence, the fault can now be attributed to the organization to the extent that one of the senior officers of the organization can be charged with the offence.

In the case of deliberate crimes, an organization can now be held responsible for the actions of its senior officers to the extent that a senior officer is party to the offence, directs other employees to commit an offence or, knowing that an offence will be committed by other employees, does nothing to prevent it.

It is important to clarify, nonetheless, that the acts or actions of senior officers must be committed with the specific purpose of procuring an advantage for the organization.

Similarly, the bill is designed to place the onus explicitly on anyone who undertakes to direct the work of other employees to take all reasonable steps to prevent bodily harm to these employees.

Finally, the bill also contains provisions for establishing general sentencing principles and probation conditions in respect of the organizations.

Before going any further in our deliberations on Bill C-45, it should be noted that in our justice system it is essentially jurisprudence that determines the conditions under which a company can be held responsible for a criminal offence.

In criminal offences that require culpable intent or intent to commit a crime, companies are only responsible for acts or omissions by people who may be said to constitute the directing mind of the company. In order for a company to be found guilty of an offence with culpable intent, it must be shown that the individual who materially committed the criminal act in the performance of his duties had implicitly or explicitly been given the authority to write policies for the company and to oversee their implementation.

For each situation, the court must decide whether the individual who committed the criminal act in the performance of his duties can be deemed the directing mind of the company. This is commonly referred to as the identification theory.

Ultimately, we are entitled to believe and maintain that, based on this approach, individuals who are the directing mind of the company personify the intentions of the company.

I could also enter into a technical argument justifying our support of Bill C-45, but I will settle for merely pointing out that this bill defines an organization as including a public body, body corporate, society,company, firm, partnership, tradeunion or municipality. Thus the term organization also includes any association of persons created for a common purpose, which has an operational structure and holds itself out to the public as such.

The main intent of the bill is to broaden the category of individuals whose actions and intentions may engage criminal responsibility of the organizations they represent. Therefore a differentiation will be made between two groups of individuals, namely representatives and senior officers, whose conduct may constitute a criminal offence attributable to an organization.

Thus a representative includes essentially any person who works on behalf of an organization or is affiliated with it, which generally means a director, partner, employee,member, agent or contractor of the organization. In this view, a senior officer means a representative who plays an important role in the establishment of the organization's policies or is responsible for managing an important aspect of the organization's activities.

The effect of this new designation will be to change the present state of the law by introducing new elements to the theory of identification.

It is also proposed to add sections to and expand existing sections of the Criminal Code to take into account in sentencing a reality peculiar to organizations. The same goes for the definition of specific conditions of probation applicable to organizations.

Once passed, Bill C-45 will increase from $25,000 to $100,000 the maximum fine for an organization under summary conviction or convicted of lesser offences.

There is currently no limit set on the maximum amounts of fines for criminal acts or more serious offences, a situation that the proposed legislation does not address. However, the bill specifies factors the court will have to take into account in setting the amount of fines.

For example, the courts will have to take into account aggravating factors such as the degree of planning and any financial advantage realized by the organization as a result of the offence or, conversely, mitigating factors such as efforts made by the organization to reduce risks.

Before concluding, I want to reiterate the support of the Bloc Quebecois for the principle of Bill C-45 at this stage of the legislative process. The committee stage will also provide an opportunity to consider further the proposed legislation and, above all, ensure once and for all that there are no loopholes organizations can use to abdicate their responsibilities.

I remind the House that the current state of the law forces us to establish a regime of criminal responsibility for businesses that is effective and takes into account the differences between an individual and an organization. I also look forward to hearing what my hon.colleagues have to say on this matter. I remain convinced that we will be able to pass this legislation with diligence for the benefit of our fellow citizens thanks to, among other things, the evidence we will be hearing in the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights.

[Question No. 36, September 15th, 2003]

What, in detail, are all of the options being considered regarding the fate of the Quebec City office of the Meteorological Service of Canada (MSC) related to the process to centralize operations, and with respect to this process: ( a ) are there plans to close the office; ( b ) what other options are being considered and have they been studied according to their economic impact, and if so, what would this impact be; ( c ) what kind of consultations have there been with the people who would be affected and what conclusions have been drawn from these consultations; ( d ) how have MSC employees been consulted and what conclusions have been drawn from these consultations; ( e ) what was the whole decision-making process that led to this possible decision to centralize services; ( f ) what are the minister’s intentions with respect to the jobs that would be affected and what types of measures are being planned for those who would be affected (transfers, layoffs, retirement, etc.); ( g ) how much is expected to be saved by closing the Quebec City office of the MSC; ( h ) how much is expected to be saved by all of the other options under consideration; ( i ) when was the Minister of the Environment informed of the department’s intentions to consider closing the Quebec City office of the MSC; and ( j ) what would be the impact on the immediate transmission of meteorological data to the people of the region of Quebec City in general, and to the media in particular?

[Justice, June 13th, 2003]

Mr. Speaker, since Tuesday, many same-sex marriages have been performed. These marriages are perfectly legal and are binding today. The legal situation across Canada is however uncertain, and the federal government must clarify this situation.

When will the government do the right thing by clearly stating that this matter has been resolved, that same-sex couples have the same rights as heterosexual couples throughout Canada and that, from this day forward, they are entitled to marry?

[Justice, June 13th, 2003]

Mr. Speaker, yesterday, the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights passed a motion in support of broadening marriage to include same-sex couples. The courts have spoken, now Parliament has spoken as well.

Will the government pledge to put an end to its attempts at obstruction and not to appeal the decisions of the courts of appeal of Ontario and British Columbia?

[Justice, June 12th, 2003]

Mr. Speaker, appeal courts in British Columbia and Ontario, as well as the Superior Court of Quebec, have all ruled that preventing same-sex couples from marrying is unacceptable and discriminatory in a free and democratic society.

In light of the new ruling brought down by the Court of Appeal for Ontario in favour of the right of gays and lesbians to equality, will the Minister of Justice promise not to appeal this decision?