Richard Marceau

[Supply, May 8th, 2003]

Mr. Speaker, I hope this is a translation problem, because to suggest that I could condone pornography in any manner whatsoever is very dangerous; it is a very slippery road to go down. I do hope the problem is with the translation, and that the member did not say or suggest, whether directly or indirectly, that I condone child pornography in any way. I think it must be made clear.

I think that child pornography is wrong. I think that we must fight it any way we can. I think that one way we can do it is indeed to through the police and technological means. I will repeat, and the member said so herself, these are sick individuals; if they are sick, let us try to heal them. Let us look for a cure like we do for cancer, through research. But the fact that we do research on cancer does not mean that we are for cancer. Similarly, studying child pornography, its causes and deviances, does not mean that we are for child pornography, far from it. Just the opposite.

I hope that I made myself clear this time, be it in French or in English, translation or no translation.

[Supply, May 8th, 2003]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to begin by thanking the member for White Rose for his question and to tell him that I have absolutely no doubt of his desire to protect children. This is an issue that is very close to my heart, being the father of a 5-year-old boy.

In order to show where our opinions diverge, however, let us look at the following example. A psychiatrist or psychologist is trying to study pedophiles' attraction to children. To do so he needs written or pictorial material created by a pornographer in order to provide care to the mentally ill persons involved in pornography and in order to investigate what make this sexual deviant a danger to the children in our society.

Would what the hon. member is proposing—and this is what I want to question in committee as well—deprive researchers and scientists of the possibility of studying this phenomenon in order to combat it?

We can, of course, fight the spread of child pornography, via the Internet in particular, with the help of law enforcement officers and specially developed technologies. This is being done, of course, but it is also important to get to the source of the problem, not just the causes. Not only must the symptoms be addressed, but work must also be done directly with the dangerous offenders that are the source of the problem. If they are to be able to do this, our researchers, our doctors, psychiatrists and psychologists must have access to the tools required.

As a result, this will be an issue I will be wanting to pursue when the bill is debated in committee, so that our children will be protected today and in the future. There may be a way to provide these people with the treatment they so badly need, and thereby to provide our children with the protection they also need.

[Supply, May 8th, 2003]

Mr. Speaker, I usually begin a speech by saying that I am pleased to speak on a certain subject, but today, I must admit, I am not pleased with the motion. In fact, I find it rather ridiculous. I think it is unfortunate and I will explain why, that we are spending so much time—a whole day—on a motion that is not even votable.

First, it is obvious that my political party is not a great admirer of the Canadian Constitution. Not only are we sovereignists, who want to get out of the Constitution rather than amend it, but also, most importantly, we believe that the Canadian Constitution, especially in its 1982 form, is illegitimate. It was imposed on Quebec. We remember the “night of the long knives”. No Quebec government since 1981 has wanted to sign this Constitution which was imposed by a conspiracy involving the federal government and the governments of nine Canadian provinces. I think that is the first essential point we wish to make.

My second point—and I will speak to the three points raised by the hon. members of the Canadian Alliance—is the following. In the motion, we are asked to bring in measures to reassert the will of Parliament. I then have the following question: where do the will and business of committees come in?

Let us begin with the first point, the definition of marriage.The Standing Committee on Justice, of which I am a member, is working very hard on this issue, and has been doing so since January. We have heard witnesses in Ottawa, Vancouver, Edmonton, Moose Jaw, Steinbach, Sudbury, Toronto, Montreal, Iqaluit, Sussex, New Brunswick, and Halifax. We are working on it.

So, what is the Alliance trying to do? It is trying to set aside the work of the committee by presenting such a motion. The Alliance, which prides itself on being very democratic, and which commended the democratic process chosen by the committee in going to consult the people across Canada, now comes here with this motion, saying in effect, “Never mind the hundreds of witnesses we have heard; never mind the hundreds of briefs they have submitted; never mind the honourable work done by all the hon. members from all political parties who sit on this committee; none of them matter”.

I am a bit frustrated that the House is being told today that the adopted definition and other things are being threatened, when the Standing Committee on Justice is addressing this very issue. I am sorry to have to say this, but this is an obvious example of the Alliance's lack of respect for this committee's work. By presenting this kind of motion today, it is showing a lack of respect.

On the definition of marriage, the government has said, given the three decisions by the lower courts, that Parliament must address this issue. A discussion paper has been provided to the members and is available to the general public. The public has been asked to tell us what it thinks about the four options.

It will not come as a surprise when I say that, of the four options presented by the government, two are unconstitutional due to the division of powers.

One of the four options is allowing civil unions. However, I would remind members that, under section 91.26 of the Constitution Act, 1867, the federal government has jurisdiction over marriage and divorce, and the provinces and Quebec have jurisdiction over all other matters relating to family law. This means, for example, that anything Parliament wants to do relating to family law, if it does not concern marriage or divorce, falls outside this Parliament's jurisdiction. For marriage, Parliament has jurisdiction only over its basic conditions. So, the idea of civil unions must be set aside based on the division of powers.

The other option is for the state to withdraw from marriage and leave this up to organized religion. Persons solemnizing marriages in the provinces get their licence from the provinces. For example, in Quebec, priests, rabbis or imams solemnizing marriages are officers of civil status. Consequently, it is not up to Parliament to tell Quebec and the provinces who has the power to solemnize the union of two people. So, these two options must be set aside given the division of powers.

The committee therefore has to choose between keeping the current definition of marriage—in other words, the union of one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all others—or changing the definition. On this, I would simply like to point out that the courts, such as the British Columbia Court of Appeal most recently, have ruled that the current definition is discriminatory and that this is not justifiable in a free and democratic society.

People can complain as much as they want, they can criticize this idea of judicial review, they can do whatever they want. The fact is that the principle of judicial review forms the very foundation of how our democracy operates. I will remind the House that this idea in Canada goes back to an old principle adopted by Chief Justice Marshall of the U.S. Supreme Court, in 1835. Canada could not use the example of the British Constitution because it is unwritten, so this notion of judicial review came from the United States.

As I was saying, they can complain about it and criticize it, but the fact is that today our society operates this way. This is the constitutional arrangement that we have set up. Being a sovereignist, I hope that when Quebec becomes independent, we will also have some way of protecting minorities from decisions of the majority. I also hope that the constitution of an independent Quebec will contain a judicial review process. This a key element for the rule of law and one of the fundamental elements for healthy democracy.

That was the first point. The second point refers to house arrest for child sexual predators, which allows them to produce and possess child pornography. Obviously, as a father of young children, I completely agree with all those who defend children as our greatest resource and say that we must protect them. That seems quite obvious to me. I think it is unfortunate that they would play politics on this by accusing other member of the House of not having the interests of children at heart.

I have been in politics for 15 years now, and I was elected almost six years ago now. I have no hesitation whatsoever in saying that there is not one person in this House, from any of the five different political parties here, that does not have the interests of children at heart. No one can say that.

It is all right to criticize the government's approach, for the opposition parties to criticize each other, but to say that someone in this House does not have children's interests and protection at heart is bad faith and demagoguery. In politics, I believe demagoguery always backfires on the one who uses it.

We are all aware that this part of the motion by the Canadian Alliance refers to the Supreme Court judgment in Sharpe , with which the members of this House are rather familiar. Apparently, the Alliance was upset by two particular aspects of this judgment. First, the Court's interpretation of the defence of artistic merit. In fact, a large part of the decision was taken up with this. The court interpreted this defence as follows:

I conclude that “artistic merit” should be interpreted as including any expression that may reasonably be viewed as art. Any objectively established artistic value, however small, suffices to support the defence. Simply put, artists, so long as they are producing art, should not fear prosecution under s. 163.1(4).

This judgment indicates that two types of material must be excluded from the definition of child pornography:

(1) written materials or visual representations created and held by the accused alone, exclusively for personal use; and (2) visual recordings created by or depicting the accused that do not depict unlawful sexual activity and are held by the accused exclusively for private use.

We presume that the text of the motion refers to one of the above two points, although I cannot read the minds of our Alliance colleagues. Since I have trouble understanding the intervention by the Alliance, however, I must base my intervention on a premise, and this is the one I have chosen.

We have trouble understanding how the Alliance could apparently overlook the fact that the government introduced a bill last December 5 that was specifically aimed at amending the Criminal Code as it relates to child pornography. The amendments proposed by the government address precisely those two aspects. They are the focus of the bill.

First, there is a proposal for a new public good defence and, moreover, the bill tightens up the definition of child pornography, which will cover aspects it did not use to cover.

While we in the Bloc Quebecois question the constitutionality of such a change to the definition of child pornography, we intend to do serious work in committee, considering the proposed changes and listening to testimonies in this regard.

I think much greater respect for parliamentary procedure and for Parliament per se would have been shown, had committee work taken place before such a motion were put forward. The Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights should have been given an opportunity to hear testimony from victims, lawyers, constitutional experts, peace officers, and artists before such a motion was put forward.

We believe that studying Bill C-20 in that environment will allow a much more serious and intelligent consideration of the issues raised in part (b) of the motion with respect to child pornography than the present debate does.

I will now address conditional sentences. Naturally, we deal with many things, and cannot deal with everything at once. But again, I would like to remind the House that the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights is considering conditional sentences and that we are not done putting our recommendations together.

Once again, for the third time in as many points, if the Canadian Alliance wants to be respectful of the legislative process and Parliament, it should do a good job in committee.

The Alliance should make sure it does its work in committee thoroughly, seriously and studiously, instead of presenting a motion such as this.

The Alliance motion is probably referring to the Supreme Court decision in R. v. L.F.W. In that case, the Attorney General appealed a conditional sentence of 21 months given to an offender convicted of indecent assault and gross indecency.

In this case, the offences were committed between 1967 and 1973 and the complaint was filed in 1995. At the time the offences began, the victim was six years old and the accused was 22.

The Supreme Court was divided in its decision but the Attorney General's appeal was rejected.

The Bloc is of the opinion that trial judges and courts should have all possible latitude in determining sentences for each case they hear, on a case-by-case basis.

They are in the best position to determine sentences. Any given sentence does not have the same impact on everyone; the impact varies from one person to another. In committee, I raised certain other questions—sometimes by questioning the witnesses—that we will continue to raise and to examine as part of the committee's business. Instead of holding a debate here on a non-votable opposition motion, a motion that is all over the place and serves as a sounding board for the Canadian Alliance, it would have been more appropriate to do this work in committee, and do it more seriously.

I see that I have only three minutes left. I have so much to say in such a short time. To conclude, I will talk about granting prisoners the right to vote.

In the case of Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer)—a 2002 decision—the Supreme Court of Canada was asked to rule on the constitutionality of section 51 of the Canada Elections Act, which disqualifies persons imprisoned in correctional institutions serving sentences of two years or more from voting in federal elections.

The issue the Court considered in this case was the following: does this provision infringe the rights guaranteed by section 3, namely the right to vote, and section 15, equality rights, of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?

The court, and this is important to remember since it is obviously a difficult subject for both parliamentarians and judges alike, overturned the previous decision by five to four. The majority opinion, signed by Justice McLachlin, ruled that the right to vote is fundamental in our society and cannot be lightly set aside.

The court found that to deny prisoners the right to vote is to lose an important means of teaching them democratic values and social responsibility. That is the purpose of sending people to prison, to tell them, “You have done something wrong. We want to rehabilitate you so you do not stay in prison for the rest of your life”. At least, I hope that no one in this House wants to see anyone remain in prison for life without any chance of getting out and becoming a full-fledged, law-abiding, responsible citizen who will find a job and contribute to society.

The government's novel political theory that would permit elected representatives to disenfranchise a segment of the population finds no place in a democracy built upon principles of inclusiveness, equality, and citizen participation.

The court adds that the argument that only those who respect the law should participate in the political process is unacceptable. Denial of the right to vote on the basis of attributed moral unworthiness is inconsistent with the respect for the dignity of every person that lies at the heart of Canadian democracy and the Charter.

The court ruled in the Sauvé decision that the Canada Elections Act provision denying the right to vote to inmates serving a sentence of two years or more infringed section 3 of the Charter and was not justified under section 1.

The Bloc believes that it is not appropriate to seek to amend this decision. Furthermore, it should be noted that inmates already had the right to vote in provincial and municipal elections in some provinces, including in Quebec.

In closing, I think that this is a waste of time, that this motion is badly structured, and that it shows a lack of respect for the committees, particularly the justice committee, which is working on three of the four issues mentioned in the Alliance motion.

[Appointment of Judges, May 6th, 2003]

Madam Speaker, the hon. member is right in saying that Madam Deschamps has excellent credentials. Nevertheless, there are doubts in certain minds and that is what must be eliminated.

I am sure that, had there been another process, had it not been left solely to the Prime Minister's discretion, Madam Justice Deschamps would very likely still have been appointed to the Supreme Court. There would not, however, have been that doubt in people's minds, because it would have been seen as an impartial and independent decision.

[Appointment of Judges, May 6th, 2003]

Madam Speaker, thank you for your suggestion. Nevertheless, my hon. colleague for Provencher has asked an excellent question that deserved to be raised. Of course, he knows very well what I think about federalism. No doubt, he knows that my political goal is not to improve the Canadian federation but to get out of it.

That said, he is, in fact, right about the various hypotheses raised. Furthermore, a member from his party had raised a very similar question in a debate I took part in a few weeks ago.

Yes, there are several possible avenues, such as having an independent tribunal consider the qualifications of appointees. The Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights could very well do this. Parliamentarians could be asked to play a role.

As to the popular argument that if changes are made to how judges are appointed, this will take away from the judiciary's independence and its appearance of independence in Canada, I think that the complete opposite is true. Now, people wonder when a former president of the Quebec wing of the Liberal Party of Quebec gets appointed. Rightly or wrongly, they wonder already.

In closing, since I know that many members want to ask questions, I want to emphasize that the doubt in people's minds does more harm to the judiciary in Canada, which has an increasingly important role in defining our public policies, than another more impartial, independent and, at the very least, non-partisan process would.

[Appointment of Judges, May 6th, 2003]

moved:

That the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights study the process by which judges are appointed to Courts of Appeal and to the Supreme Court of Canada.

Madam Speaker, it is with great pleasure that I rise to begin debate on Motion No. 288 which I have the honour to sponsor and which I had the honour of introducing in the House.

I would be remiss if I did not express my happiness with the recent changes in our rules of procedure that will allow this motion to be voted on at the end of the debate.

In fact, it was regrettable that a number of important issues, some as important as and some even more important than government motions presented to this House, were not subject to debate and especially to a vote in this House.

In our system of government, I believe it is equally important for members of all parties, including the opposition, to cause the other hon. members to state their opinions on issues of concern to them. Therefore, I want to stress the importance of this new way of proceeding in the House, which cannot help but better reflect the institution's democratic nature.

For the benefit of my hon. colleagues and the audience in the public galleries and at home, I would like to repeat the actual words of my motion, which is quite simple. It reads as follows:

That the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights study the process by which judges are appointed to Courts of Appeal and to the Supreme Court of Canada.

It is not complicated; it is simple and direct. There is no partisan intent in it. That is why I ask my hon. colleagues to listen carefully to the reasons behind this motion.

As the hon. members know, there is an old principle in English law, in the common law, that justice must not only be done, it must be seen to be done. The purpose of this principle, the very foundation of our justice system, is to maintain the highest possible level of public confidence in the judiciary. The current process of appointing judges, however, is in direct conflict with this principle, and clouds the image of justice.

There are many examples to support this statement. Two relatively recent cases are of particular interest and I would like to share them with the House.

Last summer, the Prime Minister appointed Justice Michel Robert, who had served on the Quebec Court of Appeal since 1995, to the position of chief justice for Quebec. This is a very important position, if ever there was one, in Quebec's judicial system.

The Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada announced, on August 8, the appointment of the Honourable Marie Deschamps, a judge of the Quebec Court of Appeal, to the Supreme Court of Canada.

These two individuals are, no doubt, preceded by an enviable legal reputation, which therefore surely justifies their appointment to such important positions. However—since justice must be seen to be done —it is reasonable to wonder, as members—and the general public will not hesitate to make its views known—whether their appointment has anything to do with their commitment to the Liberal Party of Canada or their connections to the latter.

Members are no doubt aware that Justice Robert presided over the Liberal Party of Canada from 1986 to 1990 under John Turner and contributed, apparently, to his fall. The Prime Minister would therefore have good reason to reward him. Bear this in mind.

Justice Marie Deschamps is the spouse of Paul Gobeil, former minister under Robert Bourassa's Liberal government in Quebec from 1985 to 1989, who still has ties to the Quebec Liberal Party.

These two examples seem to show or at least clearly suggest politicization of the courts. In today's society, this politicization or this appearance of politicization, even a hint of it, can seriously jeopardize the public's respect for the courts and the judiciary.

If we consider the important role of the courts today, particularly given their greater duties, if only due to appeals related to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, or their involvement in the evolution of various social debates such as same-sex marriage, aboriginal claims and the decriminalization of marijuana, we must avoid at all costs any association between the judiciary and the political arm.

All the more so because these judges, who are not elected as we know, make decisions which have an increasing impact on the creation of public policy in Canada and sometimes go beyond what Parliament might have wished.

This is an argument of some weight in favour of a review and democratization of the process of appointing judges, which unfortunately some will surely criticize. But we must resist and we must hold this debate. It is very likely that the public will back us up on this, on our position that the entire matter needs to be looked into, and I trust that my colleagues in the Liberal Party over there, particularly those backing the member for LaSalle—Émard in the race to succeed the Prime Minister, will do likewise.

I am making a solemn appeal to my colleagues across the way. Let them keep their eyes and ears open and especially let them not jump to a conclusion too hastily. I hope that the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Justice whom I see here, and with whom I had the opportunity to work on the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, will not take a dogmatic stand and will instead agree to a serious study, as we had moreover in connection with same-sex partners, an issue of equal importance for Canada.

I would like to remind him, and all members of the Liberal Party that the hon. member for LaSalle—Émard said the following in his speech to the students of the University of Toronto's prestigious Osgoode Hall:

—we should reform the process surrounding government appointments.The unfettered powers of appointment enjoyed by a prime minister are too great... Such authority must be checked by reasonable scrutinyconducted by Parliament in a transparent fashion...To avoid paralysis, the ultimate decision over appointments should remain with thegovernment. But a healthy opportunity should be afforded for the qualificationsof candidates to be reviewed, by the appropriate standing committee, before finalconfirmation.

The member for LaSalle—Émard could not be any clearer about the importance he assigned—and I trust still does, but we shall see whether he sticks to his opinion when it comes to the vote—to having a more democratic and more transparent process.

At the time he was referring to senior public servants, to ambassadors.

None of these senior positions that he would like to subject to parliamentary review, none of these ambassadors or senior officials, will have as much impact on public policy as appeal court judges or judges of the Supreme Court of Canada.

We could go on at great length about the current appointment processes for provincial and territorial superior court judges, for Federal Court judges, or for judges at the Tax Court of Canada, because there are specific criteria that must be filled for these appointments.

However, as members know, when it comes to appointments to appeal courts and to the Supreme Court, subjectivity reigns. In fact, there is no clear and precise process in place for the appointment of these judges.

The entire process is left to the discretion of the Prime Minister, with input from the Minister of Justice. It is strange that appointments to lower judicial appointments are more structured than appointments to these higher courts, such as the appeal courts and the Supreme Court.

The purpose of the motion I have moved is to refer to the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights the mandate of studying the issue and reporting the findings of our consultations and deliberations to the House. I am not asking anyone to take a stand or to take any position at this point. I am simply asking members to keep an open mind and to allow the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights to look into the details of this issue.

It is possible that once we have looked into this matter, we may find that it is preferable to leave the situation as is, or that a reform of judicial appointments to the highest Canadian courts is advisable. We must not shy away from this debate. We must put it all out on the table. Let us look at it and study the situation without any predetermined ideas.

This is a substantive issue that is critical for the old common law principle that I mentioned in my introduction, regarding justice and the appearance of justice. It is up to us as parliamentarians to promote public confidence in our institutions and this mission must include our legal system.

We could just quote a number of articles published in newspapers, which clearly show what the public thinks of the current process. In La Presse of June 28, 2002, Yves Boisvert commented on the appointment of Michel Robert in an article entitled “Patronage Appointment”.

On June 29, 2002, The Gazette published an editorial under the headline “Who's to Judge”. I encourage my hon. colleagues to read these articles. There is also an article published in the National Post on July 2, 2002, admonishing, “Don't politicize courts”. Then there was the London Free Press , asking parliamentarians to “Review the Appointments”.

We can see from these various editorial policies that the public is worried, that it would like a process that is more transparent, which would assure the people of Quebec and Canada that the nominees to positions as appeal or supreme court judges are not appointed because of their connections to the ruling political party.

In closing, I urge all the members of this House, and those from the government party in particular, to allow parliamentarians to examine this question, and not take a position right away. Let us examine the question. Give us parliamentarians this opportunity to review the process to ensure that judges are not treated as politicians and that there is an opportunity to consider the appointments.

[An Act to amend the Criminal Code (cruelty to animals and firearms) and the Firearms Act, May 6th, 2003]

Madam Speaker, I want to thank the hon. member for Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine for her question.

Briefly, I would like to say that those ideologically opposed remained opposed, naturally. But before this scandal and before the Auditor General pointed a finger at the Liberal government's incompetence, they were preaching in the desert so to speak. It had gone under the radar. Nobody was really talking about it. Yes, there was discontent in certain quarters. However, overall, it was relatively well accepted in Canadian society as a whole, despite some resistance.

What the Liberal government has achieved through its incompetence is get it splashed over the front pages of the newspapers again. The ideological opponents took that opportunity to say, “See, we were right. It makes no sense. Not only does this program make no sense, but any form of gun control management is bound to result in this kind of overspending”. That is precisely what I criticize the federal government for.

They could have gone on being opposed and preaching in the desert, but this scandal and the government's incompetence have provided them with a wonderful forum to attack the principle of gun control.

[An Act to amend the Criminal Code (cruelty to animals and firearms) and the Firearms Act, May 6th, 2003]

Madam Speaker, while members are trying to have a democratic debate in the House, how ironic that the Parliamentary Secretary to the Solicitor General would deny me the right to say not only what I think of that other place, but also what I think of the time allocation motion.

This is a good example of the attitude of the Liberal government and the Liberals in general with respect to how the House operates.

I was saying then, to answer my hon. colleague from the Canadian Alliance, that unlike his party—and he knows this; we have agreed to disagree—we support gun control in principle; his party does not.

The problem we have raised many times, is that, due to its incompetence and bad management, the Liberal government has given strength to the bill's ideological opponents, to those philosophically opposed to the very principle of gun control. This point is raised over and over when people say they agree in principle.

Unfortunately, the government's actions and how it has managed the program have raised many questions in our minds. This is what is so sad about how the government has managed this whole program.

[An Act to amend the Criminal Code (cruelty to animals and firearms) and the Firearms Act, May 6th, 2003]

Madam Speaker, I thank the hon. member for Prince George—Peace River for his question. First, I would like to comment on how ironic it is that what we are dealing with in this debate is an unelected and undemocratic chamber trying to impose the splitting of a bill, while here in the House of Commons, which ought to be the democratic counterbalance to the other place, we are again having imposed upon us a time allocation motion, thereby depriving members of the privileges they ought to be entitled to as elected representatives within a representative democracy.

[An Act to amend the Criminal Code (cruelty to animals and firearms) and the Firearms Act, May 6th, 2003]

Madam Speaker, I very much appreciate the calming effect you have on the House. I will try to follow your lead, after the outburst from my colleague, the member for Wild Rose.

I rise to speak to this bill, consideration of which began a long time ago. In fact, the government tried, unsuccessfully, to pass what is now known as Bill C-10 during the previous Parliament, and since then has had to contend with a variety of problems of a procedural nature, and let us say it, some related to political leadership.

It is unusual that at this stage in the debate the Senate is asking the House to split the bill. Of course, this bill was passed by the House at third reading and referred to the Senate for its consideration. The Senate's wish to split the bill in two, at this advanced stage in the legislative process, seems to be bizarre, and may not even be permissible.

So, we would like to point out the particularly eloquent relevance—I never thought I would hear myself saying this in the House—of the amendment to the motion before us, submitted by our colleague from the Canadian Alliance. The amendment reads as follows:

That the motion be amended by deleting all the words after the word “That” and substituting the following:

“, in relation to the amendments made by the Senate to Bill C-10, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (cruelty to animals and firearms) and the Firearms Act, this House does not concur with the Senate's division of the Bill into two parts, namely, Bill C-10A, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (firearms) and the Firearms Act, and Bill C-10B, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (cruelty to animals), since it is the view of this House that such alteration to Bill C-10 by the Senate is an infringement of the rights and privileges of the House of Commons; and

That this House asks that the Senate consider Bill C-10 in an undivided form; and

That a Message be sent to the Senate to acquaint Their Honours therewith.”

Members will recall that this controversial legislation was already split by Bills C-15A and C-15B during the first session of the 37th Parliament.

On December 5, the Chair heard a lengthy point of order on the issue of dividing the bill. In our opinion, the Senate is overstepping its powers by again proposing division of the bill.

According to the procedures and practices of the House of Commons, the Senate has no power to make any orders at all to the House; at most, it may make suggestions.

We all know that the upper chamber, the Senate, is non-democratic in nature. We realize that those who sit in the other place are appointed by the Prime Minister. That is a quite incredible form of nepotism in an advanced democracy such as ours. In short, it is unacceptable that unelected people, friends of the party and particularly friends of the Prime Minister, can come and tell us what to do here in the House where the elected representatives of the people sit, the 301 men and women who were elected by the people of Quebec and Canada.

I am very surprised that we can accept such proceedings in a representative democracy, such as Canada claims to be. It should be the duty of every elected member in this House to tell the hon. senators, “You have no right to do what you are doing. You have no right to tell the House of Commons, with its elected members, what to do”.

This wake-up call is too late for the Senate. Could it be a deliberate stalling tactic by the government in order to prevent passage of this bill? Considering the prevailing climate in the Liberal caucus—as we saw during question period, the shots are flying; serious divisions are being aggravated by such things as the leadership race—anything is possible.

Dividing the bill in two does not change anything in the Bloc Quebecois's stated position.

As we address the tricky issue of cruelty to animals, the arguments invoked by the various points of view must inevitably collide.

On one hand, there are the powerful lobbies, some with a position that is a bit extreme and, on the other hand, there are more reasonable groups that make a real contribution to the public debate by presenting very specific arguments.

However, the major coups of groups in the first category have the unfortunate and overly frequent consequence of lumping together all the animal rights activists. The government is being forced to retreat by some of these groups due to a lack of leadership, as seen in many areas.

In terms of amending the Firearms Act, is it necessary to spell out the firearms registry fiasco highlighted by the Auditor General? A program that, originally, was to cost barely a few million dollars and then pay for itself, will have cost one billion by the end of the fiscal year, without producing the anticipated results.

It is important not to forget the firearms registry fiasco; the Liberal government's lack of rigour in managing the firearms program has created two victims: the taxpayers because they will have to dig into their own pockets to keep the program going, and second, as serious, is that this has provided ammunition—no pun intended—to those ideologically opposed to the bill. This means that many people who had supported gun control are asking themselves questions, and some are even saying, “Yes, I support this in principle but perhaps not at that price”.

Due to its incompetence, the federal government has become the objective ally of those most strongly opposed to any form of gun control. I think that Quebeckers and Canadians will remember the huge responsibilities resting on this government's shoulders.

This legislation could always be split into as many bills as it has clauses, but it would still be a bad initiative. In fact, by literally combining two such distinct issues in one bill, the government should have anticipated the impasse that lay ahead.

Today, faced with its inaction and incompetence, the government is once again interfering with the right of members to speak freely on the matter, by having the government majority pass a time allocation motion for the consideration of this bill. Once again, the rights of members of Parliament are being violated.

The Liberal government should have put the finishing touches to its bill before introducing it. The difficulty it is having getting it passed reflects to some extent the ad hoc attitude and lack of leadership in the back rooms of government.

Finally, what the Senate has done this time, with the arrogance for which this non-elected institution is well known, is the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back. Such an affront to decisions of the House and an attempt to strip members of Parliament of their powers, even if only temporarily, are unacceptable and argue more than ever—this is one more example to add to the list—for abolishing that undemocratic, unelected and frankly outdated chamber.