Mr. Speaker, it is a pleasure to rise today in this debate on Bill C-17, commonly known in the short form as the public safety act, 2002.
I am particularly pleased to address my colleagues and to express my opinion on this bill, because this is a controversial piece of legislation that highlights the lack of vision and leadership of this government in the control of national security, and rightly so. This is in fact the government's third attempt at passing this centrepiece of its rather mixed antiterrorism strategy and response to the terrible events of September 11, 2001, more than one year ago.
The fact of the matter is that a number of political observers have drawn attention to this state of affairs, as have those who oppose the legislative provisions put forward by the government.
The Bloc Quebecois is also against Bill C-17, because it contains provisions that are not well defined and gives intelligence services and the federal police powers that are particularly vague. I will have the opportunity to get into this in greater detail later.
I will divide my remarks into five sections: first, military security zones; second, interim orders; third, information sharing; fourth, amendments to the Immigration Act; and fifth, amendments to the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act.
Let us address the issue of military security zones. The fact that this issue was taken out of the public safety legislation represents for the Bloc Quebecois and individual liberty advocates a very significant victory over a government that was pretty panicked, as we know, following the attacks of September 11, 2001, not by the fear of terrorist attacks on Canada, but rather by American pressure because of the lack of efforts made in previous years in terms of national security.
The Bloc Quebecois said repeatedly that provisions relating to the controlled access military zones posed a very serious threat to the balance that must always exist between security and liberty. My colleague from Argenteuil—Papineau—Mirabel, whose work on this issue I commend, eloquently pointed this out.
These provisions offer the potential for abuse on the part of the government by granting a dangerous discretionary power to the Minister of National Defence. They also had the effect of depriving the citizens who might happen to be within these so-called security perimeters of their most fundamental democratic rights.
As for the declaration of special zones, this measure strikes us as far more reasonable than before. We will, however, be keeping a close eye on developments, will remain extremely vigilant and will be quick to speak out loud and clear if we see anything that seems to be headed toward potential abuse.
It is essential, however, and I stress this point, for no military security zone to be created in Quebec without prior consultation with the Government of Quebec and its approval. Too many bad memories are conjured up by the prospect of abuse by federal bodies within Quebec, in the name of national security. I shall say no more, but I am sure everyone knows what I am referring to.
In its present form, Bill C-17 still maintains the considerable irritants associated with the interim orders.
This third remake of the bill still contains provisions that allow ministers to issue interim orders. Worse still, in at least one case, this extraordinary and very great power is being delegated to departmental officials. Nothing could be more of an irritant.
There are, however, some amendments that represent a step in the right direction. Two relatively minor changes from what was in the previous versions have been made by the government in response to opposition pressures, from the Bloc Quebecois in particular.
The interim order must be tabled in Parliament within 15 days of its being issued. As well, the duration of the order is decreased from 45 to 14 days, that is the length of time it is in effect without cabinet approval.
It goes without saying as well that even the most serious of emergencies cannot justify the route the government wants to take for dealing with major crises. Bill C-17 still contains a provision for the Clerk of the Privy Council not to have to weigh the compatibility of the government's action and the scope of the interim measure against the provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the enabling legislation.
Coming as it does from the government that introduced the charter, this is a rather dramatic paradox, particularly considering the historic role of the Prime Minister of the day.
Of course, and thanks to the pressure exerted by the Bloc Quebecois, notable improvements were found between the first versions of Bill C-42, Bill C-55 and the current version. Unfortunately, what is known as the charter test remains a significant problem and this is all the more regrettable.
We cannot discuss the sensitive issue of public safety and, by extension, national security, without taking a direct look at the purpose and the scope of the powers given to intelligence agencies.
In this regard, the current wording of Bill C-17 allows two individuals, namely the commissioner of the RCMP and the director of CSIS, in addition to the Minister of Transport or a designated agent, to directly obtain from airline companies and operators of seat reservation systems, information on passengers.
This information may be requested if there is an imminent threat to transportation safety or security. As regards the scope of the bill for CSIS, such information may also be requested for investigations relating to threats to Canada's security.
Generally speaking, the information gathered by the RCMP and CSIS is destroyed within seven daysof being obtained or received, unless this information is reasonably necessary to maintain transportation safety, or to investigate a threat to Canada's security.
As members know, on May 6, the privacy commissioner released a document in which he expressed his concerns about Bill C-55 regarding the gathering of information by the RCMP and CSIS.
He had reservations about two provisions that allowed: (a) the RCMP to use personal information on all airline passengers to locate individuals wanted under a warrant for any offence punishable by imprisonment of five years or more; and (b) the RCMP and CSIS to keep personal information on passengers for purposes such as the examination of suspicious travelling habits.
As regards the first point, a number of provisions posed a problem, including the definition of the mandate, the provision allowing the RCMP to gather information to locate individuals subject to an outstanding warrant, and the provision allowing it to disclose this information. The commmissioner suggested that these provisions be eliminated from the bill.
In fact, under the current version, even though the RCMP can no longer collect this type of information, it still has the power to disclose the information obtained through the provisions of the bill to a peace officer, if it has reason to believe it could be of use in the execution of a warrant.
However, it is up to the RCMP to decide at what point a situation may threaten transportation safety, which enables it to access passenger information from an airline. There is no mechanism to control this. It amounts to a blank cheque for the RCMP.
What is more, once the information has been obtained, there is nothing to prevent the RCMP from keeping the information indefinitely if it is reasonably required.
The government tightened the definition of the warrant. In previous versions of this bill, it could be a warrant issued by the government for any offence punishable by imprisonment of five years or more. Now, the definition makes it clear that a regulation will specify to which crimes the provision will apply.
As for the second point, the commissioner expressed serious reservations regarding how long the information could be retained:
The seven day period during which the RCMP and CSIS may keep the information is excessive; 48 hours is adequate.
The fact that the RCMP and CSIS can keep this information indefinitely is of concern. There must be limits.
This is what the privacy commissioner said. However, neither of the two proposed amendments were included.
As a result, on November 1, 2002, the privacy commissioner said that Bill C-17 was a bill that was not satisfactory and that only contained minor changes.
Also, according to the commissioner:
The provision in question, section 4.82 of both bills, would give the RCMP and CSIS unrestricted access to the personal information held by airlines about all Canadian air travellers on domestic as well as international flights.
He added that:
—my concern is that the RCMP would also be expressly empowered to use this information to seek out persons wanted on warrants for Criminal Code offences that have nothing to do with terrorism, transportation security or national security.
Finally, he said that the proposed changes were and still are an insult to the intelligence of Canadians. The changes made to the bill do not address the fundamental issues of principle that are at stake.
The government now proposes to have regulations limiting the Criminal Code offence warrants for which the RCMP will be searching.
But this does nothing to address the fundamental point of principle that the police have no business using this extraordinary access to personal information to search for people wanted on warrants for any offences unrelated to terrorism.
As well, in the new bill the government has removed the “identification of persons for whom a warrant has been issued” as a “purpose” for accessing passenger information under the legislation. But this is meaningless, indeed disingenuous--since the RCMP would remain empowered to match this information against a database of persons wanted on warrants and to use such matches to bring about arrests.
It insults the intelligence of Canadians to suggest, as the government does in its press release accompanying the bill, that the RCMP may incidentally come upon individuals wanted on Criminal Code warrants.
If the police are to match names of passengers against the database of individuals wanted on Criminal Code warrants, there can be nothing incidental about finding them.
Finally, as parliamentarians, we are directly being called upon by the privacy commissioner, and I quote:
Since the original Bill C-55 was introduced, I have used every means at my disposal to make the crucially important privacy issues that are at stake known and understood by all the ministers and top government officials who are involved in this matter. I regret that I have not, to date, been successful in obtaining an appropriate response from them, though I will certainly continue my efforts. It is now up to Parliament to explain to these people that privacy is a fundamental human right of Canadians that must be respected, rather than treated with the apparent indifference that the government is showing.
It goes without saying that the Bloc Quebecois is in total agreement with the privacy commissioner's criticism and that we support him in this regard.
The amendments presented by the government concerning the power of the RCMP and CSIS to gather information on airline passengers are still far too broad. Even if the proposed amendments appear to deal with the bill's obvious flaws, the shortcomings pointed out by the privacy commissioner remain as they were.
In fact, we must keep in mind that the new data bank the RCMP and CSIS will be able to create will be in addition to the new one created by Customs and Revenue, to which both the privacy commissioner and the Bloc Quebecois have objections. More than ever, as my colleagues have already said, it is important to stress that it is true that “big brother is watching you”.
Part 5 of Bill C-17 specifically amends the Department of Citizenship and Immigration Act. Two sections are added, setting out the possibility for the Minister of Immigration to enter into agreements or arrangements with a province, a group of provinces, foreign governments or international organizations.
The purpose of these would be facilitating the formulation, coordination and implementation—including the gathering, use and disclosure of information—of policies and programs for which the minister is responsible.
The proposed amendments do not hold water and seem quite weak to us. Indeed, the bill does not specify anywhere the goals or the scope of the agreements, except for the fact that they would be used to disclose information.
Since we are examining the framework of a bill dealing with the fight against terrorism and national security, and the information in question would be obtained through exceptional means, perhaps it would be appropriate to specify the nature of this information and the reasons for disclosing it.
With this change, the body of the bill would seem less problematic to us. But there is also another reality, just as difficult to control, associated with the very broad regulatory power.
Bill C-17 also contains major changes to the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act. About this part of the bill, we have some particular concerns that deserve to be considered more thoroughly.
Thus, is the objective of the proposed amendments to the bill not precisely to allow the sharing of information that we are condemning in the case of the RCMP and CSIS?
Consequently, for all these reasons, the Bloc Quebecois opposes Bill C-17 in its present form. While it contains some improvements over the previous bills, whether Bill C-55 or Bill C-42, it is obviously incomplete and flawed. It is for the reasons that I just explained that we oppose Bill C-17.
