Mr. Speaker, as I rise in the House this evening, I pray for all our military personnel serving abroad, as part of NATO's allied forces, and for all of those who are affected by this military conflict, or should I say by this war.
It is a real shame that this liberal government, the so-called government of openness and accountability, is merely holding another one of these take note debates, at a time when this country and its NATO allies are involved in an armed conflict against Yugoslavia in Kosovo. We should have a real parliamentary debate, followed by a motion put to the House. This would give the government a mandate to deal with this conflict and allow the Canadian forces to wage this fight properly.
I think the job of the defence critic for the opposition is to hold the government of Canada responsible for its actions. In this case, it is to avoid needless losses of human lives.
The Liberal government has decided on a foreign policy of “soft power” at the expense of military equipment of “firm power” and has said to the Canadian people direct threats against Canada and Canadian interests no longer exist.
Well, I have some news for the people sitting in the first rows. First, perhaps their foreign policy is appropriate for signing a treaty on antipersonnel mines, but it is not appropriate for dealing with such people as Milosevic and his government, who kill their own people and then lay antipersonnel mines to keep Kosovars within borders and NATO outside.
Second, the world is sometimes a jungle and dictators are not afraid to use force.
Third, all out wars, such as the second world war, may happen only once or twice a century, but unfortunately they happen.
Fourth, small scale wars, regional wars and civil wars are far more frequent.
Fifth, there is nothing new about civil wars, which I would like to point out to the historian from Princeton who was surprised by the brutality of Milosevic after years of tragedy in Bosnia.
This government did not take the history of international relations into account and acted in a criminal fashion by neglecting Canada's defence, for which it is responsible. The defence of the realm is a government's primary duty.
We have here in front of us the Liberal government that cancelled, for purely partisan purposes, a highly needed program, namely the EH-101 helicopter acquisition program. It is the Liberal government that sent Canadians to be taken hostage in the former Yugoslavia. It is the Liberal government that does not put bread on the table of military families.
It is the Liberal government that sends teams on search and rescue missions in Labrador helicopters and, when they do not come back, tries to take benefits away from widows and children.
So do not think for one minute that we will let the government take action blindly in Kosovo and in the sky over Yugoslavia, where a larger number of Canadian lives are in danger. The Liberal defence and military management policy has given Canadians Hong Kong and Dieppe, and the list could grow.
But now that we have been forced to take action by Mr. Milosevic, NATO must wage a war that it must win. We are not dealing with nice people in Yugoslavia. They are brutal and cunning adversaries who will stop at nothing to get their way and who have absolutely no respect for human life and human dignity.
NATO has committed to a battle from which it cannot withdraw unless it is victorious. Withdrawal at this time would have major repercussions.
But what is NATO's strategy? What is the strategic objective of NATO? Can we attain the goals NATO and this government have set?
Mr. Milosevic is cleansing Kosovo, and he is in the process of attaining his own strategic objective. His regime is intact and we have not yet seen the strongest elements of his military machine in action against NATO. He is saving them for later. He does not appear to be ready to give up, and western journalists report that he has the support of the people.
What is our objective? To put an end to the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, to force Milosevic to pull out his military and paramilitary forces, to get the Kosovar refugees back to their homes and to guarantee their safety under the Rambouillet accord and thanks to the intervention of soldiers responsible for imposing and maintaining peace?
NATO wants to do this with a progressively implemented air campaign, but we have been at this for nearly three weeks now. Have we managed to attain either of the goals in question? Probably not. NATO's declared objective is not being concretized through air strikes.
Historically, the Battle of Britain and the raids on Dresden notwithstanding, it is not air strength that wins wars. According to the NATO supreme commander directing this operation, General Clark, the bombardment will not put an end to ethnic cleansing. The chiefs of staff in Washington share that same point of view: NATO's air strength will not be successful in making the Yugoslav government listen to reason.
I have some advice. It is advice which is very simple. We should define an achievable strategic objective that will put an end to this human tragedy. We must find the means to do so. We must be prepared to answer questions in the House. We should look at the state of the Canadian forces and we should fulfil the requirements set down in the 1994 white paper.
The Canadian forces are well trained, well motivated and have a history which is second to none, but they lack key equipment, in particular the army. This government cut military personnel and the defence budget to the bone. If Canadians are needlessly killed as a result of government negligence, then this government will be held accountable.
The present government defined its defence policy with the 1994 white paper, which committed Canada to the maintenance of a modern, combat capable, land, sea and air force to deal with operations across the spectrum of combat.
In terms of implementing our national security objectives the government directed the Canadian forces to provide a joint task force headquarters and one or more of the following: an able task group of four major service combatants, one support ship and maritime air support, three separate battle groups or a brigade group, a fighter wing and a transport squadron, and all this for a grand total of 10,000 personnel at any one time.
The intent was to have the vanguard of this joint task force in place within three weeks and the entire force operational within three months. This was done having a regular force of 60,000 personnel. Can we do this today? Probably not. If part III estimates for 1999-2000 are to be trusted we are going to be below 60,000 next year.
In terms of the navy, the government stated that there was an urgent need for new maritime helicopters to replace the aging Sea King. Five years later we have not even heard a call for tenders, not even a statement of requirement. That is the Liberal definition of urgent.
The government stated that it would consider replacing old operational support vessels. We have not heard a thing about Sealift since.
Canada's army was promised three adequately equipped brigade groups and some 3,000 more soldiers in three light infantry battalions.
The white paper called for new armoured personnel carriers to replace the obsolete M-13 fleet.
There was also a discussion in very loose terms on the future replacement of direct fire support vehicles. There was no mention of a new main battle tank to replace the obsolete Leopard. An army without a main battle tank will not survive in combat. That is the end of that story.
The army has received most of its new armoured personnel carriers in the form of the LAV-25. We have enough of those for a good armoured reconnaissance regiment.
The three light battalions were created with about 3,000 soldiers. However, they are threatened all the time by cuts.
The air force was promised an upgrade of the CF-18 fighter aircraft fleet. That is happening, although the government wants to deny it every time we hear of yet another Sea King emergency landing.
The CF-18s have received their precision guided munitions, but the air force lost its in-air refuelling tankers and received no new airlift capabilities. As of today Canada lacks both strategic sealift and airlift capabilities and thus is forced to rent these items on the open market or be dependent upon the United States for any large military operation.
The lack of power projection capability is the Canadian forces' biggest problem, after money of course. That is the central issue. The white paper must be implemented if we are to project our forces abroad effectively in support of foreign policy objectives, including Kosovo.
Unfortunately, if the Kosovo conflict moves to the next phase, it is likely that we will see NATO ground troops. If that is the case, then the government will have to take a long and hard look at the NATO plan and whether Canada has forces that are properly trained and equipped for ground action.
In terms of ground operations, there are a number of issues that need examination by parliament prior to deployment. For instance, what are the objectives of the campaign? To create a safe area within Kosovo? To partition Kosovo and Yugoslavia? Or to invade Yugoslavia? How long does NATO make a commitment to stay? How do NATO troops, our troops, get into Kosovo considering the geographic realities of the Balkans and the lack of infrastructure in either Albania or Macedonia? Will we send a significant contingent, perhaps a battalion size group, or no troops at all?
We do not know what the national command relationship will be. What are the rules of engagement? We do not know how we will get our troops over to Kosovo because we have no real sealift or airlift capabilities. How will we sustain them in Kosovo? We do not know which units of the Canadian forces will be sent, if any, and whether they are trained for the mission before them. That is very important.
Let us remember the criticisms of the Somalia mission and the criticisms that the inquiry directed at the Canadian predeployment to Somalia. This deployment to Kosovo could make Somalia look like a Sunday school picnic.
Are we sending composite units that have never worked with each other before? Are they all from one brigade group? What size of contingent is going to Kosovo? Will we send more CF-18s over to Italy to back up our ground troops and the soon to be increased operational tempo? Where are the relief or reinforcements going to come from?
Will we also maintain our forces in Bosnia? Or does this mean that this is the end of the Bosnian commitment?
I point to the recently released Conference of Defence Associations' strategic assessment that questioned Canada's army organization and our ability to sustain our Bosnian forces. They said that as the army is now configured, it uses every resource at its disposal just to maintain that Bosnia commitment.
Are we going to reorganize the army to better deal with these long term commitments or are we going to maintain our current core configuration and trade one taxing commitment for another that experts claim is destroying the Canadian army? I think Canadians want to know the answer to these questions and many more prior to further deployments with our NATO allies and further escalation of this conflict.
To clear up a couple of points that we had earlier, in 1990-91 there were three debates in the House, and two of them were before a shot was fired. No one can say that it is the same situation. These were all votes. We got this out of Hansard so it is very clear that this happened before.
