Absolutely.
My fear is that the time when we controlled events with regard to our involvement in Kosovo is now long since past. I want to join our foreign affairs critic and say that all peace loving people would like to see an end to fighting in Kosovo and an end to the killing of innocent civilians. I also think that if NATO decides to go into to Kosovo we as NATO allies must join our closest international friends in facing our joint destiny.
I also think that the deployment of ground troops and military power is the worst decision that any statesman ever has to make. Once taken by the governor in council Canadians will support the government of the day.
These are conclusions that all responsible Canadians would come to with regard to the Kosovo question. The big issue for me is: Are our Canadian forces ready to go to Kosovo and what units are going? The problem is that serious questions are left unanswered about Kosovo.
We have never really had an opportunity to debate government deployment of Canadian forces to the Central African Republic. That was done with a sleight of hand, but I will concentrate on Kosovo today.
The minister has told us that we would only be going in a ceasefire mode. In terms of entering the area on the basis of ceasefire, I point out that just because we enter in ceasefire does not mean that it will hold. We might find ourselves in a situation worse than an invasion.
Let us look at the state of the Canadian forces. The present government defined its defence policy with the 1994 defence white paper which committed Canada to the maintenance of a modern, combat capable land, sea and air force to deal with operations all across the spectrum of combat.
In terms of implementing our national security objectives the government directed the Canadian forces to provide a joint task force headquarters and one or more of the following: an able task group of four major service combatants, one support ship and a maritime air support, three separate battle groups or a brigade group, a fighter wing and a transport squadron, for a grand total of 10,000 personnel at one time.
The intent was to have the vanguard of this joint task force in place within three weeks and the entire force operational within three months. This was to be done by a regular force of 60,000 personnel. Therefore we have a question today. We have 2,000 on the ground now. It is tough to get another 1,000 and yet we have 60,400 troops that are being paid. We are supposed to be able to get 10,000. There are lots of people missing there.
In terms of the navy, the government started out with an urgent need for a new maritime helicopter to replace the aging Sea King. The white paper also promised to examine the option to buy United Kingdom upholder class submarines. Last, the government stated it would consider replacing our old operational support vessels.
Canada's army was promised three adequately equipped brigade groups and some 3,000 more soldiers in three light infantry battalions. The white paper called for new armoured personnel carriers to replace the obsolete M-113 fleet. There was also a discussion in very loose terms for the future replacement of direct fire support vehicles. There was not mention of a new main battle tank to replace the obsolete Leopard.
The air force was promised an upgrade of its CF-18 fighter aircraft fleet and new search and rescue helicopters. The government also stated its intention to reduce Canada's fighter fleet by 25%, but the remaining fighters would receive new precision guided munitions for ground support.
In the end, as always, the 1994 defence white paper has been big on promises and very short on substance, with the result that it is now sadly outdated if for no other reason than the absolute lack of leadership and budget.
Canada's navy has yet to see a new maritime helicopter and after yesterday's Liberal budget it is increasingly unlikely to see them for probably up to eight years.
There has been little discussion by the government of the proposed multi-role support vehicles, and the lack of strategic sealift means that the army is largely landlocked on the continent. The upholder class submarines will not start arriving until the year 2000.
The army has just started to receive its new armoured personnel carriers in the form of the LAV-25, but we do not have enough. I suspect we do not have enough for a good recce regiment. The three light battalions were created of about 3,000 soldiers. However, the army has such a budget problem—and I am told right now that it is about $170 million in deficit—that it may be forced to cut 3,000 positions. This cut would be in addition to yesterday's budgetary slap in the face and would mean cuts through the other three services.
The air force acquired new precision guided munitions for the existing CF-18 fleet. It also got the long awaited EH-101 helicopters for search and rescue. They are getting them; they are not there yet. However the air force lost its air refuelling tankers and received no new airlift capability.
As of today Canada lacks both strategic sealift and strategic airlift capabilities and thus is forced to rent these items on the open market or to be dependent upon the United States for any large military operation.
The old commitment and capability gap still haunts Canada. The lack of power projection capability is Canada's biggest force problem. After that of course there is money. That is the central issue. The white paper must be implemented if we are to be able to project our forces abroad effectively in support of foreign policy objectives, and that includes Kosovo.
The Canadian army and air force are virtually incapable of projecting power without outside international assistance, and thus the only real force we have for independent timely service is Canada's navy. Unfortunately for the government, Kosovo is landlocked and the navy is just out of the picture. We are left with CF-18s that the air force says need an upgrade and an army that lacks the modern armoured personnel carriers, main battle tanks and troops.
The white paper stated that Canada should be able to deploy 10,000 personnel around the world at any one time, but the minister has said that it would be stretched to the limit to come up with just another 1,000 or so for Kosovo. Tonight he said 800. That gives him a 200 leeway so now he is not quite as stretched. That was before yesterday's miserly defence allocation.
Having examined the state of Canada's Liberal neglected military and its deficiencies brings me to my last point. In terms of the Kosovo operation a number of issues need examination by parliament prior to the deployment of Canadian forces. For instance, how long does NATO make a commitment to stay in Kosovo? Judging by Bosnia it will be measured in years and not just months. The United States, from my discussions in recent briefings with United States officials, do not want a long term commitment. They want to be in and then out. They do not believe that Canada's participation is really necessary.
What happens if both sides decide to engage in hostilities with each other or NATO? This situation could turn to war at any moment. We do not even know how NATO troops, our troops, are getting in and out if it turns to all-out war. Sadly, next to it is Bosnia. What happens to Bosnia? Will we send a significant contingent, perhaps a battalion sized group, or no troops at all?
We do not know what the national command relationships will be. What are the rules of engagement?
The other day on television a British commander said that his orders were to shoot to kill. I cannot imagine a Canadian officer daring to say that, right or wrong, in the present post-Somalia inquiry climate. We do not know how we will get our troops over to Kosovo because we have no real sea lift or air lift capability. How will we sustain them in Kosovo? I would suggest probably piggybacking our existing air supply to Bosnia, but no one has said that for sure.
We do not—
