Mr. Speaker, I will begin with a little aside. I would simply like to say to the hon. member who just spoke that my memory of the clause by clause review of this bill is not the same. I think that everyone contributed. We knew that the work of the House was wrapping up. Every member of the committee wanted this bill to be ready for the House when it reconvened.
Several members of the Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates have already spoken and raised several points that I too would like to address. I think it is important to highlight a few of these points.
I feel it is important to remind those watching us of one thing. It is not always easy for them to watch us on various stations, nor is it easy for us to address them on relatively technical matters. I remind them that this bill establishes a procedure for the disclosure of wrongdoings in the public sector, including the protection of persons who disclose the wrongdoings. This bill is the result of an initiative that I will now take the time to describe.
In 2001, the Policy on the Internal Disclosure of Information Concerning Wrongdoing in the Workplace was approved. It was commonly referred to as the internal disclosure policy. In the meantime, the public service integrity officer position was created. That was in 2001.
In 2003, we saw the Values and Ethics Code for the Public Service come into effect. Also in 2003, the integrity officer I was referring to recommended in his annual report, in light of the difficulty he had carrying out his mandate, the implementation of a new legislative scheme applicable to the entire public service. This recommendation was approved by the Auditor General herself.
Then, the Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates, in its 13th report—I did not have the pleasure of being an MP at the time—entitled “Study of the Disclosure of Wrongdoing (Whistleblowing)”, recommended that the government introduce legislation to make it easier for workers to disclose wrongdoing in the federal public service and to protect whistleblowers.
That was the genesis of Bill C-25, which died on the order paper, and we all know why. In October 2004, the government introduced Bill C-11, which is before us today.
I mention this chronology to demonstrate that even a policy of disclosure and even a relatively well fleshed-out code were largely insufficient tools, in the very opinion, by the way, of the person who was appointed integrity officer and, by extension, of the Auditor General. She also would have liked to see legislation.
Those tools were inadequate. In my opinion, which is shared by others, the main cornerstone missing was confidence. What was needed for us to have a valid tool was for the general public to have confidence in this law, but more specifically that disclosers have confidence in the disclosure mechanism and in the protection that was offered to them from the beginning to the end of the process. There was even a need, in cases where there might have been reprisals, for them to be confident that there would be mechanisms to protect them or to redress reprisal measures which might eventually be taken against them.
In short, the discloser must have confidence, first, that the very disclosure mechanisms are rigorous, in the same fashion as inquiry mechanisms are. As mentioned by some colleagues, the fact that the responsible person, namely the integrity officer in the civil service, will be an officer of Parliament gives all its credibility to this process.
The discloser must also have confidence that his or her integrity will be protected. That person must be confident that he or she will be protected should there be reprisals because of the disclosure and thus, that there will also be well-fleshed-out protection mechanisms.
This bill—it seems to me—appropriately takes into account those two aspects. In that sense, my colleagues were saying this morning that it represented a significant step forward and I feel they are right.
Once this bill is passed, it will be critically important that an integrity commissioner for the public service be appointed. Naturally, disclosure must be made in good faith.
In this respect, allow me to digress. This fall, I felt very concerned. On various radio stations, I heard radio hosts make very valid comments overall, reflecting a relatively high degree of cynicism toward this bill. “Would it not be perfectly normal for any public servant in any situation to make a disclosure?” they asked, “That is their job”. It struck me that these people, both in the private and the public sector, did not have a good grasp of the reality of what a burden it can be to make a disclosure, and particularly to live with the reprisal and all that comes with it.
Under whistleblower protection, reprisals cannot be taken against public servants. I want to stress—not to toot our own horn—that, while all members of the committee have worked on this, the Bloc Québécois gave it special attention. In particular, the Bloc claims responsibility for having transitional clauses included in this bill. I was and still am convinced that, the organization in which a public servant works being relatively small, whatever the nature of the disclosure, it will not be long before people figure out who the whistleblower is. It is therefore important, in my opinion, that transitional measures are in place so that, from the start, the head of that organization, be it the deputy minister or whoever else, can tell this government entity that immediate steps will be taken to ensure that the public servant in question can work elsewhere.
As far as I am concerned, this has to be done, even if it means paying this person to stay at home because he or she made a disclosure. A civil servant must never be victimized because of this legislation and its requirements. I was very pleased that all my colleagues approved this provision, among others.
When this bill has been passed, the legislation will work only when all departments and agencies really “promote ethical practices in the public sector” and “a positive environment for disclosing wrongdoings”. I find that phrase a bit odd, but there it is. People must feel free to disclose if they have a substantial doubt in good faith. This will not take concrete form unless and until a rigorous and detailed broad scale awareness program is carried out . This will, of course, have to encompass the entire public service, in conjunction with—and I cannot emphasize that enough—the various unions representing the employees, because they are equally involved.
While it will not be a cure-all, this bill ought to make it possible to raise the public's level of confidence in its democratic institutions. It will definitely protect the public purse and, let us hope, will prevent any more scandals and other flagrant cases of using public funds for purposes other than those for which they are intended. It will therefore oblige governance to be far more tightly controlled.
This is a tool with both a defensive and an offensive aspect. It is, moreover, important to note that no one will be above this law. Even the public service integrity officer could be investigated in connection with a disclosure. At such time, clause 14 in motion 4, one of the tabled documents, clearly indicates precisely at which point the Auditor General herself would investigate, and thus would on that occasion play the role of the commissioner.
In conclusion, it will be worthwhile for all members of this House to study the annual report the commissioner will be presenting, at the appropriate time, and to gauge the way this tool is evolving, based not only on statistics, but also on two things: the impact of its implementation and the recommendations made by the president and what systemic problems giving rise to reprehensible acts are identified.
The provisions in the bill on the minister's obligation to carry out a five-year review for submission to both Houses constitute a sign of the committee's desire for the disclosure mechanisms and the protection of whistleblowers to adapt to new realities and new issues as they arise.
