Madam Speaker, I welcome the opportunity to speak to Bill C-71 respecting the tobacco act.
If enacted one of the amendments would oblige the Minister of Health to lay before the House of Commons any proposed regulations under sections 7, 14, 17, 33 or 42 of the act. At that time an appropriate committee would be struck to conduct inquiries or public hearings with respect to the proposed regulation and report its findings to the House.
At the end of the 30 sitting days following the day on which the proposed regulation was laid before the House, the governor in council could make a regulation under any of the aforementioned sections only if the House of Commons has not concurred in any report from a committee respecting the proposed regulation, in which case the regulation may be made in the form laid, or the House of Commons has concurred in a report from a committee approving the proposed regulation or an amended version of it, in which case the governor in council may only make the regulation in the form concurred in.
As members will know, regulations are subordinate laws made pursuant to the authority of statutory provisions called enabling powers. The authority to make regulations is usually delegated to the governor in council, cabinet, but it may also be delegated to one or more individuals or to an independent agency. Ideally these powers are used to make the detailed rules that support the statutory provisions.
While there are a few particular cases in which parliamentary review of regulations before they are made is provided for, this process is a relatively rare exception to the general rule. In general the normal legislative process gives Parliament the role of setting out the principles of law in detailed provisions appropriate for inclusion in the statute and determining the scope and nature of the enabling power which authorizes an elaboration of these provisions by even more detailed supporting rules.
The making of this subordinate law is then left to government ideally in consultation with the primary stakeholders and with some input from the general public. What then are the exceptions to the general regulation making process?
The best example is section 116(2) of the Criminal Code which has required since 1992 that all regulations made pursuant to enabling power under part III of the code, the gun control laws, be
laid before Parliament for a review by committee prior to their enactment. A requirement that all regulations made pursuant to this enabling power undergo such a review is a precondition to exercise of the power to make the subordinate laws. Thus we see in section 118 of the Firearms Act a procedure for parliamentary review of proposed regulations before they are made.
Opportunity should be given to the House of Commons to scrutinize and amend, if deemed necessary, any regulations proposed by the minister under the said section.
While I acknowledge the general necessity and appropriateness of executive regulation making in the great majority of cases, I would argue that there are very good reasons regulation making powers in Bill C-71 must be subject to full democratic accountability which is only possible through Parliament.
We must first examine the context in which Bill C-71 was drafted. Essentially the bill represents a response by the Minister of Health to the last year's decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in RJR-MacDonald versus the Attorney General of Canada.
Members will recall that in the September 21, 1995 decision a majority of the court ruled the government had failed to demonstrate that the restraints in the Tobacco Products Control Act regarding advertising, promotion and labelling were reasonable, justified restrictions on the freedom of expression and consequently struck down most of the provisions of the act.
In its ruling the Supreme Court has also been helpful through its suggestions of a number of options which the federal government might use in future legislation. In particular, the court mentioned such options as a partial ban on advertising which would allow information and brand preference advertising, a ban on lifestyle advertising, measures to prohibit advertising aimed at children and adolescence, and health labelling requirements with the source of the labelling.
All these options have been incorporated in Bill C-71. Bill C-71 represents a conscientious attempt to respond to the guidance offered by the Supreme Court of Canada. At the same time we must remember that tobacco continues to be a legal product. The producers and retailers of this legal product continue to enjoy the rights and freedoms afforded to them by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Should we not then take advantage of every opportunity available to us as parliamentarians to ensure that any regulations proposed under the bill are scrutinized in detail and in public by a committee which would presumably invite all stakeholders to state their case pro or con on any proposed regulations? I certainly think so.
A public process would go a long way toward legitimizing any proposed regulations precisely because it would allow stakeholders the opportunity to propose in public improvements to the regulations. This public scrutiny of proposed regulations could very well lessen the possibility of court challenges against legislation.
Let us not forget the Tobacco Products Control Act was challenged in court almost as soon as it was proclaimed into law in 1988, taking another seven years before the case finally ended up in the Supreme Court of Canada. Do we really want a repeat of this process, especially when we consider that a number of tobacco companies have already been making threatening noises about further court action against the proposed legislation?
It seems to me we have a golden opportunity to correct flaws which existed not only in the substance of the previous legislation-and here I am referring to both the Tobacco Products Control Act and the Tobacco Sales to Young Persons Act-but in the process as well.
No member of the House would welcome more court challenges to Canada's tobacco legislation. We want it to work. By inviting all stakeholders to participate in the regulation making process, I am convinced we will have created a forum whereby regulations will be made through negotiation rather than intimidation.
I will now say a few words about the actual scope of the enabling power of Bill C-71. In so doing I will argue that taken together they expand regulation making powers far beyond what may be believed as their legitimate scope and must therefore be subject to full democratic accountability, which is possible in Parliament.
The five sections I have mentioned provide for the enabling power to make regulations in the first five parts of the bill which deal with tobacco product standards: access to tobacco products, labelling, promotion and enforcement. Each section begins with the phrase "the governor in council may make regulations", followed by a number of relatively detailed subsections that enumerate the specific areas in which regulations can be made. So far so good.
Each of these subsections is detailed enough to satisfy the principle that regulations should only be made in areas that have been sufficiently defined. However-and here is where alarm bells go off in the minds of all members of the House-each of these sections concludes with the subsection "the governor in council may make regulations generally for carrying out the purposes of this part".
In and of itself this catch-all phrase represents sufficient reason to demand that all regulations proposed under the bill be brought under the scrutiny of the parliamentary committee. When we consider that the purpose of the first five parts of Bill C-71 is to introduce a number of restrictions in areas of product content, access, labelling, promotion and enforcement, surely all types of regulations to be made in these invasive periods should be spelled out clearly in enabling power. Unfortunately they are not and the reason is simply that each of these sections contains a subsection which gives the governor in council a virtual carte blanche to propose any regulation at all.
How does one define the phrase "generally for carrying out the purpose of this part"? No one can because the options are practically endless. If few people today seriously dispute the legitimacy of executive law making, concerns linger over the extent of these law making powers in the manner of their exercise. The perception is that the regulation making process is not fully compatible with the values of democratic and open government. Whereas statutes are enacted by elected representatives in a public forum, regulations will be characterized as the handiwork of appointed officials who remain unaccountable to Parliament or to the public.
I point out this final observation to my colleagues. Since regulations have the force of law, the process by which they are made must be one that maximizes opportunities for the citizens to participate in their making. Since the legislation which preceded Bill C-71 has been struck down by the Supreme Court of Canada as a transgression against the freedom of expression, the least we can do as legislators is to ensure that reasonable constraints be put in place to check any potential abuse within the regulation making process of the bill.