Mr. Speaker, let me first say that I am proud, as a Quebecer and a Canadian, of the major step forward we are about to take in matters of equality and human rights with the passing of this bill on employment equity.
I would also like to thank our colleague for Hochelaga-Maisonneuve for his strong and sincere commitment to human rights and to promoting equality and equity for all of Canada's citizens.
I thank him for his ongoing efforts in this regard, both on the Standing Committee on Human Rights and the Status of Disabled People and here in the House of Commons. He continues to express his commitment with the motions he is putting before the House today in order to further improve this bill on employment equity.
With the motions we are debating, that is, Motions Nos. 13 and 14, he is proposing that the people appointed to an employment equity review tribunal themselves represent designated groups or have knowledge or particular experience in this area.
Given the legislation it applies to, the motion is highly justifiable in theory. However, it seems fairly clear to us, as some of my colleagues have already mentioned, with all due respect to my colleague, that it is literally inapplicable in practice. For the information of my fellow members, I think it would be useful to first look at the nature and the function of this tribunal and to put it in the context of the logic of this bill so we can understand when and how it intervenes and how it is made up. First, when does it intervene?
The employment equity review tribunal takes action following an intervention by a compliance officer with an employer governed by the act. When should a compliance officer audit an employer? When there is a need to determine if an employer fulfils his or her obligations under the act.
Who decides if an audit must be conducted? Again, this decision is made by the Canadian Human Rights Commission, to which the bill gives the authority to enforce the act and monitor employers' compliance.
Clause 22 of the bill provides that the commission is responsible for the enforcement of the obligations imposed on employers by the sections that concern them.
The human rights commission determines if a given employer is complying with the employment equity requirements outlined in the act.
To assume this responsibility, the commission may designate a person to conduct compliance audits of employers on its behalf. This person is the compliance officer referred to in clause 23. If the audit reveals that the employer failed to fulfil any of his or her obligations, the compliance officer tries to reach an agreement with the employer to implement the corrective measures required.
However, if the compliance officer and the employer cannot come to an agreement, the commission may order the employer to correct the situation. During the time limits set out in clause 27, the employer can challenge the commission's decision by asking the president of the human rights tribunal panel to conduct a review, again under clause 27. As for the commission, it has the same recourse if the employer does not comply with its decision within the prescribed deadline.
It is at this point that, in either case, the employment equity review tribunal becomes involved. Under clause 28, the tribunal consists of one member of the human rights tribunal panel appointed by the president of that panel. In more complex cases, the president can appoint a tribunal of three members.
The most basic arithmetic shows that the first part of Motions Nos. 13 and 14 tabled by the member for Hochelaga-Maisonneuve are unnecessary since, in most cases, the tribunal would consist of only one person. Indeed, we cannot see how a single person could represent designated groups in a proportion that reflects their representation in the Canadian population as a whole.
The member supports his argument by saying that the tribunal will often consist of more than one member if Motion No. 12 is carried, in addition to those cases where the president will deem appropriate to appoint three people. But again, the number of members would still be too small to ensure significant representation of designated groups.
Even if we implement the idea of a degree of representation for designated groups, we will unnecessarily complicate the already complex task of the president of the panel, while also, in some cases, casting a doubt regarding the impartiality of this judicial process. In short, that part of the motion would create more problems than it would solve.
The second part of the motion is definitely more reasonable and easier to implement. It provides that, in the opinion of the president, the persons appointed as members of an employment equity review tribunal are highly knowledgeable about employment equity, or have substantial experience in this area. The government has already said it agrees with that idea. The standing committee which reviewed the bill passed an amendment requiring that, when appointing tribunals, the president of the panel take into account the knowledge and experience of people in the area of employment equity.
I believe that the amendment proposed by the committee is quite similar to the one tabled by the hon. member for Hochelaga-Maisonneuve. Moreover, the same clause, specifically clause 28(7), provides that the president of the panel may hire persons having technical or special knowledge to assist or advise a tribunal. Clearly, the bill already provides sufficient guarantees that the tribunal will rely on sound knowledge in the area of employment equity. Consequently, in my opinion, the amendment proposed by the hon. member is absolutely not necessary.
