Mr. Speaker, I would like to start my speech by looking at the situation in which we now find ourselves. I think that Canadians, including Quebecers, have a better understanding of the role played by the Prime Minister of Canada and his government. They understood it yesterday and they understand it even better today.
If we look at the current situation, we have on one side the Bloc Quebecois, which wants to separate. They use words like "sovereignty" but we know that it really means separation. No wonder they refuse to even look at this proposal, to review it, to consider the possibilities. No. What they want is their own country, period, no negotiations, no flexibility, no open mind, no nothing.
On the other side-as Canadians can see-is the other extreme. All they have to say about the government's proposals is, "No, no, no, they are giving too much to Quebec and Quebecers". I find this alarming. The two extremes here in this House refuse to make any efforts to consider what the government is proposing.
I mentioned in the House yesterday that I had checked Maclean's of 1989. In one edition in a specific article the leader of the third party suggested that distinct society had certain possibilities. In fact he stated quite clearly that words were not important if people really wanted to get together and work things out. That is what is said in that article.
All of a sudden, no. Why would he think that in 1989 and have no openness today? It is quite clear. From his perspective and that of his advisers there appears to be an opportunity for his particular party, his particular view of Canada, his particular set of policies. Is it Canada first? Absolutely not. It is the party first and whatever happens to Canada, so be it. I find that most unfortunate.
It is also interesting that the question of the regional veto is also one that the Reform members have supported. They want a regional veto to stop certain amendments. Did you know that, Mr. Speaker? I have found that most interesting.
All of a sudden when we propose a veto that does not make a constitutional change, which would give additional protection to the provinces, which adds and does not take anything away, do you think Reform members would explain it that way? Would they attempt to talk with Canadians and say: "Look, this is not necessarily what we wanted exactly but we have a proposal that is not terribly dissimilar to this?" Of course not. Why not? Let me tell you, Mr. Speaker. It is quite simple. Again, it is their political agenda. It is their political party that comes first, not Canada. That is unfortunate.
That is why some people see them as two sides of the same coin; that is, we have one party that clearly states-
"We want to separate from Canada. We want our own country".
-and the other party that tries everything in order to crush, to deride, to set aside, not to look at openly, the proposals that are being made by the Prime Minister and the Government of Canada.
Their policies hold a lot of contradictions. They suggest that they do not want this regional veto, but they have a regional veto on their books. They want one for B.C. but not for Alberta. The last time I checked they were pretty close in population. I guess that is what they want, I do not know. Perhaps they want one for all of the provinces. Perhaps they do not know what they want.
I now come back to the issue of distinct society. Distinct is defined as including the language, culture and institutions unique to Quebec. I find this quite commendable and acceptable. Like the vast majority of Canadians, if they made an error in judgment, they will soon find out.
What is interesting, as you know, is that we now need unanimity on a number of issues to amend the Constitution. Nothing can be changed without the provinces' unanimous consent on a number of issues, on which I will elaborate later.
There is another clause providing that no changes can be made without the consent of seven provinces representing 50 per cent of the population. This bill deals mainly with the principle that the 7-50 formula cannot be implemented without the support of the four regions. These regions include Ontario, Quebec, western Canada-which means British Columbia and another province-, and the Atlantic provinces. This means two provinces representing 50 per cent of the total population.
What is really frustrating is knowing full well that the Constitution remains unchanged, that a little something extra has been given to everybody, that they already have a proposal in hand fostering this kind of veto and that they feel their party should come first, and the country second.
I would now like to use the little time remaining to answer the most commonly asked questions. "Why not table a constitutional amendment?", our constituents ask. But we know that the leader of the Parti Quebecois, the potential Premier of Quebec, has
already made it clear that he does not want any constitutional amendment. That is clear.
The purpose of this bill, on the heels of the Quebec referendum, is to show where the elected representatives of the Canadian people stand on this issue, and we will soon know it. We also know that the Constitution requires that a first ministers' conference on the amending formula for the Constitution of Canada be held by April 1997. Constitutional amendment proposals, if any, will be considered at that time. This bill would in fact bridge the gap until then.
There are other questions.
For example, what is covered and what sorts of future amendments would be blocked by this bill? The real impact will be on the amendments covered by the same seven and fifty rule, as I have mentioned, changes to the division of powers in favour of the provinces, changes to certain provisions relating to federal institutions, extensions or additions of provinces in some general amendments.
Another question that is frequently asked is how does this bill differ from what is already in the Constitution. This bill does not change the Constitution or the amending formula. They know that, but of course they are not going to say it. It simply indicates how the government will conduct itself with respect to its own veto. It is willing to loan out its veto. That is what it does.
There are significant vetoes already in the Constitution for provinces individually. For example, each province has a veto over matters requiring unanimity, such as the composition of the Supreme Court and the amending formula itself. Each province has a veto over any changes in its boundaries or the constitutional provisions specific to a province.
In addition, there is the right to opt out of amendments transferring provincial jurisdictions to Parliament and to receive reasonable compensation if the amendment pertains to education and other cultural matters. This gives another type of veto to a province.
The bill creates a regional veto, in effect, with respect to changes to national institutions such as the Senate and the Supreme Court, the creation of new provinces, and all amendments that transfer power from Parliament to the provinces.
Another question raised is whether the Constitution already provides provincial vetoes-does the bill provide for any double veto? There are all kinds of amendments whereby provinces already possess such a veto, such as changes to the composition of the Supreme Court or to the boundaries of a province. They are expressly exempted from the operation of the bill. So too are amendments from which provinces can opt out under subsection 38(3), those which derogate from provincial rights and powers expressly exempted through the operation of this bill.
Would the regional veto formula make it more difficult for Quebec to separate? One view of the constitutional amending formula as it stands now, which is a very common view, is that the consent of all provinces would be required for Quebec's separation.
How would the regional veto formula work in practice? This is a particularly important question because it is the very heart and soul of the issue. When at least six provinces, including Ontario and Quebec, two Atlantic provinces with over 50 per cent of the Atlantic population, and two western provinces with over 50 per cent of the western population have indicated their consent by resolution, referendum or government approval, et cetera, the federal government would be free to proceed with resolutions in the Senate and the House of Commons. If one or more of the regions fail to provide their requisite consent, the federal government would not proceed with resolutions, even though seven or more provinces with over 50 per cent of the population had adopted resolutions under the current amending formula to authorize the amendment.
We have talked about the kinds of combinations that would be required for western and Atlantic provinces to get a veto under the regional formula. I want to repeat this because I think it is important. In the Atlantic provinces, Nova Scotia and either New Brunswick or Newfoundland would have a veto. New Brunswick would be in the same position with either Nova Scotia or Newfoundland as would Newfoundland with either of the others. P.E.I. would not have a veto except in combination with two of the other three.
In the west, B.C. with any other province would have a veto. Alberta would have a veto with B.C. but not with either Saskatchewan or Manitoba alone. Saskatchewan and Manitoba together would not have a veto.
It is important to note that we are not dealing with a new veto. The bill only indicates how the existing veto is exercised at the federal level.
I am running out of time. That is unfortunate, because I would have had so much more to say. But I will conclude with, perhaps, one last comment.
As I pointed out at the beginning of my speech, these proposals concerning a distinct society, this bill and the right of veto are all part of an effort to build a better country, a country in which people work together and better understand each other.