John Bryden

[The Media, June 18th, 2002]

Mr. Speaker, the firing of Ottawa Citizen publisher, Russell Mills, because he failed to conform to the national editorial policy of the owners of CanWest Global should cause politicians and regulators to have second thoughts about whether media convergence and concentration is in the public interest.

Having authorized an article and an editorial critical of the Prime Minister, Mr. Mills was forced by his corporate bosses to run attack editorials in the Ottawa Citizen contradicting the position taken by the paper. Then he was fired.

This whole sorry story shows alarming immaturity on the part of the Aspers, the owners of CanWest, who appear not to have the foggiest notion of the concept of press freedom in a democracy.

[Health Care System, June 11th, 2002]

Mr. Chairman, renewal costs perhaps but also surely transparency. The minister will know that the health care providers in this country, the hospitals that are consuming billions of dollars, do not come under any kind of freedom of information legislation. They do not come under mandatory standards of corporate governance and transparency that are required of for profit corporations by the Canada Business Corporations Act. Is the minister, as part of her review, undertaking to study making the system of health care more transparent and accountable through proper legislative means?

[Canada Post Corporation Act, June 5th, 2002]

Madam Speaker, I will be brief. I think this legislation is very well intended. My fear is that however well intended it is liable to do damage to the very group it is trying to help.

I do come from rural Canada. I live in a small village in rural Ontario and I am very familiar with the rural mail couriers. I am very familiar with the fact that they are overburdened. The proliferation of direct mail advertising, for instance, particularly after the changes in legislation in the last few years, has resulted in an enormous burden on the rural mail couriers that operate out of my village.

However, there are two things I would like to point out to the member who is promoting this legislation. One is that in my community not all the rural mail couriers are in favour of what is proposed in the bill and the effect that would occur. The whole idea of this amendment, which would essentially allow rural mail couriers to organize, is in fact resisted by many of the people in my community who actually would prefer open competition. Their complaint is basically that Canada Post has been applying a very hard-nosed attitude to rural mail couriers.

I think another way should be sought to treat the rural mail couriers more fairly, primarily because the rural mail couriers are an important part of the character of this country. In every province, Quebec, Ontario, Prince Edward Island, or wherever, the rural mail couriers delivering the Queen's mail are an important part of our national identity and we need to support them.

The difficulty I see, Madam Speaker, is simply this. If the bill were to go through it would make the delivery of rural mail more expensive. I think what would happen is that Canada Post would get out of the business and it would go to independent couriers who would undercut and deliver the mail at a much lower price and the rural mail couriers would disappear altogether.

I have a lot of difficulty. I express my support for the intention of the legislation but I am very worried that it would have a negative effect.

[An Act to amend the Criminal Code (cruelty to animals and firearms) and the Firearms Act, June 3rd, 2002]

Mr. Speaker, I am glad to have a last opportunity to speak to Bill C-15B. Throughout its long journey through the House of Commons I have struggled in the background with the definition of animal in the legislation and tried to change it, unsuccessfully, I regret to say. I am hoping that when the bill goes on to the Senate that the senators will take some of my concerns to heart and perhaps question closely the officials and the minister on why they have gone for a definition of animal that reads something to the effect that:

...“animal” means a vertebrate, other than a human being, and any other animal that has the capacity to feel pain.

It is that latter bit, “any other animal that has the capacity to feel pain” that troubles me. That extends the definition of animal to include just about every living creature. Just about any living creature from an amoeba to a whale has the capacity to feel pain.

I think the intention and the feeling of the public is that the animal cruelty legislation should be directed towards animals that at least have a high order nervous system of the type that can feel pain and suffering. Cruelty is all about alleviating suffering, not simply trying to prevent a natural physical reaction.

This issue of the definition of animal was tackled by the consultative committee in the justice department way back in 1998 when it sent around to various interest groups and other organizations a consultative paper that invited responses on a number of questions. Overwhelmingly, organizations responded by saying that the definition of animal should be limited to animals that are non-human vertebrates. The reason is that obviously a vertebrate has a brain and a higher order nervous and mental system, and it is capable of feeling pain.

Instead however, the officials who drafted the legislation elected to choose the broadest definition possible. The definition that is before us would allow litigation based on any type of animal that may be experiencing pain, be it a worm on a hook or a lobster in a cooking pot or anything imaginable, a jellyfish. I know this is hard to imagine, but jellyfish do have a reaction when they are poked. It does not mean that they are suffering when they are taken and thrown on the beach. This definition would encompass that.

I have corresponded with the minister on a number of occasions on this. The argument back, I am sorry to say, has not been, shall we say, as exhaustive as we would like. The reaction back has been to say that there are other jurisdictions in the United States, a few state legislatures or states, such as Arkansas, that have a similar definition for animal that is just as broad.

The legislation we have before us is criminal code legislation. It is an amendment to one of the most powerful and important legal instruments in the land. Because a few isolated states in the United States have a broad definition of the word animal, not federal legislation, but state legislation, should not be a cause for adopting the same definition.

Another argument was presented by the Canadian Veterinary Medical Association who wrote to the justice minister that it was very supportive of the changes that define animal for the first time as a vertebrate other than a human being and any other animal that has a capacity to feel pain.

That is supposed to be a letter from this association. However this was correspondence in the year 2001. If we go back to the files, what we find is that the Canadian Veterinary Medical Association, when it replied to the original consultative paper in 1998, was very concerned that the definition of animal be limited to non-human vertebrates. In that sense it was entirely in conformity with all the other organizations, the majority of competent organizations that did not support broadening the definition in the way that we have before us.

I thought the reply from the minister suggesting that the Canadian Veterinary Medical Association was supportive of the definition was a little bit ingenuous because originally it wanted the definition to be non-human vertebrates and only elected to have the broader definition if, I have the correspondence here, it had the assurance from the justice department that this definition would not lead to interference or litigation involving the use of animals in a lawful and proper fashion. As a matter of fact I have quote here. It said:

Our association's support is based on our interpretation and expectation that the amendments will in no way alter or criminalize accepted activities in the treatment or use of animals.

These include practices such as in agriculture, hunting, fishing, trapping, animal research and so forth.

It was conditional. The difficulty, and where the pith of the problem is, is that the government cannot guarantee that there will not be litigation based on this broad definition. The government can only say that the courts will decide. This is where the flaw in the argument comes. The difficulty is that so many of these radical animal rights groups obtain their fundraising by confrontation before the courts. By allowing the broadest possible definition of animal to go forward in the legislation, the government is inviting endless litigation which will be the source of fundraising for various animal rights organizations for years to come.

It represents a naivete to think that simply and purely regarding a definition in legislation only in legal terms and not allowing for the social consequences it will have is a failure to properly inform the justice minister. I feel that what is missing, and indeed why we have these debates in the House, is that often when officials look at the definition of legislation, as do the courts, they often look at it in isolation. It is this place that should sound the warning, as indeed the opposition has on several occasions, that we want animal rights legislation that genuinely protects animals that are capable of suffering from unnecessary cruelty.

The legislation will do that but unfortunately, with this very broad definition, it will do more. It will give the opportunity to various organizations to bring nuisance court cases and challenges before the courts. Yes, we can fight them and yes, we will win them, but it will cost the government money to fight these cases because they will go all the way up to the supreme court. The people who will win will not be the public. It will be those who stand to profit from raising the issue of animal welfare. Animal welfare is an important thing that we are all concerned about, but it is not something on which organizations should be allowed to make money.

[Public Safety Act, 2002, May 30th, 2002]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to be able to take part in the debate. I think it is my third time.

Now I have had a chance to examine Bill C-55 very carefully, line by line with Bill C-42 its predecessor, which the government withdrew to try to do a better job of it. I think the happy news is that Bill C-55 is much improved over its predecessor. I think the legislation is better written. I think, on the limitations on interference of fundamental liberties, a balance has been attempted there and the government has gone a long way to achieving that balance.

This is not to say that the bill still does not have problems and I will allude to those, but I will pick up on several of the issues that opposition members and some Liberal members have expressed concerns about.

The military controlled access zones in Bill C-55 are much, much more limited than what was defined in Bill C-42. Notwithstanding what the previous speaker said, if we go to the legislation we will see that the controlled access zones specifically are limited to where the military might have to go to respond to an emergency. There are paragraphs that qualify the range of that zone. They are very explicit that these zones can only be established when there is a clear concern for security or public safety.

What we are really responding to is a situation where there is an emergency event somewhere in the country, perhaps a terrorist event, and the military has to go in there and of course establish a controlled access zone to protect the military. It is very, very different than what people say this has to do with, throwing a cordon around the Quebec national assembly. It is just not true.

Second, the improvements to getting information about passenger travel, one of the important features of this bill is it provides legislative rationale for access to the passenger manifests of people travelling on aircraft coming into Canada. Again notwithstanding the histrionics of the privacy commissioner this bill is very, very modest in setting parameters around what is required or available to police and security authorities from passengers that are travelling on aircraft coming into and going out of Canada.

Mr. Speaker, I refer you to schedule 1 in this bill which did not exist in Bill C-42. It defines very, very clearly exactly what type of information the authorities are entitled to get. In that context I would suggest that the bill does not go far enough. It merely requires when passengers are coming from overseas or wherever else into Canada that the airlines surrender the passport number, the name, address and certain ticket information and it is not consistent with technological capability, and indeed I think it creates a problem.

It is interesting. The president of the United States just signed into law not two weeks ago the enhanced border security and visa entry reform act. What that does for the Americans, and we need to think about this very carefully as Canadians, is it requires the American immigration authorities to move immediately to set up the ability to electronically scan travel documents for biometric information by which they mean fingerprints and faces. In other words, where the Americans are going, and it is defined in the bill, is that by the year 2004 every person entering the United States, including it would appear from my reading of that act, people crossing the border from Canada, Canadians crossing into the United States, will be required to have a document that can be machine scanned for fingerprints and photographs.

I do not propose that we require fingerprinting of travellers coming into Canada. I do not accept that. I think we are a long way from that, but I would suggest that it would be consistent to put in the schedule now that the authorities would be entitled to get photographic information from the airlines. In other words, I think it is very important for Canada to be up front with Canadians and people coming to Canada that the technology is going to come for photo identification and we are going to need to use it, because very clearly we have a terrorist threat out there and photo identification rather than just a passport number and address gives a greater certainty that there will not be a mistake when somebody is travelling into Canada and this information is being previewed by the security and police authorities in the ongoing search for terrorists. I think we should look at that.

Finally, my real reservation with the bill still centres on the issue of interim orders. I understand the rationale for this provision in the bill. What we found in the situation of September 11 was that ministers were suddenly faced with emergency situations where they had to make decisions which involved cordoning off areas and limiting access of people.

The difficulty is that unless we define these powers in law then in a limited emergency situation such as what happened in the United States we may have a situation where ministers are forced to go outside the law in order to authorize actions that are absolutely necessary under the limited emergency. If we have a terrorist attack for instance anywhere in Canada in a large urban centre the transportation minister, the health minister and the environment minister may have to take prompt action to respond to that kind of attack.

Right now we do not have that type of power in legislation, so the idea is fine. The problem with the idea is these powers of making an interim order in a significant risk situation. We are not talking about a national emergency. We are talking about a highly localized event that is an emergency, and that is why the member for Calgary Centre does not seem to have read the legislation. He seems to have been reading briefings on the legislation but he is not focused.

The interim orders pertain to a limited emergency in a limited circumstance, but the way it is phrased now is that when the minister issues this emergency order this order stands for 45 days before it needs cabinet confirmation. I believe that is too long a time. I do not really see why any interim order responding to a sudden emergency requires 45 days before it gets cabinet collective approval. I would think a seven day period is certainly enough. Surely the cabinet can be brought together after a terrorist attack or similar limited emergency within seven days. To extend it to 45 days unnecessarily gives too much power to the minister, and we do not need to go that way.

Furthermore, I am concerned that the interim orders fall outside the Statutory Instruments Act, and that again is something that has been brought up by the Bloc Quebecois. I think it is a very valid concern and I would urge the minister to look at that again because the minister may make a mistake, and much as sometimes I am critical about the civil service I think we need the input of the leading authorities in the Privy Council Office when this type of situation occurs, so I think that needs to be re-examined.

Finally, there is the question of parliamentary involvement and not having to table anything before parliament until 15 days after parliament is sitting. Of course, if parliament is not sitting this creates a problem of many months before parliament is consulted.

I would urge the minister to examine these latter issues very carefully. I think they are very crucial to a bill that is otherwise very well framed notwithstanding, if I may say so, some of the histrionics that have been circulating about this piece of legislation both in this Chamber and, I regret to say, by officers of parliament outside this Chamber.

[Assisted Human Reproduction Act, May 27th, 2002]

Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased I have an opportunity to again reply to a speech by the member for Nanaimo--Cowichan because we are having a very important dialogue here. What is before the House is a bill dealing with a high moral issue. It is proper for parliament to debate a high moral issue when morality comes into interface with science or other aspects of society.

I note that the member for Nanaimo--Cowichan called for a free vote on this piece of legislation and I take him at heart on that because I will give him an argument that I hope he will consider when he comes to vote himself.

There are two givens in this argument. First, one should accept, for this bill, that life begins at conception. Second, one needs to accept that to arbitrarily take life away is murder. We are not talking about collecting embryonic stem cells deliberately by creating individuals and then killing them.

The collection of embryonic stem cells for the purposes of research into Parkinson's, or whatever else, is only in the context of where the embryonic stem cells would be discarded otherwise, either from a fertility clinic or, and the bill does not mention this, presumably from spontaneous miscarriage, or wherever there is fetal material that as a result of a proper hospital procedure results in embryonic material being available.

The moral argument from my point of view is that the ultimate good is to preserve human life. My difficulty is with the proposals coming from the opposition and members of my own side. They suggest that we should delay implementation of allowing embryonic stem cell research as proposed in this legislation until we see whether adult stem cell research can have the same effect. My problem with that, as I mentioned earlier, is that we may be condemning people to death or to disability who we might otherwise save should embryonic stem cell research be fruitful as a means of curing things like Parkinson's, ALS and others.

I would like to put it again in a human context. In my village there is a couple in our church who we know very well. The wife is suffering severely from Parkinson's disease. The husband comes to me and says, “John, please support Bill C-56 because if there is any chance that embryonic stem cells can be developed as a cure for Parkinson's I would like it in time to save my wife who is in a great deal of difficulty right now”.

So, the basic moral dilemma from my point of view: even if embryonic stem cell research only has a 5% chance of being more successful than adult stem cell research, I do not feel I have the moral right to delay that research if it means it could possibly save some lives of people out there who are suffering from these terrible diseases.

The member for Nanaimo--Cowichan, after our interchange before, came over to me and said, “John, I listened to you very carefully”, and he is a very good member if I may say so. We really want to get at the truth here. He said that the problem from his point of view is that the embryo does not have a choice. He alluded in his speech just now to the fact that of course we encourage transplants. We can donate our kidney, our liver or whatever else. We can sign a form and when we are in an accident and killed that body part can be used to save another life. We agree that is a good thing. However, the problem is, as the member opposite has observed, an embryo does not have that choice. If we assume that a person is created at conception and that person inevitably dies--because we are only talking about a situation where that person as an embryo dies--that embryo does not have the choice of creating new life.

We agree that creating new life is a good thing. As a matter of fact, it is the highest moral good that we can think of. Now, this is where the really subtle moral distinction comes in. I do not want to get into religion and that kind of thing, but I think there is a very strong feeling that those who are alive, those who are persons before birth, are the ultimate persons of innocence. In other words, if one is a person between conception and birth, all of us would agree that as a person one is morally pure in every sense.

If we take that principle and apply it to the logic that to give life in death is one of the highest goods that one can give then surely an embryo, as a person who is the ultimate in innocence, would want to choose the highest good, and that highest good is, instead of being discarded, instead of being destroyed, to be part of giving new life and new opportunity to the living.

That to me is the ultimate ethical dilemma. It is not whether life begins at conception or not. The ultimate ethical dilemma we must face in this parliament is the fact that we have to make a choice for those who cannot choose, and we have to make the right moral choice for those who cannot choose. An embryo cannot choose, but we know in its innocence that what it would do in death is want to give life.

[Assisted Human Reproduction Act, May 27th, 2002]

Mr. Speaker, I had an opportunity in the debate to reply to some of the comments made by my colleague opposite. I respect absolutely the position that has been taken by the opposition and some Liberal members on the issues raised by Bill C-56, particularly as they pertain to stem cell research.

The member opposite in a very reasoned argument suggested that perhaps society is moving too quickly on this whole matter of experimenting with embryonic stem cells and the potential that they show and that surely first we should exploit, as a government, as a society, as scientists, the potentials of adult stem cells that may be taken from elsewhere in the body and may indeed with research be proved to be as effective as embryonic stem cells in addressing some of the illnesses that we have such hope these new procedures will cure eventually.

My problem with the argument is simply this. It is an ethical one, indeed. I think the whole debate is an ethical issue. If embryonic stem cells, taken as part of the procedures in which they would otherwise be discarded, because no one is in favour of creating embryonic stem cells deliberately for the purposes of research, but given that embryonic stem cells are now being routinely discarded, if we do not encourage the scientists to carry on research with these embryonic cells, and if we as my colleague opposite suggests and set that issue aside and concentrate on adult stem cells, what if we are delaying the procedures and the opportunities of people who have debilitating illnesses from becoming well?

For instance, I have a relative who has Parkinson's disease. It is very difficult to watch somebody who is close suffering from a disease for which we know there is no present cure. When I look at him, I am very anxious that a cure be provided for him before the Parkinson's disease reaches such an advanced state that it really debilitates him.

A person in my community suffers from Lou Gehrig's disease. That person has shown incredible courage in the way he has managed that disease over 10 years. He is really exceptional in the sense that he has lived far longer than anyone expected. He is completely paralyzed. It may be a matter of weeks or months, but it is a very short time in which that disease will finally kill him.

My difficulty is that if there is reasonably good scientific thought to the effect that embryonic stem cells may offer a better road to curing people of these terrible diseases, and we do not know for certain but the possibility is there, I feel very strongly that we have an ethical obligation to take advantage of that opportunity as it sits right now.

A problem with the idea of delaying, as was suggested in the minority report of the opposition to the health committee report, and I do not dispute the sincerity with which it made that report, is that there will be people who will die. There will be people whose diseases will advance enormously if we may find out in retrospect that embryonic cells are better and more effective in bringing about the cures that we hope from the stem cell research. That is my dilemma. I am not sure we can wait.

I would like to make one other point. There has been some reluctance to address the moral issue, the faith issue, that is lurking behind the whole debate on embryonic stem cells. There are a great many Canadians who as a matter of faith believe that life begins at conception and that part of the resistance to using embryonic cells for research is this whole idea that we are dealing with cells that have to do with the fundamentals of an individual human being.

I can only say how I react to that. I can accept that life may begin at conception. When a procedure occurs in which death follows that life, although these cells may be only a week old, they have to be discarded. That is death and I would submit that if in death those cells which we might regard as human beings can be used to give life, is that not what we all should want? I do not know how to express this very adequately, but I feel very strongly that the greatest gift that a living human being can give is the gift of life to another human being. If that gift of life is given at the moment of death then I think morally it is correct.

My difficulty in the bill is that I acknowledge the commitment and the passion that is felt by the people debating on all sides, and I have been reading the Hansard , but in the end with me it is an ethical and moral issue. In deciding, when the legislation does come before me for a vote, I will have to support the idea that when life gives over to death and that death gives opportunity to life, and I know where my vote will be.

The legislation, in supporting the limited use of embryonic cells always with the understanding these are discarded cells, ethically, at least for this person, the only choice that we have is to support what is in the legislation.

[Charitable Organizations, May 23rd, 2002]

Mr. Speaker, my question is for the finance minister.

Again we read in the media of charities raising money from a trusting public and none of it going to people in need.

The Toronto Star has reported that a charity called Planet Aid Canada raised $1.7 million only to pocket it all. This situation is being repeated time and time again by organizations that have charitable status but operate almost exclusively to the financial benefit of the people running them.

When will the government do something to force charities to be transparent and accountable so that the giving public can spot the bad from the good?

[Public Safety Act, 2002, May 9th, 2002]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to have another opportunity to speak to Bill C-55 to reiterate some of the concerns I have. One of those concerns, which does dovetail with something that was just mentioned by the member for Calgary Centre, but which I note was actually originally mentioned by the Bloc Quebecois, the member for Argenteuil--Papineau--Mirabel, is the whole question of the interim orders as described in this legislation giving ministers the power to issue essentially regulatory orders. Under any act, the Quarantine Act, the pest control act, the environment act and the criminal code, that basically has no check for 45 days.

One of the things the Bloc Quebecois pointed out very early on in this debate is the fact these interim orders, according to a clause in Bill C-55, would be exempt from the relevant sections in the Statutory Instruments Act. In other words, the minister would issue essentially an interim order that could have an enormous impact and it would not require scrutiny by the Privy Council Office, which is the way things are done now, and it could be allowed to stand without cabinet approval for up to 45 days. I would agree that this is a very serious aspect of the bill that needs to be examined very carefully in committee.

I will say, though, that I think the bill is very defensible in what it tries to do. The member for Calgary Centre has said that the Emergencies Act covers most of the contingencies that might be contemplated by Bill C-55. There I would disagree, because I note that these interim orders do not speak of a national emergency. They speak of a situation of significant risk. That is quite different from what is contemplated in the Emergencies Act, which would be a state of war or a state of attack, the use of a nuclear weapon and that kind of thing.

What Bill C-55 addresses, and why these interim orders, I presume, are seen to be necessary, is a limited terrorist attack, if you will. I will just focus on one type of scenario that I think justifies what is attempted in Bill C-55, even if we do not agree with the means as we see before us.

The world has changed very significantly just in the last year with the realization that Canada, the United States and other western countries are vulnerable to a limited biological or chemical terrorist attack. We would have here, just as an example, that an interim order could be issued with respect to the Quarantine Act.

If we go to the Quarantine Act, we can see where the reasoning is coming from. It is that if there were a suspected limited attack, say on a city or wherever else, we would want the appropriate minister to be able to activate as quickly as possible whatever measures he or she deems necessary to contain the consequences of the attack. I think a biological attack is probably the most dangerous and the most difficult to really put our finger on, to even know that we are being attacked, so I think very rightly the government wants to provide means for a very quick response. That very quick response could involve the quarantining of an area and actually blocking it off so that whatever the problem is does not spread. It could require the shutting down of certain public services and it could require the imposition, the forcing of people to submit to medical examination.

These powers are very profound because they would interfere, we would all agree, with some of our fundamental civil liberties, but I think that in the kind of limited emergency that is now contemplated as a result of September 11 and, more precisely, the growth of international terrorism, also fueled, if I may so, by the Internet, it is now possible for terrorists to communicate over the Internet and get information over the Internet that was previously unavailable, so the world has become a significantly more dangerous place for limited attack.

I support the intention of the legislation. I support the intention of the interim orders. Where I have difficulty is that I think the interim orders, as was mentioned by members of the Bloc Quebecois, the member on our side from Mount Royal and now the member for Calgary Centre, are too wide open as they sit right now. I think when the bill goes to committee we will have to examine very carefully how narrowly we want to limit those emergency orders.

My own feeling is that they should be limited to no more than, say, five days. I would think that is a sufficient length of time for a prompt emergency response to a significant risk situation, whether it is biological, chemical or any other kind of terrorist attack. That would give time for the governor in council to kick in and to look over the order that has been issued by the minister.

It would also give time for the Privy Council Office to oversee it as well because we have to remember that in the Privy Council Office, even though as a member of parliament I sometimes get annoyed with what I feel is the constant finger of the bureaucracy on what we try to accomplish here, the reality is that there is an awful lot of collective wisdom in the senior levels, not only in departments like the solicitor general or Health Canada but also in the Privy Council Office. I would not like to see the senior bureaucracy cut out of the loop when Canada finds itself in a limited temporary emergency.

I would also say, though, that I would agree with the member for Calgary Centre that we should look very carefully at and make comparisons with Bill C-55 and the Emergencies Act. I would hope the committee would very, very carefully scrutinize the powers that are contained in Bill C-55. If there are instances where there is a broader question where a significant risk as defined in Bill C-55 really constitutes a broader emergency, then perhaps it should belong under the Emergencies Act. I think it is very necessary for the appropriate committee to compare very closely the reach of the Emergencies Act versus the intent of Bill C-55 in responding to what could be limited risk situations but very profound risks.

I would say that it is no coincidence that Bill C-55 also has provision for Canada ratifying the biological and toxin weapons convention. This, shall we say, is the name of the kind of threat that we have to maturely consider as parliamentarians, always mindful that we must not overreact to the national security or the public safety issues, because I think we would all agree that any limitations on civil liberties have to be very closely and carefully defined because the terrorists will win if we over-respond to these threats. We have to be very careful. I would say this affects all of parliament. I feel I am very much on both sides of the House on this issue. I think as MPs we have to find the most careful balance and set aside partisan considerations as we consider the bill.

Finally, in that context, I think the requirement to look at the passenger manifests of aircraft again reflects a reality that we can no longer ignore, but I point out that in this legislation it is very well defined. Parliament is authorizing the examination of passenger manifests only on aircraft, so I submit that this is not an extension into other areas of society. This is a very narrowly defined extension.

It is unfortunate but we are moving into a very difficult and frightening world. While I support what the government is trying to do here, the bill really needs to be examined closely in committee, particularly in the area of the interim orders.

[Supply, May 7th, 2002]

Madam Chairman, that inevitably leads to the next question and that would be about the reserves.

There are increasing demands on the Canadian forces. Does the minister see an increased role for the reserve? Does he have any particular plans with the reserve in the context of what happened on September 11 and the new demands on the Canadian forces?