John Bryden

[Supply, February 17th, 2000]

Mr. Speaker, in fact I congratulated both parties, the Reform and the Bloc Quebecois, on having so many members in the House.

I do not think that anyone in the House can be a more committed federalist than I am. I very much appreciate the contribution that Bloc Quebecois members have made in the Chamber over the years that I have known them. Nevertheless, I am very much a federalist.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to take you back to 1995 and the so-called referendum crisis, from our side, and what occurred at that time leading up to that question, to the actual referendum. We in the backbenches of the Liberal Party were assured that it looked as though it would be an easy win for the no side, which was the federalist side. What happened was, it was a very narrow, close race. Members will remember that there was a margin of only 50,000 votes on the no side that rejected the proposed question put by the Parti Quebecois.

In the aftermath—and I tell this to my Bloc colleagues—in the Liberal caucus of which I was a part, we were in shock. We were absolutely devastated because it appeared that we had nearly lost our side. No matter what the Bloc says, it was a terribly emotional experience to feel that we may have lost our country based on what turned out to be a terribly ambiguous question, from my point of view. It turned out to be a very narrow margin. Indeed, being 50% plus one, we could have lost the entire country.

I remind members, just in passing, of the actual text of that question. That question which we agonized over read: “Do you agree that Quebec should become sovereign after having made a formal offer to Canada for a new economic and political partnership within the scope of the bill respecting the future of Quebec and of the agreement signed on June 12, 1995?”

We were appalled that our government could have taken us that close to the abyss without ensuring that a clearer question, a real question, had been on the table. In caucus government members constantly talked about how narrow an experience it had been for Canada and how Canada would have had to negotiate and if we had lost by a margin of 60,000 votes Canada would have had to negotiate the separation of Quebec.

I got up in my national caucus and I said in front of the Prime Minister “Do not talk about Canada having to negotiate on a question like this”, if we had lost that referendum, “talk about the government having to negotiate because”, I said in national caucus at that time, “if my government ever lost a referendum on such an unclear question, the first thing that would happen is there would be a vote of confidence”, because I would never agree, as a Canadian, as an MP, to negotiate the breakup of a country based on such an unclear question. There would have been a vote of confidence. We could not have accepted it. There would have been a free vote.

I was very much behind getting a clear question and very much behind the clarity bill as we see it now, because what the clarity bill does, what it simply does, is it binds future governments to be responsible for ensuring that before they even begin negotiating they have to consult parliament and parliament has to decide whether the question is clear. The reason I believe my Bloc Quebecois colleagues should support Bill C-20 is because, in the end, if there ever were a clear question that was agreed upon by this parliament, I, in the interests of civil society, would have to go along with negotiations. But so long as there is an unclear question I could never abide by it. I would always be opposed.

We have to have a clear question. We have to have a majority that I, as a federalist, accept.

The problem became this. As it was realized in the years that followed, at least realized by some on the back bench, the real problem was not with the federal Liberals, because by that time it was very clear in our caucus that it had to be a clear question and it had to be a decent or clear majority. What became clear was that if in the event the Conservatives came to power or the Reform Party came to power, we know that Joe Clark would have accepted an unclear question and begun negotiations and we know from his own mouth that the Leader of the Opposition would accept a thin majority and carry on to negotiations to break up the country. The question is how to confine future governments that are willing to trade off this great nation on such a thin margin; how to confine them to the will of parliament.

Bill C-20 does that. It does not set conditions on the questions. It does not set conditions on the majority. What it says simply in clause 1(6) and clause 2(4) is that before any of the governments of the future can negotiate the breakup of the this country parliament has to approve by free vote—one vote, one MP—the nature of the question and the nature of the majority.

It is clearly a situation where it is parliament restraining the power of future governments. This issue is between parliament and governments. It is not between the provinces. It is not between all the special interest groups out there.

This is why, if I had had my way, I would not have had witnesses before the committee at all. There was no need to have witnesses, because this is between the entire 301 MPs and future governments of this land.

I think the government was right in putting it to a legislative committee, because clearly there was no other standing committee that could possibly have the jurisdiction over a question like this. It cannot be sent to government operations, the justice committee, or any other committee. There is only one committee, and it had to be a committee of these MPs, and so it is before that committee now.

I cannot understand why Reform Party members are standing up and saying “We have to bring in the provinces. We have to bring in all these special interests groups”, when this is entirely an issue, and I stress this, between the House of Commons, all the MPs assembled, and the government of the future.

I think that if ever the day comes, and I hope it never does come, that the Bloc Quebecois can mobilize enough support in the House with a free vote on a question that it thinks contributes to secession, I would have to support it, but only if it is a clear question, and I have a free vote, and I can act on behalf of the Canadians I represent.

[Supply, February 17th, 2000]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to see that there are so many Bloquistes and Reformists in the Commons. I am going to give a very good reason why the Reform Party should reject this motion and I hope to give a very good reason—

[Supply, February 17th, 2000]

Mr. Speaker, I am delighted actually because the member wants to refer everything to the supreme court which, I have to say, follows the tradition of the Mulroney Tories who made laws so vague that we are still cleaning up the mess with the supreme court.

I point out to the speaker that the supreme court in this country comes under the Supreme Court of Canada Act. The supreme court comes under this parliament. So what he wants us to do is to refer the question to a body that in fact is under this parliament. There is a sort of confusion. We are going to go round in circles here.

Why does he not become a real true parliamentarian and take control in this House of the future of the country and use this House as the forum for debate and decision rather than going outside to an unelected body like the supreme court?

[Supply, February 17th, 2000]

Mr. Speaker, I am delighted. We appear to be having a kind of dialogue here. I draw the member's attention to a subclause 2(4) of the bill, and I will only read it in part, which says very clearly: “The Government of Canada shall not enter into negotiations on the terms” of a province seceding “unless—there has been a clear expression of a will by a clear majority of the population of that province”.

The act is absolutely clear. It says a government will not enter into negotiations unless parliament has approved. What we have simply done by this bill is that we have given parliament the power, not government the power. We have given parliament the power to decide whether any government, especially a Conservative government, shall ever enter into negotiations to break up this country. As for myself, I will trust parliament any day over a government that might be led by a Mr. Joe Clark.

[Supply, February 17th, 2000]

He may know what he is talking about. I hope he does. At any rate, he raised one issue that makes me question whether he knows what he is talking about. He made allusions several times to the fact that Bill C-20 sets parameters on the events and the negotiations leading to the secession of a part of Canada or a province of Canada.

I submit to the member that if he reads the act very carefully he will see that the act exactly does not do that. It does not define the question. It does not define the number required for a majority vote, and it does not define the actual conditions of the negotiations. It precisely avoids doing that.

What it very clearly does instead—and I would ask the member to agree with me or disagree with me, and if he disagrees to please explain—is limits the power of a government, any government, a future government of this country, to negotiate with a province on secession. It says that government must first go to the House of Commons and determine whether or not the House of Commons approves of the certain events leading up to the negotiations that government might want to do, for example the question has to be clear, the House of Commons has to determine what is a clear majority, and so on and so forth.

I submit to the member that in doing so, in limiting the power of future governments in negotiating with a province that wishes to secede perhaps on an ambiguous question, what in fact the government is doing is withdrawing from the separatists in Quebec. I do not necessarily say this to members of the Bloc Quebecois because they are very good parliamentarians, but it withdraws from the separatists in Quebec of having one of their winning conditions. That winning condition would be a leader of a government side who would be willing to negotiate on an unclear question and might have a majority in the House that has such party discipline that they would follow that leader no matter what he did.

Basically the winning condition that we are trying to avoid by Bill C-20 is surely the leader of the Conservative Party who we know, if he ever did come to power, would be instantly ready to negotiate on an ambiguous question.

[Supply, February 17th, 2000]

Madam Speaker, I thank the hon. member for his excellent speech. He covered a lot of territory there.

[Supply, February 17th, 2000]

The Bloc members and the Conservatives know that.

[Supply, February 17th, 2000]

Madam Speaker, it is a pleasure to hear the member for Winnipeg—Transcona speak on this issue because he is a member with great experience. But I think he has actually misread the act in some respects, and there is a contradiction in what he said.

In the course of his speech, he made allusions several times to the fact that Bill C-20 sets conditions on the question and the prospect of separation. But I submit that is not what Bill C-20 does at all. What Bill C-20 does is it sets limits on the government. It says very clearly that the government cannot enter into negotiations before the House of Commons has determined whether the question is clear or not and other aspects of the percentage and that kind of thing.

In my view—and I would like the member to comment on this—this is quite a different kettle of fish, shall we say. Limiting the government is something that indeed all members of parliament, even those of us on the backbench on the government side, would like to see a government limited from time to time and indeed this bill does that. I would suggest to the member that not only does it do that, but that everything in the bill is entirely within the scope of the House of Commons. It is not something that is inconsistent with what we can do as members of parliament because we have added no additional powers to parliament. We have merely limited the powers of government, which I would have thought would be entirely in keeping with what this parliament should be doing at any time.

[Supply, February 17th, 2000]

Mr. Speaker, I thank the member for his speech which I followed with great attention.

I would like to explore one aspect that he raised. That is the question of his party inviting the provinces to the committee to testify. In my reading of the legislation, the legislation deals entirely with federal powers, unless he has an opinion opposite, and I hope he will express it. As far as I can see there is nothing in this legislation that goes beyond what are the powers of this parliament.

Not to exclude the provinces absolutely, but I fail to see the utility of provincial testimony. I can see other groups from society, but I do not quite understand where he sees that the provinces themselves have something material to offer on what is entirely federal jurisdiction.

[An Act To Give Effect To The Requirement For Clarity As Set Out In The Opinion Of The Supreme Court Of Canada In The Quebec Secession Reference, February 10th, 2000]

It is okay, you are reading a speech. It is easy to read a speech.