Crucial Fact

  • His favourite word was quebec.

Last in Parliament April 1997, as Bloc MP for Bellechasse (Québec)

Lost his last election, in 2000, with 37% of the vote.

Statements in the House

Code Of Conduct May 1st, 1995

Mr. Speaker, in responding to the hon. member for Durham, I would like to remind him of what I said earlier. If the government had wanted the senators to be involved, it would have tabled a bill that would necessarily have been considered in this House and then have gone to the Senate. That was the best way to involve both Houses.

When the government does not want a bill but simply wants to create one more task force, one too many, my position is: Let us create a committee of members of this House, a committee of elected representatives. We should not mix elected representatives with those who are not elected, people who have to go before the electorate every four or five years with those who never have to run on their record. In a democracy, Mr. Speaker, and I say this through you to the hon. member for Durham, in the kind of system we have, a non-elected House where no one is accountable to anyone except to the provisions of the Criminal Code is an anomaly. And that was my message just now.

I realize the hon. member for Durham put a question mark after his comment. He said: Perhaps I did not quite understand? Perhaps I did not get it? I hope that, with this additional information, he will understand that we should not mix elected representatives with non-elected individuals. I am not saying that the Senate should not examine these issues if it wants to. However, the Senate has its own rules, its own board of internal economy which operates differently from ours. Although it does have a budget to administer, it has different rules. We, through our own Board of Internal Economy, set much stricter rules than the Senate does through its board.

My point is, we are constantly putting our seat on the line. Every day, we are accountable to our constituents for what we do. Mixing ingredients that are not terribly compatible to start with, what with Liberal members, members of the Bloc and the Reform Party, and adding a dash of Tory senators to boot, is not really a recipe for success.

Code Of Conduct May 1st, 1995

Mr. Speaker, once again, the government is hiding behind a motion. Does it ever like to delay proceedings in the House! A motion to create a committee to conduct another study. For more than 20 years, almost 25 years, various attempts by successive governments have met with repeated failure.

Had the government even the slightest political will to find a solution to the issue of conflict of interest, it would not have been satisfied with a vague motion to create a committee, but would have tabled a public bill improving on the ones that failed in the House.

The hon. member for Glengarry-Prescott-Russell mentioned Bill C-116 earlier, which finally died on the Order Paper during the previous 34th Parliament. It would probably have been possible to rewrite and refine Bill C-116 with the government policy, while taking into account the views of the opposition. But no. We are being proposed today a motion to create a joint committee made up of eight senators and 14 members of Parliament.

Fortunately, the amendment moved by the hon. member for La Prairie proposes that the committee no longer be a joint committee, but a House committee made up only of members of Parliament. The member for La Prairie even changes the membership; there would be 12 members of Parliament: seven Liberals, three members from the official opposition and two from the second opposition party, which seems fair and reasonable at first glance.

We do not need a joint committee. This House, which is made up of elected people, has its own rules and its own vision of things, while the Senate, which is made up of non elected people who are in office until the age of 75, also has its own different way of seeing things, a way with which we are not always comfortable working. Had the government wanted to involve both Houses in the development of a code of conduct, the best way of doing it would have been to table a bill. Of course, both this House and the Senate would have had to pass this bill before it could receive Royal Assent.

Instead, the government decided to create a working committee, another one. If we are to create such a committee, we should at least let the elected members study, by themselves, what constitutes a conflict of interest in their case. After all, after a maximum of five years, these people must go back to their constituents. They are accountable for their actions; they must explain why they took such and such political decisions. We should have this right, since our colleagues in the Senate do not have this sensitive test to pass. All they need is the Governor General's signature to be in office until the respectable age of 75.

Perhaps it could be interesting to get the other place's point of view, but certainly not in a joint committee. Moreover, such a committee would probably resurrect five Conservative senators whose party was literally eliminated by the Canadians in the October 1993 election and does not have official party status anymore in this House. It would be a way to give back a voice to people that want to be heard, these days. Last week-end, they stated their case in Hull, and with this motion, they would do so in a joint committee made up of members of Parliament and senators.

If nothing but to respect the will of the people, we should reject the creation of a joint committee. The referendum on the Charlottetown accord showed that the people rejected the Senate reforms, particularly in Quebec. The idea of a triple E Senate, that is equal, elected and efficient, was certainly not endorsed. The proposal was for six senators per province, regardless of the size of the province, and it was rejected.

Now, the government party wants an elected Senate, while the Reform Party wants a triple E Senate, which means that there is disagreement on the number of Es. For our part, we want a triple A Senate, that is to say abolished, abolished and abolished. No other institution in the world is denounced by as many people as is this other place we have in the Canadian Parliament. There is no reason for a non-elected house to continue to exist in 1995. Perhaps there was a need for it in 1867, but before 1867, the two Houses we had in the Province of Canada were elected. The legislative assembly of the Province of Canada was an elected assembly. Starting in 1854, the legislative council, which had been an appointed institution since 1840, became an elected one. This means that until 1867, we had two elected Houses. What

happened in 1867 that caused this split, with one house, the House of Commons, being elected, and the other, the Senate of Canada, not?

The preamble of the British North America Act, or BNA Act, 1867, can shed some light on this. In 1867, it was stated in this preamble that the Dominion of Canada wanted to have institutions similar to those of the United Kingdom. What were these institutions in 1867, and what are they still today? The House of Commons, like in Canada, and the House of Lords, made up of peers. Because we did not and still do not have an aristocracy in Canada, we invented our own lords, whom were called senators. Originally, they were appointed for life. But in 1965, the Canadian Constitution was amended so that a senator's tenure of office ends at age 75, while grandfathering the rights of those who were already sitting in the Senate at the time but had not yet reached the age of 75.

Since then, as we can see clearly, the role of the other House has become less important. The Senate now sits some 40 days a year and cannot introduce money bills under section 53 of the 1867 British North America Act. The house of sober second thought likes to drag things out, as demonstrated by the electoral boundaries readjustment bill, the GST legislation introduced by the previous government and other bills that may be filibustered by the other house in the future. Given the cost to Canadian society, I think that we could do without it.

If we asked Canadians, "Do you agree that the Senate should be abolished?", a very high percentage of them would say yes. The problem is, what should we replace it with and how should it be done? Responses vary. There is no consensus on replacement.

I, of course, am eager to support the amendment tabled by the hon. member for La Prairie to restrict committee membership to members of the House of Commons. If the Senate wants to strike its own committee, it will do so.

The hon. member for Glengarry-Prescott-Russell said a little earlier this afternoon that our institutions, including Parliament, were based on the Westminster model, while the hon. member for Saint-Léonard made some comments to that effect.

I heard earlier today our colleague, the hon. member for Elk Island, point out that we ranked 36th in the public's esteem, just before used car salesmen. It is probably because we have to defend a used system that should be refurbished, a system that, in the past 50 years, has seen a virtual takeover of the legislative power by the executive power. That was not the case previously, as we can see by looking at history. When our parliamentary ancestors fought to abolish or appropriate royal powers, they insisted that these powers should be held by the House of Commons.

Over time, royal powers shifted from the palace not to the House of Commons but to the Prime Minister's Office. It is there that important decisions are made.

In our constitutional system, which consists of three powers: the legislative, the judiciary and the executive, the legislative branch is, for all practical purposes, under the control of the executive, which in turn is under the control of the Prime Minister's Office.

We have the advantage, and sometimes the disadvantage, of having a neighbour that has inspired us to reform. Our American neighbours have inspired us to carry out some institutional reforms that may not be in our best interests. In a system in which the executive is elected and accountable to the population and not to the American Congress, a system in which members of the House of Representatives and the Senate are elected and not accountable to the executive, the situation is quite different.

In the U.S., what did the political parties decide to do? They decided to choose their party leaders, their candidates for the presidential election, at an all-members convention. We adopted this idea in Canada, so that some of our party leaders are elected by delegates at a general convention while others are elected by all party members.

In principle, this is great, but when we want to apply this to our parliamentary institutions, we face a big problem. The problem is that, when the party leader is also the Prime Minister, the party leader has practically unlimited power. First, to his cabinet colleagues, he can say: "Look, if you are here, it is because I appointed you". To his caucus, he can say: "I do not feel very accountable to you. After all, you are not the ones who elected me party leader. I am accountable to the party members who elected me". The problem is that supporters have no control over what the government party does.

You will see self-congratulatory conventions like the one held in Trois-Rivières, of course, but no real debate on party policies. The intent of the Constitution Act, 1867, was to have institutions similar to those of the United Kingdom. In Great Britain, the Prime Minister is elected by his or her peers. This means that the party leader is elected from within the caucus, primus inter pares , as the Latin saying goes. This was a much more subtle way of governing and a much more equitable one, since the Prime Minister was accountable first and foremost-and in Great Britain this is still the case-to his colleagues or peers.

The role of member of Parliament is all the more important, since members can ask and expect to obtain from their leader the answers they need to continue to support that leader. The Prime Minister's seat is probably more precarious, more of a hot seat in the British system than in ours, where one can wash one's

hands by telling the caucus: "You did not elect me". In fact, under our election law, the Prime Minister can even designate candidates himself, over-ruling the electoral conventions in the various ridings.

Imagine all the power in the hands of just one person. That person appoints cabinet members, ultimately decides who gets the top jobs in the public service, decides who is appointed to the bench, as well as who can run under the party's banner. That is a lot of power in the hands of just one person.

The time has come for a major review. I am not sure if the hon. member for Saint-Léonard was being ironic earlier when he referred to the important role of parliamentarians. Let us not forget that never before was Parliament controlled to such an extent by the executive level.

When we voted on Bill C-68, three Liberal members opposed the legislation, thus breaking ranks with their government colleagues. All three lost the positions which they held in parliamentary committees. And the member for Saint-Léonard has the nerve to tell us that we must respect the parliamentary institution. Was that institution respected then? We have to wonder.

True control is not exercised by MPs. If the government wants to give some control to members, it must first get rid of the executive level in this House. We do not need it here; let it go to Rideau Hall or on Sussex Drive, if there is room. It is quite possible to change the system so that a member's ultimate goal, his or her greatest ambition, will be to be the best possible member. There should be no incentive to eventually become a parliamentary secretary or a minister. Members in this House should have no ambition other than to be able to say: I was the best possible member for my riding. The prospect of future promotions should not be a factor.

Those who want to serve at the executive level can certainly do so. However, let us be careful not to mix the two levels, particularly in this House. We all know the perverse effects of this confusion between the legislative and the executive levels. It is high time we distanced ourselves and shifted more toward a congressional type of decision, adapting it, of course, to our way of thinking, to our practices and to our traditions by regulating the activities of lobbyists, the influence peddlars, in order to control them.

The real issue is not members' powers or conflict of interest. We already have Standing Order 21, which provides the following, and, with your permission, I will quote it:

No member is entitled to vote upon any question in which he or she has a direct pecuniary interest, and the vote of any Member so interested will be disallowed.

The criterion is there; it is basic. When problems arise, we have the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, previously the committee on privileges and elections, which is empowered to hear all matters that may arise pertaining to a member's status or conflict of interest.

The committee has only to exercise its powers. Nothing is stopping it. If problems are brought to the attention of colleagues in the House, they may be raised, and the Speaker may determine prima facie that there is justification for their referral to the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs.

The mechanisms are already in place. Why create more? It would probably be enough to have something more flexible at the level of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs so we could have our committee on the rules of ethics in order to improve our operations. It would be much wiser and better advised to control the goings-on in the Prime Minister's office.

The government is currently behaving like Nero. Legend has it that Nero played his fiddle while Rome burned down. Similarly, while the government fails to follow its own policies on ethical conduct, while the Prime Minister himself tells us that he did not consult his ethics counsellor before taking certain decisions, we are being told that parliamentarians must be watched.

But let us avoid diversion. Diversion may be a very useful tactic in a hockey game during the last few minutes of third period, in order to stop the opponent from scoring a goal. In politics though, diversion tactics should not be overused. I think that we have gone a little too far. Recent cases like that of DirecTv show that mere parliamentarians are not the ones intervening to change decisions. Obviously, people from outside the House are making direct representations to either the Prime Minister's office or to the Minister of Canadian Heritage.

Let us start by really enforcing a code of conduct throughout government, at the ministerial and the executive level. Then it will undoubtedly be time to examine the ethics of the members of this House, the legislative branch of our constitution.

Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act, 1995 March 29th, 1995

Mr. Speaker, the hon. member for Kingston and the Islands has made a few errors. At one point, I almost thought I was hearing Flora MacDonald. Now really, we do understand that the riding may remain the same, but we do at least expect the incumbents to change. Indeed, Mrs. MacDonald did once hold the seat; now it is the hon. member and, one day, there will be somebody new there. If voters do not ensure this happens, nature surely will, as it will for me one day too.

Something remains to be clarified and corrected. The hon. member for Kingston and the Islands said that the amendment proposed by the official opposition on the issue of minimum guaranteed representation for Quebec would change the Constitution of Canada in an unorthodox way, that we cannot proceed in this fashion and that we should use the 7-50 rule, which is 7 provinces representing 50 per cent of the population of Canada, plus the two federal Houses. This is the way he suggests we do it, even though we clearly indicated that under the circumstances this is not the way to go.

The amendment proposed by the Bloc Quebecois would have changed the text of subclause 16(2) of the bill to the following-I am sure that the hon. member for Kingston and the Islands will be listening to this: "On receipt by the Chief Electoral Officer of a return referred to in subsection (1) in respect of a decennial census, the Chief Electoral Officer shall calculate the number of members of the House of Commons to be assigned to each of the provinces, subject and according to the provisions of section 51 of the Constitution Act, 1867 and the rules provided therein''. And our amendment would add that: ``and, notwithstanding the foregoing, when by application of this subsection the number of members to be assigned to the Province of Quebec is less than 25 per cent of the total number of members in the House of Commons, the Chief Electoral Officer shall assign at least 25 per cent of the total number of members to the Province of Quebec''. That is the amendment which would have guaranteed us 25 per cent of all seats.

Our amendment refers directly to a constitutional amendment; by our wording we are modifying section 51. Did we have the right to propose this amendment from a constitutional point of view? The question has been raised before the courts. I will provide my hon. colleague from Kingston and the Islands with a copy of the decision in Campbell vs. Attorney General of Canada, reported in 1985-49BLR, 4th edition, page 321. Five judges of the British Columbia Court of Appeal ruled that under section 44 of the Constitution Act, 1982, the federal Parliament had the authority to make laws, and that it could make laws with respect to the criterion of proportional representation, bearing in mind that proportional representation must be interpreted in the Canadian sense of the term, not in a rigid, mathematical sense, but in the context of Canadian history. This was the ruling of the honourable judges of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Campbell .

The legislative authority on which the official opposition's amendment is based is section 44 of the Constitution Act, 1982. I would remind members that section 44 does not specify exactly how we in the federal Parliament are to use our authority to amend the Constitution of Canada within our areas of jurisdiction. Are we to change its wording directly or by reference? We are making a reference to the wording. As the Constitution does not specify a method, either, in my opinion, is acceptable.

In concluding, I would like to ask the hon. member for Kingston and the Islands a question of principle. Setting aside the constitutional arguments that could occupy us for hours, why does the hon. member for Kingston and the Islands not wish to see the people of Quebec, as one of the founding races of this country in 1867, retain this critical mass of 25 per cent of the number of members, which gives it the power to influence certain decisions?

Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act, 1995 March 29th, 1995

Mr. Speaker, the process the final stage of which is being undertaken today started yesterday, more than a year after the introduction in this House of Bill C-18, which suspended the electoral redistribution process then under way and provided for a 24 month waiting period before starting a new debate on redistribution.

Unfortunately, the Reform Party then opposed Bill C-18 and the 24 month delay initially provided under this bill. However, the House of Commons passed the bill suspending the whole electoral redistribution process for 24 months.

Later, in considering Bill C-18, the Senate did exactly what the Reform Party wanted to do in this House. It moved an amendment to Bill C-18 providing that a new bill had to be tabled by June 1995; otherwise, the old law would apply again, reviving the commissions suspended under Bill C-18.

When the bill came back from the Senate, the government should have stood up and affirmed the will of the people represented by the hon. members in this place by approving the bill as presented and with the relevant amendments adopted in this House.

Yet, the government then chose to go along with a Senate amendment that put us in a tight squeeze by reducing the amount of time available to do our work. It was, in my opinion, an unacceptable concession, which the Reform Party managed to secure through the Senate.

Following final passage and Royal Assent of Bill C-18, the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs was given the mandate to draft a bill to be submitted to the House. We worked on this for a very long time. I attended all the sessions, including those in the summer of 1994, in July 1994, in which we heard a great many witnesses, including political party representatives, hon. members of this House who came to testify, university experts and others. While working on this bill, we enjoyed the continuous collaboration of the Chief Electoral Officer and his staff.

Although we spent a lot of time on this bill, we have precious little to show for it. Of course, the bill before us, Bill C-69, contains a few sweeteners. These sweeteners are improvements compared with the present situation.

For instance, the provincial commissions will now be able to hold hearings before proceeding with their task, which is clearly an improvement on the current situation. The commissions will have to produce three maps for the regions they cover, three electoral redistribution proposals. If there is sufficient popular demand, the commissions will have to hold new hearings. Granted, the process was improved in this regard.

The bill also sets out the factors to be considered by the commissions in establishing electoral ridings.

These considerations or factors are described in subparagraph 19(2)( b ), which states that, in determining reasonable electoral district boundaries, the provincial commission shall consider the following: first, the community of interest; second, a manageable geographic size for districts in sparsely populated, rural or northern regions of the province; third, the probability that there will be a substantial increase in the population of electoral districts in the next five years. And finally, the commission shall recommend changes to existing electoral district boundaries only where the above-mentioned factors are sufficiently significant to warrant such a recommendation.

It is all fine and well to make a policy statement like that, making community of interest a guiding principle for every commission. However, we inevitably come across another provision, which sets the maximum variance from the provincial electoral quota at 25 per cent. For example, if, in Quebec, the provincial quota was 100,000 voters or a population of 100,000, the commission would be entitled to make electoral districts with up to 125,000 voters but no less than 75,000 or equivalent population.

The commission may observe a community of interest, but note that the number of voters is not significant enough. Let us not take an hypothetical case, but a real one. At present, the population of the electoral district of Bonaventure-Îles-de-la-Madeleine is 43 per cent below the provincial quota of 50,000 or 51,000, but encompasses a huge area. This district is at risk; it may actually be eliminated. While this bill allows the commissions not to apply this 25 per cent rule rigidly, the considerations are so restrictive that I wonder if they will ever be able to do so.

The only time a provincial commission can depart from this rule is when, as mentioned in paragraph 19(3), an electoral riding or district is geographically isolated from the rest of the province or is not easily accessible. Who will define "geographically isolated"? The commissions, to start with, and of course the courts. No definition was provided. I consider the Magdalen Islands geographically isolated. No one will deny that. Will the population factor apply? I suggest that the commissions consider this factor. Magdalen Islanders had their own electoral district up until 1968. Under Quebec law, they are guaranteed their own district. It is not that the hon. member for Bonaventure-Îles-de-la-Madeleine is not doing a good job at representing the district, but I think it would be highly desirable to have a member of Parliament just for the Magdalen Islands.

Magdalen Islanders will argue that they are geographically isolated, and I think that they can qualify under that factor. Then it will be a matter of satisfying the provincial commissions that the population of the islands does not vary too greatly to justify the creation of a separate district. But I can see a downside to this. While the new electoral district of Magdalen Islands gains a member of Parliament, the district of Bonaventure shrinks in terms of voters ratio. What will happen to the Gaspesian Peninsula then?

What becomes of the ridings of Gaspé, Matapédia-Matane, Bonaventure-Îles-de-la-Madeleine and Rimouski-Témiscouata? What do we do? There is a problem in the Gaspé peninsula. Does clause 19(3) allow us to deal with it globally? I am not sure. We need more information. This is a region with a dwindling population where MPs, whatever their political allegiance, have a large area to cover. They must cope with problems that do not exist, or that take a very different form, elsewhere in the province or in the country. The Gaspé peninsula is the first thing that concerns me.

Maybe clause 19(3) will apply to the riding of Manicouagan, which is indeed geographically isolated and particularly inaccessible, as my hon. friend from Manicouagan argued so convincingly before the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs and again here in the House at the report stage, if memory serves.

Maybe it will also apply to the northern regions of Quebec and Ontario. Last Monday, the ridings of Cochrane-Superior and Nickel Belt in northern Ontario were mentioned.

They cover a vast area and their population, with certain exceptions, is generally on the decline. Will the division be made strictly on the basis of the numbers? Will a greater deviation be allowed?

Clause 19(3) is much too restrictive, in my opinion, for us to give it our approval.

We had suggested maintaining, in the bill before us, criteria now being used by the provincial commissions when deciding whether to waive the rules. What are these criteria?

At the present time, a provincial commission may waive the 25 per cent criterion in any case where any special community or diversity of interests of the inhabitants of various regions of the

province appears to the commission to render such waiving necessary or desirable. In other words, the provincial commissions now have a much broader criterion when looking at particular cases.

I think that a region like the Gaspé or the Magdalen Islands, even the Lower St. Lawrence, would have benefited much more under this criterion than under the extremely restrictive wording being proposed to replace it. This may not be as bad as the initial suggestion to include a schedule of the ridings in the act and freeze them, thus giving a form of statism to the act and to the list of ridings and making it extremely difficult to work with.

Consequently, the official opposition considers clause 19 to be a major obstacle and cannot support the bill.

Clause 16 is also questionable and even unacceptable, given what it says and what it does not say.

Following the representations made last summer to the Standing Committee on the Procedure and House Affairs-by the hon. member for Mégantic-Compton-Stanstead, by the president of the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada and, previously, on June 21, by Senator Jean-Claude Rivest of the Stadacona senatorial designation-we understood that the government would be receptive to the traditional request made by Quebecers and their government for guaranteed minimum representation in the House of Commons, as is the case for some Atlantic provinces.

As you know, representation for the Atlantic provinces is guaranteed by the senatorial clause, which dates back to 1915 and which we do not question.

The senatorial clause allows a population of 120,000 people in Prince Edward Island to be represented by four members in this House. Indeed, that clause provides that a province cannot be represented by fewer members in the House of Commons than senators in the Senate. Since four Senate seats are guaranteed to Prince Edward Island in the senatorial clause, that province can also be represented by four members in this House. The same rule applies for New Brunswick, which is guaranteed ten seats in the Senate, under the Canadian Constitution.

Although the number of residents in that province does not justify such representation, New Brunswick gets ten seats and we accept that. The terms of union between Newfoundland and the Canadian federation, ratified in 1949, also contained provisions guaranteeing adequate representation of the province of Newfoundland, both in the House of Commons and in the Senate. In fact, Newfoundland was guaranteed six seats in the Canadian Senate.

So if we agree with the senatorial clause that provides guarantees for Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland, why are we up against a wall when we talk about the same guarantees for the Province of Quebec, when we talk about a minimum level of representation for Quebec?

Quebec, which as a people and as a nation, is one of the two founding peoples of this country. We are told this time and time again. We learned this from our history teachers. It is part of our collective conscience as Quebecers that in 1867, Quebecers were one of the two founding peoples. I may recall that on June 30, 1867, the day before the coming into force of the British North America Act, 1867, Quebec, then known as Lower Canada, was entitled to 65 seats out of a total of 130 in the Parliament of the Province of Canada, that is, 50 per cent.

This was agreed to by the members who were elected to represent us at the time-there was no referendum to ask what the people of Quebec thought and certainly not the women of Quebec, since they did not even have the right to vote at the time and the Fathers of the Confederation were all males-but there were no constitutional provisions that provided for minimum representation for Quebec. The only guarantee Quebec obtained was those 65 seats, but 65 out of how many?

On July 1, 1867, it was 65 seats out of 181. Later, when Canada's territory was expanded with the addition of new provinces including Manitoba, Prince Edward Island, Saskatchewan, Alberta, British Columbia and finally Newfoundland, Quebec's share of representation in the House of Commons dropped steadily, stabilizing during the past 20 or 30 years at a level slightly over one-quarter. Obviously, the Fathers of Confederation made a mistake by not including a minimum representation clause for Quebec, which at the time should have been 50 per cent.

We can hardly rewrite history and today insist on 50 per cent. People will say: Who do you think you are? We are not in a country that allows such deviations from the norm. Be that as it may, we are not asking for the representation that we had in 1867, in other words, 50 per cent. We asked for a minimum guarantee of 25 per cent of the seats in the House of Commons. In the next general election, should Quebec participate-my good friend from Bonaventure-Îles-de-la-Madeleine will agree it is pretty doubtful that we will be able to-when the thirty-sixth Parliament is elected, Quebec, for the first time in its history, will fall below this critical mass of 25 per cent, since it will have only 75 seats out of 301.

Hence our proposal, which was akin to the Liberal 1992 proposal. I read on Monday of the pleasure of the hon. member for Papineau-Saint-Michel and Minister of Foreign Affairs at being able to guarantee Quebec minimum representation of 25 per cent, saying that this represented a significant gain for

Quebec. The hon. member for Papineau-Saint-Michel described the guarantee of 25 per cent for Quebec as an incredible step forward.

Well, as regards our motion which was voted on yesterday, once again none of the Liberal members in this House in 1992, who are still here today, voted in favour. Why did the members change their minds in the space of three years? Why deny Quebec something so minor? I would like, in passing, to recognize the very open-minded approach to the matter taken by the hon. member for Burnaby-Kingsway, who voted with the official opposition to guarantee Quebec minimum representation of 25 per cent, as did the hon. member for Beauce, as if this were perfectly natural.

It was perfectly natural, since the vast majority of members from Quebec present in this House yesterday voted in favour of this minimum guarantee of 25 per cent. We can therefore say that there is very broad consensus in Quebec, which goes beyond party lines, that Quebec should enjoy a minimum guarantee of 25 per cent. When the Progressive Conservative Party, the official opposition, the Bloc Quebecois, the hon. member for Burnaby-Kingsway and the independent member for Beauce all support the motion to include guaranteed representation of 25 per cent in Bill C-69, it is obvious that there is broad support in Quebec on this point. I need not add that Senator Rivest had given his support for this provision. Even the support of the governments of Quebec, which had called for the inclusion of this provision in the legislation, did not fail. As far as I know, as well, the present government never shied away from what had been agreed in the past.

It is strange to see the government back away from something it supported in September 1992-the vote was on September 10, 1992-without much justification. Two days ago, on Monday, I listened to the arguments which the hon. member for Kingston and the Islands and the hon. member for Scarborough-Rouge River put forward, arguments which were not convincing. I do admit, however, that under normal circumstances, these two people are extremely convincing, but, for people to be able to convince others, they themselves must be convinced.

It goes without saying that, when people rise to make representations that they are forced to make-because any old reason to vote against the amendment will do-they obviously cannot be convincing. The unconvinced cannot be convincing. This was the impression that I got the other day from the hon. member for Kingston and the Islands, the impression that he did not believe in the things that he was saying and that he was using the pretext of constitutional technicalities as a reason for refusing to support a motion which had already been allowed by the Chair and declared admissible following a procedural debate. It is a little odd that the debate swung in this direction.

You will understand therefore, that, at the end of the day, this bill will be incomplete, as I said earlier, because of its stand on the issue of allowable deviations from the boundary rules in special ridings and because of its failure to take a stand on the issue of one of the country's founding peoples. Was this an intentional omission on the part of the government?

We might have asked ourselves this question when debate began on the bill. But, after the vote yesterday on the official opposition's motion guaranteeing Quebec 25 per cent of the seats in the House, it was quite clear that the government had not simply overlooked this detail, but that it was omitted by design. The government does not want to guarantee Quebec fair representation in this House and does not want to accept as a criterion the fact that the nation of francophones in Quebec is a founding people, the cradle of francophones in America. The day we took such a decision was a very sad day indeed.

Would Canadians have been unhappy to see the government finally recognize Quebec's distinct society status, founding people status, status as a nation which built this country? I think not. Yet, yesterday, all it would have taken to recognize this was a majority vote in this House. But it was denied us. It was the most modest demand formulated in the last 50 years.

Without going back to prehistory, we can go back several decades: in the 1930s, there was the Rowell-Sirois commission in Quebec; in the 1950s, the Tremblay commission also studied constitutional issues; the Laurendeau-Dunton commission reviewed what was happening in this country in terms of the Constitution.

I invite our friends from the Reform Party, who think that Canadian history started with their election, to read about the events of that period. It would be a good idea to return to the source to understand that Canadian history started, we are not sure exactly when, with the first people to land on our shores, probably the Vikings who landed somewhere near Newfoundland at the beginning of the millennium. Then there was the arrival of Jacques Cartier in Gaspé in 1534, the founding of Quebec City by Samuel de Champlain in 1608, the founding of Trois-Rivières and Montreal in the following decades. And finally, the establishment of the first government in New France, as Canada was then called.

In the beginning, we had a government of companies. As you probably remember, the King of France entrusted private companies like the Company of One Hundred Associates and the Dutch West India Company with the administration of the territory. The King of England, for his part, gave the Hudson's Bay Company the English part of the territory that later became British North America. Territories throughout the continent were administered by private companies.

Our first institutions, not democratic but public, were granted in 1663 by the King of France through the establishment of the Sovereign Council of New France. These institutions reflected the values of the time: a governor, an intendant, the Bishop of Quebec City and those co-opted by them for a total of seven people, near the end of colonial times, but without any democratic guarantees.

We, francophones, had a hard time achieving our democratic rights on the American continent. Our motherland never gave them to us.

They tried to exercise in New France the same absolute domination as in Old France. Gradually, we stopped being French while, of course, maintaining good relations with what was then our mother or home country and became a more and more distinct nation.

At first, we called ourselves Canadiens or, as we used say, "Canayens". So, on one side, there was us Canadiens and, on the other, the English who occupied part of the land.

From 1663 to 1759, we operated with these institutions. Then, in 1759, the battle that took place on the Plains of Abraham was a victory for some, but for us it was a defeat. It brought about constitutional changes, again, military government in 1759, a royal proclamation in 1763 which ceded the colony of New France to England in exchange for Guadeloupe and Martinique. It is clear that errors of judgment were made somewhere along the way because, while anglophones had won here, in America, when, on the Old Continent, the British won the war against the French and the Treaty of Paris was signed, they got New France, but France kept Guadeloupe and Martinique.

Those are great travel destinations, but in terms of the relative value of the two, I think it was a sucker deal at the time.

Still no democratic institutions. In 1774, the Quebec Act that was handed to us-because we got whatever was left over-nonetheless restored civil law in Quebec, which allowed us to have a legislative council, but not an elected one. They were afraid to give francophones, so peace-loving, democratic institutions in which Quebecers could be represented by the people of their choice. Instead, we were given a legislative council appointed by the governor.

But the Quebecers, Canadiens of those days had certainly demonstrated great pacifism and great open-mindedness because there were 63,000 francophones in Quebec at the time of the conquest and only 3,000 to 4,000 survivors of Wolfe's regiment. With that kind of power relationship, had we been even slightly vindictive, the slightest bit vindictive, we would not have had to go into overtime to decide the fate of these 3,000 or so people. We went along with a de facto situation and, guided by the elites who governed us in those days, whether we liked it or not-we will not rewrite history-we tolerated this situation.

Finally, in 1791, the Constitutional Act gave us for the very first time the right to have elected representatives and the first House of Assembly in Quebec. Naturally, we did not take any chances. It is like in a car: there is an accelerator, but there is also a brake pedal. The Westminster government allowed us to have a house of assembly made up of elected members, but it also maintained a legislative council, which was appointed by the governor and which could oppose the decisions of the assembly.

In 1791, we gained control over some institutions. The situation evolved rather rapidly and the country was divided into two parts: Upper Canada and Lower Canada. The assembly elected in Lower Canada had no extra-territorial jurisdiction. Consequently, it could not legislate for Upper Canada, nor could Upper Canada legislate for Lower Canada. We then move on to the 1830s with the Patriotes' rebellion and the infamous Durham report, which recommended unifying the two Canadas to finally assimilate and anglicize the French-speaking nation in America, something which was not to happen.

For eight years, while English was the only official language in the house of assembly of the Parliament of the Province of Canada, French Canadians fought, in their own language, to have French recognized as an official language. Thanks to their tenacity, justice was finally done in 1848, when they obtained the right to use French, which also became the language used in the legislation. I will end with 1867 and the emergence of new institutions.

You will understand, Mr. Speaker, why I simply cannot agree when I hear simplistic comments such as those made by the Reform Party, to the effect that Canada started to exist in October 1993. Canada has existed for a long time. As a member of one of the founding nations which forged Canada's Constitution, I respectfully submit that, given our long common history, this critical mass of 25 per cent is the breath of life which Quebec needs if it remains, but I hope it will not, part of the Canadian federation.

In any case, it is better to be safe than sorry; it is better to buckle up, even if you do not wish to have an accident. It is from that perspective that I wanted to discuss the 25 per cent rule. This rule is so fundamental that, even though Bill C-69 includes some improvements, the fact that Quebec is not guaranteed a minimum of 25 per cent of the total representation in the House of Commons is reason enough, in fact the only reason, for the Bloc not to support this bill at third reading. Consequently, we will oppose this legislation.

Canadian Federation March 29th, 1995

Mr. Speaker, never in Quebec history have we seen Quebec members, in this case Liberal members, reject a motion to protect Quebec's political weight within the Canadian federation.

Yes, Mr. Speaker, Liberal and Reform members joined forces yesterday in an effort to defeat a Bloc Quebecois motion recognizing Quebec's right to a minimum of 25 per cent of seats in the House of Commons.

This Bloc motion would have guaranteed a quarter of the seats to one of Canada's two founding nations and met Quebecers' historical and legitimate demands to maintain a minimum amount of political weight within the Canadian federation.

The attitude displayed yesterday by Liberal members is an example of double talk in that-

Canadian Security Intelligence Service March 28th, 1995

Mr. Speaker, since we now know that CSIS deliberately kept information from the solicitor general, how do we know the solicitor general is answering our questions fully on CSIS activities, given that he himself has been kept in the dark?

Canadian Security Intelligence Service March 28th, 1995

Mr. Speaker, how does the solicitor general explain that CSIS keeps important information from him regarding its operations, although it is his ministerial duty to be fully informed of the activities of Canada's secret service?

Canadian Security Intelligence Service March 28th, 1995

Mr. Speaker, my question is for the solicitor general. According to the inspector general of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Ursula Menke, CSIS failed to include important information in its annual reports to the solicitor general.

Public Security March 28th, 1995

Mr. Speaker, first of all, I wish to thank the Solicitor General of Canada for sending me the notes for the statement he gave today on national security.

We must keep in mind that, in his 1992 response to the first statement on national security, the Liberal member for Scarborough West pointed out that then Solicitor General Doug Lewis had hardly said anything in his statement, only assuring the Canadian public that CSIS was not doing anything illegal. To support his statement, the former Solicitor General quoted the reports from the Security Intelligence Review Committee or SIRC.

However, we now know that CSIS acted, if not illegally, at least in a highly questionable manner in its dealings with the Heritage Front and the Reform Party while the Solicitor General was preparing his first statement on national security.

As in previous statements, the solicitor general announced today that the review mechanism provided under the law was tested by the Heritage Front affair. The solicitor general proudly said that SIRC concluded that the allegations made against CSIS were without foundation.

In fact, the statements on national security are silent on this and sound pretty much the same year after year. We in the Bloc Quebecois-and probably the members from the Reform Party and even some Liberal members as well-suspect that today's statement by the Solicitor General ignores whole aspects of CSIS activities.

Does CSIS engage in legal or illegal activities? No one knows, not even the Solicitor General. According to the inspector general for CSIS, the annual reports submitted by that service to the Solicitor General do not provide an accurate picture of its activities. Consequently, it is nearly impossible to think that the Solicitor General can hide from us information which may not have been transmitted to him regarding the real activities of CSIS, whether these are successful or not.

Let me remind you, Mr. Speaker, as the hon. member for Berthier-Montcalm pointed out last year, in reply to the third statement on national security, that SIRC members are all supporters of the Conservative, Liberal or New Democrat party. Neither the official opposition, nor the Reform Party is represented on the Security Intelligence Review Committee. The five members of that committee are not ordinary citizens. If you look at the lists of contributors to the federal parties since 1990, you will see that SIRC members contributed a total of about $34,000.

The member associated with the NDP distinguishes himself from the others by contributing an average of less than $200 per year to his party, which may be an indication that the NDP must is in poor shape. The Conservative and Liberal SIRC members contribute an average of over $2,000 per year to their respective political party. The official opposition is asking that current SIRC members be replaced, so that this monitoring committee can better represent the Quebec and Canadian population, and also better reflect the 35th Parliament, as it was shaped by Canadians in the October 1993 federal election.

The Solicitor General's statement on national security is silent on the activities of the Communications Security Establishment. Yet, all those involved feel that the CSE, which receives its instructions directly from Privy Council, in other words the Prime Minister's office, poses a serious threat to the freedom of all Quebecers and Canadians. The CSE can easily intercept any telephone conversation in Canada, whether these communications are transmitted through satellite or the microwave toll network. This means that the CSE can intercept virtually any long distance or international phone call placed in Canada.

I may recall what the Deputy Prime Minister said last year in response to questions from official opposition members about allegations made by a former CSE employee. The former employee accused the CSE of spying on Canadian citizens, and most Canadian espionage experts confirmed this, but the Deputy Prime Minister always gave the same answer, and I quote: "The CSE has no mandate to spy on Canadians".

The Deputy Prime Minister never said that the CSE does not spy on Canadians. She simply said that the CSE had no mandate to do so. The Prime Minister said that the CSE no longer spies on Canadians, which implies that the CSE did at one time. However, the Prime Minister never repeated what he said inadvertently.

What do we know about the apparently unwarranted and perhaps even unlawful activities of the CSE? Almost nothing, except for a few articles by reporters and a book by a former CSE spy. No details in the Estimates. Although the most obscure council subsidized to the tune of one million dollars provides detailed information on its operations, we know nothing about the CSE and its activities. Should we simply forget about the individual rights protected under the Quebec and Canadian charters of human rights, when the CSE is manifestly engaged in electronic eavesdropping?

The annual statement by the Solicitor General does not even mention the CSE.

I hope that the government, considering the adoption of Motion M-38 presented in this House which proposes concerns monitoring the CSE through an outside civilian authority, with the requirement to report to Parliament, will table as soon as possible a bill providing for an external mechanism to monitor the Communications Security Establishment.

Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act, 1995 March 27th, 1995

moved:

Motion No. 4

That Bill C-69, in Clause 16, be amended by replacing lines 41 to 44, page 8, with the following:

"Constitution Act, 1867 and, notwithstanding the foregoing, when by application of this subsection the number of members to be assigned to the Province of Quebec is less than 25 per cent of the total number of members in the House of Commons, the Chief Electoral Officer shall assign at least 25 per cent of the total number of members to the Province of Quebec.

(2.1) The Chief Electoral Officer shall cause a notice to be published in the Canada Gazette forthwith setting out the results thereof."

Mr. Speaker, we are finally at the heart of the debate. We are nearing the point where we will know whether or not this House recognizes Quebec a right we have always considered normal, as one of the two founding peoples, the right to be represented according to our historical participation in Canadian institutions. Aside from what my friend, the hon. member for Kamouraska-Rivière-du-Loup, was saying awhile ago-since we hope that this bill on electoral boundaries will not apply to Quebec-we must continue to live with the institutions where we have been called to serve and work, in the hope of improving them until such time when Quebec democratically chooses to separate.

The Constitution Act of 1791, the first providing for elected representation, gave Quebec a large majority of seats. It means that in 1791, francophones controlled the legislative assembly. The Union Act of 1840 reduced Quebecers' share to half the seats in the House of the Province of Canada although, at the time, their numbers were far greater than those of the English speaking population.

On the eve of the union of 1867, there were, right here in Ottawa, in the Parliament of the Province of Canada, 65 members from Quebec and 65 members from Upper Canada. We had half the seats. What happened since then? From 65 out of 130, or 50 per cent, as we were on June 30, 1867, we went the very next

day to 65 out of 181, or a third, at least theoretically since the elections had not been called yet.

Today, as we sit in this 35th Parliament, we are 75 out of 295 and, should the trend continue, should we remain in this federal system which is relentlessly stifling us, we will have only 75 seats out of 301 in the 36th Parliament. Then it will be out of 310, 330, 340. This is Quebec's slow agony. Today we are called on to say if we accept this slow agony for Quebec, regardless of the referendum results. I am in good company to comment this situation.

Fortunately, we have Hansard , the official report of the debates, which allows us to see how our friends in this House looked at this issue, in 1992. I refer especially to page 12795 of Hansard of September 9, 1992, in which the hon. member for Papineau-Saint-Michel, the current Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs said, and I quote: ``Another demand is the preservation of Quebec's representation within common institutions to fully reflect its particular status in Canada. Item 21 guarantees that Quebec will be assigned no fewer than 25 per cent of the seats in the House of Commons''.

The hon. member for Papineau-Saint-Michel goes on to say: "This is in fact an extraordinary gain showing the remarkable generosity of our Canadian partners who thus recognize Quebec's distinctiveness". The hon. member for Papineau-Saint-Michel, who is now a government minister, will surely not change his mind when the matter is voted on. He will surely remember a speech he made as recently as September 9, 1992 and support the amendment tabled by the Bloc today.

Other people not known as sovereignists have considered this issue. These people have expressed conflicting constitutional positions. A case in point is Senator Jean-Claude Rivest who, when he appeared before the Committee on Procedure and House Affairs on June 21, dealt in particular with the issue of a minimum level of representation for Quebec, what this minimum level should be and why.

In the June 21, 1994 issue, No. 18, of the Minutes of Proceedings of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, Senator Rivest is quoted as saying: "However, the constitutional system that the Canadian constitution imposes on the various provinces varies considerably from province to province. In particular, the constitutional obligations that were imposed upon Quebec in 1867, and which were maintained in the 1982 Act are much greater than those imposed on other provinces.

One only has to recall the special language requirements imposed upon Quebec concerning the use of French and English in the legislature and in the courts, the provisions that were renewed concerning Quebec pursuant to section 23 of the Charter having to do with the language of instruction, and the constitutional obligation that only the government of Quebec has to maintain two school board systems".

So, says Senator Rivest: "The principle that the various provinces should be constitutionally equal is contradicted by the very text of the Constitution, which opens the way for the government of Quebec to demand, strictly at the constitutional level, i.e. in terms of the House of Commons, the Senate and the Supreme Court, special constitutional status that corresponds to the sociological, linguistic and historical reality of Quebec within the Canadian federation".

Senator Rivest added: "One example would be the 25 percent representation rule within the House of Commons, along with the fact that in the current Senate, Quebec has a markedly greater representation than do the other provinces of regions of Canada. A second example would be the Supreme Court. Only Quebec is guaranteed three seats on the Supreme Court. So when it came time to negotiate about the House of Commons, as I just said, we demanded 25 percent representation. From a federalist point of view, the basic problem of Quebec's society-and this is still Senator Rivest talking-and not the problem of the province of Quebec, is that it is inconceivable and no doubt unacceptable for Quebecers, for Quebec's society, to be part of the Canadian federation without the assurance and the constitutional and legal guarantees that the various Quebec governments have always sought and with which Quebec could retain, at the institutional level, not a majority, not equality, but enough of a critical mass to have influence corresponding to its historical, sociological and cultural reality within the Canadian federation. For Quebec, this is something that is not negotiable".

I am quoting Senator Rivest, who has not yet joined the Yes camp in the referendum debate. I asked Senator Rivest this last question when he appeared before us: "If Quebecers were to decide to postpone their move toward sovereignty, would you now be in favour of including a constitutional clause that would guarantee them 25 per cent representation"?

Senator Rivest replied: "I think that no matter how the Senate is reformed, it will be extremely difficult for the Premier of Quebec, assuming that the federal system continues, to agree to any constitutional standard, regarding the number of members, that would be below a 25 per cent threshold".

I just quoted two staunch federalists, two people who actively participated in the abortive attempts to reform Canadian federalism.

I see across the way some of the members who supported this minimum of 25 per cent, this critical mass that Quebec so badly needs in this House. The member for Cochrane-Superior voted in favour of the motion, as did the member for Saint-Maurice and current Prime Minister, the member for Sudbury, now Minister of Health, the member for Papineau-Saint-Michel, of course, after what he said, voted in favour of the motion and, oddly enough, the only two paired members, the hon. member for Kingston and the Islands and the former Solicitor General, Mr. Lewis. I hope that he will not be paired in the vote, and that

he will support, as his colleagues have done, a minimum representation for Quebec.

The vote that will be held in this House will send a message to those Quebecers who still have doubts about the willingness to reform federal institutions. It will tell them whether there is, among the Liberal members opposite, the willingness to give Quebec a minimum guarantee that the Liberals themselves, when they were in opposition, felt so strongly that Quebec should have.