Michel Bellehumeur

[Young Offenders Act, October 26th, 1998]

Mr. Speaker, there is another consensus in Quebec that the federal government is refusing to respect, and that is the consensus around young offenders.

The approach the Minister of Justice has taken in her bill is completely at odds with the current approach in Quebec.

How can the Prime Minister claim to have sorted out the issue of Quebec's distinct character when his justice minister is getting ready to impose Canada's young offenders model on Quebec?

[Criminal Code, October 20th, 1998]

Madam Speaker, according to Bill C-219, every one who, in committing an offence, operates or uses a motor vehicle that he has stolen or knows to have been stolen is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of one year. What is more, it calls for the sentence for this offence to be served consecutive to any other imposed for the same act.

From what has been said in this House today it will be understood that what is involved is auto theft, and the amendment the hon. member is proposing is no doubt intended to remedy a shortcoming. Therefore, we have to see whether there is a shortcoming in the Criminal Code, when it comes to auto theft.

There is a problem, however. We are all aware that there are indeed many thefts of automobiles in Canada and in Quebec, as the hon. member has just said. Unlike other types of crime, it is on the rise. But will the problem be solved by making the penalty stiffer, by adding what the hon. member wants to see added? The answer is no. What is there in the Criminal Code?

Motor vehicle theft is indeed a significant problem, we must agree. But is Bill C-219 the solution? The Criminal Code currently contains a series of measures that apply to auto theft. I invite the hon. member to read section 322. According to it, any person who steals property may be charged with a criminal offence and is liable to up to 10 years imprisonment, if the value of the stolen property exceeds $5,000. And, of course, in the case of an automobile, the value of the property generally exceeds $5,000.

If the value of the property is under $5,000, section 334 of the Criminal Code applies. Under section 334, the individual will either be found guilty of a summary offence, and sentenced to a maximum of six months' imprisonment, or a $2,000 fine, or found guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.

In section 335 of the Criminal Code, the law makers have provided that individuals may be found guilty of a summary offence if they took possession of a motor vehicle without, however, intending to steal it. The House will recall that we discussed this amendment to the Criminal Code very recently, with respect to Bill C-209.

In my opinion, the amendments proposed by the member for Wild Rose do not add anything new to the existing legislative framework. Finally, I think the member's bill is based on false premises. Bill C-219 implies that it is now impossible to lay charges of theft under section 322 of the Criminal Code if the offence contributed to the perpetration of another offence.

There is no sign of a regulatory vacuum in this regard at the present time. An individual may be charged with several offences, including theft under section 322 of the Criminal Code.

With his bill, the member seems to consider that stealing a motor vehicle is a more serious offence if the vehicle is used to commit another offence. The member believes that regulating this specific offence would ensure more equitable treatment of the offender. I do not agree.

Excessive regulating does not solve all the problems. By systematically regulating the multiple aspects of an offence, we would restrict the courts' discretionary power. In my opinion, Bill C-219 would unnecessarily restrict that discretionary power, which has so far served justice very well.

The courts were given this discretionary sentencing power because they are the ones that analyze the evidence relating to a case. With this discretionary power, a judge can impose a sentence that is fair and appropriate.

For example, before imposing a sentence, the judge may take into consideration the fact that not only did the individual steal the motor vehicle, but that he also used it to commit another offence. The Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Justice provided a very good explanation of how this discretionary power is used by the courts when imposing a sentence.

Moreover, the courts can, under section 718.3(4) of the Criminal Code, order that sentences be served consecutively. Again, nothing indicates that the specific case referred to in the bill would not be subject to that procedure. Nothing justifies amending the Criminal Code to require consecutive sentencing in this case.

While car theft is a major crime in Canada, the Bloc Quebecois does not think that the member's proposals will correct the situation. Systematic coding of all facets of an infraction is no guarantee of better legal processing. Contrary to what the Reform members appear to think, criminal law is weakened when we try to anticipate every eventuality in an inflexible legal provision.

There is no other area of law where evidence is as important and where circumstances play such a preponderant role. I think quite sincerely, especially for this type of offence, that the courts in Quebec and Canada already apply the sections of the Criminal Code extremely well and there is no need for us to intervene in this field of jurisdiction.

I can hear the member speaking, and he does not seem to agree with my position. I believe that everyone here and our viewing audience will understand that we will not reduce the number of car thefts merely by creating a specific section on it. It is a matter of supply and demand and, unfortunately, there are many car thieves who make their living this way.

It is unacceptable. However, the Criminal Code, as it stands, contains provisions that can and must be applied to reduce car theft as much as possible, and the amendments proposed in Bill C-219 are not going to resolve the problem. We have everything we need in the Code to resolve it.

[Criminal Code, October 8th, 1998]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise today to speak at second reading of Bill C-51, introduced by the Minister of Justice.

This bill is entitled: An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and the Corrections and Conditional Release Act. It cleans out a lot of our penal law system.

This is an omnibus bill. Traditionally, these omnibus bills always require particular attention from parliamentarians, since they involve several laws.

A careful examination of the measures proposed in Bill C-51 would show how pertinent the minister's proposals are. I must take this opportunity to point out how important the work of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights will be.

On numerous occasions in this House we have criticized the quality of the work done by the parliamentary committees, because of the government's systematic obstruction . It rarely acts on the recommendations made to it. It is therefore vital for the opposition parties to join together to demand transparency from the government in committee proceedings. As I have done for a number of other bills, I offer the minister my full co-operation in improving this bill, if possible.

Since this is an omnibus bill, I am going to address a number of extremely important matters, naturally those which involve the concerns of Quebeckers most directly.

The first part I am going to address deals with casinos on cruise ships. Since other Bloc Quebecois MPs have already spoken on this, I shall be brief.

Bill C-51 deals with certain amendments relating to casinos on cruise ships. I will give a brief historical review. Without the St. Lawrence River, Quebec and Canada—the entire North American continent in fact—would have developed in a very different way. Very early on in our history, it was the route taken by the foreign explorers who discovered the marvellous part of this continent now known as Quebec.

Although its role has changed over the years, this great navigable waterway has always influenced the development of our communities, culturally, economically and touristically. Until know, however, our legislation has had a direct impact on the river's tourism potential, by preventing cruise ships from operating casinos.

Cruise ships had to shut down their casinos when they hit the waters off Anticosti Island, or in other words two days before reaching Quebec City. The direct result was that a number of carriers avoided stopovers at Quebec City and those that did put in did so for a much shorter period of time, in the interests of keeping their passengers happy.

Since the Bloc Quebecois was elected in 1993, the member for Beauport—Montmorency—Côte-de-Beaupré—Île-d'Orléans has been trying to get the House and the government to see the disastrous impact of existing legislation on cruise ships with casinos.

If these ships are allowed to operate their casinos in the St. Lawrence River, tourism in the Quebec City area will pick up, as passengers will be able to disembark and spend more time in the area, returning to the ship at night to enjoy the casino. This will be legal. When passengers disembark, they will provide the Quebec City area with a significant economic boost.

For this, we owe a big thank you to the member for Beauport—Montmorency—Côte-de-Beaupré—Île-d'Orléans, and to all members from the Quebec City area, who worked together to get the government to see the advantage of this amendment, and especially how important it was to Quebec to amend the Criminal Code so that cruise ships could continue on their way, but be able to stop over in Quebec City, so that neither the region nor vacationers would suffer.

The other important thing I wanted to mention about Bill C-51 is the accelerated parole review provision. I would like to speak to this briefly.

In 1997, the media brought us the Lagana affair. It will be recalled that this involved a lawyer, Joseph Lagana, sentenced in 1995 to 13 years in prison for his involvement in a drug importing case and for laundering almost $47.4 million. The worse part of this story is that Mr. Lagana was released after serving only one sixth of his sentence, that is 26 months instead of the 13 years of imprisonment he had been sentenced to by the judge.

The accelerated parole review procedure provided in the Corrections and Conditional Release Act benefited this major drug trafficker, who was released after serving only one sixth of his sentence because his crime was considered a non-violent offence under the law and he had not served time before.

On this subject, let me digress to say a word about the application criteria of this accelerated review procedure. In 1987, the chief justice of the supreme court made a decision in the Smith affair, saying:

Because they are the direct cause of the hardship experienced by their victims and their families, we must ensure these importers of narcotics bear their share of culpability for the countless serious crimes of all sorts committed by drug addicts to support their addiction.

It read further:

With due respect, I believe that, when convicted, these individuals, with very few exceptions, should be sentenced and actually serve long term sentences.

This shows that the supreme court considers drug trafficking to be a scourge of serious magnitude that must be eradicated. In our view, since money laundering sustains this scourge, anyone who is found guilty should indeed, in the words of the supreme court justice, serve long term sentences.

But the Liberal government obviously does not agree, since it is allowing criminals like Joseph Lagana to take advantage of accelerated parole reviews. The Lagana affair prompted the Bloc Quebecois, through the member for Charlesbourg, to introduce a private member's bill to have this kind of review denied to criminals found guilty of money laundering, among other offences.

While Bill C-51 is a step in the right direction, the new provisions will not apply to Mr. Lagana and others like him, because bankers and lawyers who are convicted for money laundering but not for an organized crime offence will still get away with serving one sixth of their sentence. This is totally unacceptable to the Bloc Quebecois. We will not tolerate other Lagana cases.

Therefore, we are informing the House that, on Bill C-51, the Bloc Quebecois will be proposing amendments to offset the Liberal government's lack of courage on this issue.

The fact that the government is making a minor correction to a situation does not release it from all its obligations.

I also want to discuss the powers of the attorney general of Canada.

Bill C-51 affects the respective powers of the federal and provincial attorneys general regarding criminal proceedings. Indeed, while section 2 of the Criminal Code gives provincial attorneys general exclusive authority to institute criminal proceedings, Bill C-51 introduces an exception in the case of proceedings that relate to the trafficking of uncut rough diamonds. In fact, the bill creates a concurrent power for this type of offence, while pointing out that the new provisions do not affect the powers of the provinces in this area.

In spite of that clarification, we feel the amendment proposed in clause 16 of the bill opens the door to new federal intrusions in the administration of criminal justice which, as we know, is an area under exclusive provincial jurisdiction. The Department of Justice justifies this undermining of the provinces' authority by saying that the mining of diamonds takes place almost exclusively in the Northwest Territories. Under section 2 of the Criminal Code, the attorney general of Canada has, exceptionally, the authority to institute proceedings in the two Canadian territories.

Since the illegal trafficking of uncut rough diamonds can take place across provincial borders, the department feels it would be wise to allow the federal attorney general, who institutes criminal proceedings in the Canadian territories, to be able to bring these proceedings to conclusion in the provinces, if necessary.

However, we feel this is not enough of a justification. The diamond traffic , like many other offences listed in the Criminal Code, can be dealt with through co-operation between the federal and provincial attorneys general, so that criminal proceedings can be brought to a fruitful conclusion. Such co-operation currently exists, and nothing indicates that it would not exist in the specific case of the trafficking of uncut rough diamonds. I am asking the government to respect the jurisdictions established in the Canadian constitution—its own constitution—and not to get involved in areas under provincial jurisdiction.

The other very important characteristic of this bill is that it deals with section 227 of the Criminal Code, which states that “no person commits culpable homicide—unless the death occurs within one year and one day from the time of the occurrence of the last event”. The bill would repeal this provision linked to British legislation from the Middle Ages. That was a long time ago.

The centuries old one year and one day rule remained part of our criminal legislation without its relevancy ever being seriously challenged. Over the years, two main reasons were offered to justify this rule.

First, it was argued that it would be unacceptable for a person to be indefinitely subject to prosecution for murder. Second, in cases where the victim lives a long time after an injury, a causal connection between the act in question and the subsequent death may be difficult to establish.

In spite of these justifications, the rule set out in section 227 of the Criminal Code continues to be strongly criticized. The first criticism is that the rule flies in the face of the principle that homicide procedures are not subject to any statute of limitation in Canada. Furthermore, the “one-year-and-one-day” rule is viewed as an arbitrary rule that brings our justice system into disrepute.

While a causal connection may be obvious, death may occur immediately following the period of prescription provided for in section 227 of the Criminal Code, which means that the act in question could no longer qualify as culpable homicide.

Finally, we must bear in mind that, with technological progress, crime victims may survive for longer periods. Technological breakthroughs in medicine help artificially prolong the lives of patients who otherwise would have died much sooner.

By proposing that section 227 of the Criminal Code be repealed, Bill C-51 addresses these many criticisms.

By rescinding the year and a day rule, parliament would, among other things, be acting on the recommendation of the federal-provincial task force on homicide, which, in 1991, wanted to have sections 224 and 227 of the Criminal Code replaced. This recommendation would have led to the formulation of a causality rule, which is in keeping with the jurisprudence.

To this end, it is also important to point out that the repeal of section 227 would clear the way for the rules formulated by the supreme court in the Smithers case on the determination of a causal link between a death and an illegal act.

Under this jurisprudence, the only requirement of the illegal act is that it at least contributed to the death of the victim and that its contribution was not insignificant. Even if the act itself did not cause the death in question, it may nevertheless constitute a legal cause once it contributed in any way whatsoever.

In the light of the foregoing, the repeal of section 227 of the Criminal Code appears justified. Nevertheless, the deliberations of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights should enable us to dispel all ambiguity on this matter and I hope to question doctors and lawyers about it so that we end up with the best section possible in the Criminal Code dealing with this.

In introducing Bill C-51, the government could have been braver and proposed measures more vigorously attacking the real problems of the Canadian justice system. As we mentioned earlier, the amendments to the accelerated parole review in the Corrections and Conditional Release Act are inadequate. The battle against money laundering does not seem to be a priority for this government, which takes a piecemeal approach to things. The solutions it is proposing do not go nearly far enough.

There is no doubt about this government's apathy, because it could, right now, take effective action against money laundering. The Bloc Quebecois has been raising this whole issue for a long time now.

Listeners will probably recall that we even made it part of our platform in the last election campaign, and that we were not short of suggestions for what this government should do about this terrible problem in Canada. As I mentioned earlier, the member for Charlesbourg introduced a private member's bill to deal with the issue. Since its purpose is to do something about the problem of money laundering, I trust that it will have the support of the government.

One thing the government could easily and rapidly do, even in Bill C-51 before us, is to eliminate $1,000 bank notes, which is a top priority for the Bloc Quebecois. Canada is one of the only countries to issue such a high denomination. Police forces tell us that this makes it easier for criminals to launder their ill-gotten gains.

The Bloc Quebecois is also suggesting that financial institutions should in future be required to inform the police of any dubious transaction involving $10,000 or more. This requirement would also apply to casinos and travel agencies.

Despite what it is saying, the Liberal government's response to money laundering has been far from effective. Strict measures are long in coming. Because of that inertia, we must constantly raise the issue and hound the government, as we did in the case of the motorcycle gangs, for instance. The government finally decided to act following the enormous pressure exerted by the Bloc Quebecois regarding that issue. I do hope that, following our private members' bills and our representations, the government will finally take action regarding money laundering, if not with Bill C-51, then in a subsequent piece of legislation.

Since time is running out, I will conclude by saying that the Bloc Quebecois is pleased that operating casinos on cruise ships on the St. Lawrence River will now be permitted. As I said earlier, thanks to the hard work of several MPs from the Quebec City area, the government finally realized that the situation could no longer persist. The tourist industry in the Quebec City area will now be in a position to thrive even more.

The Bloc Quebecois is also pleased to have made the government realize that the accelerated review process was flawed.

Again, the Bloc Quebecois said repeatedly that it was unacceptable to see a notorious drug trafficker take advantage of that procedure. Unfortunately, the government did not realize the magnitude of the problem, since its proposed amendments do not go far enough.

When will the government understand that it is useless to try to fight gangs if nothing is done about money laundering?

In the area of crime, as in any other one, money is everything. However, the government does not seem to have understood that yet, or at least it is slow to do so. It is slow to amend the legislation, so that Canada can finally lose its unenviable title of money laundering haven.

The Bloc Quebecois supports Bill C-51, to the extent that the government is aware that the legislation has a number of flaws on which the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights will have to work.

[Apec Summit, October 5th, 1998]

Mr. Speaker, my question is for the acting Prime Minister.

The documents on the Peppergate affair handed over to the commission by the offices of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs are apparently incomplete and censured. In the opinion of the Deputy Prime Minister, does not providing the documents requested do anything to improve the image of the Prime Minister's transparency?

Is the government pulling another Somalia on us here?

[Criminal Records Act, September 29th, 1998]

Madam Speaker, the aim of Bill C-284 is to provide for a specific instance where public interest so requires for a limited disclosure of a record of conviction for an offender who has been pardoned where the conviction was for a sexual offence against a child. Thus when a sexual offender applies for a position of trust with respect to a child or children, the employer could have access to the individual's criminal record.

Before looking at the individual clauses in detail, I think it would be a good idea to look at the clauses individually.

Clause 1 amends the preamble to the Criminal Records Act by providing for an exception whereby a criminal record may be disclosed where public interest so requires it.

Clause 2 amends section 6 of the Criminal Records Act by requiring—and this is very important—the minister to disclose information on the criminal history of a job applicant pardoned for a sexual offence against a child.

Clause 3 amends the Canadian Human Rights Act by providing that a hiring policy based on a criminal history is not discriminatory where the job involves young children.

The aim of Bill C-284 is to protect society and especially children against potential repeat offenders. Crimes involving violence against young children are probably the most repugnant of all. People find such acts both shocking and incomprehensible. It is difficult to comprehend how an individual can sully youth in this manner and, more importantly, then want to put themselves in a position to repeat the offence with young people in a job involving the care of children or such like.

The member for Calgary Centre is legitimately attacking this scourge. He proposes that someone who has committed a sexual offence against a child be never permitted to obtain work that would put children in his care or put him in a position of authority over a child.

We have already examined this in the past. Society has already looked as these problems, but there are perhaps loopholes in the law, and the hon. member's work is important.

Our community recognizes that everyone has the right to be free from all forms of discrimination on the basis of social conditions. In this respect, section 2 of the Canadian Human Rights Act states:

The purpose of this act is to extend the laws in Canada to give effect—to the principle that every individual should have an equal opportunity with other individuals to make for himself or herself the life that he or she is able and wishes to have, consistent with his or her duties and obligations as a member of society, without being hindered in or prevented from doing so by discriminatory practices based on—conviction for an offence for which a pardon has been granted.

The Quebec charter of human rights and freedoms more specifically provides that individuals may not be discriminated against upon hiring on the basis of criminal background. Let me read you section 18.2 of the charter, which provides for an exception that is extremely important and interesting in relation to our debate today. It reads as follows:

No one may fire, refuse to hire or penalize a person in any other way in his or her job by reason solely of the fact that this person has been convicted of a criminal or penal offence—

What follows is very important. I read on:

—provided this offence has no relation to the job or a pardon was granted.

The phrase “provided this offence has no relation to the job” is extremely important.

As we can see, the right to non-discrimination is not an absolute right; in some cases, the lawmaker saw fit to include exceptions. For example, section 15 of the Canadian Human Rights Act states:

It is not a discriminatory practice if ( a ) any refusal, exclusion, expulsion, suspension, limitation, specification or preference in relation to any employment is established by an employer to be based on a bona fide occupational requirement;

This means an employer may refuse to employ an individual who does not meet the skill requirements without this being considered a discriminatory practice.

On the other hand, recognition of the employee's right to not be penalized for having committed a criminal act under section 18.2 of the Quebec charter does not prevent the employer from acting. In fact, where the alleged offence is related to the job, the employer may take appropriate measures to bypass or sanction an employee whose duties are directly linked to a criminal past. This applies to positions considered ones of trust by the public, such as those held by peace officers, teachers and even lawyers.

Under the Criminal Records Act, rehabilitation and pardon are synonymous. It is therefore to be expected that an individual who has been given a pardon may enjoy unrestricted freedom. Rehabilitation should ensure that such an individual is no longer a threat to public safety. However, this is not always the case, even where rehabilitation has occurred. Certain illnesses, as I shall mention, are hard to treat.

Nevertheless, as responsible lawmakers, we must make sure that rehabilitation does not lead to recidivism. For example, some experts say that pedophilia is incurable and that no psychological treatment can correct this deviance. If this were true, all penal corrective measures would be ineffective. Given that pedophiles are not in prison for life, it is reasonable to fear that on their release some form of recidivism is possible.

It is probably because of this uncertainty, which young people could pay for, that the lawmaker established ways to supervise and monitor sexual criminals after their release. I think the government member covered this earlier, but unfortunately, this monitoring and supervision is not foolproof.

Section 161 of the Criminal Code provides that the court may prevent a sexual offender from taking or keeping a job or volunteer work that would put him in a position of trust or authority with persons under 14 years of age.

The effectiveness of the process in section 161 of the Criminal Code is, however, contingent on the good faith of the offenders who want to comply with the court order. One only has to visit the courthouse on days when the court is sitting to realize that many orders are breached. Section 161 is a good section, it is a start, but it is too discretionary. It puts the onus on the offender to declare certain things. Follow up is a problem, because follow-up is based on the good faith of the offender.

A question arises here: Are we to enable employers to anticipate the bad faith of certain offenders by allowing them to have access to offenders' records and to deny employment as a result? I think this is a question raised by the bill, and with all I have said, we must say yes to this question in order to protect children.

In conclusion, non-discrimination implies the right to not be subjected to an illegal distinction based on criminal offences for which one has been pardoned. Non-discrimination is not, however, an absolute concept. Public safety may justify specific measures which take individuals' characteristics into consideration, their criminal background for instance, as well as giving consideration to those whom we wish to protect.

In the case of Bill C-284 introduced by the hon. member for Calgary Centre, those we wish to protect are children, and I wholly support that objective.

Since the safety of children necessitates unceasing vigilance and since the right to non-discrimination is not an absolute concept, in that the public interest could justify restriction of that right, a controlled disclosure of the records of sex offenders could be justified. For this reason, I can tell the hon. member introducing this bill that the Bloc Quebecois is in favour of it.

[Criminal Code, September 24th, 1998]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to speak to the bill brought forward by the member for Mississauga East.

To start with, I too would like to congratulate her on her bill since it opens up a part of the Criminal Code. It is important to review it, check a few things and eventually perhaps go along with the member.

I want to say right away that I am in favor of the bill and its being scrutinized by the committee to see—I will go into it in more detail later—whether the bill is in keeping with the Criminal Code, the case law, the Canadian way and especially the Quebec way.

I will remind listeners that the bill provides for the imposition of consecutive sentences where a person commits sexual assault and another offence arising out of the same events or where a person is already serving another sentence at the time.

Moreover, the bill amends the Corrections and Conditional Release Act. This amendment provides that a person sentenced to life imprisonment for first degree or second degree murder is not eligible for parole until the person has served, in addition to the portion of sentence that the person must serve for murder, one third or a maximum of seven years of any other sentence imposed on the person in respect of an offence arising out of the same events. The mandatory portion of each life sentence imposed on a person who is convicted of a second murder must be served consecutively before the person is eligible for parole.

This is all very technical, but those who are somewhat familiar with the Criminal Code will have understood what I said. I will try to shed some light on this during my allotted time.

The seriousness of the offence is one element I take into account when I look at a bill, especially a private member's bill. I try to see what exactly is the intent. This bill deals with the most heinous crimes. Therefore every member of the House should pay close attention to it.

If murder has as a consequence the taking of a life, sexual assault defiles the victim forever. One must look at this offence with a very careful eye and try to see the parallel that exists between various criminal offences.

Sentences given for those crimes must reflect the seriousness of the offence, in light of the circumstances. Imposing a fair and adequate sentence is difficult in that we have to make sure it takes into account the characteristics of the offender, protects the interests of the community, which largely depend on the values it cherishes in a given period, and meets the victim's need for protection and reparation.

The sentencing judge must make sure the sentence is proportionate to the seriousness of the crime and the degree of responsibility of the offender. Bill C-251 raises a fundamental question: Does Canadian criminal law deal adequately with murders and sexual offences, given the seriousness of these crimes? This is an extremely important question, and it deserves an answer.

Incidentally, I would like to tell the House that I am currently working on a bill similar to the one introduced by the hon. member, because I am also of the opinion that sexual offences are very serious. I hope she will return the favour and support my own bill. My goal is to allow judges to take the psychological damage inflicted on victims into consideration in sentencing.

Having said that, I think we could indeed improve the situation now prevailing as far as sentencing for sexual offences goes, because these offences are very serious.

But the Criminal Code already allows judges to impose sentences to be served consecutively. This is in section 718.3(4) of the Criminal Code. This provision deals with sentences for offences in general and not sexual offences specifically. That is probably why the hon. member felt she had to introduce Bill C-251.

She is probably right, and we should add this special provision relating to sexual offences so that judges not only may but are in fact required to impose sentences to be served consecutively. When I say we should see whether that provision is compatible with the Criminal Code or with Canada's case law and way of doing things, I mean that we should see whether this bill deprives judges of a degree of discretion they now have.

At first glance, I honestly and sincerely think “sexual assault” should be added, to send a signal to the public to show that we are taking sexual offences seriously, given that such offences are committee every day, are serious and all too often involve children, who are scared for life by such vicious crimes. In the end, it is society that pays for this at the psychological, medical and other levels.

This clause could include specific provisions on sexual assault, so as to force judges to impose consecutive rather than concurrent sentences as they sometimes do. However, this would take away some of the discretionary power of the courts.

I have some concerns in this respect. I am in favour of the bill. I would like the committee to give very serious consideration to the bill as a whole to determine if the changes proposed by the hon. member would not in fact hinder the smooth operation of the judiciary and infringe on the discretionary powers currently enjoyed by judges.

If we look at how sexual assault and sexual offences against children, women or minors are dealt with by the courts across Canada, in Quebec, Ontario and the other provinces, I think judges do not take this kind of offence seriously enough. There are cases where certain comments made by a judge lead us to question the sentence imposed by that judge.

With this amendment, when there is more than one offence, the judge would have to impose consecutive sentences and we would then be sure that the accused would serve all his time.

The Bloc Quebecois believes that offences against the person must not be taken lightly. Our criminal justice system must consider the seriousness of offences such as sexual assault and murder. We also believe that the establishment of a rule with regard to consecutive sentences for sexual assault should be studied by the Standing Committee on Justice in light of our concern not to unduly limit the discretionary powers of the courts.

The courts are still in the best position to analyze individual cases, but I think that sometimes we have to force the hand of justice. We do it from time to time in certain pieces of legislation. As legislators, it is our duty to do so.

The Bloc Quebecois still wants to issue a word of caution—and it is not necessarily the member but rather the Reform Party that has a tendency to do that—to those who could be tempted to legislate on the basis of an exceptional case such as the tragic case of Clifford Olson. The justice system as a whole must not be judged on the basis of a few exceptional cases.

Again, if we look at the Canadian justice system as a whole, it is a good system. It works well. Naturally, we can try to improve it and I think Bill C-251 is a step in the right direction.

That is why I will co-operate in committee to see to it that this bill is adopted or even to improve it if necessary.

[Criminal Code, September 23rd, 1998]

Mr. Speaker, echoing the government member somewhat, we in the Bloc Quebecois also believe that this bill is not votable. If it were, we would vote against it, because I believe that there are some very important principles involved, ones which the Reform Party appears to have ignored.

It must not be lost sight of that the objective of this bill is the deletion of sections of the Criminal Code which allow a judicial review of the parole ineligibility period with respect to certain life sentences.

Certainly, on first examination, the Reform Party approach seems to have some merit, but once again—and this is not the first time I have said this—we must look at the Canadian justice system in its entirety, and not just approach it piecemeal, trying to solve certain problems one at a time.

I believe the entire Canadian system is a bit like a giant jigsaw puzzle. If one piece is taken away, there is a whole section that cannot be put together, and this is a very dangerous thing. In the case before us now, what the Reform bill would have us remove is a vital piece of the justice system.

Much has been said on this. I had a written text, but I do not think I shall follow it, because the basic problem is readily understood. Where the justice system is concerned, we must not go overboard. The justice system must not be examined in the light of some cases that make front page headlines. This is not the way the problem can be solved.

At the present time, the Criminal Code contains a series of sections on parole mechanisms, starting with 745.6. It is not true, as I have heard said on this side of the House, that it is so easy for a criminal to obtain parole. We must start with the basic premise that the parole system has one very clear objective, and that is rehabilitation. If there is no agreement on that principle from the start, it is obvious that what will follow will be fruitless dialogue and that we will never be able to reach an agreement.

In Quebec, for the past 30 years at least, we have had a clear idea where both young and adult offenders are concerned that there must be a rehabilitation component to the parole process. This is extremely important.

Rehabilitation is not automatic, obviously. Before a case is examined in order to see whether a person who has committed a serious crime and been given a life sentence can obtain any type of parole, within the system we have at the present time, it is certain that an analysis has been carried out. We have to be sure that the offender's behaviour will not pose a threat to society. It is not true that just anyone is released. A case is examined and an extremely important review procedure takes place.

This procedure can be found in section 745.6, which was debated in the House in 1996 with Bill C-45, as I am sure members recall. At the time, the government proposed limiting accessibility to the review procedure through a series of legislative amendments. I remember this very clearly because I thought back then that the government was going too far.

Even today, I think that the government went too far, but it is now part of the system. We must live with it and make the best of it.

If we examine the issue from a public safety standpoint, the higher the bar is placed for a criminal seeking release, the greater the guarantee of public safety, of course. Even before the government's amendments, the safeguards for society were adequate, but the government added additional obstacles for these offenders and the result is that today we are fine with the amendments.

Even with the government's amendments to Bill C-45, the Reform Party is proposing the repeal pure and simple of the review process. When we look at the legislation that the government opposite is producing, inspired by Reform Party ideas, we can see similarities between the two parties.

From a justice and legislative point of view, there are similarities with respect to severity and repression. We will see this again in the very near future, when the government introduces a young offenders bill. I am sure that the government will crack down and that Reform Party members will say the government is not going far enough. But this is not how Quebec has looked at things for at least 30 years, as I have already mentioned.

To come back to the review procedure which is the focus of the bill, section 745.6 cannot be viewed as an escape clause for offenders trying to shorten their sentence. I think that the review procedure provided for in section 745.6 is complex and elaborate. We must avoid the conclusion that criminals purging life sentences have too easy access to early parole because of section 745.6 of the Criminal Code.

A clear understanding of the application for review procedure necessitates reference to section 745.6 and sections 745.61 to 745.64, which describe how the review procedure works. On reading these new sections, we see that the review is not a matter of chance. It is far from being a lottery for inmates. If they are lucky, they get paroled, if they are not, their applications get turned down. The review is rigorous and has two stages. First, there is the initial examination mechanism and then the admissibility of the application is considered.

I listened earlier to the parliamentary secretary as she clearly summarized the review application procedure. I will focus on one point only, which is that the application, once accepted, is put to a jury, and, here again, it is no cakewalk for the inmate. He must convince the jury of the validity of his application for release. This is no easy matter. The procedure is highly complex. I am not saying it is too complex for the criminal. I am saying there is no need to alert public opinion over such matters.

Our system has been improved over the years. There are of course cases like Olson's, which a Reform member mentioned earlier. Everyone agrees that such cases could no longer occur under the current legislation. There was indeed a loophole in the Criminal Code, but we tried to plug it.

Although I may once again appear to be defending the government, my purpose is in fact to see that justice prevails. This is a matter of fairness. Even in cases involving criminals, I think the legislation must be fair.

I will sum up very briefly why the Bloc Quebecois is opposed to this bill. First, we oppose it because it goes against the sentencing guidelines of public safety and rehabilitation. Second, the bill is based on the misconception that early release is impossible, even if rehabilitation has truly taken place. Third, the review procedure provided for in the bill is too complex and elaborate to think that offenders serving life sentences can abuse it. Finally, the opportunity to declare an offender dangerous under section 752 of the Criminal Code reduces the possibility of repeat offences.

The fact is that I have not had the time to elaborate on the subject but, once again, there are provisions for declaring someone a dangerous offender and this entire review procedure is impossible.

For the reasons I have mentioned, I think that Canada's parole system does not jeopardize public safety.

[Judges Act, June 11th, 1998]

Mr. Speaker, this morning we are considering Bill C-37, an act to amend the Judges Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts.

I think the first question we should ask is why, today, we are at this point. We are at third reading of a bill concerning judges' salaries, Bill C-37. I think I should first provide a bit of background first and take a look at the constitutional context of the whole matter.

On September 18, 1997, the Supreme Court of Canada in a reference on the pay of provincial court judges in Prince Edward Island, determined the constitutional requirements the legislator must abide by in establishing judges' pay. The court stipulated that the independence of the court system, as protected by the Constitution, involved the establishment of an independent and objective commission with sway over decisions on judges' salaries.

The provincial and federal attorneys general asked the supreme court to stay the effects of the decision to enable them to meet the constitutional requirements.

The supreme court acted on this request in its decision. On February 10, the court decided to stay the effect of its decision from September 18, 1997 until September 18, 1998.

The justices of the supreme court sent us, the lawmakers, the following message “Change the law to comply with our recent decision, and we will give you time to do it, that is, one year, until September 18, 1998”.

Since time flies—here we are at the end of the session—the House must consider this legislation and its amendments and act on them.

The government amendments we have before us, however, are not necessarily what I would have liked to see. As it stands, the supreme court ruling calls for the creation of an independent commission, nothing more.

This is clear from reading the ruling. It calls for the creation of an independent commission, period. The government party is not right in saying that it is merely giving effect to a supreme court ruling with its salary increases. Naturally, I will come back to the government's salary increases for judges during my speech.

The supreme court ruling is not to be interpreted as a requirement to increase judges' salaries. To respect the constitutional imperatives imposed by the court in the reference, parliament is not obliged to go along with the Scott commission recommendation to increase judges' salaries. At the very outside, parliament should undertake to set up an independent commission that can influence, but not dictate, judges' salaries. Here again, it is very important to look at the supreme court ruling, to understand it and to compare it to the bill before us.

The Minister of Justice was not obliged—and I choose my words deliberately—to include an 8.2% salary increase over two years for federal judges in order to meet the constitutional requirements set down by the supreme court. Clause 5 of the bill we are now studying, Bill C-37, which contains the salary increase provision, threatens the whole bill, in my view. This is unfortunate because the bill contains some very good elements, such as the creation of permanent judicial compensation and benefits commissions.

The Bloc Quebecois considers that the government is far exceeding the conditions set by the supreme court in proposing a salary increase of 4.1% per year for two years. The government used a false claim of unconstitutionality to justify a salary increase that was not required by the supreme court in the reference on judges' salaries.

While only one clause in the bill being considered poses a problem, we cannot support the bill. The Bloc Quebecois is entitled to demand rigour from the government in the drafting of its bills and the avoidance of unjustified discrepancies.

It is immediately clear from the bill that the government has gone much farther than the justices of the supreme court asked it to. If we add up all the increases proposed in the Scott report and those authorized by government for the statutory increases provided under the Judges Act, passage of the bill will give the judges an increase of 12.4%.

As it appears that the government has been preparing this one for a long long time, the bill is likely to be passed intact.

While clause 5 of the bill refers to a salary increase of 4.1% a year for two years, the federal judges will be entitled to an increase of over 12% retroactive to April 1, 1997, if the bill is passed by the House of Commons.

If we add indexing of 2.1% on April 1, 1997 and 2.08% on April 1, 1998 to the 8.02% provided by the bill, the total is an increase of exactly 12.38% that will be given the judges. An increase of 12.8% just calculating the increases provided under the law and Bill C-37. It is simple math. Just add 4.1 twice, plus 2.08, plus 2.1%. We must add up all these increases to understand that, retroactively, this makes a total increase of 12.38%.

Any accountant and reasonable person who looks into the matter will tell you that the combined effect of these individual increases is an overall increase of more than 12.38% because increases are all one over another. Factor in retroactivity and we have been told by accountants that it is actually closer to 13%. That does not make sense.

As a the matter of fact, under Bill C-37, if passed, a superior court judge will earn approximately $175,800 a year. The chief justice of the Supreme Court of Canada will see his salary increase from an attractive $208,200 to a lovely $225,700. I do not think these can be considered middle class incomes. Yet, the government is granting judges a salary increase of approximately 13%.

Let me digress for a moment. At present, it is clear that the government across the way is not even able to come to an agreement with his own employees. Our pay clerks at the House of Commons did not get even a small salary increase, only crumbs off the table of the rich. They have to fight with their employer, and the pay office. They have to fight with the government, the Board of Internal Economy, just to get what they are owed, to maintain salaries similar to those paid elsewhere in government. They cannot get a small increase and adequate recognition for the work they do. The government over there will be giving about $25,000 in pay raises to senior justices, and $20,000 to the rest.

These judges perform very useful work, I am sure, but I also believe that certain government employees do extremely necessary work, including the pay clerks, who are currently involved in a dispute with the government.

Returning to the judges' raises in particular in Bill C-37, the Bloc Quebecois cannot honestly understand how the government can commit to a pay raise of 12.4% for federal judges, when we know that the attack on the deficit, and the subsequent budget surplus, are being achieved on the backs of the least well off. The incomes of those most in need are being cut, and those with high incomes are being given increases.

The government is not capable of competing with the lucrative private job market. That is one of the arguments that has been raised. We are told that, if we want to have competent judges, we have to pay them properly. I agree, but I think that, at some point, there has to be a limit.

David Scott, the head of the commission that looked into judges' benefits in 1995, told the justice committee that the government ought to raise the pay of federal judges if it hoped to attract the best candidates from the private sector.

At this time, the lists of candidates for judgeships are full to overflowing. The Judicial Council will attest to the fact that there is no shortage of applicants. Lots of people are queuing up to get judicial appointments.

If, however, the government has set itself the objective of going after the top-flight lawyers in the major law firms, the 4.1% increase yearly for two years will not make any difference to that.

When a lawyer emeritus decides to make the leap to a judgeship, he or she does so for the professional prestige, not just for the money. Despite the salary freeze of recent years, the federal courts have excellent magistrates at this time. Let me take this opportunity to congratulate and thank them for the excellent work they do in all the courts in Canada, particularly the provincial courts in Quebec, the superior court and the court of appeal. I congratulate them on their excellent work.

They do not do that excellent work because of the pay. They do excellent work because they have the qualifications and qualities required, they have good judgment, they are professionals, and I congratulate them. Again, it is not because we are giving them a 4.1% raise over two years that they will do an even greater job. Judges will continue to work the way they have been since they were appointed to the bench.

Are we to understand that the government decided to opt for a strategy similar to that used by major professional sports teams, which are prepared to raise the stakes in order to attract the best athletes? If so, the government should find a new approach, because it is not in a financial position to compete with private law firms. We all know that some brilliant lawyers in some big private firms make a lot more than $200,000 per year.

However, this does not necessarily mean that a lawyer who earns $150,000 in a private firm is not as good as one who makes $250,000 or $300,000. This is not how lawyers are rated. But the government seems to think so. I do not agree.

I know judges who used to work for legal aid, a government service. I know some who used to be crown attorneys and who are now excellent judges. These people did not earn $250,000 or $300,000 per year, yet they are very good judges because they believe in their profession and in the justice system. They are good, but they were not paid like brilliant lawyers in big law firms around the country, including in Montreal and in other major centres. Yet, they do a great job.

I heard all sorts of things about the review of Bill C-37. At the risk of offending some people, I say that anyone who works for his or her country—for Quebec or for Canada—must be considered a public servant. The salary of that person is paid by Canadians through their taxes. Senior public servants, secretaries of state, ministers, the Prime Minister and others are all paid with taxpayers' money, which means they are at the service of the public and the state. Judges—and this may upset some people—are also at the service of the state, since it is the people who pay the judges' salaries through their taxes.

We must keep that in mind when we give a raise or when we pay a salary to someone who works for the state.

Of all the people working for the government, in Canada, specifically the professionals, including the Prime Minister, the ministers and all the members of this House, the judges are the best paid.

In considering the salary of judges, we have to think what an individual might earn in a liberal profession of similar scope. The Bloc Quebecois agrees with all those who say that judges perform very important functions and should be held in esteem in our society because of their position.

The Bloc Quebecois is not starting a war against the judges. On the contrary, it is simply raising the choice the government has made, which, in our opinion, is not the right one. So the judges are the best paid in the professional category in Canada.

In an article on May 13, the Toronto Star informed us that our judges earn an average of $126,000 a year. That is more than medical specialists and lawyers earn. Medical specialists earn about $123,000 and lawyers in private practice, an average of $81,000.

Mr. Speaker, I have a question for you. Should judges earn more than medical specialists? Which is more important in society?

I think the question is an easy one to answer or that, at least, it raises other questions. Is this the way we should look at it? Maybe not. Maybe we should not be comparing the salaries of judges and doctors.

The point I want to make, however, is that a medical specialist is every bit as important to society as a good judge. Why give an astronomical increase to judges and not to medical specialists? At some point, we have to stop and think. Is the increase too high? I think the government did not give it enough thought.

Another thing that bothers me a little bit about this bill is that they are trying to conceal the fact that it is retroactive. It is retroactive to April 1997. Why should there be retroactive compensation for the salary freeze of recent years? That is the reason we are being given. It is not retroactive, but it goes back to April 1, 1997 because judges' salaries have been frozen in recent years. Either it is retroactive, or it is not. If the government wants to compensate them for a freeze, they should be compensated for what they lost, and not more. In response to the minister, therefore, indexing would have been enough. But the government is giving more.

The 1995 Scott commission's report on judges' salaries and benefits proposed an 8% increase as compensation for the ground they lost in recent years. The Minister of Justice probably based the 8.2% increase mentioned in clause 8 of Bill C-37 on this figure.

As even certain Liberals on the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights have said during hearings, this catch-up policy is unacceptable. When salaries are frozen, it is because the public purse cannot keep pace with the consumer price index.

A salary freeze does not necessarily go hand-in-hand with a promise of an increase when the situation has improved. We are barely out of a budgetary crisis—a look at Canada's deficit makes it plain we are not yet out of the woods—and one of the ways this was done was by making the most disadvantaged members of society foot the bill, and the government is preparing to spend money retroactively by increasing judges' salaries and indexing them as well.

Public service salaries also dropped during the period when indexing was frozen. Members also had their salaries frozen for five years.

When the freeze was lifted, if one could call it that, the 1% or 2% indexation was restored, but there was never any question of raising salaries to compensate for the money lost because of the freeze. Why should we give judges special treatment? Whey should they be treated differently than other government professionals or salaried workers?

We also know that the least well off are the ones who have had to bear the brunt of the fight against the deficit, as I have already pointed out.

Now. the government is making those same people pay for the judges' salary increases. Those in greatest need get cuts, and those with what I consider respectable salaries are given an increase that works out to around 13%, when all the raises are combined.

Time is flying, but I would like to quickly remind people of the cuts to social transfers. The government over there cut billions in transfer payments. The eligibility criteria for employment insurance, formerly unemployment insurance, have been tightened up. In fact, judging by the effect on the public, it ought to be called poverty insurance. The government will be taking billions from the pockets of workers.

Now that the Minister of Finance has a bit of money to play around with, he wants to give it to the most well-off in salary increases. I think that both an individual and a collective contribution are required here. The Minister of Finance is digging into the employment insurance fund to solve his budget problems, and everybody knows it. I think the Bloc Quebecois has done excellent work on this. It has alerted the public to this extremely important matter.

I have already referred to transfer payments. It must be kept in mind that the amount the federal government transfers for health has been cut back terribly. This week we heard the minister boasting that the cut was only $42 billion, rather than $48 billion. Forty-some billion is a really big amount. I am not saying he was right or wrong. I am simply saying that he made these cuts on the backs of the most disadvantaged and vulnerable in our society, and on the backs of the sick; so he should not turn around and give the money he cut to the wealthiest.

The public remembers that the same people always pay. We have to conclude, in the case of Bill C-37, that the rich are not treated like the poor and disadvantaged.

The government wants us to agree and approve a bill awarding an increase like this. The government is accusing us of failing to honour the Supreme Court decision. That is not true. We want to comply with it. We are simply saying that the government is going well beyond the Supreme Court decision, because there was no mention of what sort of increase we should give the judges in that decision. The Supreme Court said “Set up an independent commission”. We could simply have limited the scope of the bill to establishing the commission sought by the justices of the Supreme Court of Canada.

In closing, judges too, in my opinion, should make budget sacrifices. Ask the man in the street. I am sure you will find that they agree with the Bloc Quebecois that judges, ministers, Prime Ministers and the like should contribute equally to the effort to eliminate the budget deficit.

Those opposite often criticize what goes on in the Quebec National Assembly.

Mr. Bouchard and his government could probably teach the members across the way something about making budgetary sacrifices, because that is what they have done in Quebec City, the premier included. Judges also did their part. The government reduced its payroll by 6%.

Why would it be any different here? If the federal government is taking in too much in taxes and no longer knows what to do with all the money, it could perhaps turn it over to the provinces so that they could use it as they saw fit, for their own objectives, to reduce their own deficits and ultimately lower taxes.

Since the federal government is providing increasingly fewer services to the public, if it no longer knows what to do with the money, it should get out of a lot of areas and leave the taxes for provincial governments, including the Government of Quebec.

I believe that all members of our society must work collectively to put our fiscal house back in order, and federal judges are no exception. An increase in the salary of federal judges during a period of cutbacks would, in our view, further undermine the public's confidence in the judiciary.

In closing, I wish to cite Mr. Justice Lamer himself, whose opinion can be found in the reference on judges' remuneration. It will help the members opposite in their reflections. In the supreme court ruling, Judge Lamer said the following:

I want to emphasize that the guarantee of a minimum acceptable level of judicial remuneration is not a device to shield the courts from the effects of deficit reduction. Nothing would be more damaging to the reputation of the judiciary and the administration of justice than a perception that judges were not shouldering their share of the burden in difficult economic times.

It could not be stated more clearly. Even the supreme court judges, in their ruling, told the Parliament of Canada that it should not give them salary increases because it would be prejudicial to the public's perception of them.

I sincerely believe that an increase that is close to 18% and that is retroactive to April 1, 1997 is ill-advised, and that it will not achieve the specific goal of increasing the public's confidence in the judiciary.

[Supply, June 9th, 1998]

Yes, appointed by the federal government. Admittedly, I was once a Liberal, but he is still one.

The judge said that there was a case of a man appearing in a financial institution with a hockey bag stuffed with $20, $50 and $100 dollar bills. He had the tidy little sum of about $270,000 in there. As things now stand, the institution is not required to refuse this, to say the least, odd deposit.

This would be one place where the lawmakers could amend the law to reinforce this and not allow such strange deposits. An individual should be required to report the source of bills being deposited.

[Supply, June 9th, 1998]

Come on, raise your hand. There are not many Liberals and there is no one on our side.

Mr. Speaker, do you have ten bills of $1,000 in your pockets? No?

In Canada, $1,000 bank notes are used almost exclusively for transfers, for buying land, or by organized crime members. Not many people walk around with $1,000 bank notes in their pockets. I think that bills of $100, $50 and $20 adequately meet the needs of Canadians, particularly since we make extensive use of credit cards. There is no need to carry large amounts of money in our pockets.

Why not, then, go along with what the Bloc Quebecois requested during the election campaign and on a few occasions since 1997 and take one thousand dollar bills out of circulation? It is very simple.

I have a friend who is a lawyer, a judge now, whom I will not name for fear of making his life difficult—