Michel Bellehumeur

[The Divorce Act, November 4th, 1996]

Mr. Speaker, since this morning we have been discussing Bill C-41, and the Bloc Quebecois, as a party from Quebec, naturally reflects the demands of Quebec, but as the official opposition, it also reflects the concerns of certain provinces and groups in English Canada,

and the government seems to be turning a deaf ear or does not seem to understand the demands we are making.

It is all very clear, however. We made a series of proposals, a series of motions this morning to amend the government's position on the very important concept of residence, in other words, that this should mean the child's place of residence to prevent any ambiguity in interpreting the guidelines.

We tabled motions on the federal government's discretionary powers to adopt or not to adopt the guidelines of a province. Here again, the government turned a deaf ear.

We presented a motion on vested rights, to tell the government that if Quebec, for instance, establishes guidelines according to the present rules of the game, we would not want a subsequent Conservative, Reform Party or even Liberal government, under another prime minister, to be able to change these guidelines at will. We presented a motion for vested rights, and here again, the government seems to turn a deaf ear.

We also presented a motion to prevent the application of certain national standards. We definitely want the guidelines presented by Quebec to apply in cases of divorce and separation.

I heard the parliamentary secretary say in reply to the Bloc Quebecois that the Divorce Act was a federal statute. We do not challenge that fact. We know that the Divorce Act is a federal statute. We know that according to the Constitution, the federal government has jurisdiction over the Divorce Act. What we are saying is that this is unacceptable.

In Quebec, people get married under the laws of Quebec. They have children under the laws of Quebec. The children are registered with the registrar for births, deaths and marriages under the laws of Quebec. In a family, people make purchases, buy a house and cars. The family property comes under Quebec's jurisdiction. If things do not work out, people separate under the laws of Quebec. But divorce is a federal matter.

That is what is wrong and why everything is so complicated. On the weekend we saw that Quebec wanted to adopt a family policy. There is a consensus on this in Quebec. That was clear, and I think that my friends opposite-not my friends, because they are not really my friends-I am sure that hon. members opposite saw there was a consensus in Quebec on family policy this past weekend.

But they are turning a deaf ear to it. To translate this consensus into concrete action, they could give a helping hand and start changing some things. But no. We have seen, through justice parliamentary secretary for justice, that the government seems adamant in its refusal to consider any amendment, any proposal from the official opposition, the Bloc Quebecois, in keeping with the general consensus and the will at large to see things change; but the government in Ottawa has decided in its ivory tower, in a characteristically paternalistic fashion, as one of my colleagues said, not to budge.

I am happy, however, that the Reform Party is not in power because the motion it presented says a lot on the way English Canada sees things and on its intentions. Somehow, the Reform Party has a lot in common with the way the Liberals think and act.

With regard to Motion No. 13 presented by the Reform Party, which appears innocuous, ordinary enough, one might think that, after all, Reform has good intentions, it wants the federal government to support it, to look at it, it wants the elected representatives to have a look at the guidelines.

The Reform Party's motion asks that Bill C-41, in clause 11, be amended by adding the following:

"26.2(1) The Minister of Justice shall have each proposed guideline laid before the House of Commons.

(2) Each proposed guideline that is laid before the House of Commons shall, on the day it is laid, be referred by that House to an appropriate committee of that House, as determined by the rules of that House, and that committee shall report its findings to that House.

(3) A proposed guideline that has been laid pursuant to subsection (1) may be established on the expiration of thirty sitting days after it was laid.

(4) For the purpose of this section, "sitting day" means a day on which the House of Commons sits."

If one looks at this amendment, it does not seem that bad. But what is really hiding behind it? What is hiding is English Canada's desire to centralize even further an issue Quebec believes should be decentralized, to the extent that it should be an area of exclusive jurisdiction for Quebec.

Sometimes the Liberals and the Reform Party question the necessity of having Bloc Quebecois members in this House. I think we have another opportunity to show how important it is for Quebec to have Bloc Quebecois members in this House, to prevent the Reform Party from proposing very centralizing measures and the government from proposing centralizing bills.

This motion shows the true philosophy of English Canada, which wants to centralize everything in Ottawa.

What does that mean in practice? It means that, if the motion is carries without amendment, all guidelines adopted by Quebec will have to be submitted to the justice minister who will, in turn, submit them to the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs for further study.

We all know that Quebec intends to implement such guidelines. We even have some information concerning those guidelines. The justice minister would simply submit those guidelines to the committee for its consideration. For example, if Quebec considers that it is important for the guidelines to be based on the real cost of

a child's needs, we, in Quebec, will find it crucial that the guidelines be determined accordingly. However, if we submit them to the committee, it could decide that, at the federal level, this is not important and that Quebec will have to change its guidelines so that they are based in part on a legal obligation to maintain the standard of living. Quebec would not have a say in this.

This is what the Reform Party motion could mean for Quebec. There are a series of guidelines which Quebec examined and, if the motion is carried, these could be reviewed by the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs. You will surely understand that it would be unacceptable for the federal government to dictate the rules and determine the procedures in an area like family policy which is so important for the future of Quebec.

I must say that, when I speak about family and family policy, unfortunately, this also includes separation and divorce. After a divorce, the children are still there and they must be supervised and protected, because they are the ones who are the most vulnerable in a separation. Our role, as members of Parliament here, is to pass legislation that would best protect these children.

Bill C-41 that the government proposes to us is, as a whole, a step forward, but there are several little points that are disturbing, that are not in line with Quebec's claims, among others, of course, the points that I mentioned at the very beginning of my speech concerning residence, at the government's discretion.

More specifically, Quebec's position, the position defended by the Bloc Quebecois, goes against Motion No. 13 proposed by the Reform Party. You will understand that we will vote against this motion.

In concluding, I would also like to say that, while we seem to challenge or argue several of the points in Bill C-41, as a whole, this bill seems favourable to us. That must be kept in mind. As a whole, Bill C-41 was asked for repeatedly by the official opposition. We wanted a legislative measure, but not one with these points that are not favourable to Quebec. I will have the opportunity to come back to Bill C-41, since there are other motions, because I have so many things to say about this bill.

[Divorce Act, November 4th, 1996]

Mr. Speaker, I listened to the remarks made by the members who have taken part in this debate so far, and the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the system in which we live is very complex.

Let us take as an example people who live in Quebec. They get married in Quebec and they have children in Quebec. If the marriage does not work, they separate in Quebec. But if they want a divorce, then they fall under Ottawa's jurisdiction.

You will understand that, as a member of the Bloc, I would be inclined to tell you without any hesitation that the federal government should completely withdraw from this area. However, as we have said many times before, as long as we are part of this system, we will try to improve it as best we can under the Constitution.

And unfortunately, under the Constitution as it is now, the Divorce Act is a federal statute. Therefore, as good members of Parliament and as responsible people, since the Bloc Quebecois is the official opposition, we must try to improve this legislation to respond to the concerns I personally heard when I sat on the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs, concerns expressed by women's groups and also by the provinces, because this bill has indeed several major flaws. That is why the Bloc Quebecois, as a responsible party and as the official opposition, is trying to improve this legislation.

However, it seems that the members opposite do not understand what we want even though it is simple. Our goal, which should also be the goal of the government, is to protect the children. I heard the minister of Justice himself say that Bill C-41 aimed at correcting injustices against children.

I believe that all motions introduced by the Bloc Quebecois aim precisely in that direction and are in response to requests made by people, women and interest groups heard by the committee.

This government does not seem to listen much to what we say. Yet, it is crystal clear that we want is for the good of children. The government should understand that. We introduced a motion proposing that the place of residence for guideline purposes be the child's residence. It must be clear that support payments are to be paid to women or men who are taking care of their children, whatever province they come from, including Quebec. They must know in advance, whatever may happen, that the place of residence will be the place where the children are living.

We have introduced a motion but I am pretty sure the government will oppose it. Why? Because it is proposed by the Bloc Quebecois. Yet, it is precisely within the same line and goal. We have also introduced an amendment to take all discretionary powers away from the federal government, because we want Quebec and the National Assembly to decide on guidelines. If the National Assembly presents guidelines, we want the federal government to have no other choice but to accept them.

How will the government react to this motion? It will reject it. Why? Probably because it was proposed by the Bloc and not by it. Yet, this proposal follows along the lines of other proposals heard before. I know that this is what the National Assembly very much wants. We want government to have no choice.

We also moved a motion regarding vested rights. We do not want the federal government to change the rules on us. We do not want things to go one way under the Liberals and another way under the Conservatives. We want to reassure people and we only have one purpose in mind, protecting children. What is the government going to do about it? It is going to vote against it, I am quite sure of it.

Furthermore, we moved a motion to delete the infamous "or other cause" in one clause. What does "or other cause" mean? This means that any given day the government might decide, by order in council, to add to the eligibility criteria. Or, depending on its mood, it might just as well decide to eliminate some of them. All we want is to protect the children. We want to know exactly where we are going, how the courts are going to apply the applicable guidelines to all concerned.

Finally, we moved two of the motions in this group, Motions Nos 6 and 9, which are aimed at protecting children. Is it right-I see the member for Québec is nodding in agreement, I believe she agrees with me-to set guidelines and to provide, as does Bill C-41, that with the parents' consent the amount of support might be below that set in the guidelines? Is it right? Does it protect children? No, it does not.

Suppose that, according to the guidelines, the children of a divorced couple are entitled to $150 a week in support payment, is it right for the judge to award the children, with the spouses' consent, $75 a week? Is it right to go to the trouble of developing guidelines, and then, after negotiations in the court's back rooms, sometimes under pressure or even duress, to have a ruling which does not respect them?

I have witnessed women being threatened. It is mostly women and children we want to protect. On occasion, I saw women coming to court in the morning, their mind made up. They had come there that day determined to get so much in support payments, fully intending to fight for their children's sake.

Following negotiations and after extremely long delays, sometimes you get to the court house in the morning and you cannot tell when you will leave because of emotions and all sorts of considerations; sometimes the lawyers and the spouses agree and the amount finally granted is considerably lower than what the party seeking alimony had decided to ask for in the morning. Those are the rules.

Also, it is often the squeaky wheel, the most forceful lawyer who will win. As you know, all sorts of things happen in the court house. Is it usual to approve all that? This is what the government is proposing with Bill C-41 and the clauses we want to delete. We want to remedy that situation with Motions Nos. 6 and 9. Is it usual, as I have just said, to condone the actions of lawyers?

What I want to say is, is it usual to perpetuate that way of doing things? This is what the government is doing. If the spouses agree, the court can determine an amount different from the one which would apply according to pertinent guidelines. We know quite well that the bill already says there will be no problem if the amount is higher than what would be determined with the guidelines. The goal is simple: to help the children.

The guidelines say $150 a week; the husband and wife agree on $200 a week. Who will benefit? The children. Then the goal is reached. The judge has no say. He can only go along with the agreement. But, the reverse is also true. These clauses we want to delete would allow the judge to make a ruling along the lines of an agreement whereby children would receive less than what the guidelines provide. That is unacceptable.

I see the justice minister is listening. I think he realizes there is a flaw in this bill. I hope that when the time comes to vote on Bill C-41, and on Motions Nos 6 and 9 presented by my colleague the member for Quebec, the government will change its mind and decide to support these motions whose ultimate purpose is to protect children.

[Liberal Party, October 28th, 1996]

Mr. Speaker, in their typically arrogant way, last weekend, the Liberals wrote their own report card on their so-called brilliant performance since the Grits' return to Ottawa.

The Liberals gave themselves a score of 78 per cent, after getting elected on a platform of jobs, jobs, jobs and doing nothing since; after promising in 1993 to abolish the GST and finding nothing better to do than have the Deputy Prime Minister temporarily resign and then apologize for having failed to fulfil their commitment; and after promising to put the government's fiscal house in order but merely cutting funding to the most disadvantaged members of our society and shovelling the deficit in the provinces' backyards.

One year to the day after the Quebec referendum, there is no reason to applaud this government's achievements in this respect. At their convention over the weekend, the Liberals swept aside the embarrassing issue of the constitutional debate, no doubt to make sure they got a passing grade.

In fact, the only 78 per cent score the Liberals deserve today is for the act they put on at their convention.

[The Elections Act, October 9th, 1996]

Mr. Speaker, the government has an opportunity to make these changes and appeal this ruling.

Is the minister's inaction not an admission that he is quietly getting ready to support the Libman case to be heard by the Supreme Court, which challenges the provisions of Quebec's referendum legislation on expenditure limits, in order to defend his own Liberal colleagues and friends and fine tune the government's strategy in Quebec's next referendum campaign?

[The Elections Act, October 9th, 1996]

Mr. Speaker, my question is for the Minister of Justice.

We learned today that the government has decided not to appeal the Alberta Court of Appeal's decision last June to strike down the provisions of the federal law prohibiting third parties from spending more than $1,000 on advertising during election campaigns.

Does the minister not believe that his decision not to appeal this ruling could create a situation similar to that in the U.S., where rich lobby groups can finance the candidates they want and therefore unfairly influence election results?

[The Criminal Code, October 3rd, 1996]

Mr. Speaker, I intend to speak for 20 minutes.

There is no doubt that, with the introduction of Bill C-55, the Minister of Justice fulfils a popular wish. Western Canada, among other regions, must be pleased to see measures which, at first glance, are aimed at strengthening and tightening the supervision of high risk offenders and at keeping them in prison for a longer period.

However, we should not rejoice too quickly, since this is a bill motivated by purely partisan considerations and the fact that the next election is not far away.

In order to assess Bill C-55, one must see where it comes from, know what is currently being done in this area, and try to figure out the purpose of the proposed amendments. You will realize that Bill C-55 is hardly the result of lengthy research by the federal Minister of Justice and that it did not originate with him, since it is a topic that has been discussed for a long time and one on which even the Conservatives had done some very thorough research.

In fact, between 1988 and 1993, if I may digress to provide a better understanding of the purpose of these amendments, many studies were carried out and many people looked into this problem. There were provincial commissions of inquiry on the Stephenson case, the Pepino federal commission of inquiry, and reports by the Standing Committee on Justice on serious and bodily harm in February 1993 and on the Fulston and Crews case in April 1993.

All this combined with increasing public pressure led members of the Conservative caucus in 1988-93, faced with the Reform threat, to convince the Conservative government that it should propose a series of measures, which it did in the form of a white paper on the subject of dangerous offenders.

On May 25, 1993, the then solicitor general Doug Lewis tabled two draft bills, which covered five main components, most of which we see again today in Bill C-55. The first component is post-sentence detention, which could be ordered by a court and the purpose of which was to incarcerate indefinitely inmates who were found to be far too dangerous to be released on expiry of their sentence.

The second point indicated in this draft bill was long-term supervision for a maximum of 10 years, to be imposed by the courts at the time of sentencing. The third point was no parole for offenders serving a sentence for sexual assaults against children and automatically considered as having caused serious harm to the victim.

The fourth point was a change in the calculation of consecutive sentences for any new convictions during a parole period that would result in an extending the time of detention. The last point concerned various amendments to the Parole Act, including a disciplinary committee for members of the National Parole Board. This happened between 1988 and 1993, as you can see. After a series of studies, in 1993 a number of components were defined and the bill was introduced with these five components.

One would have thought that, if amendments in this area were so badly needed, the Minister of Justice would have amended the Criminal Code immediately after his election, since the research had been done. He did not. Since this was a popular issue with the public, the government preferred to wait a little longer to be able to use this issue closer to an election, and use it for campaign purposes.

According to the same study, in 1993, the then minister set up a federal-provincial-territorial task force to consider the problem of high risk violent offenders. In 1994, the new Liberal government tabled Bill C-45, an act to amend the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, but all this was still subject to the task force's soon to be released report on high risk offenders.

In January 1995, the federal-provincial-territorial task force on high risk violent offenders set up by the Conservatives and maintained by the Liberals released its report outlining a strategy for managing high risk offenders. The report contained a series of recommendations. Among other things, the task force recommended that dangerous offender provisions and civil incarceration procedures be used more often in the case of dangerous offenders suffering from mental illness who had almost completed their sentences.

It also proposed a procedure for criminals to be declared long-term offenders so they could be subject to supervision after their release. As you can see, the conclusions in this report bear a great deal of resemblance to the bill tabled by the then solicitor, Mr. Lewis, in 1993. The wheel had already been invented back in 1993.

In March 1996, a Reform member tried to revive former minister Lewis' bill during private members' business. In May 1996, a bill on the government business research project was tabled. This is another study in the area, this time on dangerous offenders.

This study, which focused on 64 dangerous offenders and 34 high-risk violent offenders, was designed to help solicitors determine which cases met the criteria for being declared dangerous offender. The report contained 11 recommendations.

There were many studies, as you can see. We have been looking into this problem for years. We had a series of tools at our disposal to act quickly in an emergency, if there was a need to amend the legislation, but these were not used until the very last minute.

What is the present situation? Is there a vacuum, a void in the legislation? We have seen all the publicity around Bill C-55, the reassurance the minister wanted to give the people of Quebec and Canada through this legislation, as if that was the problem and he had just found a magic solution.

But the subject of dangerous offenders is already covered by the existing legislation, part XXIV of the Criminal Code, sections 752 through 761. More and more individuals are being declared dangerous offenders. Statistics show that, in March 1995, 145 inmates had been declared dangerous offenders. Of these, 51 per cent were in a maximum security institution, 43 per cent in a medium security institution and the rest, or 4.5 per cent, in a psychiatric institution.

Dangerous criminals are not out on the street. We already have in the Criminal Code all that we need to jail those who need to be and to identify dangerous offenders as such. The problem rests with enforcement.

Does the justice minister's Bill C-55 do more? Is the Minister of Justice ensuring that the citizens of this country and their families will be afforded better protection? Perhaps we should take a look at what exactly this bill provides for.

The bill aims to make it easier for the courts to attach the "dangerous offender" label to violent offenders who are likely to offend again. In short, it covers four points, which are strangely similar to the four I mentioned earlier in reference to the bill former solicitor general Lewis had introduced. As I said, the Lewis bill was introduced in 1993. We waited three years for essentially the same results.

First, a special court hearing to have an accused designated a dangerous offender; there is nothing particular about this. Second, the Crown will have until six months after the conviction to make a dangerous offender application; this may be a new element that was not in the Lewis bill. It is easy to understand the reason for this six-month period, given that useful additional evidence is sometimes obtained later by the crown.

Third, the number of psychiatrists who have to testify at a hearing goes up from one to two. Fourth, the initial review of an application for parole by a dangerous offender increases from three to seven years.

The bill also creates a new category of offender, who will be subject to long-term supervision, for up to ten years. This new category will include offenders convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, sexual exploitation, exposure, sexual assault with a weapon, aggravated sexual assault, or breaking and entering to sexually assault an occupant.

So far, we cannot really be opposed to this bill and its proposed changes.

Legal constraint could also be used in the case of an accused found not guilty by the court, but likely to commit a serious personal injury offence, as defined under section 752 of the Criminal Code.

Such constraint could include the use of electronic monitoring when such a program exists in a province. We are totally opposed to this approach, which goes against a number of judicial precedents and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It is a very serious violation of recognized legal principles, and I will get back to this later on in my speech.

Finally, in the case of the fourth point concerning low-risk offenders, there is no problem with an increased use of risk assessments by lawyers, judges and prosecutors so that sentences can be served in the community; there is no problem with more frequent use of day parole; nor is there a problem with correctional services using particular techniques on a more frequent basis to reduce repeat offences; and, finally, there is no problem with encouraging the use by natives of sentencing circles either.

So there you have Bill C-55 tabled by the minister in this House. It is well-intentioned but, in my humble opinion, the minister has merely given an official legal structure to what is current practice. What he is seeking to achieve through amendments is already being done by judges and the legal world as a whole through their discretionary powers.

In cases where judges realize that the person before them is a dangerous offender, they make sure that he cannot regain his freedom as easily as that. In fact, the courts are already handing

down indefinite sentences to offenders identified as dangerous. According to the statistics consulted, there are a good dozen a year.

In addition, even under the present legislation, none of the offenders identified as dangerous by the courts have been granted parole on their first application after three years, so it goes to seven years and the result is the same.

Why is the public being treated to all this song and dance? In the end, it is to persuade the public that Bill C-55 now before us will be the answer to almost all the problems with dangerous offenders. I would say to you that it is because it is a good move, election wise, because it goes over well, particularly out west.

Although the minister could have taken action much earlier, he was waiting for the right moment. He was waiting for a good date in the party's electoral calendar. By responding to the Reform Party's campaign, the minister is minimizing his party's losses.

Furthermore, I wonder to what extent Ottawa consulted. We were told that it carried out a series of consultations. I heard the minister himself say so. Section 810.2, subsections 1 to 10, allowing a judge to order preventive monitoring for an accused found not guilty, was never part of these consultations. I checked with my colleagues in Quebec, and we realize that this point was never submitted for discussion. They were very surprised to see this matter of electronic monitoring in the bill.

When you talk about electronic monitoring, you are also talking about additional costs. That, too, was not discussed. We do not know who will cover these costs, it was not discussed. Generally speaking, the criticism we have of this bill concerns the costs. In 1993, the cost was evaluated at $150 million by the former solicitor general of Canada, Mr. Lewis. Today, it could go as high as $250 million with electronic monitoring. We have no commitment from the minister as to who will pay.

There is no evidence that electronic bracelets are a reliable way to monitor dangerous offenders. Some reports from the United States indicate that a person who is fitted with a bracelet must remain within a certain radius of his telephone, because the waves are transmitted via the telephone. If the person is one floor down, he disappears from the screen, and we no longer know where he is.

Furthermore, an electronic bracelet will not keep a dangerous offender from repeating an offence or an assault. A bracelet will only help the police to find out where the individual was on a given date at a given time. As far as crime prevention is concerned, the system is worthless.

This is one point where we are very critical of the bill. That the government did not act sooner is another point, as I said earlier, and above all-and I think this is a good question-how does the Correctional Service of Canada intend to make this new system work, a system that will involve increased supervision, when today, that same correctional service is unable to prevent the sale of drugs in so-called maximum security prisons?

I had an opportunity to question the commissioner in committee, and he admitted quite frankly that drugs were a problem in our prisons, but they were incapable of monitoring all that. They are incapable of monitoring the circulation of drugs in prisons, and they want to supervise dangerous or so-called dangerous offenders using electronic bracelets. It does not make sense, considering the cost involved.

Another point is that Bill C-55 contains no preventive measures. It has an extremely serious weakness. Nor does the bill reflect the reality of 1996, because when we look at the statistics, we realize that the number of violent crimes has decreased by 13 per cent since 1991. We also realize, on the basis of the same statistics, that cases of sexual assault have dropped 21 per cent since 1994.

So things are not all that bad. I agree that the ideal situation is paradise. I agree that we see full page headlines in the newspapers, but if I told you that newspaper headlines are inversely proportionate to reality, what would you say? You would say I was right. Indeed. But big headlines sell newspapers. And the Reform Party takes advantage of those headlines. Every day we see Reform Party members using the newspaper headlines to try and make political capital. But reality is different.

We must keep working on prevention as they are doing in Quebec and in more and more Canadian provinces as well. But Bill C-55 is a band-aid solution being used to cope with a problem that is far more serious than that.

There is also another point, another important criticism, which is that the bill does not contain any clauses related to extending prison terms or creating a monitoring system for an inmate who turned out to be far more dangerous when his release was imminent than when he was sentenced. It is not possible to know that someone sentenced for 10 or 15 years will not be more dangerous when he comes out than when he went in. We have absolutely nothing about this in Bill C-55.

Finally, what I feel is the major point is the problem relating to an acknowledged principle, the presumption of innocence, since section 810.2 would allow a judge, as I have just said, to bring down a not guilty verdict while imposing supervision, which casts doubt on the validity of his verdict.

I believe very sincerely that, when a society starts to suspend such basic rights as the presumption of innocence on a case-by-case basis, it is treading close to the line of intolerance and is at risk of falling over that line into unjustified excesses.

Canadian society and Quebec society merely mirror the people who constitute them. Society, therefore, bears a share of the responsibility, and this bill I have before me, Bill C-55, does not reflect this sharing of responsibility.

It is imperative, and absolutely necessary, for the government and Parliament as a whole, to ensure the protection of our children, the ensure the protection of our families, as well, of course, as to ensure the protection of society.

As a party and as responsible individuals we intend to fight for these important principles. However, I would have liked to see in this bill a comprehensive prevention policy that would really try to achieve the objective the minister had in mind. I will have to wait for another bill, because I can find nothing in Bill C-55 that gives me reason to believe the safety of the public, of our children and of society in general will be improved. I see absolutely nothing in this bill that would achieve this.

That being said, the Bloc Quebecois as the official opposition can hardly object to the principle of a bill whose purpose is to protect the public against violent or dangerous offenders, and deficient though the bill may be, there is a principle to which we cannot object.

However, I think the minister should be very careful when he says that this kind of bill will solve practically all our problems. I think he is raising expectations among the public, which clearly will not be met by Bill C-55.

I therefore urge the minister to pay attention to what I just said, to review that part of the bill which concerns the electronic bracelet and electronic monitoring, and remove the part which I think might be challenged by the courts and which would otherwise cost the governments of Canada and Quebec and all taxpayers who would challenge this part of the legislation a fortune in legal fees.

[Divorce Act, October 1st, 1996]

Mr. Speaker, I wish I were wrong, but when I read Bill C-41 and the draft guidelines on child support, prepared in June 1996 by the Department of Justice, I am forced to conclude that, unfortunately, I am right. Having to say this in the House is no fun, but I am right.

The federal model is based on the assumption that both parents have the same income. It is of course not always the case. Why presume that both parents have the same income? The judges dealing with divorce proceedings will base their decision on this assumption. If these guidelines are passed as they stand, judges will have no discretion to decide whether the children are entitled to support and, if so, to determine the amount of such support.

I mentioned that, in Quebec, the National Assembly is about to pass guidelines that will be based on the ability to pay of both parents. If one parent earns $200,000 while the other one has never worked, or earns only $25,000 or $30,000 a year, a judge should not rule that the children will receive X dollars in support and that each parent will contribute half of the amount. It goes without saying that the father who earns $200,000 will have to pay more than the mother who earns $20,000 or $25,000 per year.

I wish I were wrong. Perhaps the hon. member is aware of some discussions within the Liberal caucus that lead him to believe that the minister will make some changes to the guidelines, and that he will lean toward the Quebec approach rather than the one he is currently advocating. In the meantime, when I read Bill C-41 and the draft guidelines of the justice minister, I come to the conclusion that the federal model is unfortunately disconnected from reality.

[Divorce Act, October 1st, 1996]

Mr. Speaker, Bill C-41, which is before us, is a good illustration of the fact that policies do not necessarily respond to people's demands as quickly as one could wish.

Bill C-41 is intended to solve a problem known to many a single-parent family. Members know that, in most cases, women-in perhaps as much as 99 per cent of the cases-and ultimately children-in every single case-have to live with it. There has been a lot of unfairness.

Women's and community groups as well as many individual men and women have long been asking first the Conservative government, and then the Liberal government since 1993, to amend support legislation. There was clearly a consensus although some non-custodial fathers, naturally, viewed this unfavourably. But as the objective was to improve the children's lot, I think everybody recognized that there was a problem.

It took a legendary court case to bring the government to really do something. It took a courageous woman to confront the government on this important issue. I am referring to the Thibaudeau case, which is known to everybody.

Mrs. Thibaudeau had the support of a lot of people, including, although I do not want to brag, the support of the official opposition from the very beginning. A Liberal member said earlier that his party had supported from the beginning the amendments proposed in Bill C-41 but, from the moment we became the official opposition, we were the ones who, clearly, asked the government questions on this particular issue.

Members will recall how often, in the House, the Bloc member for Québec asked the justice minister to introduce legislation to split the cost of raising children between both parents. Or the hon. member for Temiscamingue who said this in May 1995: "Thus, it is imperative that the government act right now to answer women's expectations".

I take this opportunity to congratulate the hon. member for Québec, among others, for her persistence and perseverance in this difficult matter. In spite of all the different preconceptions and factors to be taken into account, she did an excellent job. This is why the opposition parties joined forces to have the rules changed.

I would also like to thank the member for Témiscamingue, who was our critic for National Revenue at the time. He explained very clearly the financial implications. Because of his explanations, all the members of the Bloc agreed on this issue.

However, almost a year late, the government and the minister have at last introduced the reform the Bloc Quebecois has been calling for for so long.

In the 1996 Budget, for the first time, the federal government finally unveiled the new child support payments system. As members will recall, there were four sections. The first established that child support payments will no longer be deductible for the custodial parent, but for the non-custodial parent. Second, the maximum working income supplement included in the federal tax benefits for children will be doubled. Third, guidelines will be drawn up for calculating support payments. Fourth, new measures enhancing the enforcement of child support will also be announced.

If Bill C-41, which amends the Divorce Act, the Family Orders and Agreements Enforcement Assistance Act, some provisions of the Garnishment, Attachment and Pension Diversion Act as well as other related acts, is adopted, it will implement two of the four elements I mentioned earlier. I will cover these elements in greater detail later.

According to the bill before us, the Divorce Act will be amended to create a framework for the use of the child support payment determination guidelines. Such guidelines would replace the discretionary power of the courts and would be adopted through regulations.

The other aspect changed by Bill C-41 concerns enforcement. Specifically, the bill would amend the Family Orders and Agreements Enforcement Assistance Act to add Revenue Canada to the list of federal departments whose data banks could be searched to find individuals who have been delinquent in paying child or spousal support.

The changes create a new mechanism to deny certain licences or benefits to individuals who regularly neglect to pay support. The rest of the new legislation will be put in place through a budget implementation act which will probably be introduced in the fall.

When we examine those two aspects of Bill C-41, we realize that the first one, that is to say the guidelines, is the most important. I have heard all kinds of things in this House, and it is worth taking a few minutes to talk about the guidelines and to explain to members who might not know what is going on in other provinces regarding these guidelines, because the province of Quebec does have such guidelines.

Bill C-41 will establish guidelines that will prevail even though some provinces have already adopted their own guidelines. To respond more specifically to the member for Halifax, who said she did not know what the guidelines were in Quebec, I think it is worth taking a few minutes to examine these provincial guidelines as well as the federal ones.

Here are some details about the criteria used to establish the guidelines. I invite the members opposite to listen very carefully, especially the member for Halifax. She must listen to understand what is going on.

The Quebec model is based on the actual cost of the child. An estimation is made of what the child needs. It could not be more accurate. However, the federal model is based on a partial equalization of living standards. According to that model, a five-year old child generally needs so much. But one child may need more than another child depending on his or her family's standard of living. Therefore, we can see right from the first criterion that it is not completely true to reality.

A second element concerning the Quebec model is that it is based on the ability to pay of both parents. Is that not perfectly normal? The financial responsibility for the children is shared between both parents on a pro rata basis depending on their resources. Again, it could not be more accurate. How has the federal government, which thinks it knows everything there is to know on the subject, gone about it? The federal model is based on the premise that both parents have the same income. Nothing could be further from reality.

In some cases, both parents do have the same income. It is possible. However, in some fields, women earn 30 per cent less than men. The premise used by the federal government may be based on the ideal situation, but, again, it is not true to reality. According to what my colleague said, even for work of equal value, women earn 30 per cent less than men. Therefore, if you take two engineers, there is a difference right off the bat, so the federal government is wrong on all counts.

Third, the Quebec model does not include, either implicitly or explicitly, an amount for the custodial parent. The federal government takes the opposite approach. Its model implicitly includes an amount for the custodial parent.

A fourth element of the Quebec model is harmonization with Quebec income security and taxation programs. Is this the right approach? The federal government does not seem to think so, because its model is not harmonized with Quebec programs.

Another point is that, in Quebec, the proportion of child expenses decreases with income. In the federal approach, child expenses remain constant. Finally, in Quebec, the non-custodial parent receiving income security payments is not required to pay support. Under the federal model, the non-custodial parent receiving income security could be called on to pay support.

I have just provided the member for Halifax, who said she doubted that there were large differences between the Quebec and federal models, with all the proof necessary to show that there indeed are. She can take that to her caucus and try to convince the Minister of Justice that he is on the wrong track in wishing to impose certain federal standards, the same system for all the provinces.

This is yet another example of how in Quebec-because I am an MP from Quebec, not because I am a Quebecer-we do things differently. This is proof again that we are a distinct society. Even in a bill that, all in all, has nothing to do with the Constitution, we see that Quebecers do things differently.

I think this would perhaps have been a good opportunity for the federal government to have a clause specifically recognizing the distinct character of Quebec with regard to the family and giving it full jurisdiction in this area. It was time to do so. The Prime Minister of Canada boasts that he recognizes the distinct character of Quebec. It was time to prove it in a bill that, in my view, is extremely important for the family, which is, after all, at the very basis of Quebec society.

That being said, although the Bloc Quebecois initially applauded the minister's reform concerning guidelines to determine the amount of support payments, we voiced several reservations with respect to the implementation of these federal guidelines in the province.

Upon reading Bill C-41 and after comparing the Quebec model and the federal model concerning these guidelines, it is clear our fears have been confirmed, since thanks to Bill C-41, we will have two entirely different systems.

I think the points I just made for the benefit of the hon. member for Halifax could be used by other Liberal members to contend with the demon of centralization, as the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs said so eloquently. I think they have enough facts to prevent the minister's demon of centralization from becoming active and to backtrack, face the facts and decentralize as we hope they will.

The first part of Bill C-41 deals with quite a few items, and I will run through them very quickly. What I am going to say is very legalistic but I think we should spend some time on these items, considering that legislators must mean what they say. This is a rule of law that has been cited quite often. I think that when Parliament adopts a bill of this kind, the meaning of every word is extremely important.

If a provincial government decides to set certain guidelines for its province, such guidelines will take precedence over the federal guidelines, provided the governor in council designates, by order, the provincial guidelines as the applicable guidelines. Here I am referring to subclause 1(4) which reads as follows:

The Governor in Council may, by order, designate a province for the purposes of the definition "applicable guidelines" in subsection (1)-

"May", Mr. Speaker. And right away, you will understand that the Bloc Quebecois cannot go along with this "may". Obviously, this should read "shall", "the Governor in Council shall, by order-". We do not to leave the governor in council any choice, any discretion to decide whether or not the guidelines of a province must take precedence over the federal guidelines.

If the province takes the initiative, if a province bothers to establish guidelines in an area as important as this one, I think the governor in council has no choice and shall, by order, designate that province as the province whose guidelines will apply.

According to the bill, provinces must therefore meet the criteria set out by the federal government in clause 26.1 if their guidelines are to be accepted as applicable. Thus, the federal government reserves absolute discretionary power to accept, or not to accept, the order according to sub-section (4).

Once again, we can see the usual federal paternalism at work here, always wanting to have power over provincial governments' social policies. Every time, the federal Big Brother places the provinces in a situation of guardianship, insisting on imposing its views on the provinces, without any concern for adapting to specific situations in various regions of Canada.

As well, rejection of a province's guidelines would lead to the absurd situation of having the provincial payment grid apply when the parents separate, while the federal one would kick in when they divorce, since the federal level has precedence in matters of divorce.

We would see people legislation shopping with the blessings of the Minister of Justice in Ottawa. If we adopt the bill as it stands, it will enable lawyers and those involved in a family case to ask: which is better for me, separation or divorce? The only consideration I have is the following-even though I am a man myself, I think I can say that men often see certain things from the financial point of view, which may not be the case of women caught in a very emotional situation and the lawyers will be involved in this. If the lawyer is on the ball at all, and can influence or try to influence his client, and he or she succeeds in influencing the opposing lawyer-who may well be a woman, as women often choose other women to represent them, which is their choice and there is nothing wrong with that-well then, after negotiation, after the lawyers sort out the various points that may influence their choice, the client may opt for divorce rather than separation, because the federal guidelines are perhaps less generous than the provincial.

We will really start to see legislation shopping, and I believe that, if there is one area in which that must be prevented, it is in family law, for the objective is, as I have stated at the start of my speech, the protection and welfare of the children involved.

Finally, the federal government uses the place of residence of the debtor, the person paying the support, to determine which guidelines are applicable. I have another difference for the hon. member for Halifax: the Quebec government considers the child's residence, a criterion that is much more consistent with the principles outlined in several court orders that the child's interest must prevail over everything else.

The rules applied by one province may be much more in line with the child's situation than those of the debtor province. This goes without saying. Does the Minister of Justice not think that all children have the same value, whatever their parents' status may be, whether it is a separation or a divorce case?

I do not know what the minister's answer is, but I can tell you right now that, in the eyes of the Bloc Quebecois, whatever their parents' status is, all children have the same value, and we should ensure that child support payments are as generous as possible so that the children are as comfortable as possible in this rather difficult situation.

Let me give you another example. According to the current federal and provincial regulations, if the amounts set by federal regulations are lower, after everything is taken into account, Quebecers would pay less in child support if they lived in Ontario. What is preventing Quebecers paying child support who are starting to feel the heat from moving to Ontario, thus reducing their

payments under section 1(3)( a )? What is preventing someone like that from moving to avoid his financial obligations or to pay as little as possible? Nothing. Even if we look at the minister's notes, the draft guidelines clearly allow this way of getting around one's financial obligations.

This lack of uniformity between provinces, combined with the number of courts issuing child support orders, the many overlapping federal and provincial laws, and the regional disparities in the cost of living, results in financial instability for separated and divorced families. We will not reach our goal unless we make the necessary amendments to this bill.

Obviously, it would make much more sense to let each province choose the model for determining support payments that suits its needs and let each decide terms of implementing the rules governing their determination in keeping with provincial social security, tax and family policy.

The area of the family is not something that can be pulled out of a hat and dealt with like that. It is more intricate. The area of the family is an extremely important area, and with the examples I gave, with the Quebec model, the federal model, I am sure that the House of Commons has understood that the province-Quebec in the example I gave, but I am sure that other provinces also have terms already established-is closer to the people, knows about such family-related problems as income and allowances of all sorts. The provincial government is in a better position to recognize family needs. The federal government should therefore withdraw from this area and give full jurisdiction to the provinces.

Since you are signalling to me that my time is running out, I will say briefly that the opposition supports the second part of Bill C-41.

[Family Trusts, September 25th, 1996]

Mr. Speaker, by refusing to let the courts rule on the family trust scandal, is the Minister of Justice not admitting in fact that the decision made by Revenue Canada was rather questionable and that any judge called upon to rule on this issue would not hesitate to overturn such a twisted decision without giving it a second thought?

[Family Trusts, September 25th, 1996]

Mr. Speaker, could the Minister of Justice tell us whether he intends to go to the courts to settle the family trust scandal and check if Revenue Canada did indeed misinterpret the Income Tax Act, as Choices and eight academic experts claim it did?