Gaston Leroux

[Supply, June 8th, 1994]

I thank the hon. member for Vancouver Quadra for his question. We have frequent discussions in committee. I know that he is very learned and that he has great concern for democracy and parliamentary institutions.

The hon. member noticed that I made reference to two different systems in my remarks. I meant to compare our Canadian Senate, which is completely ineffective, with two different models that do work, each in its own way. They get things done, they wield some power, and play specific roles. My colleague had mentioned a few models, and I just added a few more.

Our fundamental goal is always to increase the powers and the role of members in this House so that they can really begin to carry out their duties as soon as they are elected and do so completely.

I do not advocate any model for the Senate. What we are doing, Mr. Speaker, is examining an ineffective institution, and pointing out that this government does not want to change the rules because it refuses to reopen the Constitution. It does not want to hear a single word about the Constitution, even though some of its members would like to bring about improvements and propose amendments.

I do not advocate any specific model. All I said is that the Senate just does not work, and that it does not need that much money.

[Supply, June 8th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, the hon. member for Glengarry-Prescott-Russell will certainly not succeed in making me cry.

In response to a comment that the hon. member for Glengarry-Prescott-Russell made earlier, the hon. member for Vancouver Quadra told him that provincial representation in the Senate simply does not exist. So, you can just forget about regional representation.

Second, I will tell my colleague that his party is in a catch-22 situation. The Liberals are defending the allocation of funds to a Senate which, according to the hon. member for Vancouver Quadra, must be reformed and improved. My colleague does not realize that, to do so, we have to amend the Constitution, and it so happens that his own leader has said clearly that amendments to the Constitution were absolutely out of the question. Do these people talk to each other sometimes? It seems that they do not talk to each other at all.

Does the hon. member not hear what his leader says here in the House? Each time he is asked a question about constitutional matters, the Prime Minister says that he does not want to talk about the Constitution. Yet, the argument invoked by the hon. member to defend the allocation of funds to the Senate is that we must improve the Senate, change the name of the game, and so on. Such comments cannot be serious.

We know full well that the Senate has no power. Senators are appointed by the Prime Minister and they have a particular job to do, a job that is partisan in nature. Everybody knows that. The Senate costs a fortune to administer, more than $42 million to be exact, and yet, as mentioned by the Auditor General in his last report, it sits only a little over 40 days a year, with absenteeism running at between 20 and 25 per cent. It is ridiculous to invest millions of dollars in such a useless institution when there are so many unemployed and so many people on welfare in Quebec and across Canada.

[Supply, June 8th, 1994]

The principle of equal regional representation has become increasingly more tenuous as the regions have evolved, as the member for Glengarry-Prescott-Russell mentioned in his question. I submit that the original regional distribution, which dates back to the negotiations surrounding the 1867 Constitution Act, is no longer representative of today's population nor of present regional borders. Fortunately, provincial assemblies quickly took over the Senate's role regarding representation of regional interests.

Finally, we must mention the dismal failure of the Canadian Senate as the protector of minorities. One of the Upper House's important roles, which is enshrined in this country's Constitution, is not only provincial or regional representation, but also the representation and protection of interests less well protected by the House of Commons.

Since linguistic duality, the notion of two founding nations, is a fundamental characteristic of Canada, such duality should normally be manifested in the Senate and be a fundamental element of its make-up. I am referring here to the double-majority mechanism, which ensures a more adequate protection for French-speaking minorities outside Quebec.

But, never ever has the Upper House stood up for these minorities' interests, and this is a proven fact. Take, for example, the problems encountered by all French-speaking communities in Canada, and that was evidenced again today. The Senate's action in all its spheres of activity fails miserably.

In fact, Canada's Upper House has a very clearly defined mandate, which is to represent partisan interests, Tories or Grits. A majority of the senators appointed by the Prime Minister have some political experience, in fact approximately half of them, and the others usually have rendered well-recognized services to the party in power. The Senate does allow a golden retirement for politicians and others who are long-time supporters of Liberal and Conservative members and who have always been close to the corridors of power in Canada.

From 1925 to 1963, the average age of senators was 69. In 1975, it was 64 years. A seat in the Senate is a true reward at carreer's end, since one does not have to fight anymore to keep one's seat until the age of 75. For the government, it is both a reward and a way to control its institution.

[Supply, June 8th, 1994]

We must admit it is not easy to deal with two legislative houses in a British type of parliamentary system. Parliamentary systems, clearly dominated by the executive, give their Upper House very limited if not meaningless powers. Given that such is the system in Canada, the Senate is reduced to an anachronism since it has no weight in the country's political balance and lacks legitimacy because its members are not elected but simply appointed by the Prime Minister. Since the executive is accountable only to the House of Commons, the Senate loses any influence it might have over the government. The parliamentary system requires that the Lower House have greater powers than the Upper House because the government comes from the former and is elected and, therefore, is accountable only to it.

That problem does not exist within a presidential system like the one in the United States since the executive is politically accountable neither to the House of Representatives nor to the Senate. The separation of powers is more strictly established in a presidential system than in a parliamentary system like ours where the Senate is useless.

In the third part of this demonstration, I would like to touch on the question of administrative responsibilities associated with the allocation of $26.9 million for the operation of an Upper House within the Canadian parliamentary system and, with your permission, I will explain how the Canadian Senate is unable to accomplish various tasks which, in theory, are part of its obligations.

For example, it is difficult to justify the existence of an Upper House based on the principle of legislative review. The idea that the Canadian Senate could reflect soberly on the legislative measures of the House of Commons flows from the conservative prejudices that existed earlier under the monarchy. The Canadian Senate is a remnant of a traditional and elitist representation opposed, in a way, to the monopolistic embodiment of a democratic legitimacy already more than 200 years old in the western world. The Canadian Upper House, the Senate, accepts its secondary role by undertaking activities that have nothing to do with its legislative role. In fact, senators are named by the

Prime Minister to play a partisan role, red or blue, or to represent pressure groups. What they do is lobby.

Here is the truth: Over the last 50 years, the Senate used its veto power only to delay, as was pointed out by my friend, the hon. member for Vancouver Quadra. Between 1943 and 1964, only two bills were rejected by the Senate and since 1964, only one, and under circumstances which were not really significant, considering that on the rejected bill, C-43 about abortion, MPs and senators were free to vote according to their conscience. Before the Constitution Act of 1982, the Senate always bowed to the desires of the government and the Commons. It did not exercise its veto power because it was continuously controlled by the party in power.

When the Canadian Senate was created, the idea was to enable the senators to distance themselves from the partisan positions taken by the members of the House of Commons. The idea was to have a House of sober second thought which would be above the bursts of passion of the people.

In Canada, the Fathers of Confederation were in favour of nominating senators to preserve the independence of the members of the Upper House. One could have expected that senators, who hold office until they turn 75-quite the job security at a time when unemployment rate is so high, both in Canada and Quebec-and are not subject to the whims of the people, would have shown their independence towards the party in office.

On the contrary, the Upper House members have been staunchly partisan, with little regard for their role as impartial law-makers. It needs to be stated again, senators are appointed on a strictly partisan basis.

For the Bloc Quebecois, which is concerned not only with Quebec's interests, but also with the democratic values dear to all Canadians, the contradiction between the myth of a House of sober second thought and the reality of a partisan Canadian Senate, is reason enough to oppose any kind of subsidy for this useless institution and to advocate its abolition.

[Supply, June 8th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, as the member for Richmond-Wolfe and on behalf of my colleagues from the Bloc Quebecois and of all the people we represent in the House of Commons, I will speak to the notice I gave to this House objecting, on behalf of the Official Opposition, to the vote in the amount of $26,952,000 under the heading Parliament-The Senate.

The Bloc has always spoken out against the existence of a Senate, and I would like to demonstrate that this institution is, in our opinion, as archaic as it is useless. This institution is nothing more than an excuse for the government to reward its friends, be they Liberal or Tory, who will then work-in true partisan fashion-for the government or for the interests they represent. Several of my colleagues will prove it in several ways during this debate.

I listened to the speech made by the hon. member for Vancouver Quadra and I will go over the issues he dealt with. He will probably not like my arguments. I note at the outset that the hon. member for Vancouver Quadra must be feeling lonely because, first of all, he looked at the issue of maintaining the votes through the objective of revamping and improving the Senate. He must be feeling lonely because, first, his own leader does not want to address in any way the constitutional issue and, second, the Senate itself would have to scuttle its own ship.

I would like to remind you that the current distribution of the 104 Senate seats is provided for in Section 22 of the 1867 Constitution Act. As Canada is divided into four regions, these regions must be equally represented. Ontario and Quebec get 24 senators each; New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, six each; Prince Edward Island, four; the four Western provinces, six each for a total of 24; in 1948, Newfoundland got six; finally, the two territories have one each.

Senators are appointed by the Governor General who, according to tradition, acts on the initiative and advice of the Prime Minister. Everyone recognizes that they are in fact appointed by the Prime Minister.

Since senators are not elected, and the hon. member directly alluded to that fact, the Bloc Quebecois feels that the other place is an anachronism, as the hon. member for Vancouver Quadra put it so well, given the modern criteria which underly the political management of a State.

So, on behalf of my colleagues from the Bloc Quebecois, I denounce this unacceptable waste in the form of a credit of $26.9 million, plus statutory expenditures of some $15.7 million, for a total budget of $42.6 million, not including the services provided. This is an unacceptable expenditure for an archaic political institution which plays a useless role for Quebecers and Canadians at large.

Let me remind you of the origin of senates in the various political systems, and of the objectives of the Canadian Senate when it was created. This will give you a better idea of how that institution is a miserable failure in the Canadian political system.

Let us take a look at history. In ancient Greece, more than 500 years before Christ, the legislators formed a council of the 500, whose role was to control the possible excesses of democracy. The very ancient societies had the wisdom to create a political body to monitor decisions concerning society as a whole. The hon. member for Vancouver Quadra alluded to this earlier. On one of the walls of the Canadian Senate, there is a maxim by Cicero, who was a thinker in Ancient Rome, to the effect that it is the duty of the noble to oppose the instability of the people. How pretentious!

From time immemorial, when democracy was still in its infancy, people sought to give an aura of wisdom to the Senate, in order to legitimize this institution, whose mission is fundamentally a conservative one for society.

The Senate is like the British House of Lords; it is a House for very important people. True to the British tradition, the accent is on sharing legislative power among the two Houses, which represent two different social classes, that is the people and the nobility.

The first objective of the Senate, like its British model, is to review and think, thus monitoring the House of Commons. This is very close to the perception that prevailed in antiquity. Senate members are supposed to counterbalance the executive side of Parliament. Moreover, the Fathers of Confederation also wanted to follow the American model and created a Canadian Senate similar to a federal Chamber whose objective was to protect the rights of the regions and provinces, and to ensure its participation in the legislative process of the Federation.

The founders of the Canadian Upper House took their inspiration both from the British House of Lords and the American Senate, two models that were clearly incompatible and light years away from any historical affinity. The House of Lords, anchored in the medieval myth of the monarchy, and the Senate, with its modern North American dynamics firmly anchored in the twentieth century. This was a highly unsuitable marriage between a modern American Senate and a medieval British system.

We must not forget that the criteria for representation from Quebec and Ontario, at the time the Canadian Constitution was drafted, were included at the behest of Lower Canada-in other words, Quebec-in exchange for agreeing with the principle of proportional representation in the House of Commons.

In the minds of the founding fathers, the Senate was intended to provide equitable representation for the regions. However, it was never intended as a house of the regions. Today, there is no reason why the House of Commons should appropriate funds to a political institution that is ineffective and totally useless.

Considering the state of the economy, with a debt of over $550 billion and unemployment and poverty in Quebec and Canada, the total budget of $42.6 million allocated to this institution would be better spent on economic recovery and job creation.

To continue this discourse on the failure of successive federal governments to provide for responsible management of public funds, as they sank millions into an institution that is utterly useless, I would like to give two examples of a functional Senate; the U.S. Senate and the German Bundesrat referred to by the hon. member for Vancouver Quadra.

Unlike the Canadian Senate, the American model-the first federal model on this continent-is unique in its simplicity. In the House of Representatives, representation is based on numbers, while in the Senate, it is based on absolute equality among the States.

A description of the duties of U.S. senators demonstrates how ineffective and useless members of the Canadian Upper House really are. Here is why American senators have specific legislative duties that are essential to the proper functioning of the American presidential system. Thus, in conjunction with the House of Representatives, they pass bills previously approved by the President. If no compromise can be reached, the bill is not passed. They also have executive functions whose importance is

still growing, such as the approval of appointments made by the President, appointments of judges, ministers and ambassadors which are often subjected to rigorous inquiries by the U.S. Senate.

Ratification of international treaties is another major executive power held by the Senate within the American system. The American presidential system is efficient in that, among other things, the Senate produces prestigious members well known for their legislative skills, and let me remind you that they are elected by the people, which is not the case in Canada. They are elected by the people.

The U.S. Senate alone has attracted the most talented minds of the nation and constitutes an intellectual centre of indisputable superiority compared with the legislative dynamics of the Canadian Senate.

The United States Senate has really brought to the fore, through a real and constant practice of politics, the spirit of wisdom and reason which inspired people from antiquity when they set up the early senates.

Let us talk about the Bundesrat. As for the German Bundesrat, or Federal Council, it is another Senate-like democratic institution, but contrary to the Canadian Senate, it works. The Bundesrat, which was created by the Constitution of the German Empire in 1871, was a major legislative body of the Empire. It was originally an assembly of ambassadors from member states. It is the ancestor of the second German House, the Assembly of the Landers' Executive members or, if you prefer, of the federated provinces representing the various territories, either provinces or regions.

Simply to explain how the Bundesrat works, it is formed by 45 members of the government of Landers and each Land is allowed at least three votes. To illustrate the process, when a bill is introduced, for instance, it must be submitted to the approval of the Bundesrat, the equivalent to our Senate, which has a veto it can use within one week, provided there is a majority of two thirds of the votes. The head of the government of a Land automatically becomes a member of the Bundesrat. The central government designates as many ministers as the number of votes the Lands are entitled to.

I should add that the approval of the Bundesrat is required when an issue deals with administrative or financial interests of the Landers, the equivalent of the provinces and regions in Canada.

In Germany, federalism finds its true meaning. Eleven Landers are directly represented by the members of each Land's government. Therefore, Canadian federalists cannot decently talk in Quebec or elsewhere of the merits of a viable federalism that does not even respect its own components. Federalism has never existed in Canada. There is a central government that tried by all means to grab as much power as possible at the expense of provinces and regions. The Canadian Senate plays no significant role in the defence of regions and minorities, one of the reasons why it was created, which leaves the Executive of the House of Commons a maximum of powers.

[Canada's French-Speaking Community, May 27th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, as it pursues this objective, does the government intend to act on a request from the Fédération des communautés francophones et acadiennes to create a central agency responsible for implementing a comprehensive policy for the French-speaking community? Yes or no? People are waiting for an answer.

[Canada's French-Speaking Community, May 27th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, yesterday, the Fédération des communautés francophones et acadiennes complained about the federal government's indifferent attitude and asked the government to do what it is supposed to do. A tall order, Mr. Speaker!

So far, the Minister of Canadian Heritage has responded rather contemptuously by dismissing the executive of the Federation as a bunch of malcontents.

My question is directed to the Acting Prime Minister. Considering the ravages of assimilation and the widening income gap between francophones and anglophones, would the Acting Prime Minister agree that instead of attacking francophones who invited the leader of the opposition to explain his position, his government should concentrate on implementing a comprehensive policy for the development of Canada's French-speaking community, as requested by the Federation?

[National Library Act, May 27th, 1994]

Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague for telling me that our fears will be alleviated.

In conclusion, I will say that I raised the issue of micropublishing and of the problems facing microfilm publishers. This is another very specific example of a very limited production. These publishers mentioned that their sales were very low and that the National Library of Canada was one of their customers. Under such circumstances, I would like their very specific concerns to be taken into account.

[National Library Act, May 27th, 1994]

Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague for her remarks, but what we have in mind particularly are the limited editions, the art books. You know very well that some artists produce major works as limited editions. The legal deposits could then exceed the sales. You should consider this. What we suggest is that the regulations provide for a tax credit.

My last question deals with another problem created by having two levels requiring the same thing. We asked whether it was possible to consider a single-window proposition, since Quebec already has its library.

[National Library Act, May 27th, 1994]

Mr. Chairman, my colleague is right, they supported the amendments, but with one qualification. It relates to the regulations which have not been tabled along with the bill. They drew the attention of our critic to the fact that they will have a double financial burden. The parliamentary secretary is right, they support the bill, but they want to know what will be done regarding the double legal deposit. Did you think of the burden for the industry?