Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to address Bill C-54, an act to support and promote electronic commerce by protecting personal information that is collected, used or disclosed in certain circumstances, by providing for the use of electronic means to communicate or record information or transactions and by amending the Canada Evidence Act, the Statutory Instruments Act and the Statute Revision Act.
This long awaited bill introduced by the minister does not meet the objective stated at the outset, namely to protect privacy in a technological world that challenges this fundamental right.
What we have before us is a bill whose content is to be found in a schedule, a bill that gives no real powers to the commissioner. This is a bill whose form and content will both create confusion.
It is a bill whose wording lends itself to broad interpretation, a bill that includes a provision allowing the governor in council to amend the act without any parliamentary debate and democratic consultation.
It is not likely, therefore, that the bill will meet the public's expectations, because it is too flawed.
First, most of the provisions governing protection of personal information are to be found in a schedule of the bill. Such a structure—which is unusual, to say the least—could result in a number of problems, since the schedule will have to be read in conjunction with the rest of the bill. This will only make it harder for businesses to figure out their obligations and consumers' rights.
Moreover, the schedule is merely a model code for the protection of personal information drafted by the private sector and by consumers, as a framework to protect personal information, but strictly on a voluntary basis.
The minister did not follow through on the recommendations made by consumers and the privacy commissioners, who stated that the code provides a good starting point, but needs to be reviewed and amended if it is to be included in the legislation.
This shows how anxious the minister is to see electronic commerce develop in Canada, and it also shows the priority given to economic values, rather than to social values and the right to privacy.
Second, the legislation is muddled.
The conditional is frequently used in Schedule 1, for example, “should be specified”.
We may well wonder whether the use of the conditional in Bill C-54 means that the legislation is simply making recommendations without imposing obligations, particularly since the answer is not obvious. In clause 5(2), the bill provides:
(2) The word “should”, when used in Schedule 1, indicates a recommendation and does not impose an obligation.
11.(1) An individual may file with the Commissioner a written complaint against an organization for contravening a provision of Division 1 or for not following a recommendation set out in Schedule 1.
Clearly this confusion and these contradictions will make for happy lawyers and unhappy consumers.
Clause 4.3.2 in Schedule 1, which sets out the CSA code, provides:
Organizations shall make a reasonable effort to ensure that the individual is advised of the purposes for which the information will be used.
I would remind you as well that Quebec is a unique model in North America for its legislation regarding the protection of personal information. It has had this legislation for four years. Like the charter of human rights, Quebec's laws consider the protection of personal information a basic right. Article 5 of the 1975 Quebec charter of rights and freedoms provides that every person has a right to the respect of his or her private life.
Clearly, Bill C-54 has as its sole objective to promote electronic trade while the right to protection of privacy in the private sector is relegated to the background. Its title alone makes this clear.
Worse yet, this bill will reduce, in some cases, the rights of Quebeckers acquired under Quebec law.
Let us consider an example. Under section 17 of the Quebec legislation, an employee in a department store would be entitled to see his personal file, even if kept outside Quebec.
With Bill C-54, he would not necessarily be able to view his file, because his request would be subject to legislation that ignores the right to privacy when the access to information request is made under labour relations provisions and is not of a commercial nature.
Moreover, as I said earlier, Bill C-54 is based on a voluntary model code prepared by the CSA. Let us see what the access to information commissioners of Quebec and British Columbia think of that.
On page 15 of his Annual Report for 1997-98, the Quebec access to information commissioner says “going along with this proposal, the CSA standard, would be a step backward from the current situation in Quebec as far as protection of personal information is concerned”.
The British Columbia commissioner, David H. Flaherty, compared the BC legislation, the European Union legislation and the CSA code which is the foundation of Bill C-54. He came to the conclusion that the purpose of the CSA code is not to protect the right to privacy; that the concept of personal information is most poorly defined; that there is no reference to data banks; and that the definition of consent is evasive compared to what can be found in other legislation.
Also, the tools provided in Bill C-54 are ineffective, since the commissioner cannot issue orders. In fact, Canadians will have to go to the federal court to solve disputes, but only once the commissioner has issued his opinion.
I could go on and on about this bill, but I am running out of time. However, I support the request of my hon. colleague, our industry critic, and urge the government to immediately withdraw Bill C-54 concerning electronic commerce and personal information protection in the private sector.
The bill as it now stands will not provide consumers with the level of confidence they need to ensure the development of electronic commerce.
There are three facts that surface when one reads this bill: the bill allows the federal government to subject huge sections of the economy currently under Quebec jurisdiction to federal legislation; the bill is so confused that it could be interpreted any which way; and last, it is extremely weak, since it does not grant the federal privacy commissioner the power to issue orders.
When we think about it, we once again wonder why the federal government did not rely on the four years of positive experience Quebec has in this area.