Ted McWhinney

[Petitions, February 20th, 1998]

Madam Speaker, the third petition with 240 signatures from B.C. calls for the Canadian government to use its influence to ensure that Turkey abides by UN security council resolutions on Cyprus.

[Petitions, February 20th, 1998]

Madam Speaker, the second petition has 210 signatures from Vancouver and Victoria. It calls for the elimination of sales taxes on reading material.

[Petitions, February 20th, 1998]

Madam Speaker, I have the pleasure to present three petitions. The first has 167 signatures from all over British Columbia. It is from the physicians for global survival and it calls for a binding international convention to abolish nuclear weapons by the year 2000.

[National Unity, February 17th, 1998]

Mr. Speaker, the British Columbia panel on national unity, appointed by Premier Glen Clark and including MPs from the three federal parties now holding seats from B.C., has just reported on its province-wide hearings on the nine provincial premiers' recent Calgary declaration.

The panel has found that British Columbians, by a very large majority, support constitutional recognition of the status of the French civil law, the French language and the French culture within Quebec. British Columbians' constitutional recognition of Quebec as a unique society within our federal system flowed logically and inevitably from that by an equally large majority.

British Columbians have accepted Quebec as a unique society without demanding any constitutional quid pro quo or recognition of any B.C. special historical constitutional claims. They have made a unilateral gesture of goodwill to Quebec in an expression of faith in the future of a plural Canadian society within a plural Canadian federal system.

After 30 years it may be time now to close the constitutional files.

[Foreign Affairs, February 13th, 1998]

We will continue our policy of constructive engagement with China. We are maintaining an administration of justice program. We are training Chinese judges. We are training Chinese police officials.

Let us face it. We do not make invidious comparisons. We apply human rights to every government we deal with.

[Foreign Affairs, February 13th, 1998]

Mr. Speaker, there are no back doors to the foreign ministry. The minister is up front in meeting people. I say again the minister met with Wei Jingsheng—-

[Foreign Affairs, February 13th, 1998]

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Wei Jingsheng met with two ministers of the present government and appeared as a witness before the standing committee on foreign affairs.

The vice-president of Cuba came here to sign two treaties with the Canadian government, one of them an anti-hijacking treaty and the other, an air transport agreement.

We will continue our constructive engagement with Cuba. We do not make invidious comparisons. Does the hon. member want us to join Jesse Helms?

[Middle East, February 9th, 1998]

Madam Speaker, the prime minister undertook to this House that before Canada would consider any request for going beyond diplomatic action in the present crisis in Iraq, he would consult the House. He has done this and I think it is worth noting that it is a progressive step in the evolution of parliamentary responsibility.

The United States Constitution envisages the president and congress acting together, but increasingly they resort to armed force done by executive presidential action alone. We are the only country, I think, among the present group of countries interested in this issue where Parliament has been consulted. I think it is a precedent for future action and a welcome one.

There has been some discussion of 1991. It is worth commenting that although there was a big debate in Parliament, it did occur three months after the decision was taken to send the troops in. When the call comes at five in the morning “Please join us in military action”, we simply say “Look, we have to consult Parliament”. That is our approach. It is a new approach and we thank the prime minister for it.

There has been some discussion on the legal authority of the United States and by the same token those associated or allied with the United States to take action involving the potential use of force against Iraq. It has been said “You must go to the security council and get a fresh resolution”.

I do not think that is so as a matter of legal interpretation. In fact the gulf operation was rather special. It was undertaken by a government on Canada's part previous to the present one, and the United States by a president previous to the present president. What was done was a little different from classic UN peacekeeping operations or peacemaking operations where in fact there is a UN force under the aegis of the UN secretary general and responsible to the secretary general.

In fact what was done was a series of umbrella resolutions delegating the power to the United States commander in chief and responsible to the president of the United States. I say that was an unusual action but the series of resolutions have a broad, legal authority for which I think it can reasonably be argued that the authority to take the present action is there.

My own advice would be if the opportunity allows to seek a fresh security council resolution, but I do not think it is legally necessary and we would have to bear in mind that the veto power operates. It is intolerable that the veto should be used to prevent collective action on which there is a consensus. This was the argument we made and other countries made as far back as the Korean war in 1950 when the general assembly passed the uniting for peace resolution, an unprecedented constitutional step. I think the legal authority is there.

Canada's own role as we know has been the classic UN peacekeeping role which then foreign minister Lester Pearson devised. It is associated with his name. We do believe in the peacekeeping role. We have tended to eschew the use of armed force. Our role in the gulf war was limited to a supporting auxiliary role with an interdiction of search and destroy operations.

It is worth noting that the president of the United States in approaching us has asked us to do that and no more. It is search and rescue operations, transport operations, but not more. I think there is advantage for that, and it is not something that we have sought, but it means that problems involving the use of armed force, involving the law of war, simply do not apply in relation to the Canadian operations.

The United States in relying on the resolutions of course does not operate in a vacuum. The present United Nations based law is subject to the general law of war, the customary rules of international law. One of the rules is of course that you must exhaust the diplomatic methods, the peaceful methods, the lesser controls. The United States is aware of that. We are aware of that.

The prime minister and the foreign minister have assured us that diplomatic activities will continue. That is the primary obligation. It is only after they have been tried and exhausted to the full that one is allowed to resort to other options which may involve the use of armed force. The principle of the economy in the use of power applies if armed force is used. All parties to the gulf war operation were aware of that and parties to any future action in the present situation would be aware of that.

In particular, granted the evolution of international law, the developing juridical conscience, times have moved since 1991. It is true that the 1978 Geneva protocols additional to the Geneva protocols of 1925, which established stringent rules in the application of air power where civilian targets are involved incidentally to a military objective, apply even though it is true that neither Iraq nor the United States ratified them. International law supplied the general rules.

I say this simply to stress that if one feels one has to move beyond the diplomatic stage, one does not operate in a legal vacuum. We are aware of this. Our allies are aware of this. We will be continuing with our diplomatic negotiations to make that clear if further options arise.

To recapitulate, it is not in my view necessary to obtain a fresh security council resolution. I believe there is enough available under the series of umbrella resolutions passed in 1991 and their continuing interpretation and application but it would be better to obtain such a new resolution. I welcome our foreign minister's undertaking that this is going on and will continue to go on.

As I say, if it should become necessary to apply some form of military force, the Canadian role at the request of the United States is limited to auxiliary support operations. However even in roles for allies going beyond that, the rules of temperamenta belli apply. It is not a situation of operating in a legal vacuum.

[The Late Mark Macguigan, February 9th, 1998]

Mr. Speaker, Mark MacGuigan, who died last month, was a professional philosopher as well as a lawyer. His career moved quickly through the different domains: university law teaching, university administration, politics as a backbench MP for 12 years, then in the space of four more years, foreign minister and justice minister, and finally judge of the appeals division of the Federal Court of Canada.

He continued, through his long illness, his scholarly interests, with a treatise on law and morality in 1994 and leaving two other manuscripts, on foreign policy and the administration of justice, partly completed upon his death.

His life represents the continuing attempt to reconcile a natural law based set of ethical values with the practical necessities of a rapidly evolving Canadian society.

[Iraq, February 6th, 1998]

Mr. Speaker, we have made very clear our position that the problem in Iraq can be resolved by Saddam Hussein complying with the security council resolutions.

At this stage diplomatic negotiations are going on. Other action may be needed, but I can give the prime minister's assurance that any action involving Canadian commitments would be preceded by a debate in parliament.