René Laurin

[Supply, April 27th, 1999]

Madam Speaker, I rise on a point of order. I thought there was unanimous consent to give the member five more minutes. He already has had five additional minutes.

[Supply, April 27th, 1999]

Madam Speaker, the hon. minister mentioned troops in Macedonia, saying that they will be equipped with Griffon helicopters, which will conduct security operations in Kosovo.

I would like him to elaborate on this because we were under the impression, after listening to the Prime Minister's statements, that our troops would be stationed in Macedonia only. There was no mention of Kosovo for the time being, but the minister said there will be security operations in Kosovo.

Does this mean there will be forays into Kosovo? I would like the Minister of National Defence to elaborate on this.

[Kosovo, April 23rd, 1999]

Mr. Speaker, since Canada is a member of NATO, the G-8 and the security council, why is it not the one showing leadership and innovation on the diplomatic front?

Why do we look like we are following everyone as regards this conflict, whether it is in terms of humanitarian, military, political or diplomatic initiatives?

[Kosovo, April 23rd, 1999]

Mr. Speaker, Russia attempted a diplomatic breakthrough with the Milosevic government, with a plan that provides for the sending of a civilian peacekeeping force under the UN.

However, the terms set by Belgrade do not meet NATO's minimum requirements to end the air strikes.

My question is for the Prime Minister. Does Canada intend to use that opportunity created by Russia to resume diplomatic efforts, or has the government given up any hope for a peaceful resolution of the conflict?

[Issue Of Ceremonial Statements Of Service Act, April 22nd, 1999]

Madam Speaker, it is also a pleasure for me to take part in this debate and I hope that the few comments I will make will be a positive contribution.

It is a very good idea to propose to reward or even only to recognize the service of certain persons during an armed conflict.

Of course I agree with the hon. member from the Reform Party that this would not make a big difference for our veterans, whose service is already recognized under the act, which, incidentally, now gives merchant sailors the same privileges as them.

But, many other persons distinguished themselves by their battle exploits or simple acts of courage or voluntary work. These are recognized with medals like the governor general medals, but for various reasons, there are other anonymous persons who would not qualify for such medals.

I think for example of a person who, during a war, would have taken a group of soldiers in for a few days to hide them from the enemy, protect them, feed them or treat their wounds. We know that many people did that during world wars.

They are not necessarily Canadians. They could be foreigners. In World War II, for example, Canadian soldiers on campaign in Normandy were taken in by French men and women who fed them and tended to their wounds. We should recognize not only Canadians, but extend that recognition to other persons as well.

What is more important in life than being recognized by one's peers? Those who work as volunteers never do it for money or other financial considerations, but rather for the love of the cause they believe in or for the sake of those they love.

Usually, these people do not ask for recognition, but when they do get it, they are both pleased and honoured. It is a bit like an honorary degree. When a university or a school decides to recognize, on the basis of merit, the action, experience, know-how, dedication or expertise of a person who is not one of its graduates, it awards this person an honorary degree.

Many people would deserve the same kind of recognition for their service at war or in humanitarian causes.

People are not asking for any kind of compensation, and the bill says so. Those who would receive a ceremonial statement could not expect any compensation, benefit, or financial consideration. The only purpose of the statement would be simply to recognize people for their effort, work, dedication, volunteer work or outstanding feats during a conflict in which Canada was taking part.

This does not entail any financial commitment. We not need pass any financial motion and the finance minister does not have to figure out how much it would cost. My understanding is that the bill introduced by the hon. member for Timmins—Baie-James is simply intended to provide some official recognition to those who deserve it because they served their country and their fellow citizens.

I am happy to support this bill. Although it is not votable, I hope that the comments and thoughts shared during the debate will bring the government to reflect on this and come back later with a votable bill this time.

As regards the concerns of the hon. member of the Reform Party about the bill being too broad, not addressing such and such point, or about the form this recognition would take, we can see that the bill grants the minister enough discretion.

Like any other good bill, this bill could be followed by regulations established by the minister. These regulations could define more precisely in what circumstances and according to what criteria the government could recognize that the actions of a citizen entitle this person to a ceremonial certificate of service.

This certificate should not be a mere piece of paper. It should not be the kind that anyone can get. Otherwise, it would not mean anything. This certificate would be proof that the actions of a veteran were really extraordinary and special. It should be a document that is not easily obtainable.

The specifics could be covered in regulations. I do not believe it is necessary to put everything in the bill. The more you put in a bill, the higher the risks of making a mistake and leaving out certain circumstances.

This bill deserves support in order to show these people who are still living quiet lives, unnoticed, that Canada, the country to which they have made a great contribution, Canadians, Quebeckers, are all grateful to them and acknowledge their contribution and their work.

We would like the world to know about it. We would like to see an official gesture showing that these persons have earned recognition of their fellow citizens, not just a few lines in a weekend newspaper or a little thank you when we happen to meet them. We would like to say that they deserve our gratitude and that we are pleased to set this recognition out in an official document called a ceremonial statement.

Once again, I congratulate the Hon member for Timmins—James Bay for preparing a bill like this. I trust that it will receive the greatest possible support in the days and weeks to come.

[Canadian Armed Forces, April 21st, 1999]

moved that:

That, in the opinion of this House, the government should have a standing committee of the House of Commons hold public hearings on every proposed procurement of goods or services by the Canadian Armed Forces valued at more than $100 million, in order to ensure that the procurement process is transparent and fair to all concerned.

Madam Speaker, I will begin with the following question: Why did I move such a motion?

On numerous occasions, examples of insufficient spending on the part of National Defence have been raised in the daily newspapers and in the House, and there have also been examples of heavier spending, in fact, very substantial spending.

Looking at these examples, one could not help but conclude that what applies to minor spending ought to apply equally to major spending, which is the reason for this motion.

In the past, National Defence's goods and services procurement procedures have experienced numerous failures. I want to go into a few examples of these.

First of all, the purchase of the utility tactical transport helicopters known as the Griffons. Cabinet approved this on April 7, 1992, and Treasury Board assented on September 8, 1992. The very next day, a $754.5 million contract for the purchase of some 100 Griffon helicopters, a flight simulator, and other equipment, plus related documentation and services, was awarded.

The first aircraft was delivered in March 1995, and the last in January 1998. The estimated total cost of the project was $1.2 billion, according to the auditor general's April 1998 report.

It can therefore be seen that the project went $445 million over budget, more than 59% over budget. It has cost $1.2 billion rather than $754.5 million.

The Griffon replaced three other models of helicopter, which were retired: the CH-118 Iroquois, the CH-135 Twin Huey and the CH-136 Kiowa.

The auditor general made many criticisms with respect to the selection of this helicopter. I refer to the April 1998 auditor general report, which states that “it appears there was a review of how a single aircraft could replace two types but departmental officials could not produce a copy of it”.

Other documents as well were lost only God knows how.

A study done in August 1992, after the department had decided on the Griffon, showed that its load capacity was less than that required to transport a gun or engineer equipment. Its load capacity for evacuating wounded and for logistical support was also lower than required.

In its response, the department stated that the lack of capacity could be made up by the support provided by allied aircraft. In other words, the equipment we are unable to load in our helicopters could be loaded with the help of our good neighbours. That is the good neighbour strategy. So much for Canada's sovereignty in the area of national defence.

The department concluded that to buy only one type of utility tactical transport helicopters would cost less than to modernize and maintain a fleet made up of several types of aircraft. However, the auditor general demonstrated that the operating cost of the new helicopter would be 20% to 40% higher than that of the aircraft to be replaced.

The department bought the aircraft from the only supplier it consulted. Only one supplier was consulted. This is a commercial aircraft and not a military one. Other types of helicopter were turned down. Life cycle costs for other aircraft, which might have been lower, were not considered.

This aircraft has a limited reconnaissance capability, and the auditor general concluded that the tactical studies did not adequately justify replacing two divergent aircraft types with one, and that they were concluded too late in the process to affect decision making. In addition, the studies called into question the suitability of the aircraft that was selected.

The acquisition of search and rescue helicopters is another example. They are the Cormorant helicopters, the ones in the notorious helicopter contract.

On April 23, 1998, the Minister of National Defence announced the purchase of 15 Cormorant search and rescue helicopters from a British-Italian consortium, E.H. Industries. The total value of this contract was $777 million, with $580 million for the aircraft and $197 million for project management, training, parts, integrated logistic support, and a small contingency fund.

Delivery to the Canadian forces should commence in the summer of 2000 and be concluded by the spring of 2002. The financial resources for this program are provided for in the February 1997 federal budget, and they are within the existing financial framework.

Four helicopter manufacturers were competing for this contract. There was E.H. Industries, which manufactures model AW-520 or the Cormorant; Boeing, an American manufacturer offering the Chinook; Eurocopter, which manufactures the Cougar; and Sikorsky, an American company manufacturing the Maplehawk.

Initially the cost of acquiring helicopters was some $593 million. This was reduced to $580 million, because a saving was made by having the helicopters picked up at the manufacturer in Italy, rather than having them delivered to Canada.

E.H. Industries expected providing the Canadian forces with helicopters would mean jobs totalling 5,000 person years for Canadians over the life of the eight year contract.

E.H. Industries also undertook to provide major industrial and regional benefits before the conclusion of the contract. So, it made a commitment to spend a total of $629 million on industrial and regional benefits.

Here again, of the $593 in industrial and regional benefits already distributed—that is what we were told in May 1998—$318 million will go to Quebec companies. The E.H. Industries consortium in Canada includes Bombardier, located in Montreal, Canadian Helicopter Corporation, in St. John's, Newfoundland, and Bristol Aerospace in Winnipeg.

There are other examples of major purchases. I mention here the purchase of 35 helicopters intended this time for maritime patrol. The purchase of these new helicopters has become necessary because it is time to get rid of the thirty or so Sea King helicopters from the 1960s. Every hour of flying time requires an average of 21 hours of maintenance, according to the army. In addition, the army also says that they have to be stripped down almost entirely after every 500 hours' flying time.

The Sea Kings are based on warships. They fight submarines, acting as the eyes and ears of the frigates.

Minister Eggleton, like his predecessor, asked his staff for a study on the possibility of renting helicopters instead of buying them. The acquisition cost of 35 helicopters is estimated at $2 to $3 billion. As for the search and rescue helicopter contract, Eurocopter is in contention for this new contract.

In 1997, this company lost out in the bidding process for 15 maritime search and rescue helicopters. Bitter, it even threatened to sue the government and its competitors. It would have been useful to have a committee of the House compare the bids at the time so that parliamentarians could see them and make absolutely sure that we made the right choice.

Members will recall that, originally, the Department of National Defence had called for 50 aircraft, that is 15 search and rescue helicopters and 35 maritime patrol helicopters. However, in 1993, the Liberals cancelled the EH-101 contract, saying that the contract, which was awarded by the Conservatives, was too expensive. We demanded a lot of explanation at the time but never got the information we wanted.

The cancellation of this contract cost taxpayers a whopping $478.3 million, or almost half a billion dollars.

Today, with regard to the search and rescue capability, the Liberal government would have us believe that it saved money, even taking into account the cost of cancelling the EH-101 contract. Let us wait and see how much this contract for 35 new aircraft will cost taxpayers. Again, in this case, we think that the opportunity to discuss this issue before a standing committee of the House would help shed some light on the real terms of the contract.

I will now deal with the auditor general's report on DND, dated April 1998 . It shows that DND bought military equipment that does not meet the needs of our troops. In other words, the department is badly mismanaging its budget.

Out of six major capital equipment projects worth a total of $3.3 billion, half the projects scrutinized by the auditor general do not meet the pre-established needs of the military. Therefore, 60% of the $3.3 billion worth of capital equipment purchased does not even meet the real needs of the army.

Another example is the Leopard thermal weapon sight. On September 19, 1996, Treasury Board officially approved a project to install a thermal weapon sight on Leopard tanks.

The total estimated cost of the project is $145 million. The results of tactical analyses on how to upgrade the Leopard do not justify the decision to improve only the night vision system. Indeed, the army established that the upgrading of the whole vehicle, including the gun and the armour, was the minimum that would have been acceptable.

According to DND, a detailed analysis of existing options was not carried out for financial reasons. DND decided that purchasing the thermal weapon sight was the only affordable option. However the auditor general found no study showing this option optimized the financial resources of the army.

As part of a 1992 study by the Canadian forces, contracting out was considered. However, they came to the conclusion that no Canadian firm could supply this service and it was therefore preferable to buy the equipment. However the department did not bother calculating the cost of contracting out this service.

Then there was the project to replace the Lynx, the Coyote project.

In 1992, the government announced it was purchasing 299 light armoured reconnaissance vehicles and related support equipment. A contract was signed in March 1993. The total cost approved by Treasury Board was $883,686,000 for the budget year. The vehicles were delivered in March 1996 and January 1998.

The Coyote provides the army with a reconnaissance capability. The tactical concept adopted for the Coyote armoured reconnaissance vehicle was based on various studies, including the simulation study used for the Leopard C1. This study showed that, without the support of a powerful force, a vehicle with armour like the Coyote's could not withstand enemy fire during a battle of average intensity. There again, the vehicle acquired was not suited to the needs of the army.

The study also showed that this type of vehicle could certainly not be used by a multipurpose force. Units using this kind of vehicle should be considered light units with limited means and should perform only limited tasks.

At the time of the audit by the auditor general, Canadian forces were still conducting trials to determine how the Coyotes could best be used. The assistant deputy minister, materiel, and the vice chief of defence staff ordered that Coyotes be bought on the basis of prime necessity. However, no other vehicles had been tested.

These are enough examples to justify the motion.

However, I will deal with the conclusions reached by the auditor general in April 98. He concluded that the Department of Defence relied on simplistic judgments for complex purchases, that it relied very little on equipment use plans in its studies and that the choice of materiel it ends up buying is not based on the results of the studies carried out.

This probably explains why, for 12 maritime coastal defence vessels, the department bought two units of a mechanical minesweeping device that is only effective against specific types of mines. This probably also explains why it did not buy all the necessary equipment that would allow its ships to conduct effective night patrols in poor visibility. In other words, we are well protected, but only during the daytime and when the weather is fine.

For taxpayers in Quebec and Canada, this waste of public money is unacceptable. It is also a major cause for concern, since DND plans to spend close to $6.5 billion over the next five years.

Once again, the federal government is mismanaging our tax dollars, and taxpayers in Quebec and Canada would be well advised to see to this.

We must change the defence department's way of doing things. On February 11, 1999, the auditor general appeared before the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs to provide an update on that department's procurement policy.

On that occasion, the auditor general levelled criticism at the defence department's way of doing things. The department now has a plan of action to reform its procurement process, but that plan is incomplete and it does not go far enough.

For example, the purpose of the pilot project component is to test certain procurement concepts. However, several of these projects will not be completed before September 2000. Moreover, the pilot projects selected are relatively unimportant.

Conversely, in Great Britain, the smart procurement initiative was much for audacious. It led to a broad reform of the procurement proposals process, which could lead to a closer partnership between government and the private sector.

Contrary to what is done here, the British have literally opted for their major procurement items, namely their aircraft carriers, attack submarines and Apache helicopters. Canada could follow the lead of the British in that regard. Meanwhile, the House could make a first step by voting in favour of this motion.

In conclusion, I wish to say that taxpayers in Quebec and Canada can expect, in the months and years to come, to pay colossal amounts of money for these projects.

Therefore, they have a right to expect that their money is being spent wisely on good quality products. For that to happen, we believe that we should avoid past mistakes and change the way the department does things, first by adopting a rule whereby any procurement project valued at more than $100 million will be examined during public hearings by a standing committee of the House.

The purpose is to make the process more transparent and fairer for taxpayers in Quebec and Canada, so that they can get more of their money's worth. Finally, we do not believe that our motion is an end in itself. However, we do think that it is a step in the right direction.

[Supply, April 19th, 1999]

Mr. Speaker, I have a question for the hon. member.

Does he agree that, in our democracy, what the government is suggesting here is that we democrats not use the most powerful tool we have to express our democratic views, namely our right to vote?

The government is saying “You can talk all you want, we will allow that, we will organize debates. We will allow you to talk, but when the time comes to really say what you want to say, you will not be allowed to do it”. A parliamentarian expresses his or her point of view by using his or her vote. What the government is proposing is the opportunity to speak.

Does the hon. member agree that the government is violating our most sacred right, the right to vote?

[Supply, April 19th, 1999]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask the minister two questions.

First of all, he is right when he says that members have had ample opportunity to express their views in the House and that over 130 members have already done so. However, when we have a vote, it is not 137 members out of 301 who express their views. When we have a vote, it is 301 members out of 301 who take part in that vote.

Every soldier in Kosovo can say that his or her member in the House of Commons has supported our involvement or not. Every soldier supports his or her MP and is ready to do the job he or she is asked to do.

My other question is this: can the minister tell us whether or not troops are engaged in a ground operation in Kosovo at the moment?

[Kosovo, April 19th, 1999]

Mr. Speaker, we will have 18 planes taking part in the air strikes in Yugoslavia.

Can the minister tell us whether this is the maximum number of planes Canada can make available to NATO and, if not, how many more operational planes does Canada have to respond to future such requests?

[Kosovo, April 19th, 1999]

Mr. Speaker, we learned on the weekend that Canada would increase its military effort by sending another six F-18s to Kosovo.

Without again raising the issue of the need for our participation, could the Minister of National Defence tell us what our involvement in this conflict has cost to date and what sort of budget the government has set itself for its current operations in Kosovo?