Lost his last election, in 1997, with 36% of the vote.
Exports Of Military Equipment May 30th, 1995
But this was reported in the press yesterday, Mr. Speaker. This study also shows that Canada is the seventh largest supplier of military weapons to third world countries.
My supplementary is for the Minister of National Defence. Are we to understand that this violation of arms trade regulations by the Canadian government is totally in line with its new foreign policy, which puts trade before human rights?
Exports Of Military Equipment May 30th, 1995
Mr. Speaker, my question is for the Minister of National Defence.
A study conducted by Project Ploughshares, a research institute in Waterloo, Ontario, shows that in 1993-94, more than US$200 million in military equipment manufactured in Canada was exported to at least 11 of the 39 countries ravaged by civil war last year, in contravention of the arms exports controls.
How can the Minister of National Defence explain the fact that the government authorized the sale of Canadian-made arms and military equipment to countries like Peru, Turkey and Burma, where human rights are systematically violated?
Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act May 16th, 1995
Mr. Speaker, I am eager to participate in today's debate on Bill C-87, an act to implement the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction.
Today, when they look at the world around them, people in Quebec and Canada are concerned. We are concerned because we do not know what awaits us in the future. We are worried about the nuclear weapons that are still around, about the biological and chemical weapons scattered throughout the world.
By passing this bill, the Canadian government will be among the first 65 countries to ratify the convention on chemical weapons out of the roughly 135-there are perhaps 132 at this time-nations that have signed it. The convention will take effect 180 days after the 65th state to ratify this agreement tables it. Along with my party, the Bloc Quebecois, I wholeheartedly support this convention on chemical weapons, which follows the debate on arms control and disarmament.
The convention on chemical weapons is the result of more than 20 years of negotiations at the conference on disarmament and the forums that preceded it.
For the first time, we have an instrument that really resulted from an actual multilateral negotiation process. The signing parties undertake to refrain from various activities in relation to chemical weapons, to co-operate in a number of ways so as to facilitate the implementation of the convention and to ensure that persons also refrain from those activities and provide the necessary co-operation.
Since the Second World War, the issue of the arms race has come up every time the prospects for enduring peace or the possibility of war is discussed. Most observers felt that the arms race was intrinsically dangerous and ultimately destabilizing. Western countries thus found themselves facing a paradox: on the one hand, they believed that force deters aggression; on the other hand, they were convinced that the arms race alone could provoke a global war.
The latter shook up our certainty that deterrence is the best form of insurance against potential aggression. We could not avoid the disturbing realization that the very measures taken to ensure our security could bring about our downfall and lead to a global conflict.
The debate on arms control is largely based on the preconceived notion that any arms race is, by definition, a chain reaction which tends to trigger an escalation of the conflict. The responses of warring states to the stockpiling of conventional, nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons, as well as the attempts made by each side to gain the upper hand lead to destabilization and greater international tension.
It is claimed that, if there is another world war, it will be by accident, in the sense that it will result from a climate of suspicion and crucial errors of judgment made regarding a regional conflict. This is why it is essential, for international stability, to control the arms race.
However, military experts contend that arms control merely regulates the arms race, instead of limiting it. Many issues remain very timely, even though the cold war is over and these issues are no longer related to an east versus west situation. There is a new phenomenon on the international scene: regional
armed conflicts resulting from the emergence of new nations and the fact that others are trying to increase their influence.
Since most of the objectives of the superpowers' traditional arms control program have now been reached, the international community is turning its attention to measures designed to prevent a wider proliferation of nuclear, bacteriological and chemical weapons. That goal is now part of an effort to face today's geopolitical realities. Indeed, the time has come to carefully reassess existing monitoring mechanisms.
Following a resolution passed by the UN general assembly in December 1993, it was announced, in March of this year, that the delegates at the conference on disarmament had reached a consensus on a proposal to set up a special committee to negotiate a reduction of fissionable material production for nuclear arms. Conference delegates also discussed, among numerous other issues, chemical weapons, in the hope of developing a convention on such weapons.
That was not an easy task, since the participants did not agree on the monitoring procedures. The 1990 U.S.-Soviet bilateral agreements on the sharing of information and the destruction of weapon stockpiles helped further multilateral talks on this issue. In June 1992, the conference on disarmament submitted a draft treaty to prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Monitoring activities were delegated to an international organization responsible for the prohibition of chemical weapons, based in the Netherlands.
The long-awaited treaty on chemical weapons was finally signed in Paris, on January 13, 1993. The signature and the coming into effect of that agreement is undoubtedly an historical event. As I see it, this instrument is important for three major reasons. First of all, it represents a real step forward for international security. Second, it is truly universal in scope, since it reflects a number of fundamental balances. Finally, we should also consider what the situation would be like if it did not exist. The convention is the first multinational disarmament agreement that prohibits an entire class of weapons of mass destruction.
It prohibits producing and also acquiring, stockpiling, transferring, using or engaging in military preparations to use a chemical weapon or assisting anyone to engage in any activities prohibited by the convention. The prohibition on chemicals covers chemical products as such, their vectors and any equipment designed for the use of chemical weapons.
Furthermore, any state party to this convention would be obliged to destroy all chemical weapons within its territory, those it abandoned outside that territory and facilities for the production of chemical weapons. This is very important. It means this is a truly comprehensive prohibition that affects all chemical weapons in the world.
The convention constitutes an effective deterrent to developing clandestine chemical weapons production systems because of its unique inspection system. By setting a common standard and giving the international community the means to enforce its application, the convention provides the impetus for joint action to eradicate weapons of massive destruction.
Furthermore, all countries that have chemical weapons will have to destroy these, with their facilities for the production of chemical weapons, within ten years. Consideration was also given to the technical and financial problems that may arise when a country must destroy its arsenal of chemical weapons.
The convention provides for certain adjustments, including an extension of the ten-year deadline, which would, however, involve stricter monitoring procedures, tantamount to being under the supervision of the international community. The same applies to exceptional cases where facilities for the manufacture of chemical weapons are converted to civilian use.
In the case of chemical weapons abandoned by one state within the territory of another state, the convention obliges each state to destroy the chemical weapons within its territory while at the same time assigning responsibility for destruction to the state that abandoned weapons within the territory of another state.
State parties to this agreement are responsible for meeting their commitments at the national level, but how they meet those commitments is monitored by the international organization. This applies to the destruction of weapons and the facilities to manufacture them.
If the convention had not been adopted, this would have been a signal to those responsible for the proliferation of these weapons to continue the production. The security of all countries would have been at risk, especially countries in the southern hemisphere. The result would have been to reinforce unilateral non-proliferation policies which would have increased barriers to trade and technology transfers while in addition penalizing developing countries that respect their commitments.
The chemical weapons convention serves the interests of all signatory countries and all countries that will sign in the future. Contrary to what was said in some quarters, it is not designed to serve the sole interests of industrialized countries. On the contrary, it is developing countries that will benefit from the convention. Indeed, in the past few years, unfortunately, it has been the developing countries which have used chemical weapons in their conflicts, while industrialized countries have found them of no interest strategically or as a deterrent.
And understandably, come whatever may, industrialized countries will always be better equipped to detect and to protect
against chemical weapons than most developing countries, which do not have ready access to such equipment. We have only to think of what went on in Japan.
Japan is, nonetheless, better equipped to deal with such situations while the same would be more difficult for third world countries, where there would probably be more deaths. In fact, it is the industrialized countries which will take on the better part of the task of industry monitoring by virtue of the fact that their chemical industries are more highly developed.
However because of the extension of the definition of industries considered capable of producing chemical weapons, all countries will be affected by monitoring in one way or another.
Likewise, it is only natural that countries which are willing to be monitored and which respect the commitments made under the convention will feel that the current restrictions imposed under the current non-proliferation agreements are eased up.
It is worth noting that the cost of destroying a chemical weapons factory is ten times that of building it.
Having said this, you will understand our concern with the financial burden that the obligation to destroy chemical weapons will place on certain states lacking the necessary financial means to do so.
The convention's provision that some factories may be temporarily converted into disposal facilities when this is possible and cost-effective, so that they can be considered converted, will not relieve such countries of this problem.
I would like to add in closing that the convention is an historical first, which the conference on disarmament can add to its list of accomplishments.
This convention proves that, when the conditions are favourable, the conference does have the required competence and skill to draft agreements which are as politically sensitive as they are technically complex, and which contribute to the well-being of our respective populations.
The question arises as to the role the Government of Canada intends to play in encouraging its partners to ratify the chemical weapons convention as quickly as possible.
To my mind, Canada must play a strong leadership role in this regard. To date, we have seen no hint of such an intention. If the government wants to act consistently, it should announce a series of initiatives in this regard in the coming weeks. After all, only 28 countries have ratified the convention up to now.
I should perhaps point out that neither the United States nor Russia has signed yet. We realize that it will cost Russia significantly to comply with the convention.
What will the federal government do to help Russia get rid of its chemical weapons stockpiles? In my opinion, Canada should take a creative approach. For example, should the federal government not consider providing technical assistance to Russia, as it has in the past? It could, for example, set up a task force of technical experts.
We know very well that there are competent people in Quebec and in the rest of Canada to do this type of work, whose main thrust would be the evaluation of how Russia, for example, could destroy its manufacturing facilities and its chemical weapons at minimal cost.
Clearly, signatures and ratification mean little. Accordingly, in addition to de facto intentions, the federal government must ensure the organization has the intention and the resources to make the monitoring system a reality.
As you know, both Russia and the United States must participate in this convention, if it is to fulfil its role, since they have the biggest stockpiles of chemical weapons. As I said earlier, neither has yet signed.
We in the Bloc Quebecois believe that our support for this bill will mean that Quebec and Canada will be able to quickly carve a choice niche within the various institutions of this new international organization.
National Defence May 12th, 1995
Mr. Speaker, is it not the government's duty to shed light on this whole issue?
My question is for the Minister of National Defence. Given that the president of Agusta was arrested last week in Italy on charges of corruption, fraud and unethical practices in relation to several government contracts, how can the minister continue to refuse to investigate the circumstances surrounding the Canadian government's EH-101 contract with Agusta at a time when the government is about to pay millions of dollars for breaking its contract with the company?
National Defence May 12th, 1995
Mr. Speaker, my question is for the Minister of National Defence.
This week, the Minister of Public Works categorically refused to break off negotiations with Agusta regarding the settlement to be paid for the cancellation of the EH-101 contract. However, during the investigation in Europe regarding Belgium's EH-101 purchase contract, senior executives at Agusta revealed that the company is in the habit of giving kick-backs to obtain contracts.
In light of these rather troubling developments, how can the minister refuse to investigate the circumstances surrounding the federal government's EH-101 contract with the company? What guarantees can the minister give to the House that the company did not use bribery to get its contract with Canada?
Veterans Review And Appeal Board Act May 8th, 1995
As you know, Madam Speaker, yesterday, almost everywhere in Canada, we were commemorating the end of the Second World War. In my riding of Shefford and in Grandby I had the honour to meet with some of the veterans and whether it was Mr. Benoit, Mr. Lemay, Mr. Brodeur, Mr. Saint-Onge and many others, during the Second World War, they were young and served in the military. Some of them gave five years of their lives to their country.
Today, I am going to give you my point of view on Bill C-67, an Act to establish the Veterans Review and Appeal Board, to amend the Pension Act to make consequential amendments to other Acts and to repeal the Veterans Appeal Board Act.
The immediate result of the restructuring will be the merging of the Canadian Pension Commission and the Veterans Appeal Board. I am particularly concerned with this aspect of the bill which appears quite contentious to me.
Once the bill is passed, applications will be reviewed directly by the minister and his close collaborators, commissioners and officials. The decisions so taken will nevertheless be open for review and appeal in front of the veterans Board.
Consideration of the bill tends to indicate that there might be a loss of acquired rights for veterans, without proof that the recognized problems which led to this reform will be dealt with by this bill.
We can rightly believe that the fundamental argument of the government to justify the proposed changes is to speed up the timeframe for pensions to be awarded. These changes to the decision process are deemed to go directly to the root of the perceived problems.
It is with that in mind that the Secretary of State for Veterans tabled Bill C-67 on December 15. He also tabled an explanatory note which alluded clearly to the overly long delays and the slow processing of applications, and which also criticized the present pension awarding system.
Indeed, according to an analysis done by the government, the main reason for this slow process is the fact that the structures and agencies awarding the pensions are widely scattered.
The Bureau of Pensions Advocates and the Canadian Pension Commission are being blamed. In order to resolve the problem of the delays incurred in awarding pensions, the government proposes to abolish the Canadian Pension Commission, transfer its responsibilities to the minister and his officials, transfer its resources to a new appeal board, and integrate the Bureau of Pensions Advocates into the Department of Veterans Affairs. All this would come under the department's control.
The bureau will no longer serve veterans, except when an appeal is filed. According to the deputy minister, these measures should reduce the average delay following the first pension application from 18 to 9 months. As you know, those currently applying are often 70 or 75 years old. It is therefore necessary to reduce delays, and we agree with that.
Most of the groups concerned agree that current delays are too long and should be reduced. However, as pointed out in the Marshall report, the figures now available in this regard are in dispute.
The red tape involved in processing applications was noted for the first time in the 1986 report of the Auditor General of Canada, Chapter 13, Section 13.98 and the following sections. So this problem is nothing new. It was known even in 1986.
As you can see, this delay problem did not surface yesterday. Beyond the award system as such, moving the headquarters from Ottawa to Charlottetown in 1983-84 was clearly identified as a major reason for longer processing delays.
This observation does not take anything away from Charlottetown employees, who, in my opinion, do their best to meet demand; rather, it is aimed at the system in which they operate. For example, why are fully qualified district physicians required to submit case assessments to the approval of head office physicians who are no more qualified than they are?
The central authorities' compulsive need to control everything is in a way the main obstacle leading to excessive delays in the award process. So, what undermines the present system is not the various authorities with different mandates but rather the duplication of certain phases of verification, validation and
consistency between authorities. Would it not be better to decentralize the entire decision-making process to improve access to services?
In spite of everything, the federal government is considering shortening the waiting period for pensions by eliminating the Canadian Pension Commission, transferring all of its responsibilities to the department, assigning its personnel to a new board and making the Bureau of Pensions Advocates a part of the department.
I wonder about the appropriateness of these measures which, as far as I can see, come with no guarantee of producing savings within the given time frame, while the right to be represented in the first instance is certainly being removed. The Canadian Pension Commission is an independent decision making agency. Delays directly related to this activity generally do not exceed 20 days.
Abolishing the Canadian Pension Commission is not, in my opinion, a valid way of reducing delays significantly. I cannot understand, under the circumstances, how the department can come to the conclusion that this measure will reduce the current waiting period by four months.
As for the Bureau of Pensions Advocates, it loses its status as an independent agency, becoming a part of the department. Moreover, it will no longer provide assistance to veterans filing their first application.
The issue of conflict of interest and independence concerning this Bureau was examined extensively in the late 1960s and this actually led to the Bureau being detached from the department in 1971.
Incidentally, providing this kind of assistance from the beginning ensures that applicants have support every step of the way. At present, nearly half of all first applications are approved without any further need for review. How will the approval rate be affected if there is no more legal support for applications and no independent and impartial commission?
I seriously doubt that the proposals contained in this bill will bring about any reduction in the processing time. The government's solution, in my opinion, overlooks such basic objectives as the independence of a body, as well as the decentralization of power and decision-making. The legislation should have focused more on regrouping the eligibility and evaluation steps, to speed up the process leading to a pension being awarded. As well, entirely favourable decisions should only need to go through one stage.
Most applicants are older people who need an answer quickly. As I said before, I met some extraordinary people in my riding, people who have a sense of honour, people who gave three, four or five years of their lives. Some were imprisoned; some were injured. These people need an answer quickly. This is not a question of bureaucratic reorganization, exclusion of services, or reduced assistance. The purpose is to ensure the efficiency of a process which is based on favourable consideration of veterans.
We must not merely say once every 50 years that we love our veterans. We must table legislation designed to help them. These people need our support, and we must do everything we can to provide them with quality service. In my opinion, subjecting initial decisions to ministerial authority is a step backward. It is worrisome to say the least. There will be much more control.
I truly hope that veterans will enjoy speedier processing of their applications, through measures which are based on fairness, transparency and equity.
Madam Speaker, you can rest assured that the Bloc Quebecois takes its role seriously, and that it will closely monitor the government's reform. Our only concern is to ensure that veterans are satisfied with the services provided to them.
Workers's Rights May 1st, 1995
Mr. Speaker, I attended a celebration marking International Workers Day yesterday, in Granby. A representative of the former workers of the Simonds plant reminded me of our collective responsibility to defend workers' rights.
Simonds, a Granby tool manufacturing company which has now closed down, took over its employees' pension plan. Since 1988, Simonds' ex-employees have been pleading in court to recover the surplus from their pension plan. Last week, the company decided to challenge the unanimous Appeal Court decision to distribute the surplus among the workers.
It is time to expose this kind of fraud. We have a duty to let companies know that they have to fulfil their moral and legal responsibilities towards their employees.
National Defence April 26th, 1995
Mr. Speaker, what we do know about the frigate program is that it will come in at $2 billion over budget, not $1 billion under, like the minister said.
Since senior officials of the Department of National Defence recognize that the Canadian Forces can still buy all the equipment they need in spite of budget cuts, will the minister admit that his department's capital budget has been overestimated, that more drastic cuts should have been made and that no submarines should be purchased, as specified in the Bloc Quebecois's dissenting report?
National Defence April 26th, 1995
Mr. Speaker, my question is for the Minister of National Defence.
In his 1994 report, the auditor general gives numerous examples of mismanagement resulting, among other things, from DND's inability to assess the cost of its operations. More recently, we learned that the cost of the frigates was underestimated by nearly $2 billion, with two of the twelve frigates yet to be delivered.
How can the minister maintain that the projected savings announced in the 1995 budget will be achieved, when the Auditor General's figures show that the department keeps miscalculating its expenditures?
National Defence April 25th, 1995
Mr. Speaker, you will agree with me that as long as Quebec remains part of Canada, it is entitled to its fair share.
Are we to understand that the minister is perfectly content with this custom of penalizing Quebec both in terms of representation at senior military levels and in terms of military spending and does he recognize that it would have been fairer to Quebec not to close the Royal Military College in Saint-Jean?