Gordon Kirkby

[Canadian Human Rights Act, May 9th, 1996]

Mr. Speaker, I have a quote here from the hon. member for Lisgar-Marquette, who said: "If we want to look at what homosexuality and permissiveness have done to some countries, let us look at Africa and the problems it has run into. Let us look at Liberia right now. Do we want that type of system? I do not". This is implying, of course, that homosexuality will lead to civil war.

In addition to that, a Reform member from British Columbia at a public meeting indicated earlier this week when a series of intolerant statements were made, he asked what was the dividing line between China and India and named the Fraser River as the answer.

I wonder if leader of the Reform Party could tell us if he agrees with these statements. If not, will he tell these members what to do.

[Canadian Human Rights Act, May 9th, 1996]

Madam Speaker, I am pleased today to speak on third reading of Bill C-33, an act to amend the Canadian Human Rights Act.

With this amendment we will fulfil a political commitment to the people of Canada and implement a long standing policy of the Liberal Party of Canada. This amendment will bring the Canadian Human Rights Act up to date with court decisions, with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and with the human rights legislation of the majority of the provinces which already have such legislation in place. It will give effect to the fundamental principle and value in Canadian society that individuals should be treated fairly.

The commitment is clear. The Prime Minister said during the last election campaign this amendment would be introduced. In the 1994 throne speech the government promised amendments to the Canadian Human Rights Act. Since then the Minister of Justice has repeated the commitment.

The position of the Liberal Party of Canada is clear and has been so for a long time. The amendment has been the policy of the Liberal Party for nearly 20 years.

Nearly 20 years ago, the Liberal Party passed a resolution in support of offering protection against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.

Further resolutions to this effect have been passed, most recently two weeks ago at the Liberal Party meeting in Windsor, Ontario. In 1985 an all-party House of Commons committee unanimously passed a resolution that this amendment should be made.

The position of the Liberal Party of Canada has for many years been to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Having formed the government we are following through on the commitment.

Now I would like to talk about Bill C-33, its purpose and its effect. It is important to look at this carefully and objectively so that we clearly understand what the bill does and what the bill does not do. I have listened to the debate on the bill and I want to address the misconceptions and misperceptions that may exist about it.

Let us talk about the scope of the Canadian Human Rights Act. I think this has sometimes been lost in the debate so far. It is important to remember the real scope of the Canadian Human Rights Act.

First, the act applies only to employment and the provision of goods and services coming under federal jurisdiction.

This includes the federal government and federally regulated employers such as banks, railway companies, air transportation and telecommunications common carriers.

Second, this means that only about 10 per cent of the Canadian workforce is covered by the Canadian Human Rights Act. The rest of the workforce is covered by provincial and territorial human rights codes. The vast majority of employers and service providers come under provincial jurisdiction. Religious, cultural and educational institutions come under provincial jurisdiction and therefore are subject to the provincial codes, not the federal codes.

The scope of the Canadian Human Rights Act and this bill is limited to what I have heard said about it. This brings me to another very important point. This amendment is hardly revolutionary and hardly new, not only in respect of the Canadian Human Rights Act but in respect of all those areas to which, as I have said, the Canadian Human Rights Act does not apply but provincial laws and the charter of rights and freedoms do apply.

Sexual orientation is already in the majority of human rights laws by court order or by legislative action. Eight provinces or territories with 90 per cent of the population in Canada have already added sexual orientation to their human rights legislation, that is, to prohibit discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation within the provincial legislation: Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba, Yukon, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, British Columbia, and my own province of Saskatchewan. Some of these provinces implemented this legislation as long as 20 years ago.

The Supreme Court of Canada has held that section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, part of the Constitution and thus part of the supreme law of the land, prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.

The Ontario Court of Appeal ordered in 1992 in the case of Haig v. Canada that the Canadian Human Rights Act should be treated as though sexual orientation were already a prohibited ground of discrimination. Since that ruling, cases have been dealt with in legal fora under the act regardless of this amendment.

This amendment merely confirms what has already been put in place by the courts. The amendment in Bill C-33 will bring the Canadian Human Rights Act into conformity with these court rulings and with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

It is time for parliamentarians to act on this. Canadians should not have to turn in cases such as this where we are dealing with discrimination or protection against discrimination to find out what the law is. The law should be plain on its face and there for everybody to see.

The law is composed of statutes, court decisions and common law. When a court decision has the effect of changing or modifying a statute, it is important that the court decision changes the statute in a manner which reflects or deals with the court decision so the law is plain on the face of it.

Courts have made these types of decisions for many many years, even before the charter of rights and freedoms came into effect. Legislatures and Parliaments across this land since then have dealt

with legislation that has been altered or modified by court decisions to make the legislation more clear.

It is the responsibility of Parliament to articulate and codify principles of equality. This should not be left to the courts. I have listened to some people suggest that we have not had time enough to debate this issue, which is not so. This issue has been around for 20 years. It has been discussed and debated. Parliament has addressed this issue many times.

There have been many private members' bills. There was legislation introduced by the previous government. There has been an all-party report by a parliamentary committee which held hearings across Canada. The Supreme Court of Canada has addressed the issue. The government has received countless letters and submissions. The elected legislatures of eight jurisdictions in Canada with almost 90 per cent of the population have voted to enact such amendments.

Much has been said on this issue and much time has been taken already. The issues are clear and now it is time to make a decision. I know there are strong feelings and beliefs on this issue which I respect. As a matter of fairness and justice we have to address this issue. It is an issue of how we treat people in the workplace and in the marketplace. We have tried to explain this.

I will take the opportunity to talk about what this amendment does and does not do. This amendment will prevent basic forms of discrimination. It is to prevent what we all agree is unjust: firing someone from a job because they are gay or lesbian; denying someone service at a bank because they are gay or lesbian. This is a matter of simple fairness. Canadians do not think it is fair to fire someone from a job or refuse them service only because they are gay or lesbian.

I have heard it suggested that this bill provides special rights. Nothing could be further from the truth. Bill C-33 will not give special rights to anyone. If an individual is discriminated against on the basis of colour, whether black or white, they are protected by human rights legislation. If an individual is discriminated against on the ground of religion, be they Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, Muslim or some other religion, they are protected by human rights legislation. Similarly, if an individual is discriminated against on the basis of sexual orientation, be they heterosexual or homosexual, human rights legislation offers protection.

Protection against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation at the federal level means that a person who has been fired by an air carrier or a railway company or was denied service by a bank is offered a remedy under human rights legislation.

Human rights laws are intended to ensure that individuals can be hired and employed and services provided to them on the same basis as everyone else, not to be fired or refused a service merely because of their colour, religion, sex or sexual orientation. This is not special treatment; it is the very opposite. It is intended to stop employers or service businesses from singling out homosexuals, blacks or religious minorities and instead treat them the same as everyone else. This is not special rights. It is equal treatment.

The law will protect heterosexuals as well as homosexuals. But it is clear that it will protect those who need the protection the most, that part of our society that has been subject to historical disadvantages and stereotyping, to discrimination and worse. The evidence is clear. Gay bashing, discrimination within the workplace, discrimination in obtaining goods and services: tribunals and courts are replete with such examples of discrimination and we must move to remedy that situation.

The Parliamentary committee that looked at this issue wrote as follows:

We were shocked by a number of the experiences of unfair treatment related to us by homosexuals in different parts of the country. We heard about the harassment of and violence committed against homosexuals. We were told in graphic detail about physical abuse and psychological oppression suffered by homosexuals.

The amendments will reinforce the message that Canadians do not tolerate prejudice and discrimination. We will not permit our colleagues, our friends, our relatives, our sons or daughters, our fellow citizens to suffer simply because of their sexual orientation.

What is the impact on the family, on marriage, on other societal institutions? The bill will not detract from marriage and family. Marriage, whether it is solemnized according to provincial laws or is common law, and the family are fundamental parts of our society. Nothing is going to change that. In our laws, our policies, our practices, we will continue to provide support to these institutions. That will not change now or ever.

The preamble of Bill C-33 makes this abundantly clear. It recognizes the family as the foundation of Canadian society. It also affirms that the amendment will not alter the fundamental role of family in our society.

As mentioned above, the Canadian Human Rights Act deals with discrimination in employment and the provision of goods and services. It is not broader than that; it is not more than that. I will repeat it again because this has been the source of some misunderstanding. The Canadian Human Rights Act and the amendment we are dealing with deals with discrimination in employment and the provision of goods and services only. The purpose of the preamble

is to keep the focus on this and to make it clear that the amendment will not detract from the importance of the family.

What about marriage? This amendment cannot change marriage because the Canadian Human Rights Act has absolutely no application to marriage. The act applies to employment and the provision of goods and services. Maxwell Yalden, chief commissioner of the Canadian Human Rights Commission, said last month before the Senate committee studying Bill S-2: "We are not talking about who is married and who is not married. That is none of the business of our commission".

That is right. The Canadian Human Rights Act simply does not apply to marriage. The common law has always provided that marriage is the union of a man and a woman. The common law has equal force with the statute law.

When this law was challenged under section 15 of the charter, protection against the discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, the court held: "The common law limitation of marriage to persons of the opposite sex does not constitute discrimination". This is the law across Canada.

The inclusion of sexual orientation in the charger and in the majority of provincial human rights statutes has not changed this. As I said, the Canadian Human Rights Act and this bill cannot change this because they, without a doubt, have no application to the laws on marriage.

I have also heard people worry about the grounds of family status in the act. In 1993 the Supreme Court of Canada decided in the Mossop case that family status does not include same sex relationships. That was the decision of the court then and it remains the law today.

While some have expressed concern about the court revisiting this, the concern has been resolved. In the Egan and Nesbit case last year the Supreme Court of Canada made it clear that issues about benefits in respect of same sex relationships will be dealt with as a matter of sexual orientation. This is now in the law by court order.

The grounds of family status and marital status were not involved. It is clear there is simply no need for the courts to reopen the definition of family status or for a definition of marital status to be legislated.

I have also heard suggested that the bill affects adoption. This is plainly and clearly wrong. This is a simple matter of the constitutional division of powers between the federal government and the provinces. Adoption is a matter of provincial jurisdiction. This law covers only matters coming within federal jurisdiction. This amendment does not, cannot and will not affect adoption.

I have been asked about the question of benefits for same sex partners. Let us be clear that this amendment makes a simple change to the Canadian Human Rights Act. It does not change the law on benefits. Whatever we do here, the issue of benefits is already before the tribunals and courts. Whether we make this amendment or not is not relevant.

The tribunals and courts are already dealing with the benefits question. This amendment will not change that. It will not change the law. Moreover, in the Egan case last year the Supreme Court of Canada held unanimously that sexual orientation is a prohibited ground of discrimination under the equality provision, section 15 of the charter. The court also held that such discrimination did not support the extension to same sex partners of the pension benefits, the issue in that case.

As I mentioned earlier, eight of the provinces and territories prohibit discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. Although the prohibitions have been around for some time, these provisions have not led to the automatic extension of benefits to same sex partners.

Sexual orientation has been in provincial human rights statutes going back as far as 1977. It has also been included by the courts in section 15, the equality right guarantee, of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

As a result there have been a considerable number of cases in which tribunals and courts have looked at discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. They have interpreted it to mean homosexuality, heterosexuality and bisexuality. The courts and tribunals are clear on this. There is a clear understanding of this. The definition is clear.

Further, the seven provinces which have added sexual orientation to their human rights legislation have not defined it. Even the Supreme Court of Canada, which considered sexual orientation under the charter in the Egan and Nesbit case last year, saw no need to define the term.

It is clear this law protects lawful conduct, nothing else and nothing more.

Any currently prohibited behaviour will remain unlawful under the Criminal Code and be afforded no protection through this amendment.

To remove any doubt, the preamble of the bill provides that the law applies only in respect of lawful conduct.

I have heard it suggested that it would be better to drop the list of grounds from the Canadian Human Rights Act rather than add sexual orientation. Again, I am not certain if I understand the point. If we drop the list of grounds, what would it be replaced with? How would we protect against discrimination on the basis of

race, religion, sex and sexual orientation? How would we know what forms of discrimination are prohibited and which are not? I simply do not understand what this would accomplish. Either we protect against discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, sexual orientation and the other listed grounds or we do not.

In my view it is mischievous to suggest dropping the list. I believe ultimately the suggestion is meaningless. It is simply designed to stir up controversy, trouble and confusion. It is intended to avoid the real issue.

If we are to protect against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation the amendments in the bill will do that. There is no other way.

I have tried to address the questions I have heard, the fears and the misconceptions. When we look at this amendment issue by issue, point by point, we can develop a better appreciation of what the bill does and what it does not do. We develop a better appreciation of what the amendment is all about. It is about human rights. It is simply a matter of justice and fairness.

It is a matter of justice and fairness.

Today's debate comes down to a basic question. Do we think it is right to discriminate against gays or lesbians, to fire them from their jobs or refuse them service because of their sexual orientation? We believe the answer is no. The answer flows from the Canadian tradition of tolerance and fairness.

This is a proud tradition.

These are values we all hold close.

These values are fundamental to our identity as Canadians.

After having reflected on this thoughtfully and carefully I think the way is clear. I believe the bill deserves the support of the House of Commons.

[Canadian Human Rights Act, May 7th, 1996]

Madam Speaker, I am speaking on Motions Nos. 1, 9 to 15 and 18.

I am not certain that I understand the purpose of Motion No. 1. Motion No. 1 is a suggestion that we replace the words "all individuals" with "every individual" as they occur in the preamble to the legislation.

The purpose of the changes in Bill C-33 were proposed by the drafters in the legislation section at the Department of Justice. They do not have anything to do with the sexual orientation amendments. The drafters were simply trying to follow the usual practice that when a section in a statute is changed they will also try to modernize the language.

The modernization of the language has no legal effect, that is, it has no effect to alter the statute as it appeared. It is also necessary to make the English version of the statute equivalent to the French version which has contained the modern language for a period of time. What is being proposed by this amendment simply goes against modernization of the language. Modernization of the language is important when considering legislation, in essence to tidy it up.

Motion No. 9 states in part that nothing in sections 2 or 3 shall be construed so as to render any provision of the Criminal Code inoperative or of no force or effect. I have read this clause very carefully. However, I do not understand its purpose.

Any lawyer will say that Bill C-33 and the Canadian Human Rights Act have nothing to do with the Criminal Code. They do not affect the Criminal Code. They have no jurisdiction over the Criminal Code. I can only conclude this motion stems from a lack of understanding of the legislation in question. I would have hoped that by now a parliamentarian would have a better appreciation of federal legislation and the way it operates.

The Canadian Human Rights Act and Bill C-33 only apply to, only affect, only regulate two main things: employment and the provision of goods and services. The Criminal Code has absolutely nothing to do with this subject matter.

Perhaps hon. members have confused the Canadian Human Rights Act with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The charter is a part of the Constitution. As the supreme law of the land, the Constitution has primacy over all other laws, federal, provincial or municipal, and this includes the Criminal Code. However, we are not dealing here with the charter. We are simply talking about the Canadian Human Rights Act which has no application to the Criminal Code.

Finally, the preamble makes it clear that Bill C-33 protects lawful conduct only. Any behaviour that was illegal before remains illegal now. It is not protected by the Canadian Human Rights Act.

While I have tried to understand the purpose of Motion No. 10, I I do not know why an amendment like this is necessary. The Canadian Human Rights Act applies to a relatively small percentage of employers and service providers coming within federal jurisdiction, that is the federal government and federally regulated businesses such as banks, airlines, railways and telecommunications companies.

The Canadian Human Rights Act and the amendment in Bill C-33 do not apply to churches or religious organizations. These come under provincial human rights acts and are not affected by the amendments being brought forward. The change proposed in this amendment is not necessary. If I could put it bluntly, it would be of no force or effect, it would be a useless amendment.

Churches and religious organizations are regulated by provincial human rights laws. The federal act is the wrong place for these amendments. This is something for the provinces to address in their legislation. They are completely unaffected by Bill C-33 which can only change human rights legislation within federal jurisdiction, namely the Canadian Human Rights Act.

If the Canadian Human Rights Act were applicable to churches and religious organizations, which it is not, an employer may still refuse to hire on reasonable and justifiable grounds in the circumstances. For example, the Supreme Court of Canada has held that it is reasonable and justifiable for a Catholic school to require that the religious views of its instructors conform with the views of the

church. Churches and religious organizations may rely on this to justify conformity with the tenets of their religions.

With respect to Motion No. 11, no changes to the definitions of marriage, family and spouse are planned or necessary as a result of this amendment. Bill C-33 does not change the law. Sexual orientation is already in the law. The charter and the Canadian Human Rights Act by court order have already done this. This amendment would only make express in the Canadian Human Rights Act what is already there.

The issue of same sex benefits and other issues are already before the courts and tribunals. Whether or not this amendment is made, those cases will be decided and the relevant statutes considered as the courts and tribunals see fit.

Motion No. 12 proposes an amendment that states in part that sexual orientation "shall not be construed so as to affect the freedom of religion, expression or association as guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms". This amendment is also unnecessary. Freedom of religion, expression and association are in the charter.

The charter is part of the Constitution of Canada. The Constitution is the supreme law of the land. It overrides all other laws, whether federal or provincial. It has supremacy over the Canadian Human Rights Act. Therefore, nothing that could be done in the Canadian Human Rights Act could take primacy over the charter or affect the freedoms of religion, expression or association as guaranteed by the charter. This motion is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the law of the country. Freedom of religion, expression and association are guaranteed by the charter and cannot be taken away by Bill C-33 or any other law. The amendment proposed would add nothing to the law and is therefore not necessary.

It is important to remember also that the Canadian Human Rights Act applies to the employment and the provision of goods and services at the federal level. Therefore, the scope of this amendment is very narrow. It does not apply to churches or religious institutions. There is no way in which Bill C-33 is going to affect freedom of religion or expression.

Motion No. 15 would add a clause stating that nothing in sections 2 or 3 shall be construed so as to authorize the marriage of persons of the same sex. The Canadian Human Rights Act and consequently Bill C-33 have absolutely no application to marriage. The act applies to employment and the provision of goods and services only. The primacy of the act is over statutes on employment or which provide goods and services. While the federal government can make laws concerning the capacity to marry, such laws do not fall into the areas of employment or goods and services.

As Maxwell Yalden, Chief Commissioner of the Canadian Human Rights Commission, said last month before the Senate committee studying Bill S-2: "We are not talking about who is married and who is not married. That is none of the business of our commission". That is correct. The Canadian Human Rights Act simply does not apply to marriage.

The common law has always provided that a marriage is a union of a man and a woman. The common law has equal force with the statute law. The common law on marriage could only be changed by specific federal legislation on marriage. As noted earlier, the Canadian Human Rights Act applies to employment and the provision of goods and services and cannot affect laws on marriage.

In 1993, in the Layland and Beaulne v. Ontario case, the plaintiff challenged the common law requirement that marriage is a union between a man and a women under section 15 of the charter against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The charter, as part of the Constitution, does have primacy over all other laws. This is what the majority of the court stated: "The common law limitation of marriage to persons of the opposite sex does not constitute discrimination against the applicants, contrary to section 15 of the charter". This is the law and it is the law right across Canada.

There is only one answer to Motion No. 18. Bill C-33 does not add and cannot have the effect of adding sexual orientation to the existing affirmative action provision, section 16, of the Canadian Human Rights Act. The argument that it is included by implication is wrong. Section 16 stands by itself with its own list of grounds. If the intent were to provide for affirmative action on the basis of sexual orientation, section 16 would have to be amended.

Bill C-33 adds sexual orientation to sections 2 and 3 of the act, not section 16. The list of grounds in section 16 remains unchanged.

The government will be voting against all the amendments contained in Group No. 1.

[Criminal Code, May 6th, 1996]

Mr. Speaker, I am delighted to participate in the debate today on Bill C-203, introduced by the hon. member for Hochelaga-Maisonneuve.

The bill proposes amendments to the Criminal Code in an effort to deal with criminal organizations. More specifically, the bill would create a new part in the code. A new offence of living in whole or in part off the proceeds of crime from a criminal organization would be established. This offence would be punishable by up to 10 years imprisonment. The bill would also establish two presumptions in respect of persons who could be members of a criminal organization.

The bill borrows extensively from the provisions of part XXII.2 the Criminal Code which deals with the proceeds of crime and modifies them for application to property from criminal organizations.

The bill would also impose on the courts an obligation to order that a person convicted of an offence serve three quarters of any term of imprisonment handed down in respect of this conviction.

The bill recognizes there may be significant charter problems with some of its provisions, specifically subsection 33(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and states the provisions of the bill operate notwithstanding certain rights and freedoms guaranteed under the charter.

The problems of organized crime are difficult and complex. It has been suggested by some that our Criminal Code does not provide law enforcement agencies the tools needed to fight organized crime. According to some, our relative lack of successful investigations and prosecutions of organized crime figures is considered to be evidence that our laws are insufficient. It follows according to that logic that our laws must be changed. Given the breadth of some of the proposed solutions, it is incumbent on those who advance these proposals to satisfy a number of concerns.

I will take the next few minutes to review and comment on the manner in which this question was approached in the United States and more specifically deal with an American statute which is frequently mentioned as a possible model for Canada. I refer of course to the racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations law, or the RICO law as it is called.

The racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations provisions of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 represent the attempt of the United States Congress to control the growth of organized crime in America.

In response to the report of the President's commission on law enforcement and the administration of justice, the Katzenbach commission, Congress adopted what became title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. In passing the RICO statute Congress put in place the statutory machinery it hoped would expel the cancer of organized crime from American society. In doing so, Congress focused on the criminal infiltration of legitimate enterprises relying on the existing legal apparati to respond to other criminal issues such as gambling and prostitution. To excise the cancer of enterprise infiltration Congress proposed to confront organized crime by direct attack, by forcible removal and by prevention of return.

The essential drafting difficulty was finding a constitutional method of defining organized crime. A deliberate choice was made not to explicitly outlaw membership in organized criminal groups such as the Mafia because of the recognized constitutional concerns of making status, that is, membership in an organization, a crime, and of defining what constituted an organized criminal syndicate. Rather, in an attempt to ensure the constitutionality of the statute, Congress made its central proscription the use of a pattern of racketeering activities in connection with an enterprise.

Unable to define what were organized criminal syndicates and then outlaw membership in them, Congress turned to an operational definition of organized crime and tried to get at the criminal organization through its activity. Thus RICO pursues a broadly

defined category of criminal activity, not the mere membership in an organization that can only be broadly defined if the definition is to be in any way helpful. RICO prohibits activities not membership.

Early versions of the statute applied to anyone who invested deliberately unreported income, regardless of the source of the income or the criminal status of the investor. As finally enacted however RICO is not limited to any statutorily defined member of the Mafia. At that time the novelty of RICO was not the criminal fine or the imprisonment provision but the section providing for criminal forfeiture to the United States government any illicit interest in or profit gained from a criminally infiltrated enterprise.

The stated purpose of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 under which RICO is subsumed is to seek the eradication of organized crime by establishing new penal prohibitions and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies. To implement this general purpose, Congress fashioned an elaborate statutory scheme proscribing a variety of racketeering activities.

The first section of the RICO provisions provides a definition of terms. In particular, the definition of racketeering activity marks a significant departure from typical criminal statutes because it includes activities traditionally considered criminal, such as murder, narcotics dealing and gambling, as well as acts such as extortion, mail and wire fraud and securities fraud. Any of the offences listed in this definition may serve as predicate acts to a criminal RICO charge.

In a similarly broad manner, a pattern of racketeering activity is defined as at least two acts of racketeering activity, the last of which occurred within 10 years, excluding any period of imprisonment after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity.

The second section of RICO lists the crimes which result from engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity. Section 1962(a) outlaws the acquisition of an interest in a legitimate business through the investment of money obtained from racketeering activity. Section 1962(b) prohibits the acquisition of a legitimate business through racketeering acts. Section 1962(c), the most widely used provision, outlaws the operation of an enterprise through the use of racketeering activity. Section 1962(d) prohibits the conspiracy to commit any act in the first three parts of section 1962.

Rico prohibits among other things the installation of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. These words have made Justice Scalia of the United States Supreme Court state in a 1989 decision:

That the highest court in the land has been unable to derive from this statute anything more than today's meagre guidance bodes ill for the day when a constitutional challenge is presented.

Those familiar with the history of Rico will know that it is aimed at stopping the infiltration of racketeers into legitimate organizations. Canada chose to pass its proceeds of crime legislation to effect the same result, that is, taking the profit out of crime.

Those familiar with its operation will know that the state must prove at least two predicate acts that constitute a pattern of racketeering activity, those predicate acts being for all intents and purposes other codified offences before the remedies provided by Rico can kick in.

[Criminal Code, May 6th, 1996]

Mr. Speaker, on a point of order. I did indicate no on the motion put forward by the House where you indicated you did not hear a negative response.

[Equality In The Workplace, May 2nd, 1996]

Thank you, Madam Speaker. With respect to the motion before the House, the bill is not in order. I suggest we not support this piece of legislation. I think it is within all our hearts and desires to ensure that all people in this society have opportunity.

This is not about special opportunity, this is about equal opportunity for all Canadians. We must ensure we use the types of measures which will fix the historical problems of the past. We must ensure that some time down the road in our future we can all have opportunities to succeed in the jobs of our choice. We must be willing as a society to take measures to protect all individuals, whether because of race, ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age, mental or physical ability. We must allow all of these people opportunities in society.

Words are very important. Words can hurt or words can heal. It is time all members of this honourable House realized the import and the power of words. Let all we say and all we do bring dignity, respect and honour to all Canadians and to our shared values of tolerance, working together and justice.

[Equality In The Workplace, May 2nd, 1996]

After the apologies were made yet another Reform member, the member for Athabasca, on a radio program in his riding said he thought minorities should be discriminated against. A number of other Reformers were quoted as agreeing with the position of the hon. member.

We have heard concerns expressed not by this side of the House but by members of that party about the extremism that exists within that party. It is not us. Their very own people are worried about it. These people were caned into submission in a caucus meeting. How is that for free speech? How is that for allowing everybody to express how they feel?

It is little wonder the hon. member suggests there is not a single example of racism that has been brought forward to him so that he could fix. Everybody who would be subject to racist activities knows he would not be the one to fix it.

We talk about a bill before the House that has brought an amendment to the charter of rights and freedoms to outlaw affirmative action, something that would make it so that we could not have affirmative action and programs to fix an alleviate the conditions of people who are less advantaged.

We just get finished celebrating the 50th anniversary of the end of a terrible period in our history. How did that period start? It started with talk. It started with the systematic marginalization of minorities, the people the majority thought did not matter. It went through action. We all know where it ended. Let us remember history. Fifty years is not a long time. Fifty years is not long enough in the evolution of humanity to think these kinds of things could never happen again.

That is why we must all be vigilant and persistent and continue our efforts to ensure equality within this great nation, to see that all citizens, regardless of race, regardless of colour, regardless of religion, are free to enjoy this country. We can all work together to build a better society in which people will be free from the types of comments and actions we have been witness to this week.

[Equality In The Workplace, May 2nd, 1996]

Madam Speaker, I have a speech but I do not think I will be using it to any great extent. I would prefer to answer the comments put forward in such a callous and outrageous fashion by the member across.

He is blaming the government that the motion is non-votable. That decision is not made by the government. It is made by an all-party committee which agrees through consensus which motions are votable. If members of his own party do not agree it is worth our time, I do not suppose we should either.

I was in the House the other day and I witnessed the hurt and the pain expressed by the member for Etobicoke-Lakeshore at the remarks made by the member for Nanaimo-Cowichan, remarks that were all over the newspapers.

Her feelings matter. Her feelings are important. She has worked hard all her life in the face of discrimination, in the face of adversity, to build her community, to bring tolerance to society and to show all Canadians we all have a place in this country regardless of our race, regardless of our religion, regardless of the colour of our skin.

To have this lifetime of work shamelessly put down, shamelessly put to the side by the callous remarks of the member for Nanaimo-Cowichan is not acceptable. Her conduct in the circumstances was quite reasonable in comparison to members of the Reform Party.

The deputy leader and the leader would not condemn the actions of the member for Nanaimo-Cowichan but glibly sat by, saying it is all right, it does not really matter, it is not important. They say he really did not feel that way. He did feel that way. On December 14, 1994 he made the same comments in a Nanaimo paper. That is twice. He does feel that way. It does hurt the hon. member.

After that, after the apologizes were made-

[Criminal Code, May 1st, 1996]

Madam Speaker, Bill C-217 seeks to extend certain protections in the Criminal Code currently provided to young witnesses under the age of 14 in prosecutions for sexual offences and offences involving violence. The bill would extend these protections to all witnesses.

I applaud the member's intentions in proposing these amendments to the Criminal Code. The criminal justice depends on victims and witnesses to report crimes and co-operate to the fullest extent possible, including participating as witnesses at preliminary inquiries and trials. The criminal justice should therefore facilitate a witness's participation. Participating as a witness should not turn out to be more traumatic than the crime itself.

Over the past 10 years many improvements have been made to ensure that victims and witnesses can provide their testimony without fear of intimidation. While Bill C-217 would build on these improvements, we would be cautious in supporting the amendments without a very careful examination of their implications and without consideration of the background of the current provisions.

I am well aware of a recent sexual assault trial in Montreal where the accused represented himself and subjected the victims to hours of cross-examination. This case has naturally outraged victim advocates and the public. If those victims had been under 14 years the Criminal Code would have permitted the judge to appoint a lawyer to act for the accused and conduct the cross-examination. The victims would not have had to be personally questioned by their attacker.

The member's proposed bill would respond to that case by extending these procedures to all witnesses. My concern is that the amendments may be too broad and too far reaching and may not in the current form be necessary.

The Criminal Code already includes several protections to ensure that young victims and witnesses are able to provide necessary testimony. In addition there are several provisions to facilitate the participation of sexual assault victims whether young or adult. While these recent reforms to the law are designed to assist victims and witnesses, we cannot ignore the fact that people have an obligation and a duty to report crime and provide relevant information and evidence. In some cases it will not be a pleasant experience.

In the case of young victims and witnesses there is a requirement in the Canada Evidence Act that the judge must conduct an inquiry to determine if a witness under the age of 14 is able to communicate the evidence and understands the nature of an oath or affirmation. Even where a young witness cannot be sworn they may still be able to provide evidence wherever young witnesses are deserving of special protection.

The provisions of the Criminal Code which the proposed bill would amend, that is sections 486(1.1) and 486(2.3), were only proclaimed into force August 1, 1993. The amendments were included in Bill C-126 which proposed a wide range of proposals which in part responded to the recommendations made by the parliamentary committee that reviewed the child sexual abuse provisions of the Criminal Code.

Bill C-126 resulted in additional reforms to the child sexual abuse provisions of the Criminal Code, including abrogating any requirement that the court warn a jury about convicting an accused on the evidence of a child; providing for special prohibitions and probation orders for persons convicted of certain offences against children, for example, prohibiting offenders from seeking employment or volunteer work involving children.

It also included providing for peace bonds where it is feared a person will commit a sexual offence against a child; permitting a support person to accompany a child while testifying; providing that the judge consider the need to safeguard the interests of the witnesses under the age of 14 when determining whether the exclusion of the public from the courtroom would be in the interests of the proper administration of justice; permitting a judge to prohibit an accused from personally cross-examining a child.

These amendments were designed to enhance the reforms made in 1988 by Bill C-15 to effectively deal with child sexual abuse. One of those original amendments provided that child sexual abuse offences and sexual assault offences, the complainant could testify from behind a screen or by closed circuit television if the judge is of the opinion that the exclusion is necessary to obtain a full and candid account of the acts complained of from the complainant.

In other words, if the face to face contact with the alleged abuser would make it difficult to obtain the necessary evidence, the judge could order the use of a screen or closed circuit television.

However, the protection provided for young complainants by this section was illusory where the accused chose to represent himself. The accused, acting as his own lawyer, could come face to face with his young victim. The amendments passed in 1993 were designed to address this problem and were accordingly focused on young witnesses.

We know that child abuse occurs in part because of the inequalities between children and adults in size, knowledge and power. Cross-examination by an accused of a child victim continued the abuse. Therefore, the Criminal Code was amended to provide that an accused shall not personally cross-examine a witness under 14, unless the judge is of the opinion that the proper administration of justice requires the accused to do so. The judge can appoint counsel for the unrepresented accused to conduct the cross-examination of the child.

This provision applies in sexual offences or in an offence in which violence against the person has been used, alleged or threatened. This provision, coupled with the provision for the use of screens or closed circuit television ensures that child victims will not have to face their abuser which may assist them in providing their evidence.

The private member's bill before us would open that protection to all victims and witnesses of sexual offences and crimes of violence. The judge could appoint counsel for unrepresented accused to conduct the cross-examination of a victim or witness.

I have no doubt this protection would be beneficial and desirable, but is this protection necessary for all adult witnesses or only certain more vulnerable witnesses? We must carefully examine the implications of such proposals.

As I indicated, these provisions were designed to address the problems of child sexual abuse to ensure that young victims of abuse could provide the necessary evidence. However, adults are presumed to be able to provide necessary and relevant evidence.

The Criminal Code already includes a number of provisions to safeguard adult victims of sexual offences, including the discretion of a judge to exclude members of the public, to order publication bans on the identity of complainants and witnesses, to make evidentiary provisions such as restrictions on questioning about previous sexual activity and in camera hearings for the determination of admissibility of certain evidence. All those safeguards would apply even where the accused is not represented by counsel.

We must also consider the cost implications. Who will pay for the lawyers appointed to act for unrepresented accused? As members know, under our Constitution, the administration of justice in the provinces is a provincial responsibility. Where a judge appoints a counsel to act for an unrepresented accused, it would in most cases be the responsibility of the provincial attorneys general to pay for that appointment.

If we permit the court to appoint counsel for unrepresented accused in sexual offences, sexual assaults or crimes of violence against the person, we are creating the potential for imposing major costs on the provinces. It is therefore absolutely essential and necessary that all provinces be consulted about the proposed amendment.

The Criminal Code already includes similar provisions to appoint counsel for unrepresented accused persons in specific circumstances. For example, where an accused is thought to be unfit to stand trial, the court can appoint counsel to act for the accused. For appeals to the Supreme Court of Canada, that court can appoint counsel where it is in the interests of justice and where it appears the accused is financially unable to retain counsel.

These are exceptional cases that arise rather infrequently. Nevertheless, the provinces have expressed their concerns about the potential cost implications where counsel is appointed in these circumstances. Perhaps we should consider permitting a judge to appoint counsel to conduct the cross-examination on behalf of an unrepresented accused where the victim makes an application and where in the judge's view, the interests of justice demand. However, even this more limited measure should be discussed with the provincial attorneys general.

It is a general principle of our criminal justice system that all proceedings take place in open court. The presiding judge does, however, have the discretion provided by the act to exclude all or any members of the public.

There are many protections in place at this time. We acknowledge the positive intent of the bill but we believe that consultations should be conducted with the provinces and all aspects of the bill reviewed.

[Canadian Human Rights Act, May 1st, 1996]

Mr. Speaker, with respect, I believe the hon. member from the Reform Party has completely missed the point, but that ought not to surprise any of us.

I will make it clear for her. At present an individual who is a heterosexual could be discriminated against and could be fired for that reason. This legislation will prevent that from happening. Is that not a good thing?