Bob Ringma

[Peacekeeping, March 29th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to start by reiterating the motion:

That this House, in light of the UN Security Council consideration of renewed mandates for UN forces in the former Yugoslavia, take note of the rotation of Canadian forces serving with UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia.

We are taking note and Canadians are taking note. Canadians are generally proud of the role of the Canadian forces in peacekeeping. They very much respect the humanitarian role that can be played. I do not think they are totally aware of both sides of the equation from a military point of view.

On a very basic level if the troops are told, as they have been recently in Valcartier, they are next in the slot, the morale of the troops increases and they say: "Good. We have a job to do, let us do it". If they have been trained for it, as most of them have, they can do a very creditable job.

The problem is that this has gone on for too long. While there is a momentary surge in morale, the piper must be paid after that. If the troops get rotated with too great a frequency, we have a problem. If the troops do not have the wherewithal in equipment to carry things out, there is a problem. If defects are perceived in leadership in the Department of National Defence or within the Canadian forces, there is a problem. If the terms of reference in the first place are inadequate, there is another problem.

While it is good for the Canadian public to support its peacekeepers, as I do, I nevertheless have to sound a note of caution that all is not that well. There are many impediments, many problems to overcome. The longer we are in this business the more those problems are evident. I would like to agree to some extent with my colleague from Vancouver Quadra who was extolling the virtues of the government by saying that it was doing the right thing by consulting Parliament. I agree, it is a good thing to do.

The government made a start on this a year or more ago when this Parliament began. However, I have to question its sincerity when looking at the events of today. Although the mandate for our troops expires in two days' time, the government only yesterday announced the special debate of today. That is totally inadequate. However the intent may be correct. To put it in general terms, as the hon. member for Vancouver Quadra did, it is a good thing to consult Parliament. I wholeheartedly agree with that. It is a good thing to consult Parliament, but let us do it effectively, not in a cursory way.

A good part of the reason for the Reform members' position is that we established in discussion among ourselves what we consider should be the conditions for sending troops on peacekeeping operations. One was that peacekeepers should be left alone to do their job in the Bosnia area. The second was that the Sarajevo airport should remain open. The third was that convoys

should be able to operate unimpeded. The fourth was that there should be a ceasefire in place and holding.

All of those conditions have been violated. Atrocities are occurring, Canadian hostages have been taken, UN patrols have been fired on, so-called safe areas has been fired on, landings at Sarajevo have been stopped. We have ethnic quarrels going on all the while. In fact, the ethnic quarrels are at the very root of our objection to this whole situation. There will be no basis for peace in the former Yugoslavia until the residents decide they want peace. If it is going to be ethnic group against ethnic group, religion against religion. It is going to go on and on.

Canadians found themselves as peacekeepers in Cyprus for 29 years with no way out of it. We finally pulled out and the situation is no worse now than it was before. I am not trying to simplify this situation. It is fraught with danger.

Let me speak to the other side of the coin. How much danger is there? I ran into Major-General Lewis MacKenzie of Yugoslav fame a week or so ago. He sent me an article which he had had published in the New York Times . I would like to read part of what he wrote. He was talking, by the way, in favour of the UN leaving, certainly in Croatia. He wrote:

If President Tudjman gets his way and the UN withdraws from Croatia, war will follow and it won't be a short, local war between Croatia and the Krajina Serbs. The Krajina Serbs have been "assisting" the Bosnian Serbs in the battle for the Bihac pocket and they have recently signed a co-operation agreement for common defence which includes provisions for a joint defence council.

General MacKenzie's knowledge, having been on the ground there is far superior to me.

He concludes in favour of keeping troops there.

Surely this is the real litmus test for the UN in the new world order. It is up to the permanent five of the Security Council, led by the U.S.A., to make sure the UN is not found wanting on this issue. Failure to do so will sentence the Balkans to an even bloodier future.

This is a knowledgeable statement from a knowledgeable person. It says to me, why should Canada interpose itself to the degree we seem to be doing and saying we are responsible for the whole safekeeping of that area? It is a UN responsibility. I quite agree with General MacKenzie that pressure should be put on the UN, led by the U.S.A., to do something about the situation.

I would go beyond that and ask what is NATO's role in this. NATO surely has a role to play. It must exercise its influence in the area. Going beyond that, I would ask about the contiguous countries, about Greece, Turkey, Albania and all those that are affected. Where are they? They must take some responsibility in this whole thing.

We wind up with this problem. Unless the situation can be orchestrated by the UN, by NATO, by the countries in the area and by the ethnic groups in that troubled area saying "we want peace", Canadians cannot impose it on them.

Our military situation is well known. Our troop rotation is too frequent; the equipment is inadequate; the troops are carrying too big a load for the resources they are being given. We have the Jeffries report out of Petawawa. We have the Oehring report out of FMC saying there are problems within the Canadian forces. These problems are of morale and leadership. We had better straighten up that situation on our own home ground.

To conclude, if there is no chance for peace, if there is no desire for peace by the people who are there, we cannot impose it. It will do our country, NATO, the UN and the countries in that area a lot of good if we are seen to be stopping now. Blow the whistle and say: "Whoa, let's start over. Let's see what it is we are doing. Let's give notice now and take it from there".

[Canadian Armed Forces, March 29th, 1995]

In that case, Mr. Speaker, I have a supplementary. Canadian soldiers and their families know that death is an occupational hazard. It is expected in the course of duty, but when it takes the form of ten suicides, some sort of explanation is necessary.

What steps will the minister take to reassure the families of the other soldiers that he has the situation in hand and will initiate a plan of action to resolve the problems in the armed forces?

[Canadian Armed Forces, March 29th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, I would be more than delighted to help him or the troops directly in any way I can.

In the meantime my question through you, Mr. Speaker, to the minister is: What are you doing specifically?

[Canadian Armed Forces, March 29th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, given the Somali incident, the Petawawa videos and the low morale in the armed forces and the fact that the members of our armed forces are being forced to do more with less, what does

the Minister of Defence intend to do about the ten armed forces suicides at Valcartier? What is he doing to get to the heart of this distressing situation?

[National Defence, March 28th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, the incidence of suicide in the armed forces in very disquieting. Over the past few months, six soldiers have committed suicide. The families of these soldiers have asked the department to explain the circumstances of their deaths and, up to now, have received inadequate answers. This raises serious questions about the competence of the Minister of National Defence and of his department. Once again, the minister has demonstrated his lack of leadership skills.

This affair is but an episode in the long string of bungled issues at the department: first, Somalia, then the Petawawa videos; on top of those incidents, the Fowler-Doyle intrigue and now, these families demanding a public inquiry.

The families affected by this tragedy deserve answers and the Reform Party is insistent that the minister give them these answers.

[Firearms Act, March 28th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, it is with pleasure that I rise today to address this House and the people of Canada in support of the motion put forth by my hon. colleague from Yorkton-Melville.

This motion suggests that firearms control and crime control be addressed separately by dividing Bill C-68 in two. By making the two issues of lawful possession of firearms and their use for criminal purposes separate, this amendment could help introduce nuance and sophistication in this debate on firearms

use. It seems to me that this would enable us to break the current stalemate over Bill C-68.

Our proposal is to address separately the administrative issues relating to the acquisition, storage and transportation of firearms and those legal issues relating to the Criminal Code and what to do when offences are committed with firearms. This way, the principles of the right to have free disposal of one's private property and the right to public security could be debated and legislated in a more consistent way. It appears that this approach would enable us to deal with the problem of firearms use for criminal purposes without criminalizing at the same time law-abiding owners who only use their firearms for recreational purposes.

As it stands, Bill C-68, if adopted, would be a failure in every regard. Many legal loopholes remaining unplugged, offenders would continue to avoid sentences commensurate with the seriousness of their crimes. The deterrent effect of the sentence must have an impact on individuals. It has no impact on an object such as a firearm.

Among the legal loopholes that remain in Bill C-68 is the provision for lesser charges than those for violent criminal offences. In addition, it would still be possible to plea bargain for lesser charges. Finally, this bill does not address the problem of minimum sentencing even in cases where it is recognized that a violent crime was committed with a firearm. Such inconsistencies in the Criminal Code and its enforcement by the judicial system are not dealt with in Bill C-68.

In other words, this bill would offer no guarantee against an eventual outbreak of sensational crimes such as those committed by Denis Lortie at the Quebec National Assembly in 1984, by Marc Lépine at l'École polytechnique in 1989 and by Valéry Fabrikant at Concordia University in 1992. Of course, you will argue that there really cannot be any guarantee and this is a realistic way of minimizing risks. However, when you consider the fact that this legal system allowed Lortie to serve a minimum sentence and Fabrikant to own handguns in spite of the warnings of Concordia lawyers, you quickly realize that there is something very wrong with the Criminal Code, both in terms of its concepts and its enforcement.

Making the necessary amendments to the Criminal Code, which would include decriminalizing the storage and carrying of firearms, as well as providing strong deterrents and stiff sentences when firearms are used for violent purposes, might help reconcile the various interests expressed by Canadians. The Liberal government could preserve its integrity by fulfilling its promise to improve safety at home and on the street, thus allowing Canadians to heave a sigh of relief. The opposition, at least the Reform Party, would be prepared to co-operate.

I want to correct some outrageous claims made on December 6, regarding the existence of a correlation between domestic violence and the availability of firearms.

I fully agree that violence against women and children has its roots in the existence of a sociological and historical power relationship. However, I totally disagree with claims to the effect that the availability of firearms is a direct and primary cause of that type of violence. Firearms are only used as the ultimate means of violence; in most cases, victims of violence suffer physical or emotional abuse long before their tormentor decides to use a firearm.

I share my party's position as regards extending the monitoring system to include compulsory registration for everyone as well as possible confiscation of firearms. It is obvious to me that the arguments of the Reform Party against such a system are more numerous and better documented than those submitted by the Minister of the Justice to support his proposal.

The minister cannot provide evidence confirming the existence of a link between firearms control and crime control. In fact, buying, carrying and storing firearms are already extensively regulated activities. In spite of the stringent existing legislation on the traffic of legal firearms, criminals manage to obtain such firearms by relying on other sources such as smuggling, the black market, etc.

In the absence of any study on the effectiveness of the present system, we think it appropriate to adopt the recommendation made by the auditor general in 1993 that such a study be carried out before consideration is given to extending the regulation of firearms at an exorbitant cost of several hundreds of millions of dollars. It would make no sense at all to implement other regulations, when we still do not know the merits and shortcomings of our present system.

There is no direct relationship between the control of firearms and the control of criminal activity. When we compare the situation in Washington, D.C. to that in Switzerland, it is difficult to argue otherwise. In Washington, where the possession and sale of firearms is prohibited, the homicide rate is 81.6 per 100,000 inhabitants. Conversely, in Switzerland, where the possession of firearms is almost universal, the homicide rate is 1.1 per 100,000 inhabitants.

An examination of these statistics leads to the inescapable conclusion that a complex assortment of factors-social, economic, cultural, political, psychological, symbolic and so on-is at work in how individuals and societies approach firearms on the one hand and crime on the other. Trying to establish a direct link between the control of firearms and the control of criminal activity is too simplistic.

In proposing that Bill C-68 be split into two separate parts, my colleague for Yorkton-Melville and the Reform Party are making a constructive suggestion that might satisfy all Canadians. Helpful criticism and practical solutions have been offered in the House by a number of Reformers. I hope that this Parliament will have the wisdom and good faith to give serious consideration to this motion and to make a commitment to act accordingly.

[National Defence, March 27th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, the minister's unwillingness to answer this question leaves me and others in this House to believe that something is being hidden. He is doing nothing at all to instil public confidence in the inquiry into the whole Somalia affair.

Will the minister restore the integrity required by the public by demanding that Anne-Marie Doyle be removed immediately?

[National Defence, March 27th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, the answer of the Minister of National Defence to previous questions on the Somalia inquiry were totally inadequate. The point remains whether the inquiry is or is not going to be impartial and conducted at arm's length.

Will the minister replace Anne-Marie Doyle with someone whose impartiality is unquestioned?

[War Measures Act, March 27th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to read the motion to make it clear. Motion No. 332 reads:

That, in the opinion of this House, the government should immediately make an official public apology, accompanied by financial compensation, to the hundreds of citizens of Quebec who were the victims of arbitrary arrest and unjustified detention during the enforcement of the War Measures Act in the early '70s.

Should the War Measures Act have been invoked? The answer is very debatable.

It might serve the purpose of the House to go through a bit of the history of the time. In late 1969 some bombs were detonated in Montreal at the Board of Trade and le Club Canadien. In February 1970 Charles Gagnon, the FLQ leader, was freed on bail. In May 1970 Pierre Vallières was freed on bail. In June 1970 the justice minister of Quebec, Jérôme Choquette, announced a $50,000 reward for information on activities leading to the arrest of key members of the FLQ. The reward led to tips which allowed the various police forces, the Quebec Provincial Police, the Montreal police and the RCMP, to make arrests.

It is helpful to realize all those forces were at work. It allowed them to make a series of arrests and uncover information which cited the FLQ's intent to kidnap the Israeli and American consuls as a sign of protest against American imperialism and the FLQ's solidarity with the Palestine liberation movement.

On October 5, 1970, James Cross, the senior trade commissioner at the British Trade Commission was abducted by the FLQ. On October 10, Pierre Laporte, the minister of labour in the Bourassa cabinet, was kidnapped. On October 15 the federal cabinet agreed to use the War Measures Act if the situation deteriorated. On October 16 the cabinet made the decision and implemented it. On October 18, two days after the implementation of the War Measures Act, the body of Pierre Laporte was discovered. On October 19, one day later, the House voted to support the government's decision.

On November 2 a bill called Public Order Temporary Measures Act was introduced to replace the War Measures Act. That bill correctly was limited to the FLQ. On December 1 the bill was passed in the House, 174 to 31.

Meanwhile, earlier in November the famous Montreal five: Lemieux, Vallieres, Gagnon, Chartrand and Larue-Langlois, were charged with seditious conspiracy and membership in the FLQ. On December 3 Mr. Cross was freed. Finally in January the troops were removed.

I would like to run that measure of events against my own memory of the incidents. In 1964 I was a staff officer at the headquarters of the eastern Quebec area when the Queen was about to visit. The FLQ at that time was making a lot of noise. In fact, the Queen's life was threatened. The general officer command in Quebec command at that time went to Quebec City and talked to me, among others, asking if the Queen's visit should be cancelled. My counsel to that general at the time was that we should not because we did not know the extent of the FLQ presence. Surely this would be taking too reactionary a step against an enemy that was supposedly very small and turned out to be quite small. I think the counsel was correct at the time. It was saying, do not over-react.

In 1970 I found myself as the commanding officer of the Cinquième battalion de services à Valcartier. I was living through all of these events. I was kept fairly busy because I was first of all told to provide some of my troops to help the infantry. I had to establish an advance base in Montreal and take part in the security of base Valcartier.

My personal conclusion from all of these events was that the invocation of the War Measures Act was not justified. The same conclusion can be reached by others. If we look at the "Queen's Quarterly" the Commissioner of the RCMP at the time, William Higgitt, was even more blunt.

He made it clear that he had never been asked for his opinion on the efficacy of invoking the act but only on the mechanics of implementing it. He added that if it conferred certain advantages to the police, there were many disadvantages, not the least of which were the excessive powers granted the Quebec police and the misuse of these powers that went on unchecked.

The commission pressed for documentation of the apprehended insurrection. Higgitt said that there was none. He went further to insist that he would have stopped somewhat short of using the words "rebellion" or "open rebellion". I had greater faith in the people concerned than that.

From all these things I would conclude that the Liberal government of 1970 was a bit like the Liberal government of today. It could see this thing coming but failed to act, or it deliberately invoked the War Measures Act for political purposes.

I can see the current Liberal government acting in the same way. Look at the dock strikes. Look at the stevedore strike, the railway strike. It is either too little, too late or it is just the opposite, a total over-reaction. As one critic said at the time, it is like cracking a peanut with a sledgehammer.

My conclusion on this motion is that the problem in Quebec was with the Quebec forces as much as with the federal forces. As we have seen, all the Quebec police forces; the QPP, the Montreal city police and the RCMP were all involved in this.

In my judgment, the Bloc Quebecois is not wrong in making this motion. I cannot go along with it but it is not wrong. It is being used as a warning of what can happen in a democratic country such as ours. At the same time, nothing can excuse the crimes that were committed nor is the Bloc trying to excuse them. Crimes were committed by the FLQ and nothing can excuse that.

In my view the government of today is not in a position to make an apology nor should it make financial compensation. Undoubtedly there were some innocent victims in all of this but we cannot prove it today. It would be of no value to try to bring it all to light again and find out who was innocent and who was not. The blame should be shared around. But I cannot condemn the Bloc Quebecois for bringing the motion up today. Let it act as a warning of what can happen in a democratic society.

[Maintenance Of Railway Operations Act, 1995, March 25th, 1995]

I say that for several reasons. First, over the last 18 months, the government reacted to things instead of acting, as it should have.

If we look at the longshoremen's strike as well as the rail strike, we can see that the government could foresee what was going to happen. The government knew there was a strike coming on. What did it do? Nothing. C'est le mot précis, rien.

We have a government that is reactive. We have any number of examples, one being the budget. Look at the government's action on the budget. It knew it had to do something but how much did it do? Just the bare minimum to keep things a little bit in balance. That is the government's approach throughout this.

Look at national defence and the situation with the Canadian forces. We have had this whole Somalia thing whirling around our ears for several years now. The government had the opportunity to take action on this but it did not.

I blame the government for a lack of leadership and a lack of initiative. Let me remind the House of the airborne situation. The government saw what was coming. It was pressed as long ago as September 1994 to have an inquiry, get things out in the open, and find out what had gone wrong. The government said no, it would wait. It dragged its feet. When it stopped dragging its feet, it finally moved a baby step, not a big one, never enough to cope with what is needed.

We find exactly the same thing with Bill C-77. Bill C-77 is not a permanent solution. It gets us off the hook for another year or maybe two years. We will be voting for Bill C-77 because we have a Canadian problem on our hands. This just temporarily gets us off the hook. It is another baby step on the part of the government.

Permanent solutions are available. My hon. colleague from Lethbridge proposed a private member's bill, Bill C-262 a week or two ago. In Bill C-262 lie the seeds of a permanent solution the problem, not only in the rail area, but in the area of stevedoring as well. Why do we not come up with a permanent solution to these things? We have had 50 years of strikes. What does that mean? It means that the collective bargaining process in the area we are talking about and in the longshoring area is not working.

We had the recent strike in Vancouver. Incidentally no one else here was very concerned about it. "It is just Vancouver so we will legislate that quickly. No big problem".

I want to read a couple of quotes from two things. One is part of a letter from the Canadian Wheat Board to the government: "In a letter to your government dated April 1994, we the Wheat Board proposed that in those cases where a negotiated settlement could not be reached, a binding arbitration process, including final offer selection be instituted. This type of action would mean that a strike could be averted and the parties could continue to pursue collective bargaining. In short, the interests of all parties could be satisfied". This is the wheat board talking to the Government of Canada.

This went out a year ago in April 1994. It has been reiterated in March 1995. These are cries in the wilderness saying: "Government, please listen". Government has a responsibility to take a leadership role and it is not doing it.

I would like to read a line or two from a commission that looked into the Vancouver ports area several years ago. The commission stated: "There are two key impediments to the future growth of container traffic in the port of Vancouver. One is a lack of co-ordinated effort by various links in the intermodal chain. The other is a poor labour relations climate in the port of Vancouver which acts as a disincentive for potential investment in the port and its related intermodal linkage.

To overcome both these impediments requires a new approach to managing human resources and organizational behaviour in the port than has been taking place in the past. The experience in Puget Sound ports, particularly in Tacoma, reveals that these elements can be adjusted, attitudes can be changed and reputations can be altered. The key to success seems to be the provision of leadership and effective organization in order to harness and channel available resources toward an identifiable goal". It is possible.

Let me cite one other example where the government could have done something in anticipation of a problem. It commissioned the Fraser report. A year ago the Minister of Human Resources Development appointed Paul Fraser to conduct an independent review of current labour issues on the railway. This report was supposed to be tabled in June 1994. It is still not on the scene. Where is the Fraser report? What is the government doing with it?

Was the minister so flustered by the lack of progress with his social programs that he scrapped this one as well? We have a new Minister of Labour in the House. Perhaps that minister will pick it up and do something with it.

The Fraser report, along with all the other reports that have been done ad nauseam, may have provided a long term solution to this continuing problem. However, the Fraser report is non-existent. Even if it did exist, it would be ignored. The point I am making is that the west coast terminal strike could have been avoided in the same way that this railway strike could have been avoided. We need a commission to come up with a permanent solution.

I stand here as a Reformer, saying this is what the government should do. However I know that not many across the way are listening. Sometimes I ask myself, are you being effective in Parliament, member for Nanaimo-Cowichan? A year ago I would have given you the answer: I really do not know. What am I doing here? What effect am I having? This year I have the answer. The answer is: If we stick to our principles, which we are doing, the markers are moving.

The Minister of Finance, for all the world, sounded like a Reformer a month or two ago. He sounded totally like a Reformer. He was getting the message. He was trying to get that message across through the budget.