Jack Frazer

[Petitions, June 21st, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, pursuant to Standing Order 36, it is my duty and honour to present a petition on behalf of 100 constituents of Saanich-Gulf Islands and surrounding area.

The petitioners humbly pray and call on Parliament to enact legislation providing for a referendum of the people, binding on Parliament, to accept or reject two official languages, English and French, for the government and the people of Canada.

[Somalia, June 21st, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, let us look at a specific example.

Justice demands that Mark Boland testify, but he has made allegations about the conduct of military police and even now is in their custody. He may have the right to appear, but I question his freedom to do so as long as his treatment and even well-being are under the control of the very people against whom he may testify.

What will the minister do to ensure that a soldier like Mark Boland can without fear of retribution testify freely before the commission?

[Somalia, June 21st, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, the defence minister promised the Somalia inquiry would be free and open. He said that anyone having pertinent testimony had the responsibility to appear. However earlier this week Justice Letourneau suggested serving soldiers might need to be protected and offered that some could testify in camera.

Does the minister accept that military witnesses may need protection? Will he ensure that soldiers can testify, perhaps even against the department and their seniors without fear of reprisal?

[Petitions, June 19th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, I only have one petition to present.

Pursuant to Standing Order 36, it is my duty and honour to rise in the House to present a petition duly certified by the clerk of petitions on behalf of 108 individuals from the riding of Saanich-Gulf Islands and surrounding area.

The petitioners call upon Parliament to consider, if the $2 bill is to be discontinued and replaced with a coin, that it depict the face of Terry Fox, a Canadian who has done more than anyone else we can think of to bring Canadians from coast to coast together in a single endeavour.

[Bosnia, June 19th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, the government continues to waffle about whether Canada will join the UN's rapid reaction force. It stalls for time, refusing to make the tough decisions about the mission in Bosnia. The government owes it to Canadians to stop dithering and decide its course.

Will Canada join the rapid reaction force and commit itself more deeply to the fighting or will it, as the Reform Party has been suggesting, begin to wind down its participation?

[Bosnia, June 19th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, all Canadians are grateful that the troops at Ilijas and Pale have finally been released.

Now that they are free, the government is also free to address our continued presence in Bosnia in a more objective way. Approximately 700 Canadians remain on their base at Visoko, stuck between hostile armies in the midst of an escalating conflict. They are pinned down by land mines and threatened if they try to leave their compound.

Will the minister now accept that continuing this deployment is pointless, dangerous and irresponsible and that Canada should urge withdrawal as soon as possible?

[Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act, June 19th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to again address Bill C-87 which, when proclaimed, will enable Canada to implement laws prohibiting the production and use of chemical weapons and providing for the regulation in Canada of certain chemicals which could readily be turned into chemical weapons.

This new law will fulfil Canada's obligation under the United Nations chemical weapons convention signed by Canada and over 130 other states in Paris in January 1993. Almost a quarter century of negotiations have taken place at the conferences on disarmament in Geneva to bring this initiative to fruition.

This is a major achievement and the first multilaterally negotiated treaty to abolish an entire category of what can only be called weapons of mass destruction. Not only will all chemical weapons and their production facilities be destroyed under international supervision, all government and industry activities falling under the convention's objectives will be liable to international monitoring and possibly inspection. This is a mammoth undertaking and the success of this important milestone in world affairs is dependent upon each participating state or country ratifying the convention and then abiding by their treaty obligations.

Canadian negotiators have done a tremendous job and can take great pride in the instrumental role government in co-operation with the private sector has played in the successful negotiation of the convention. An important multilateral process has taken place. Its success can fuel even greater co-operation among nations so that even larger strides can be made to make our world a safer place in which to live.

Because trade with nations which have not signed the agreement will be prohibited, our ratification of the treaty will ensure our chemical industry remains competitive. Additionally, speedy passage of this bill will make it possible for Canada to be among the first countries to ratify the treaty. It is fitting that Canada be among the first 65 nations to ratify the treaty. After all our nation has worked diligently to ensure its success.

The treaty will come into force 180 days after it has the validation of 65 of the 160 signatories to the agreement. Should some member nations require more than the 180 day period to meet the criteria, there are provisions to extend this period but it may not be extended beyond two years.

Because of the implications and complexity of this convention, every avenue has been sought to ensure that all obligations under the convention are fully met. It is important that we

recognize those who have dedicated their efforts to ensure that implementation will go smoothly for our industries.

With the co-operation of the Canadian Chemical Producers Association, the Canadian Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, Merck Frosst and government officials conducted a trial inspection of the Merck Frosst facility in Quebec to test the verification provisions. These results were presented by both associations to the annual industry consultations with negotiators in Geneva. This ongoing private sector co-operation was instrumental and invaluable in ironing out the wrinkles during the negotiations and in drafting the legislation.

The Canadian Chemical Producers Association played an integral role by submitting one of the first papers on the issue of confidentiality to the conference on disarmament. This preliminary private sector involvement provided valuable constructive support and all participants are to be applauded for their contribution.

Additionally, officials from the Department of Foreign Affairs deserve commendation for their extensive preparatory work initiated to ensure the legislation will be effective while at the same time minimizing any negative impact on or interference with the affected industries.

By choice and representing the views of Canadians, Canada does not possess chemical weapons or chemical weapon production facilities. Therefore the overall impact will not be as difficult or significant for us as for those nations that do produce these instruments of war.

The greatest impact within Canada will arise from the provisions dealing with industry activities. The underlying thrust of the legislation is, as dictated by the chemical weapons convention, to completely prohibit any activity relating to the production of chemical weapons.

The most toxic, destructive and dangerous chemicals are listed in schedules 1 and 2. These chemicals will have the least impact on Canadian industry because production in Canada of chemicals on these lists is negligible. They have little or no commercial use. The more commonly used industrial chemicals noted in schedule III will have the greatest impact on our industry. Because of the commercial value of schedule 3 chemicals, industry production will proceed without inspection up to a limit of 30 metric tonnes.

As for Canadian industry, the initial and annual declarations will be mandatory for all plant sites that were in production the previous year and/or those plants expected to produce in the following year more than 30 metric tonnes of schedule 3 chemicals.

The initial declarations where necessary must be made within the 30-day period after the treaty comes into force. Chemical amounts exceeding 230 tonnes will be subject to verification and random onsite inspections to ensure compliance. They will require an initial declaration followed thereafter by mandatory annual declarations. Such declarations must include aggregate national data from the previous year on quantities produced, imported and exported of each schedule 3 chemical. Also each involved country must provide a quantitative itemization of each product exported and imported. This information will be declared no later than one month after the convention enters into force.

Reporting will commence in the calendar year following ratification of the treaty. Canada will be required to submit annual declarations within 90 days after the end of each calendar year. Also annual declarations on past activities are to be presented no later than three months after the end of the previous year.

Should production estimates exceed the projected threshold a new declaration must be submitted within a two month period. Should projected production be greater than the reported estimates such new activity must be reported at least five days before such production commences.

To allow some flexibility for industry declarations may not be necessary for any schedule 3 chemicals that are mixed in low concentration with other substances. The guidelines dictate that if these chemicals could be easily recovered from the mixture or if the total weight represents a risk factor reporting could be required.

Reports for production exceeding the 230 tonne threshold will include the purpose, the chemical name, common or trade name used, the structural formula and chemical abstracts service registry number if one has been assigned. The declaration of anticipated activity will be indicated in ranges starting for example between 20 and 200 metric tonnes and extending all the way to ranges above 100,000 tonnes.

Production levels for previous years will be similar in nature to the outline just mentioned. Verification within Canada will be carried out by onsite inspections. Using mechanisms such as specially designed computer software, the technical secretariat will randomly select plant sites for inspection. Such selection will be based on factors such as the identified chemical designation, as provided for in the legislation, plant site characteristics and the nature of activities carried out at the plant.

Every effort will be made to ensure there is an equitable geographic distribution of inspection activities. As a note, provisions clearly stipulate that no more than two inspections per year will take place at any one plant although special provisions pursuant to article IX will permit more inspections.

The combined number of inspections in any one country shall not exceed three plus 5 per cent of the total number of plant sites declared by a state or the maximum number of 20 inspections, whichever of these two figures is lower.

The general aim will be to verify that activities are consistent with the information reported in the declarations and ensure that no chemicals indicated on other schedules are being produced or used. Inspection teams will be authorized to demand access to records, particularly in situations where it is determined this information is needed for verification.

Sampling and on site analysis will be conducted to check for the presence of undeclared chemicals. If on site analysis is not possible, analysis may be required at a designated laboratory. Plant areas to be inspected will include storage sites, delivery sites, reaction vessels, feed lines to the reaction vessel valves, flow meters or other equipment associated with the production. There will be an external inspection of reaction vessels and ancillary equipment as well as any lines leading to long term or short term facilities for the chemicals, areas for waste, effluent handling and disposition of chemicals not meeting specifications.

Inspections are not to take more than 24 hours but in some cases extensions may be sought and negotiated. At least 120 hours' notice of an inspection must be given prior to the arrival of the inspection team. Industries producing chemicals such as phosphorous, sulphur and fluorine, which can be readily adapted to produce chemical weapons, will have to report their activities but at least at this stage will not be subject to random inspections.

Inspection data will then be compiled and forwarded to the International Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, OPCW. Our government must also control and report the import and export of these chemicals ensuring the confidentiality of the data collected.

For the most part the necessary structures are already established in Canada. The national authority will be set up within the Department of Foreign Affairs. Our current export and import permits and laws will facilitate the monitoring of the products.

Domestic enforcement is to be conducted under the Criminal Code. Industries must co-operate with inspectors or be subject to conviction if indicted and found deficient. The most serious infractions can make industry liable for up to five years in prison and a $500,000 fine. After five years an international conference will take place to evaluate the success or failure of measures implemented to monitor the agreement. If necessary new methods or requirements may be established at that time.

In establishing mechanisms to bring this convention into effect, every effort must be made to ensure the paper burden and costs do not become so prohibitive that smaller industries will be adversely affected or even forced out of business. Government must also continue to be sensitive to the financial implications of administrative costs. Extreme care must be taken to ensure the decision making will be streamlined and effective avoiding the creation of an excessive bureaucratic machine to track these chemicals. Already business in Canada has far too much bureaucracy and red tape to contend with.

The collection of data and conduct of inspection should be cost effective and any industry feedback must be heard and receive due consideration. Hopefully the co-operative relationship established between government and industry during the preliminary development stage will continue.

Although some of our veterans were subjected to it most Canadians are fortunate to have been spared the horrors of the use of chemical weapons such as were experienced with the use of mustard gas or nerve gases in wartime. Chemical warfare in the Iran-Iraq conflict brought vivid pictures of the terrible lethality of these weapons. The indiscriminate and massive loss of human life convinced the international community that every effort has to be taken to outlaw these terrible weapons of human destruction.

Our world has changed. The cold war is over but recent events in Japan bring home the necessity of continuing to work toward the elimination of these terrible weapons. That event proved it does not take a war to result in chemical weapons intruding into our lives.

At the time when the nerve gas assault on Tokyo's subway system took place, leaving 12 dead and 5,000 sick, it was not illegal to make or possess sarin and other nerve gases. In the days and even weeks after the nerve gas attack, a series of frightening incidents affecting defenceless civilians continued. The cult's top scientist was fatally stabbed in front of reporters. Burning bags containing a form of cyanide were found in a public washroom in a huge train station. Mysterious noxious gases were released several times in train stations and other public places making hundreds of people ill.

Police raids on cult sites yielded tonnes of chemicals and equipment necessary for the manufacture of sarin. There is even further evidence that research was taking place on biological weapons. Because of the cult attacks, Japan recently enacted laws to prohibit these chemicals.

Moving to another region, there is now very conclusive evidence that chemical and biological weapons were present in the theatre of operations during the Persian Gulf war. In this instance the introduction of low levels of such chemicals may have resulted from bombings of either Iraqi chemical weapons facilities or caches of Iraqi weapons on the Saudi border.

The Canadian Peacekeeping Veterans Association in Victoria has been approached by field engineers who were involved in operation axe. One of their duties was to destroy objects that could not be specifically identified and some are now suffering from what appears to be exposure to highly toxic substances. Their reported symptoms include severe headaches, bleeding gums, rashes, joint pain, memory loss, dizziness and breathing difficulties.

Collectively these symptoms, first traced to their origins by the doctors examining American veterans, had become known as the gulf war syndrome. Not only is this of great concern to those directly affected, a molecular toxicologist at the University of Maryland, Dr. Ellen Silbergeld, told a congressional hearing last fall that scientists now know that those exposed to these toxic chemicals can pass the poison on to their children.

Dr. Francis Waickan, an environmental pediatrician, has compared birth defect statistics between gulf war babies and other children. His findings reveal that abnormalities among children of gulf veterans is probably tenfold that of the normal population.

There is additional evidence that some of these toxins are released from the body during night sweats experienced by these veterans thus transmitting the chemicals to their spouses. This explains why many veterans' spouses are reporting similar rashes, fatigue and other symptoms of this ailment.

Clearly the effects and tragedies connected with chemical warfare do not end at the time of their use. The ramifications persist even being passed on to the future generations and causing untold harm to the human race.

The passage of Bill C-87 is just the first step on the way to eliminating future tragedies such as these. The real test will come when we are able to measure the willingness of the major powers of this world, those having the greatest number of production facilities and the largest stockpiles, to indicate their commitment to accept and institute these measures.

It is my fervent hope that the obstacles facing the international community can be overcome and that we can look forward to a day when both biological and chemical weapons will be no more.

To reiterate, we now stand at a pivotal junction on the road to eliminating these cruel, indiscriminating and devastating weapons. Let every nation accept the challenge by agreeing to continue to further the implementation of co-operative approaches and multilateral efforts to promote world peace and security.

The Reform Party supports Canadian agreement to and execution of Bill C-87.

[Bosnia, June 16th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, while the Prime Minister and the G-7 leaders plead with the Bosnian Serbs and Muslims to play nice, the European peace envoy says: "At the moment there isn't a political process. At the moment we're heading towards war."

Will the Minister of National Defence categorically assure this House that the government will decline to participate in any rapid reaction force and announce its intention to withdraw Canadian troops as soon as possible?

[Bosnia, June 16th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, the policy of the Canadian government toward the mission in Bosnia has been wavering and inconsistent since the beginning.

The Minister of National Defence rashly disbanded the airborne regiment but now needs its capabilities. It wants to be neutral in Bosnia but approved air strikes and may join a rapid reaction force.

In its heart, this government wants out of Bosnia but cannot make the tough decision. Will the minister agree that Canada has done its part in Bosnia and that it is time to leave, rather than sending more troops into an impossible situation?

[Somalia Inquiry, June 14th, 1995]

Mr. Speaker, as I understand it, this was a weapons handling charge. If such charges are not included in the Somalia commission inquiry, they should be.

The minister has frequently told this House, and yesterday said it to the face of a tearful wife and mother, that he cannot prejudice the inquiry. In my view, keeping the Brocklebank charges secret for two months prejudices the inquiry. Mark Boland's imprisonment prejudices the inquiry. Barry Armstrong's sudden deployment to Bosnia prejudices the inquiry.

How can the minister defend the contradiction between his professed wish for openness and his department's policy to lock up, shut down, or ship off eyewitnesses to the events in Somalia?