Mr. Speaker, on behalf of the Minister of Foreign Affairs I am pleased to initiate the debate on Bill C-87, an act to implement the convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction.
This draft legislation represents the achievement of what has been for successive Canadian governments one of our most important priorities in the arms control and disarmament field, a multilateral agreement on a global and comprehensive ban on chemical weapons.
Such an agreement is of special importance for Canadians. It was almost 80 years ago that Canadian soldiers were among the victims of the first gas attack in Ypres Salient in April 1915. There are still alive today Canadians who remember with horror the effect of such weapons on their friends and comrades, their husbands, brothers and fathers.
Having let this horrendous genie out of the bottle, the international community has ever since sought ways to control and suppress it. The Geneva protocol of 1925 was the first such attempt but its scope was effectively limited to a ban on the first use of chemical weapons and many states, Canada included, felt obliged to develop and stockpile such weapons against the possibility that they might be necessary to retaliate against future attacks with chemical weapons.
The hon. member for Hamilton-Wentworth, who will be speaking after me, has done a lot of research in that area. Hon. members may wish to consult with him for more information.
While our troops in subsequent wars were spared the horrors of further chemical attacks, neither the Geneva protocol nor mounting international condemnation of these weapons prevented other states from using them in other wars, most recently in the Iran-Iraq war. Even more monstrous, some have gone so far as to use chemical weapons against defenceless civilians. Who can ever forget the shocking pictures of the Iranian and Kurdish victims of Iraqi chemical weapons or the terror inflicted on Israeli citizens by Saddam Hussein's threats during the gulf war to rain chemical weapons down on Israel.
Spurred on by such barbarities, negotiators at the conference on disarmament in Geneva redoubled their efforts to conclude a multilateral agreement on chemical weapons which would forever remove this scourge. Canada is proud to have made a major contribution to these efforts, from the days in 1983 when a Canadian, Ambassador Donald McPhail, chaired the committee that developed the first outline of such a treaty to the successful conclusion of negotiations in 1992 when Canada was in the first rank of those pressing most strongly for a truly effective ban.
The chemical weapons convention resulting from these negotiations which opened for signature in January 1993 represents a major multilateral success. For the first time a whole category of what are known as weapons of mass destruction is to be eliminated. All stock piles of chemical weapons are to be destroyed under international supervision, along with the facilities which produced them. A verification regime which is global, comprehensive and effective is to be set up to ensure such weapons will never be developed again.
The convention is unique in a number of respects. Not only does it oblige states parties to destroy all existing stocks of chemical weapons and the facilities which produced them within a set time frame and under close international supervision, it also establishes a system of verification and inspection which is by far the most rigorous ever developed in a multilateral agreement.
Moreover, it does not just ban any future development of chemical weapons but seeks to safeguard against clandestine chemical weapon production through international monitoring and inspection of all facilities which might be used for such activity. Again uniquely, it extends this regime into the global civilian chemical industry. The basis of this verification regime of civilian industry is set out in three schedules or lists of toxic chemicals which either have been used as chemical weapons or are chemical weapon precursors.
Facilities working with such chemicals will annually report on their activities to their governments and through them to the international monitoring and inspection organization being set up in The Hague, the organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons, or OPCW. If their activities exceed certain thresholds they will be liable to inspection by international inspectors.
The convention's overview of industry extends even further because certain facilities which produce what are called unscheduled discrete organic chemicals, particularly those which contain phosphorus, sulphur or fluorine, can be adapted to produce chemical weapons.
The convention also requires these facilities to report on their production activities and provides for the future development of a system of random inspections of such facilities. Thus the scope of the convention extends beyond chemical and pharmaceutical industries and covers facilities producing pesticides, fertilizers, paints and coatings, textiles and lubricants.
Given the confidential nature of some of the information being reported by industry, the convention has its own provisions for protecting such information and requires states parties to abide by those provisions. The convention also requires states parties to institute restrictions on the export and import of schedule chemicals with states not party to the convention.
Perhaps the most novel element of the convention is the provision allowing for states parties to have the right to demand short notice or no right of refusal inspections called challenge inspections of any place, whether government or civilian, where they believe activities are being carried out incompatible with the obligations and goals of the convention.
In another departure from general practice the convention obligates states parties to pass penal legislation that not only encompasses activities on their own territory but also prohibits their citizens from undertaking forbidden activities outside their territory.
The convention has its own sanctions regime, although it also recognizes the pre-eminent authority of the United Nations security council regarding mandatory sanctions in the case of serious violations of the convention.
In view of the breadth and complexity of the convention, the Canadian government, like many other signatories, has given very close consideration to how its obligations shall be implemented in Canada.
Fortunately whereas the convention is 160-odd pages long, the draft legislation resulting from that consideration now before us is barely more than one-tenth that length and yet encompasses all the obligations that arise out of the convention relevant for Canada.
As Canada does not possess chemical weapons or chemical weapon production facilities, the related provisions of the convention do not pertain to Canada. Instead, the main impact on Canada arises from those provisions concerned with industry activities. The act's central provision is to ban completely anyone's activity relating to anything with chemical weapons in exactly the same terms as are used in the convention.
Also, as provided in the convention, these provisions ban the use of riot control agents as a method of warfare. Operationally speaking, as required by the convention, the draft legislation authorizes the Minister of Foreign Affairs to designate officials to act as Canada's national authority which will serve as the national focal point for liaison with the organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons, OPCW, and other states parties, collect the required information for the affected industries and transmit it to the OPCW and facilitate international inspections of Canadian facilities.
The draft legislation then spells out clearly the conditions under which the required information will be obtained; the right of the international inspection teams to conduct inspections in Canada in accordance with the provisions of the convention, and the roles and responsibilities of the national authority in facilitating such inspections. Because of the need to protect confidential information, it contains appropriate provisions to do so. It extends existing controls on chemicals by specifying all the chemicals on the convention's three schedules will be subject to the authority of the Export and Import Permits Act.
It institutes penal provisions and applies those to both activities on Canadian territory and activities by Canadian citizens outside of Canada. It further makes clear the enforcement of the proposed act will be conducted under the Criminal Code.
It provides for appropriate regulations to be prepared concerning inter alia the collection of the required data and the procedures under which the national authority will carry out its assigned responsibilities.
In considering this draft legislation, the government's first concern has been to ensure all of its obligations under the convention have been fully met. At the same time, however, the government has also paid very close attention to the convention's impact on the affected Canadian industries and has sought to achieve maximum effectiveness with the minimum amount of interference in the legitimate activities of those industries.
Fortunately in this regard the government has benefited from several years of close consultations with the most affected industries both during the course of the negotiation of the convention and in the preparations for the convention's implementation in Canada.
Throughout, the response from industry has always been positive and constructive. It was the Canadian Chemical Producers' Association which produced one of the first papers submitted to the conference on disarmament concerning the issue of confidentiality.
In 1990, thanks to the co-operation of the Canadian Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association and Merck Frosst, government officials were able to conduct a trial inspection of the Merck Frosst facility near Montreal to test the verification provisions of the convention. Both associations provided representatives to participate in annual industry consultations with negotiators in Geneva.
In our preparations to implement the convention in Canada, we have continued to consult closely with industry on the impact of the convention by distributing information brochures, briefing industry associations and contributing articles for industry publications, conveying information seminars and sending questionnaires and information material to some 2,100 companies across Canada to help determine which companies will be affected by the convention.
Almost without exception the response from industry has continued to be very constructive and encouraging. We confidently expect that as we proceed with this draft legislation and its associated regulations, this high level of co-operation with industry will continue.
The government believes the draft legislation before us is not only appropriate and necessary but represents the most balanced and cost effective means of implementing the convention obligations in Canada.
We all recoiled with horror some two months ago when in an unprecedented act of senseless barbarity, madmen unleashed chemical weapons on unsuspecting Tokyo commuters one early spring morning. We may not be able to prevent individuals from committing such unspeakable acts, but with the successful passage of the proposed legislation we can at least hope to control and deny them access to the materials for such weapons. This morning I was very pleased to read in the news that the police in Japan arrested those responsible for the nerve gas attack on Tokyo's subway.
With all party co-operation, which we will be getting in consulting with the official opposition and the third party, all three parties would like to get this legislation through as quickly as possible. When we do, hopefully the convention and the legislation will prevent the production, stockpiling and use of the kind of substance used on the Tokyo subways.
