Ed Harper

[Justice, May 2nd, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, this has already been tested in one court but the important question is has the government estimated the cost to taxpayers involved in this appeal and if so will it table these figures?

[Justice, May 2nd, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, my question is for the Prime Minister. The figures released last week by Elections Canada proved once again big spenders cannot buy Canadian voters.

Now that the Charlottetown accord outcome has been reinforced by these results will the government save tax dollars and drop its appeal of the gag law?

[Petitions, April 29th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, I rise in the House today to present yet another petition requesting that Parliament ban the importation and sale of killer cards.

By now it must obvious that the wide public outrage over these despicable cards must be addressed swiftly by government.

[Pearson International Airport Agreements Act, April 26th, 1994]

That is correct, Madam Speaker.

[Pearson International Airport Agreements Act, April 26th, 1994]

Madam Speaker, actually the history going back to 1987 was when the Parliament of Canada passed the National Transportation Act which set the stage for a newly deregulated Canadian airline industry.

On April 8, 1987 the Government of Canada issued its policy on the future framework for the management of airports in Canada. It envisioned local airport authorities as the preferred method of airport management. Privatization was only given passing mention.

Three months later we had a reversal. On June 22, 1987 the Airport Development Corporation was the preferred developer to construct and operate terminal 3 at Pearson. The Matthews Group of companies sponsored an unsuccessful bid in this competition. However it will reappear.

In September 1989 the Matthews Group submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Government of Canada to privatize terminals 1 and 2 at Pearson. This proposal was not accepted. However no costs were expected at that time.

In October 1990 the government announced that private sector participation in the modernization of these two terminals would be sought through a future request for proposals process. No details were provided. As a matter of fact attempts by local airport authorities were rebuffed or rejected. They were not even encouraged to bid in spite of the success of airport authorities in Vancouver, Edmonton and Calgary.

On March 11, 1992 the government issued a request for proposals with 90 days provided for responses, placing heavy demands on those submitting a proposal. This gave the Matthews Group an advantage since it had previously submitted a bid in 1989. Two groups bid on the project: Paxport controlled by the Matthews Group and Claridge.

It must be noted that 90 days is a very short time to allow for proposals on a project of this magnitude. Another thing worth noting is that this was a one stage process. When T3 was considered it was a two-stage process, the first stage being to solicit and short list bidders and the second stage being to encourage detailed bids. This was not the case when we were looking at T1 and T2.

Another interesting aspect was that passenger volumes were open to projections by the bidders. A significant amount of information and coming up with a price was left open to those who were going to be bidding.

At that time there were many firms looking for work and yet so few were given the opportunity to bid on this project.

In December 1992 Paxport Incorporated was announced as the best overall proposal. It had to demonstrate its viability by February 1993. By that time Paxport found it did not have the financial backing it needed so it turned to Claridge for support.

The question here is how could a project of this magnitude proceed without financial ability as a prime consideration. Having discovered that it did not have the financial ability, the

questions arise: Why Claridge? Was no other option available to Paxport?

In February 1993 Paxport and Claridge announced a joint venture partnership which became T1 T2 Limited Partnership and eventually the Pearson Development Corporation with terminal 3 to pursue the redevelopment according to Paxport's proposal.

The request for the proposal implicitly said that there must be competition between T1 T2 and terminal 3. As a matter of fact Paxport in its bid highlighted the importance of competition in its bid. However in joining forces the competition that was to be there was eliminated.

In May 1993 Claridge had assumed effective control of the joint venture. Competition is lost and yet Paxport is still there.

In June 1993 the Pearson Development Corporation and the government signed a letter of understanding as to the substance of the previous agreement. Just prior to that a member, Huguette Labelle, a former transport deputy minister, was moved out of her position because of her opposition to the government's movement.

On August 30 the Minister of Transport announced that a general agreement was reached with Pearson Development Corporation to redevelop T1 and T2 and indicated the agreement would be finalized in the fall with a legal agreement for the long term management operation and redevelopment of the terminals. This is with the election only days away. On September 8, 1993 the election was called.

Prior to the conclusion of the legal agreement the Leader of the Opposition, the present Prime Minister, had indicated clearly that parties proceeding to conclude this transaction did so at their own risk and that a new government would not hesitate to pass legislation to block the privatization of terminals 1 and 2 if the transaction was not in the public interest.

At this time the chief negotiator of the Government of Canada sought written instructions about whether to complete the transaction.

On October 7, 1993 the Prime Minister at the time gave written instructions to complete the deal. We were in the middle of an election and those instructions were given. One has to ask the question: Why?

On October 7 the legal agreement was made to complete the Pearson privatization. At this point we were only 18 days away from an election. Knowing it was going to be an election issue, knowing it would be cancelled if it did not prove to be in the public interest, the government proceeded with the undertaking.

On October 28, 1993 the Prime Minister appointed Robert Nixon, a former Liberal cabinet minister, to do a quick review of the Pearson deal.

There is much that has gone on in the background and, as I said at the beginning, there are many questions that have been raised here. In fact there are questions that are crying out to be answered.

We should take a minute to review some of Mr. Nixon's comments and his opinions in the process. On page 8 of his report he states:

The request for proposals having as it did only a single stage and requiring proponents to engage in project definition as well as proposal submissions and all within a 90 day timeframe created, in my view, an enormous advantage to a proponent that had previously submitted a proposal for privatizing and developing terminals T1 and T2.

[. . .] With little consideration and development occurring others should have been sought and given reasonable time to participate.

The role of lobbyists and political staff, as stated on page 9 of the report, reads:

It is clear that the lobbyists played a prominent role in attempting to effect the decisions that were reached, going far beyond the acceptable concept of consulting. When senior bureaucrats involved in the negotiations for the Government of Canada feel that their actions and decisions are being heavily affected by lobbyists, as occurred here, the role of the latter has, in my view, exceeded permissible norms.

As well, there was the perception that political staff were interested in this transaction to a highly unusual extent; indeed, this climate of pressure resulted in civil servants being reassigned or requesting transfers from the project.

In closing, this was a flawed process that would appear to be killing this project. Mr. Nixon in his review said that the project should indeed proceed. There are five chairpersons and 32 municipalities which support that position.

There is also a safety angle here. Pilots have been stressing this safety factor. I quote from an article in the Toronto Star that was reported in response to some airline pilots who attended a committee hearing.

As pilot Rick Anderson noted, "planes are designed to land in the wind. Crosswinds can cause problems, especially on slippery runways. When heavy crosswinds are blowing, a second north-south runway would be safer to use than the existing east-west runways, and cut delays as well. While the value of the latter cannot be underestimated as we pull out of this recession, since planes burn about 1,360 kilograms of fuel an hour while waiting to land, travellers, airlines and environment all would benefit from reduced travel time, fuel costs and air pollution".

There are thousands of construction jobs at stake. The delay in this project is hurting job creating projects around the province, and indeed in Canada. Mike Sifton, president of Toronto Airways, stated that "airports create jobs and business. The real

jobs an airport creates are one and a half miles down the road from the runway".

This review need not and should not hold up construction. Currently some Toronto MPs are delaying this for purely local concerns. Canadian jobs and growth are at stake. Pearson is a national issue, not a local issue, and jobs are at stake in Kitchener, Windsor, North Bay, Kingston, Oshawa and Barrie.

There is much at stake here: honesty and integrity in the system, confidence and trust in politicians, potentially millions of taxpayers' dollars, the names and reputations of many people, Pearson's revitalization, thousands of jobs and future growth in the economy.

Bill C-22 in my view does nothing to address these issues. We will be supporting the Bloc amendment. I would move an amendment to the Bloc amendment. I move:

That the amendment be amended by adding immediately after the words "more open" the words "in Canada".

[Pearson International Airport Agreements Act, April 26th, 1994]

Madam Speaker, I appreciate the opportunity today to speak on Bill C-22.

This whole Pearson revitalization and the studies that have been done raise many questions. I am hoping that the debate we are about to embark on will provide some answers to the questions. Actually Mr. Nixon's review demands a response. I would like to quote from the press release that came out with Mr. Nixon's review: "My review has left me with but one conclusion, to leave in place an inadequate contract, arrived at with such a flawed process and under the shadow of possible political manipulation, is unacceptable. I recommend to you that the contract be cancelled".

Those are very strong words and I think in those words there is a message that we must be fair. I was interested in the minister's comments when he spoke earlier this morning about being fair. The minister said that there may be those who would question any moneys being paid because of manipulation. He acknowledged that there may have been some manipulation. However he wanted his government to be fair and reasonable.

To whom are we going to be fair and reasonable? Will it be the taxpayers of Canada, the people who are paying the bills, or the lobbyists who are to profit from any moneys that are exchanged here? I think we have to be fair and reasonable. My priorities are that we have to be fair and reasonable with the taxpayers of Canada. We have an obligation to be fair and reasonable to those whose names and reputations have been called into question in all of this. They should be given an opportunity to clear themselves if that is possible. There should be no tax dollars spent until the air is clear.

Bill C-22 is virtually unprecedented. However I would suggest that the circumstances here are virtually unprecedented. We have accusations of patronage, accusations of political interference, accusations of excessive lobbying and apparently the elimination of competition.

The government has said much about honesty and fairness. I would like to quote from the red book on page 91. Chapter 6 begins:

If government is to play a positive role in society, as it must, honesty and integrity in our political institutions must be restored.

The most important asset of government is the confidence it enjoys of the citizens to whom it is accountable.

Bill C-22 does nothing toward this goal. Full disclosure of all that has taken place would go a long way toward achieving this. Let us review the background and the history to bring us up to date on the Pearson revitalization. There are many conflicting and contradictory positions.

Through a series of complicated deals two companies merge as partners: Paxport, which is controlled by Matthews Group Limited with very strong Tory connections, and Claridge investments, a company with very strong Liberal connections. These two companies are joined together as the Pearson Development Corporation.

Bill C-22 is the beginning of the end of a process which started in 1987 to move airports across Canada into local hands. Generally airports across Canada have gone into the hands of local airport authorities. The ones they have tried so far have met with some excellent results.

Pearson airport was a different case. The former Tory government was determined to privatize Pearson for the benefit of a number of its friends, among them David Matthews, a former Tory president and fund raiser and former Tory cabinet minister. Otto Jelinek joined Paxport, which is Matthews owned, shortly before the election. He is on its board of directors and president of its Asian wing. Excessive amounts of lobbying went into the privatization of Pearson airport. At least 10 firms were involved.

One of the clearest parts of this whole deal is the fact that the Liberals are heavily involved. Since the Liberal government has been in power it has appointed a former provincial Liberal cabinet minister to lead the review and the Prime Minister's former law partner to lead the negotiations for compensation.

These may be very capable and honest people. However the circumstances dictated that direct political connections should have been avoided. A suspicious and secret deal by the Tories now looks very much like a suspicious and secret Liberal cancellation.

[Pearson International Airport, April 25th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, this project benefits all of Canada for economic and safety reasons. Pearson has been studied to death. When will this government take action on Pearson's job creating potential? Thousands are waiting.

[Pearson International Airport, April 25th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, surely the minister must realize that Pearson expansion is not a local issue. In an earlier question he indicated it was being held up by some Toronto MPs.

It is an issue of national importance. National development and jobs across Canada are at stake. Perhaps the real question here is why has the minister abrogated his national responsibilities regarding Pearson? Why has he passed the matter off to a select group of Toronto members who will clearly have local rather than national interests at heart?

[Pearson International Airport, April 25th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, my question is for the Minister of Transport.

This government was elected on a promise of jobs and infrastructure. Pearson airport is arguably the single most important piece of infrastructure in Canada and a huge creator of jobs.

All five regional chairpersons in the metro area agree that future growth and jobs are at risk. The review on Pearson by Mr. Robert Nixon recommended the same thing, that immediate construction begin.

Can the minister explain why he continues to ignore local leaders and the Nixon report by delaying action on this important project?

[Government Contracts, April 19th, 1994]

Mr. Speaker, it is obvious the ethics counsellor is long overdue. Can the Prime Minister tell us when this appointment will finally be made?