Mr. Speaker, on behalf of all the members of the Official Opposition I would like to thank the government for deciding to hold this debate in the House. It will I am convinced be a non-partisan debate, enabling us to clarify our own and everyone else's thinking, so that we can make a decision that is in accord with our most fundamental interests.
I think debates like this one should be repeated from time to time, when the subject lends itself to such an approach. I would like to say that for our part we have thought very seriously about the matter. We do not claim to have the answer, we have approached it modestly. Our remarks today will reflect our awareness for the hard reality, the complexity, of an issue that demands a very difficult decision.
To the extent that we can assist the government in making a decision that accords with our fundamental interests, we will do it in all sincerity. We are therefore delighted to have this opportunity to participate in the debate.
The government, we feel, would like the whole Canadian policy on peacekeeping to be debated, not just the current intervention in the former Yugoslavia, even though the latter is expressly referred to in the wording.
But no one can be ignorant of the fact that it is the questions raised by the Bosnian intervention that have led to today's debate. In a way, it was inevitable that the concerns provoked by such a challenging mission would result in questions about Canada's peacekeeping role.
So there we have the framework for the rethinking process in which we are called upon to participate: on the one hand we must tackle a thorny question of immediate and urgent concern, and on the other we must define attitudes for the future. Although the two matters are connected, it does not follow that future Canadian policy must be based solely on our experience in Yugoslavia.
This is not Canada's first involvement in peacekeeping operations, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs has reminded us. We pioneered this type of mission. We have acquired experience
and expertise in the field that are respected by the whole world. But what is happening in Yugoslavia is without any real precedent. The apparent futility of our efforts, the risks our soldiers are running, the astronomical figures that have circulated about the costs of the operation and the daunting complexity of the political and military situation there have shaken the support that public opinion has traditionally given this type of commitment.
So we must take into account the difficulties faced by our mission in Bosnia especially, at the side of the other members of the peacekeepers. But if our decision is to be broadly and solidly based, we cannot lose our general perspective on the peacekeeping role Canada has assumed. This perspective is much more extensive in time and space than the one episode in the former Yugoslavia.
I would like here to pay heart-felt tribute to the courage and dignity with which our soldiers are carrying out the difficult duties entrusted to them overseas. They deserve our admiration and our complete support. And let us spare a thought for those who here in Canada are enduring trying times because of their anxiety for loved ones far away.
We must bear in mind that before they started being perceived as a thorn in the flesh of our diplomacy and our foreign commitments, as they are today, Canada's peace missions were, like CIDA, a great source of pride for Canadians and Quebecers. The disinterested and humanitarian nature of our international interventions was hailed again and again. And did not the architect of Canada's peacekeeping role win the Nobel prize?
Indeed, more than anyone, Lester B. Pearson symbolized this acceptance of one's moral obligations, which is one of the duties of a democratic country. That is an aspect we must bear in mind when deciding, for example, whether we must stay on in Bosnia-Hercegovina, or withdraw and then establish criteria to govern any future participation.
Another aspect of peace missions we must not ignore is their great diversity. What exactly do we mean when we talk about international missions carried out by Canadian soldiers under UN mandates? We must avoid simplifications: in fact, this involves a whole range of varied, and indeed disparate, actions and interventions.
For 30 years, from 1949 to 1979, Canada maintained 27 soldiers in order to monitor the ceasefire in Kashmir. Canada committed 9,000 soldiers to go to war in Korea from 1951 to 1954; since that time it has kept only one on the spot to monitor the armistice agreements. Canada assigned 248 soldiers to monitor the demilitarized zone during the Vietnam war. Canada sent an observer mission under UN auspices to monitor the election that, on December 16, 1990, brought to power President Aristide, who visited us yesterday. In 1991, Canada sent 55 soldiers to monitor disarmament and human rights observance in El Salvador. In 1991-92, Canada sent 103 soldiers to help clear mines in Cambodia. Then Canada doubled the personnel assisting the UN to disarm factions that had been at war for years. Most recently, Canada sent a contingent to co-ordinate the delivery of food in Somalia, last year.
Canada has participated in 44 of the operations the United Nations has organized since the end of World War II. It has been said that we have played the role of boy scouts; this is a picturesque term, but I feel that it casts a pejorative light on a remarkable effort by Canada on the international scene, an effort that must not be minimized.
During those 44 operations, 98 Canadian lives were lost, including the eight deaths occurring in the former Yugoslavia. Canada lost 25 soldiers during the 30 years it was present on Cyprus. But the place in which Canada lost the most soldiers was the Middle East: 46 in Lebanon, Israel, Egypt and Syria.
And what about the costs? Theoretically, our share should be 3.1 per cent of expenditures; that is a percentage based on the GDP, population and, lastly, a complex weighting of factors. But, in fact, there are no set standards, because mandates change with situations and with the nature of agreements. On Cyprus, Canada alone paid the price; in the former Yugoslavia, theoretically-and I stress the word theoretically; we are well aware that this is unlikely to happen in the near future-the UN will reimburse Canada for a portion of the costs. Incidentally, many far-fetched figures on the costs of the operation in Bosnia have been bandied about. In particular, the figure of $1 billion has been mentioned. I feel that that is a rather irresponsible, I would even say a very irresponsible, way of providing information, since the true figure is nowhere near that sum. It is still a sizeable sum, of course, but we should be talking about less than $200 million in additional expenditures incurred there specifically, because the soldiers would have been paid and the equipment used here in any case. So if we are talking about a specific direct cost of our presence there, we should be talking about a figure closer to $160 million.
Thus, although our commitment in the former Yugoslavia was part of a continuing program, it very quickly gave signs of being radically different from previous commitments. The operation in Slovenia and Croatia really is a peacekeeping operation, since our troops are responsible for ensuring that peace agreements already reached are observed. But Bosnia clearly differs from the traditional model. There, we are right in a combat zone, stuck between belligerents. How can we ensure that peace reigns in a land where peace does not exist and where all ceasefires have been violated? That is where things have deteriorated; in particular, the whole world has witnessed, through the unbear-
able images broadcast on television, atrocities that we thought were no longer possible at the end of the 20th century.
The perceived justification of our mission there has been very much influenced by the world situation.
It is horror-stricken that we have witnessed and are still witnessing children much like our own dying in the streets, injured left to die in hospitals without care and without necessities. The world had come to hope for a new order which would not lead us to expect atrocities such as those we have seen once again in Bosnia-Hercegovina.
The fall of the Berlin wall in November 1989 provoked a euphoria as sudden as it was unexpected. On December 31, 1989, von Karajan went to what, for 42 years, was known as East Berlin to conduct Beethoven's Ninth. It was like living in a dream: Vaclav Havel had just crowned the velvet revolution in Prague, "solidarnosc" was on its way to power in Warsaw and Hungary was once again free. The Warsaw pact had just crumbled like a pack of cards, after more than 40 years of dullness and dictatorship. All this happened at the end of 1989; it happened, and this cannot be over-emphasized, without bloodshed, without a single gun being fired.
As everyone else, I felt I was a witness to historic events, I felt a certain amount of pride at seeing some ideals such as liberty and democracy make giant leaps. Eighteen months later, Boris Yelstin was waving a three coloured Russian flag on top of a tank. The USSR had just collapsed.
As soon as the cold war ended, we started thinking about creating new institutions to take over, to mark out what was soon called the new world order. In particular, all the European countries, the United States and Canada formed the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe designed, in the words of the then Secretary of State James Baker, as a new forum to ensure peace and dialogue from Vancouver to Vladivostok.
What remains today of this burning hope for a new world? Of course, the Czech republic, Poland and Hungary seem on the right track. However, Russia seems to be failing. Then on our TV screens, we witnessed the tragic war in the former Yugoslavia, which has been going on for the last two years.
In this new world order, one expected international law to be enforced. The relations between states would not be governed exclusively by the mere balance of power. The strong would no longer be able to bring the weak to their knees. The new order became reality once, in the winter of 1991, when Kuwait was defended against Iraqi invasion. Cynics have said there was something underground in Kuwait that seemed to be as valuable as the people living on the surface, and perhaps more valuable.
In Bosnia-Hercegovina there are three communities: the Muslims, the Serbs and the Croats. The first are the descendants of Slavs who converted to Islam after the Ottoman conquest, some 500 years ago. So these are three very ancient communities, with equally deep roots in the same soil. Demographically the Muslims are the largest segment of the population with 1.9 million inhabitants or 44 per cent, followed by the Serbs at 31 per cent and the Croats at 17 per cent. But unlike the other two groups-and this is no small detail-the Muslims cannot count on a sizeable community of fellows in a neighbouring republic.
After Slovenia and Croatia became independent, neither the Muslims nor the Croats in Bosnia wanted to stay in a reduced Yugoslavia where Serb predominance would be still greater. They called for the independence of Bosnia-Hercegovina in late February 1992. The Bosnian Serbs refused to be part of this new state.
If the Serbs had been content to fortify their position and mark out a territory for themselves where they formed a majority, we would have seen a political impasse that would probably have led to long and laborious negotiations. But unfortunately that was not what happened. The Bosnian Serbs were quickly able, with the assistance of the Yugoslav army, a relatively well-equipped force dominated by Serbs, to take control of 70 per cent of the territory in Bosnia-Hercegovina, including territories where they were only a tiny minority, to expel the non-Serbs systematically, especially the Muslims, and even to execute a certain number of them.
We can all recall the internment-camp stories that held the headlines in the summer of 1992. A number of these camps still exist today. Moreover, cultural and religious symbols have been systematically blown up, including 16th century mosques that were part of the world's shared heritage, and houses often burned to the ground.
In reaction, and this is the spiral, the same treatment has been inflicted by the Muslims on the Serbs and the Croats and by the Croats on the Serbs, obviously on a smaller scale.
A journalist from the Paris daily Le Monde , Yves Heller, summed up the situation nicely on October 1 last, and I quote: The Muslims, who are the victims of anethnic cleansing'' of unspeakable savagery, have lost very large territories in western Bosnia which the Serbs have conquered with extreme brutality-''
We know today that "cleansing" was discussed in the corridors of power in Belgrade, capital of Serbia, at the end of the eighties.
Judging by the history of the last century, each of the three communities nurtures historic grievances against the two others. It is not for us to allocate blame. But there is no denying that in 1992 and 1993 a concerted strategy was methodically implemented which reminds us in many ways-I say this with great sadness because, like the majority of people in the west, I thought we would never again witness such barbarity-which reminds us of what other peoples, including the Serbs themselves, suffered at the hands of Hitler's troops.
And all this occurred in a region only a few hours away from Venice by car.
We must remember this today and remember also that this is the judgment of the whole international community. The Europeans recognized Bosnia-Hercegovina's independence on April 6, 1992; the United States followed suit the day after and Bosnia was admitted to the United Nations on May 22, 1992. The majority in a legitimate country was attacked by a national minority receiving substantial help from a neighbouring country. This majority should have enjoyed the protection of the United Nations charter, but such was not the case.
The recognized representatives of Bosnia have asked repeatedly for international help, but to no avail. What is the difference between Iraq annexing Kuwait and the Bosnian Serbs annexing a substantial portion of a recognized country?
The United Nations did not vigorously come to Bosnia's aid, but it did name the aggressor. On May 30, 1992, the Security Council imposed a commercial, oil and air embargo on Serbia and Montenegro. On October 9, the Security Council excluded Serbian aircraft from Bosnia's air space, and on December 1, the Human Rights Commission in Geneva used for the first time the term "genocide" and condemned the policy of ethnic cleansing applied by the Serbian leaders in Bosnia and Croatia. That is as clear as one can get.
It would not be fair to say that the United Nations have been totally indifferent. They have managed to take control of the airport at Sarajevo in order to use it for transporting humanitarian aid. The 30,000 or so peacekeepers have deployed throughout Bosnia manage, despite being harassed by the different factions, in transporting part of the aid destined for Muslim or Croat towns besieged by the Serbs and in some cases by the Muslims, thereby affording them a partial but indispensable relief. And six Muslim enclaves are under the protection of the United Nations. Thus, in Srebrenica, 150 Canadian peacekeepers stand between the 45,000 people who are crammed into the town and the hostile Serbian environment.
But the United Nations protection forces have spoken out. They say they are incapable of carrying out the missions they are assigned for lack of sufficient means. On the other hand, negotiations between the warring factions are bogged down; peace seems more remote than ever. Therefore, should we stay?
The easy thing would be to throw our hands up, pack up our bags and leave but this is not the way Canada earned its well deserved reputation abroad as a steady peacemaker willing to walk the extra mile in the name of peace.
Admittedly we are testing uncharted waters but we are in a new world. We rejoiced at the end of the cold war. The world is now in a state of flux and it would be unseemly of us to give up at this juncture.
France in Bosnia has shouldered a heavier burden than Canada and has paid the price with 18 dead men and 269 wounded. France seems willing to stay. It is going too far to say that there is no peacemaking whatsoever in Bosnia. There are six protected Muslim enclaves surrounded by Serbs with nothing standing between them and the Serbs but peacemakers. The peace is kept even if it is a peculiar kind of peace.
There have been 150 Canadians who have preserved 45,000 Muslims in Srebrenica from the ghastly treatment meted out to so many Muslims.
Now what will happen? This is the question we have to ask. What would happen if all peacekeepers left Bosnia? We should never forget to answer this question. First, the enclaves would be submerged in a very short time with the exception probably of Sarajevo. Second, the Serbs would be targeting more strategic towns and villages in the hope of breaking the backbone of the Bosnia resistance. Third, the Croats in central Bosnia would have to run for their lives. In short it would be all out war and all out ethnic cleansing.
The men in the peacekeepers act also as our eyes and our ears on the field. They justify and complete the other measures which have been carried out by the international community. Suppose they all leave at the end of their present mandate which expires at the end of March. We would have to suspend the arms embargo against Bosnia. Not doing so would be cold blooded cruelty. However, then how could we justify keeping operation Deny Flight which forbids Bosnian skies to the Serb air force?
It would really be all out war with the very real possibility of sucking in, in a much deeper fashion, allies from both camps such as Russia and Turkey who are already in the backstage. Then the Balkans would then really live up to their history.
In fact all these measures have been enacted to scale down the level of Serb aggression. As far as they go they are intended to protect the Bosnian Muslims. To turn our back on one of these measures, namely the UN forces on the ground, is to begin the unravelling of the whole patchwork. It is not an idea that is well thought out.
However, can things continue as they are now? Can we tolerate the harassment and the kidnapping of peacekeepers? No, we should not. We should give them clear engagement rules and not timid ones. We should give them the military means to do their job. If the United Nations wants to play a meaningful role in that part of the world then it must get its act together.
The biggest morale booster for the UN forces would be the knowledge that they are not bogged down in some indefinite stalemate. There must be movement at the negotiating table. This is not for us but really for the parties involved to decide.
The truth is that the Prime Minister was imprudent, to say the least, when, as he was leaving Brussels at the beginning of the month, he mentioned the possibility of a unilateral withdrawal of Canada's peace mission to Bosnia. Whatever we decide, we must act in concert with our allies. Canada must not breach the solidarity pact that it has wisely, generously and courageously built over the years with our partners and friends of the North Atlantic council.
Second, to let down a civilian population whose survival, until now, has been secured largely through our presence and our aid, and to let it fend for itself in utter deprivation and insecurity, would go against our interpretation of our humanitarian obligations.
Third, we ourselves could not tolerate the sight of the massacres that would almost certainly befall the Bosnian people, as our retreat would likely start a chain reaction. Public opinion among our allies and friends would draw serious conclusions from such a decision. After setting an example of commitment and compassion, we would then set an example of disengagement and indifference. It is to be feared that others would follow in our footsteps in this second option as they did in the first one.
Finally, the maintenance of the peacekeeping forces in the former Yugoslavia affords us our only guarantee that the conflict will be contained inside the territory where it is already raging. If the peacekeeping forces were withdrawn, the hostilities could then spread unabated to Macedonia and Greece and eventually ignite the Balkan powder keg. But if we decide to stay, we must take steps to see to the safety of our troops, which means increasing our defence and intervention capabilities.
The peacekeepers must stay, as must Canada, even more so, if we wish to see the Bosnian conflict end around the negotiation table rather than on the battlefield, with violence and massacres. It is up to us really to decide if this tragedy will be resolved through force or through reason.
It is imperative then for the future that we set the guidelines that will dictate our actions. Once in position, it is usually too late to consider a withdrawal. Those guidelines must be defined with the help of military, diplomatic and other experts. I hope the government in its upcoming white paper on defence will set forth an analytical plan that we can study thoroughly. But for the moment, the main thing to do is to keep in mind that we must continue, insofar as our capabilities allow it, to fulfil our fair share of the obligations that result from our allegiance to the values of democracy, peace and justice, values which, given their universality, deserve our efforts to further them abroad.
