Paul MacKlin

[Civil Marriage Act, February 21st, 2005]

Madam Speaker, the hon. member's question is important for the many people who observe our process to understand what is about to transpire.

Once the debate concludes, a vote takes place and, if the bill passes, it goes to a legislative committee. A legislative committee is a committee of the rules of this place where whips from all parties have an opportunity to select their own members and to bring forward the members they would like to present.

One of the realities also in the House, as we have learned, is that this is a minority Parliament and the way in which the committees are set up the government will not be able to maintain a majority vote on these committees. The public needs to know that the committee will be representative of the way in which the House is constituted and, in fairness, will deal with it as best it can, again representing all of the parties in the House and dealing with it in a full and democratic way.

The second point the hon. member raised goes back to the vote in 1999. As the hon. member may know, I was not a member of Parliament at that time, but as an observer it was a situation where one was able to sit back and look at the changes that have occurred in the House over time. I recited a number of changes to the marriage law that have occurred over the years and also to the divorce law. As time passes, the way in which we look at issues changes as well.

In particular, what we have to look at in our case is the evolution from a parliamentary democracy to a constitutional democracy. When in 1982 we entrenched in our Constitution a Charter of Rights and Freedoms, that was the Charter of Rights and Freedoms that was chosen by the House. In so doing, we set a standard. We established a set of rules to be applied against all of our laws in this country. That is very important. Many people do not realize that we put that in place as a guide, a sense of direction and a sense of our values being presented in a meaningful way so that it could be judged against all of our laws that come before the courts.

What is the position of our courts? The courts then become the guarantors for each and every one of us. As a law is brought forward and challenged based on the charter, the courts have to look at that law and see if it measures up to the values that we entrenched in 1982. If it does, then they leave it alone. If it does not, then they are our guarantors and have every right to strike down a law of that nature.

I suggest that there is a significant change that has occurred over the last 20-plus years.

[Civil Marriage Act, February 21st, 2005]

Madam Speaker, I rise today to speak in support of Bill C-38, the civil marriage act, introduced by the government.

Before addressing the subject, I just want to say that much has been made of the fact that the government is not allowing a free vote on this and that if the vote were free, the bill would not pass. This is pure nonsense. The vote will be free on this side of the House. The hon. members can vote as they see fit.

However, the government has an opinion and this is a government bill. Accordingly, cabinet will vote in favour of the bill, as will the parliamentary secretary to the Minister of Justice, since the bill was introduced by the Minister of Justice.

There is nothing magical or coercive in this. The government will urge all hon. members to consider the merits of a vote confirming what, in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada, is a fundamental right vested in the charter.

For my part, as a mere parliamentary secretary required to vote in favour of the bill—although I know I am not the only parliamentary secretary to do so—I would have voted in favour of it regardless. Let me explain why.

We certainly cannot deny that for many this is a difficult decision for religious or personal reasons. We are talking about one of the oldest and most central institutions in our society. The topic is highly charged emotionally.

I would join my colleagues, however, in encouraging members of Parliament and indeed all Canadians to conduct the debate as it has been to date, in a calm and respectful way. The views of all members must be heard. The test of our values and our respect for tolerance and diversity will be to continue to listen with an open mind to the comments and concerns not only of those we agree with, but even more importantly, of those we do not agree with.

What strikes me as I have listened to the comments from colleagues and other members of the House, constituents, religious groups, family and friends is that the arguments being made in the House today are not unique. Let me take a brief moment to read a representative comment, “Assuming that there must be some restrictions as to marriage, we may assume also that the laws imposing such restrictions ought not to be changed without some good and clearly ascertained case”.

The speaker then went on to say that there is “no sufficient cause for the change now proposed” and that it is not unreasonable to alter the traditional law on marriage as “it is contrary to sound principles to legislate for the very few when such legislation must injuriously affect the welfare and happiness of a much larger number”. He expressed concern that the changes in legislation would result in changes to religious practices and concluded that the legislation was too important to be passed quickly without “due time for ascertaining the sentiments of the people generally”.

Debate in the House of Commons would be insufficient as his parishioners in Nova Scotia had difficulty following the goings on of the Parliament in distant Ottawa. The time was needed for the populous to get used to the idea. Parliament was rushing the issue.

Many of the arguments made today against extending civil marriage to same sex couples are eerily similar to those arguments. Those comments were drawn from well over 100 years ago, in 1890 when Canada's marriage laws were being amended to allow a widow or widower to marry the sibling of their deceased spouse. Those comments were made by the Anglican Bishop of Nova Scotia because of course this marriage was then prohibited by the church.

As would be expected, the bishop expressed concern that this extension of marriage was contrary to the Christian concept of marriage and cited numerous quotations from the Bible. He even raised the spectre of polygamy. A man who was prepared to marry his deceased wife's sister, he said, might next want to marry all of her sisters at the same time, and what would be left to stop this if we allowed him to marry more than one sibling one after the other?

In the year 2005, well over 100 years later, it is striking to me that this House has also heard every one of these arguments anew. I am fascinated by how easy it is to lose perspective as we sometimes lose history.

I hope we come to view these arguments with the same perspective now as the House finally did in 1890 when these changes to Canada's marriage laws were passed.

Nor was 1890 the last and only time that our marriage laws were amended, or these arguments were raised. As recently as 1990 the federal Marriage (Prohibited Degrees) Act was amended to extend access to civil marriage to those who were related by blood in second degree relationships, that is, cousins, and uncles or aunts and their nieces and nephews.

In 1990 many experts in genetics were called before a Senate committee to explain that there was no scientific basis for the perception that these relationships resulted in an increased probability of physical or mental impairment. So consistent was the evidence that the amendment passed with very little controversy.

I suspect that many of my fellow members of Parliament did not even know that the law had been changed in this regard. It is another example of the fact that civil marriage is not immutable and has been extended over time to groups previously excluded.

Indeed, Upper Canada passed its first marriage act as early as 1793. The legislation was based on the British Lord Hardwicke's Act and restricted the ability to perform marriages to the Church of England or Anglican ministers. In 1798 after considerable pressure, the ability to perform marriages was extended to ordained Presbyterian, Lutheran and Calvinist ministers, but only where they were certified, which was an extra procedure that was not necessary for the Church of England ministers.

Methodists were specifically left out until 1829 when the legislation was extended to Congregationalist, Baptist, Independent, Mennonite, Tunker, Moravian and Methodist ministers. It was not until 1857 that ministers of every religious denomination, including Jewish rabbis, were authorized to perform marriages. Other provinces and territories followed similar paths.

Civil marriage in Canada was created by legislation fairly early in Canada's west, in British Columbia in 1888, in the Northwest Territories in 1898, in Manitoba in 1932, perhaps more because of the unavailability of religious ministers. Ontario waited until 1950 to introduce civil marriage. Quebec, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, P.E.I. and Newfoundland and Labrador introduced it only in the 1960s. In each case there was controversy and concern.

Although Canada never had any laws preventing interracial marriage as there were in the United States, Canadian authors cite instances where authorities resorted to deportation and charges of seduction, as well as instances where community members resorted to torture and even murder to prevent such unnatural unions. Happily, this aspect of marriage has changed.

Similar arguments were put forward with regard to divorce laws. One member of Parliament in 1894 said:

Every Catholic is opposed... and yet the Protestant majority of this House want to impose the law upon us in this matter.... Who may tell what the future keeps in store for us?

Those words are from a distinguished member of the House, the hon. Hormidas Jeannotte, uttered in 1894 in the context of a debate on the bill of divorce for one James St.-George Dillon.

Prior to the passage of Canada's first Divorce Act in 1968, individual bills were needed to grant divorces. Certainly the concerns uttered then are again similar to those that we have heard more recently.

Senator Bellerose said in a debate in the Senate on the same bill that if divorce were granted it would “encourage the whole population of Montreal and of the province of Quebec...to separate from their wives in order to achieve the same end”. He insisted that it would be a travesty if Parliament passed the bill because “it was understood at the time of Confederation that divorce would not be granted to Catholics”.

Indeed these arguments were raised in almost every recorded debate on any change to Canadian laws on marriage or divorce and yet, as we can all plainly see, religious practices have changed very little. Some religious groups still do not recognize divorce, and the change in the civil law does not force them to do so.

Some religious groups still do not allow marriage between first cousins, and the change in the civil law does not force them to do so. In the same way, the passage of Bill C-38 would not force religious groups who do not recognize marriage between same sex partners to do so.

I fully understand that those opposed to this bill are not radicals. They are not bigots. They are not homophobic. This is a big change for our society within one lifespan. For me, and as others have said before in the House, when I grew up and first learned the law, homosexual behaviour was still prohibited by the criminal law. It is not long ago in our lifetimes, as the Prime Minister mentioned in his speech, that gay and lesbian Canadians were not welcome in the Canadian Forces, were not protected by the law from being dismissed from a job or refused service in a restaurant simply because they were gay. It is difficult for some in our society to accept that what was very recently hidden and invisible is now being accepted as a minority group deserving of protection and respect.

Let me just probe that a little. Why would this not be a group of people deserving of protection from discrimination? As the Minister of Justice has said, it is easy to believe in equality when we agree with a particular minority, but history is full of instances that demonstrate just how much a test of our beliefs and our values it is when we are talking about a minority that we do not agree with.

Let us remember that gay and lesbian individuals have been subjected to a lengthy history of discrimination and indeed persecution in many societies. It is all too recent that they were targets of Nazi Germany, where they were forced to wear pink triangles and many were housed in concentration camps. It is all too recent that the fear of outing or coming out meant the end of a career and even family life for many who were forced to live invisibly in our own Canada.

I was concerned to hear the opposition make reference to the fact that this is not about human rights, that there are no instances of real discrimination here with regard to this group. With respect, that is a denial of history and a denial of fact. I have heard from parents, as I am sure have a number of members, sad and terrible stories about children who have committed suicide because they were afraid of telling their parents about their sexual orientation, of young people cast off by their families, of schoolyard taunting and harassment, of violence directed against people only because they were suspected of being gay.

No purpose is served by comparing the history of disadvantage, of discrimination and of exclusion of different minority groups. I will be supporting this bill because I believe in the eradication of discrimination for all minority groups, and in the equal importance of the protection of the freedom of religion. The government bill acts responsibly and carefully to balance full respect for equality and the freedom of religion, basic Canadian values of such importance that they are entrenched as part of our Constitution, forever limiting the power of this House.

The opposition says that this bill should not pass because half of Canadians are not in support. I realize that Canadians are evenly divided on this issue, but what about those who are in favour? Should those opposed ask the House to turn back the hands of time, to ignore the fact that the law has already changed in eight provinces and territories because the courts have made binding decisions that limiting civil marriage to opposite sex couples is a violation of our Constitution?

Our own history shows us that those opposed will be fully protected from these changes. They will not touch their lives unless they choose to have it happen. Religious groups will retain the full ability to make their own decisions about whether to recognize these legal changes in the same way they already have with earlier changes to the civil law on marriage and divorce.

However the House has a duty, not only to those opposed but to those in favour, not only to those religious groups who do not wish to perform same sex marriages but also to those who do.

In the discussions surrounding the 1968 Divorce Act, religious groups took sides. Some urged the government not to pass the civil divorce law for Canada fearing the impact on religious practice and others who urged the government to go further and include a ground for divorce based solely on marital breakdown.

Now as then, it falls to the civil authority to legislate in a way that allows all religious groups to continue with their beliefs. The way to do that here is to pass this law, allowing religions to decide this issue for themselves and for their communities.

I respectfully submit that the bill represents the great Canadian compromise and I would urge all members to support the bill.

[Civil Marriage Act, February 16th, 2005]

Mr. Speaker, the Leader of the Opposition said that Parliament can legislate to preserve the traditional definition of marriage without invoking the notwithstanding clause, because the Supreme Court refused to answer the fourth question.

What does the hon. member for Laurier—Sainte-Marie have to say on this issue?

[Constitution Amendment, 2005, February 15th, 2005]

Mr. Speaker, the motion that is put forward today by the hon. member for Lanark—Frontenac—Lennox and Addington for the repeal of the constitutional disallowance and reservation powers deals with a matter that, to the best of my knowledge at least, has not been much of a concern or priority for anyone recently.

However, it is a subject that has often been formally, or informally, raised at federal-provincial constitutional reform discussions going back over 100 years. In that sense, it remains a relevant topic for consideration at the appropriate time and in the appropriate context.

The Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada does not support this motion for a number of reasons. I hope the sponsoring member and all members of the House who have an interest in the continuing of Canadian federalism, as opposed to dismantling of federalism as we know it, will find these reasons compelling.

Indeed, I dare to hope that after hearing these reasons, the hon. member might consider withdrawing his motion. If not, then I hope I can convince our colleagues here in the House, or at least those who believe in our federal system, to vote against it.

To begin with, I think it is safe to say that in modern times no federal government would ever consider exercising these powers, except perhaps in the most extraordinary of circumstances.

As I indicated a moment ago, these powers and their possible repeal or, for that matter, the creation of limitations on these powers or the examination of other alternatives remain a relevant topic for consideration when the time and forum are right. At the moment, there does not appear to be a need for fixing this provision and no observable consensus that we should be dealing with this at this time.

Repeal of these powers might be considered in the context of the development of an integrated and coherent set of proposals for constitutional reform. In such a context, the powers of disallowance and reservation could be considered amongst others dealing with modernizing or generally improving the federal-provincial balance of powers and related matters.

It has not been a part of our constitutional reform tradition up until now for the federal or provincial government to put forward constitutional motions unilaterally without some prior discussion and without some give and take in developing a comprehensive proposal. From the federal perspective there are good reasons for this based primarily on the federal government's concern that it guard and exercise its powers in the interests of all Canadians from a national perspective.

Social, economic, political and other related developments of modern life are often complex and interconnected. These developments have an impact on the constitutional vision that guides our political leaders when proposals are put forward, usually after much consideration, for the constitutional amendment. In addition, progress towards constitutional peace, if not always change, often involves informal understandings in the context of cooperative and practical federalism.

The federal government has never been prepared to acquiesce in the proposed repeal of these powers except in the context of a comprehensive discussion where give and take on all sides leads to a constitutional agreement acceptable to a broad range of Canadians throughout the regions of the country.

Pending such a broader constitutional deal, these powers, unexercised for decades for good political reasons, are hardly a high profile and pressing irritant that require priority repeal, as would eventually follow from the adoption of this motion.

As noted by Mr. Justice La Forest in the 1993 Supreme Court of Canada decision in 3 S.C.R. Ontario Hydro v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board):

The power of disallowance, which had long been in decline, has not been used since 1942...It is the very breadth of these powers that protects against their frequent or inappropriate use. It was not the courts but political forces that dictated their near demise. They are, as was said of the power of disallowance, “delicate” and “difficult” powers to exercise and “will always be considered a harsh exercise of power, unless in cases of great and manifest necessity--

Members can also see in Severn v. The Queen, 1878, 2 S.C.R. 70, through Chief Justice Richards at page 96 and Justice Fournier at page 131:

Their inappropriate use will always raise grave political issues, issues that the provincial authorities and the citizenry would be quick to raise. In a word, protection against abuse of these draconian powers is left to the inchoate but very real and effective political forces that undergird federalism.

If we cast our minds back to the mid-1980s and the five conditions put forth by Quebec's then Premier Bourassa for Quebec's acceptance of the Constitution Act in 1982, the repeal of these powers was not one of them. The resulting discussions that led to the Meech Lake accord also did not generate a call for the repeal of these powers.

In the early 1990s an even more ambitious attempt at constitutional reform led to the Charlottetown accord. In that context, such a proposal was balanced by others that maintained and strengthened the equilibrium of the federation and the balance between federal and provincial powers, as well as the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of Canadian citizens.

It would be inappropriate and, indeed, unwise for the federal government to support the piecemeal repeal of the powers of disallowance and reservation at the present time without any quid prop quo from the provinces with a view to strengthening the federation and enhancing the protection of the rights and interests of Canadians everywhere.

I see no more logic in a motion to deal with these powers independently than for any other individual item that might appeal to a particular member, constituency or lobby group. In a nutshell, the federal government does not support and does not recommend that we should unilaterally give up any federal powers even if their existence is mainly, if not entirely, historical and theoretical.

I would also note that unlike a bill, the details and technicalities of which would be examined in committee, the adoption of a motion at this time would bar technical analysis and possible improvements.

Constitutional amendments to our federal structure are inherently significant and important, and proposals for such amendments should not be embarked upon in a hasty, ill-timed and ill-considered way. I suggest to hon. members that a motion fast-tracking a constitutional amendment should be contrary to every instinct that we have as legislators. Therefore I would encourage all members not to support the motion.

[Criminal Code, February 14th, 2005]

Mr. Speaker, before I explain why we are unable to support Bill C-215, I want to mention that the motive for the bill is highly commendable. However, the Minister of Justice and I do not support Bill C-215, sponsored by the hon. member for Prince Edward—Hastings.

The purpose of Bill C-215 is ensure that strong measures are taken under the Criminal Code in the case of offences committed using a firearm. No one disagrees with the overall purpose of this bill.

However, the manner in which Bill C-215 proposes to realize that objective raises serious concerns. The most glaring concern is the proposal to add a sentence on top of a life sentence in the case of murder committed with a firearm. This is illegal under our law. The novel concept which Bill C-215 proposes to introduce to our law can perhaps best be described as supplementary sentences.

As drafted, the bill proposes to require that essentially two penalties apply for the commission of one offence if committed with a firearm, one penalty for the underlying offence itself and another minimum penalty of 5, 10 or 15 years of imprisonment, respectively, if a firearm is present, discharged or used to injure or kill a person other than an accomplice.

With respect to the offence of using a firearm in the commission of an indictable offence, the effect of the proposals in the bill would be to replace the current one year minimum penalty with 5, 10 or 15 year minimum terms of imprisonment, consecutive to the penalty for the underlying offence. If the weapon used is an imitation firearm, Bill C-215 proposes a five year minimum penalty, again, in addition to the penalty for the underlying offence.

These extraordinary, high penalties for using firearms in the commission of certain offences may appear to some to be appealing at first glance. However, it is important to look closely at Bill C-215 to examine the effect the bill will have if implemented.

It is, however, useful to consider plausible hypothetical cases or scenarios when trying to determine what effect such a proposal could have if enacted.

Bill C-215 proposes a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years if a firearm is discharged during the commission of a crime.

A plausible hypothetical case would be that of an 18-year-old who uses a rifle to pop the tires of a series of cars parked in a lot. The motive—whether this person did so because of peer pressure or a complete lack of judgment—is irrelevant.

The sentencing judge could not take into consideration any of the special circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence or the delinquent's own situation, even if, for example, it were a first offence. The judge would have to impose the minimum 10-year sentence, proposed by Bill C-215, if property damage exceeded $5,000.

The actual penalty would be greater than 10 years since the bill proposes that the minimum 10 years for discharging the firearm would be in addition to the sentence imposed for the underlying offence in this hypothetical case of mischief.

As parliamentarians, as the country's lawmakers, when examining proposed legislation, it is important that we ask ourselves whether such law would be reasonable and would withstand charter scrutiny. Would it be reasonable to have an 18 year old person with or without a prior criminal record go to a federal penitentiary for over 10 years for shooting out car tires? This is what Bill C-215 would do. Few Canadians would find this to be just.

The bill would provide no flexibility to allow for appropriate sentences to be imposed, given the particular circumstances of the cases that could reasonably arise. We need to ensure that the penalty schemes in the legislation we pass leave room for any and all cases that may arise. Otherwise, the penalty provision itself will be found to be unfair and, consequently, struck down.

The other important factors need to be considered as well. The existence of minimum penalties in the Criminal Code does not provide a guarantee that they will be imposed on those who commit the offence to which the minimum penalties apply, particularly the higher ones. Depending on the circumstances, police are sometimes reluctant to charge a person with a particular offence if it carries an unusually high penalty. The example I gave earlier about the first time offender who shoots out car tires could be an example.

Also, judges and members of the jury can be reluctant to convict an individual if that conviction requires the imposition of a harsh minimum sentence despite the existence of special circumstances.

Mandatory minimum sentences promote an all or nothing approach, which does not serve our criminal justice system. It is much more advantageous, from the standpoint of public security, to ensure a conviction and the imposition of an appropriate sentence, instead of running the risk that an accused will not stand trial or be convicted of the offence he or she committed.

Mandatory minimum penalties also encourage greater plea bargaining. Accepting a guilty plea on a less serious offence, one that does not carry a minimum penalty, is a frequent occurrence in the criminal justice system to avoid the all or nothing outcome described. Whether appropriate in the circumstances or not, I doubt that provoking greater plea bargaining is the goal of Bill C-215.

We should also be mindful that mandatory minimum penalties remove the incentive for offenders to plead guilty. This increases the number of matters that end up going to trial, which in turn increase the case backlogs and cause further delays. Introducing additional and increased minimum penalties would also have cost implications, not only for the court system but also for correctional services. Last, mandatory minimum penalties hamper a judge's ability to make the punishment fit the crime, whether on the high end or on the low end.

Before I conclude my remarks, I would like to suggest that we also ask ourselves why we would want to seriously consider the proposals in Bill C-215. The firearms legislation passed by Parliament in 1995 introduced significantly high minimum penalties for 10 serious offences committed with a firearm. Those minimum four year terms of imprisonment are being applied and upheld throughout Canada. For other indictable offences committed with a firearm, there is ample room for judges to impose as stiff a sentence as is warranted in the circumstances.

Therefore, I would urge all members to resist the temptation to support what may appear an attractive tough response to gun crimes and to consider the serious implications of passing a set of amendments that could lead to inflexibility in our laws or negative, unintended consequences. The existing penalty scheme for gun crimes provides an appropriate range of penalties to ensure that judges have the discretion to impose a sentence that fits the crime.

[Citizenship Act, February 10th, 2005]

Mr. Speaker, methamphetamine is currently classified under schedule 3 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. As a result, the maximum penalty for possession is three years and the maximum penalty for trafficking is ten years.

In contrast, the maximum penalties for drugs in schedule 1, such as cocaine or heroin, are seven years for possession and life imprisonment for trafficking.

The responsibility, as has been previously mentioned, for the administration of the CDSA and specifically the listing of these substances is with the Department of Health. Health Canada is aware of the views expressed by the courts, prosecutors and the police that higher penalties should be available for trafficking in these methamphetamines.

Starting in March of last year, officials of the Department of Justice have met with officials of the office of controlled substances at Health Canada to discuss the issue. Justice officials will continue to work with their counterparts at Health Canada in this process.

As the minister mentioned today, at a recent federal, provincial and territorial justice ministers meeting in January of this year, a working group was set up that will forward with this and bring forward recommendations as to how we may better combat this problem that the hon. member raises.

[Citizenship Act, February 10th, 2005]

Mr. Speaker, I do not believe everyone in this House is familiar with the expression crystal meth or about the meth problem. I would like to take a couple of minutes to inform hon. members about this problem.

Meth, which is short for methamphetamine, is a synthetic drug in the family of amphetamines. It is similar in chemical structure to its parent drug of amphetamines but causes more damage to the central nervous system. The ingredients are household chemicals and solvents combined with ephedrine from cold medicine, and supplies are readily available in our retail stores. Local clandestine drug labs manufacture the drug in makeshift labs. The fact that it can be manufactured locally separates it from other drugs, such as cocaine which has to be imported from another country.

Meth is known by various street names such as “crank” and “speed”, but crystal meth is also known as “ice” which refers to the smokeable form of methamphetamine.

Meth comes in the form of crystals resembling pieces of ice, shaved glass slivers or clear rock salt. It also comes in a powdered form. The drug is sometimes sold in tablets or capsules that can be swallowed or emptied for smoking.

Meth is taken through smoking, injecting, snorting or swallowing, with smoking being the most common method. Members should know that any substance that is smoked goes directly to the brain in about eight to ten seconds. It is the most addictive way of using the drug. The smokeable form was developed in the 1980s but is more potent now than it was in the past.

Many young people are, of course, reluctant to use needles. This may well be their first hard core drug, and to many young Canadians smoking is familiar. It is generally smoked in glassware that can be heated.

Crystal stimulates the central nervous system by pumping up the levels of neurotransmitters such as dopamine. At low doses, it boosts alertness and blocks hunger and fatigue. At higher doses, the drug can cause agitation and bizarre behaviour. Physical effects include increased heart rate, blood pressure and body temperature. The serious psychological effects attached to the chronic use of meth include anxiety, emotional swings and paranoia. Symptoms increase with long term use and can involve paranoid delusions and hallucinations. Violence and self-destructive behaviour are common. Overdose is also a risk with the use of crystal meth. Symptoms include fever, convulsions and coma. Death can result from burst blood vessels in the brain, triggered by spikes in the blood pressure, or heart failure.

Meth use takes a toll on both individual health and well-being, as well as community safety because of its effect on behaviour. The agitation and paranoia can lead to aggressive and violent behaviours, and those behaviours have an impact on family members and the community.

An additional safety concern is the meth labs themselves. Making meth produces odourless toxic fumes which can explode, posing a danger to those who are living in or visiting the abode, socially or professionally, and those within close proximity. Many of the chemicals are flammable and highly reactive. Spending time in an environment where there is this phosphene gas, a by-product of meth production and a poisonous gas, can make people ill. The toxic waste produced by these labs, which winds up in ditches, sewers and dumpsters, poses another public safety issue.

Clearly, crystal meth is a concern.

[Criminal Code, February 7th, 2005]

Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to rise today to speak in support of Bill C-10 and to encourage all members of the House to support this reform.

The Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights reviewed the mental disorder provisions of the Criminal Code in 2002. The work of the committee is reflected in Bill C-10.

The public may recall the old law that used the term “not guilty by reason of insanity”. The current and modern criminal law refers to persons found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder and those found unfit to stand trial. These terms better reflect the reality, however, the law is not well-known and is often misunderstood. There remains a perception that a person who commits an offence and is found not criminally responsible gets away with their crime. This is not the case. There are consequences and in some cases they may appear to be more severe than where an accused is convicted.

The law governing persons found unfit and not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder does provide consequences: usually treatment and supervision that can last indefinitely, and for some, detention in a secure psychiatric facility.

Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code provides a comprehensive regime to regulate effectively and equitably the supervision and treatment of a mentally disordered accused and the protection of public security.

I indicated that this area of the law is not well understood, even by some lawyers. For victims of criminal acts, criminal law and the criminal justice system are generally overpowering, complex and often daunting. Victims rarely need to know the law until they find themselves at the core of the justice system.

When an accused is found to be unfit to stand trial or not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, victims of criminal acts are even more confused and are confronted with more obstacles in their pursuit of justice.

Victims of crime desire and deserve information about the justice system and about the case in which they are personally involved. Law reforms, as well as changes in policies and expansion of services, have given victims a greater role in criminal proceedings.

For example, amendments to the Criminal Code in 1988 introduced the notion of the victim impact statement as a mechanism for victims of crime to describe the harm or loss suffered because of the crime. Publication bans to protect the identity of sexual assault victims were also enacted in 1988.

Criminal Code amendments over the last 15 years have further enhanced the role of victims of crime while respecting the rights of accused persons.

In response to the 1998 report of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, “Victims' Rights: A Voice, Not A Veto”, the government enacted a package of reforms in the Criminal Code in 1999 to, among other things, ensure the victims were made aware of the opportunity to submit a victim impact statement.

We also wanted to make sure that the safety of the victim was considered in the judicial interim release decisions, fix the amount and clarify the automatic imposition of a victim surcharge, and allow judges discretion to order a publication ban on the identity of any victim or witness where necessary for the proper administration of justice.

The 1999 amendments also apply to the victim of an offence committed by an accused who is suffering from mental disorder, and they provide for the preparation and presentation of a statement by the victim to the court or the review board at a hearing to make a decision, under section 672.541, in the case of an accused who is not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

The court or the review board shall take into consideration any statement filed “to the extent that the statement is relevant to its consideration of the criteria set out in section 672.54”. However, in each case, it is the victim who will decide whether he or she will prepare and file a statement.

The victim impact statement is provided for in subsection 672.5(14) which states:

A victim of the offence may prepare and file with the court or Review Board, a written statement describing the harm done to, or loss suffered by, the victim arising from the commission of the offence.

Where an accused person is found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, the review board decides how the accused is to be supervised.

Victims of crime have been overlooked in many cases and receive little information about what will happen next, how their safety concerns will be addressed or whether they will have any role or access to any information.

The standing committee in its review of Bill C-10 considered additional amendments to enhance the role of the victim. The committee heard several witnesses, some who advocated for a greater role for victims and others who were not supportive of the victim interests. The committee clearly rejected the submissions of those who sought to restrict the victim's role. The committee also considered the existing code provisions and other measures that should be addressed in policy rather than legislation to improve the response to victims.

The amendments included in Bill C-10 would enhance the role of victims of crime where the accused was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder. However, the new provisions for victims fully respect the differences between the law the governs a person who is criminally responsible, convicted and sentenced and those who are not criminally responsible.

The accused found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder is not held accountable for his or her conduct, and the appropriate disposition in section 672.54 must take into account several factors, including the need to protect the public, the mental condition of the accused and the reintegration of the accused into society. The impact of the crime on the victim may be relevant only to some of the criteria. Where the court or review board is considering a conditional discharge, the victim statement may be relevant to the crafting of particular conditions, for example, that the accused not contact the victim or that the accused not go to certain places. There also may be benefits to the victim of submitting a victim impact statement, even where the accused's condition is unchanged.

Again, I should point out that the administration of justice and the delivery of services to victims come under the jurisdiction of the provinces. The services provided to victims in the administration of justice are also provincial responsibilities.

The provision of forms for the victim's statement, the assistance provided to the victim to help him or her fill out the forms, the gathering and presentation of the statements to the Crown or to the court are generally managed through the provincial victim services programs.

The standing committee in its 2002 review recommended that courts or review boards conducting a review hearing notify the victim where the victim had indicated interest in receiving such notification. Bill C-10 includes provisions to require a court conducting an initial disposition hearing or a review board conducting the initial disposition hearing where the court has not to inquire of the crown or the victim whether the victim has been advised of the opportunity to prepare a statement. As a result of an amendment passed by the committee, notice of the hearing and of the relevant criminal code provisions, including the victim impact statement provisions, will be provided to the victim. The manner and time for the notice will be established by the rules of the court or review board. Other non-legislative initiatives are required to inform victims of crime about the provision of the code which apply to them and about relevant dates of proceedings, the terms of a disposition and other essential information.

Let us not forget that the victim should, until the accused has been declared not criminally responsible, benefit from the implementation of all the provisions of the code that are aimed at facilitating victims' participation and at protecting their safety and private life. It is only once the accused has been declared not criminally responsible that the implementation of the code's new special provisions is necessary to ensure the victim's participation in the hearings of the review board.

Bull C-10 also includes the following provisions, which seek to strengthen the role of victims of criminal acts.

Victims would be permitted to orally present their victim impact statements at the review board hearing. The statement would be prepared in advance and the victim could read it aloud or in some cases present it in another manner.

Following the delivery of the verdict of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, the court or review board chairperson must ask the Crown, victim or victim representative whether the victim has been made aware that he or she can submit a victim impact statement.

The first hearing may be adjourned to allow the victim to prepare a statement, if he or she so wishes. The review boards will have new powers allowing them to impose a publication ban on the identity of the victims and witnesses, when this serves the interests of justice.

As a result of a committee amendment, at the victim's request, notice of the hearing or other code provisions would be given to the victim. Rules of the court or review board would be set out how this notice should be provided.

Also, as a result of an amendment passed by the committee, review boards would be required to provide a specific notice to victims where, based on an assessment report of the accused that indicates an improvement in the conditions of the accused, they anticipate the accused would be given an absolute discharge or conditional disposition. The victim would then be advised of the opportunity to prepare and submit a victim impact statement.

To the extent possible, Bill C-10 includes provisions for victims similar to those of the Criminal Code that apply when an accused is found guilty and is sentenced.

The government places a high priority on addressing the concerns of victims of crime. This is shared by all members of the House, and was reflected in the improvements made by the standing committee to Bill C-10. The amendments to Bill C-10 are a contribution of the evolution in our justice system that recognizes the roles of victims of crime.

I would encourage hon. members to support Bill C-10. I believe that these amendments provide greater protection for mentally disordered accused persons and a greater role for victims of crime.

[Question No. 27, February 4th, 2005]

Mr. Speaker, I ask that all remaining questions be allowed to stand.

[Questions on the Order Paper, February 4th, 2005]

Mr. Speaker, Question No. 27 will be answered today.