Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise to discuss in the House the motion for fixed elections. I do appreciate, too, that it is the desire of the opposition, in embracing a fixed election date, to stimulate a debate on what will make our Parliament more effective and responsive to the critical issues of our times. I think both sides of the House share that objective, and in fact a great deal of the discussion with respect to the democratic deficit has generated the kind of debate that we are involved in here.
I would suggest that there are some fallacies with respect to the motion put forward, and some false premises, I might add, that may not have been considered. I would like to put them out for the House to consider from my particular perspective.
First, may I say that the motion for fixed elections purports to introduce more democracy and accountability in the same manner as the motion for proportional representation. We remember that one being put forward.
The premise here is that fixed election dates would reinforce the concept of democracy, the ability for Parliament to remain vigilant and reactive in a dynamic way. If I may just digress for a moment, proportional representation was put forward in the same manner. I would suggest that if we look at proportional representation, we will see that it too was flawed in terms of the premise. I will attempt to trace that through to the fixed election date argument.
We heard that proportional representation would actually weaken traditional parliamentary institutions. Generally what would happen is that proportional representation would disaggregate public opinion. Instead of having a coming together of a consensus on a particular issue, we would probably have many more perspectives put forward. That would lead, in my opinion--and this was not part of the debate at the time--to the creation of special interest parties that would reflect special interest groups. Finally, that in fact would lead to the breaking down of the cohesiveness of Canadian society that in fact is reflected in the party system, through the party system, and is represented in the parliamentary tradition.
I would contend that this motion for fixed election dates, while it is well intended, is an attempt to replicate the presidential system without considering the impact on the parliamentary system. It is doing so by challenging under the rubric, let us say, of challenging executive authority as vested in the Prime Minister.
However, we should reflect for a moment on the differences between a presidential system and the parliamentary system, because if we think that south of the border the system is working so well with fixed election dates, we should keep a few things in mind. First, while there is a fixed term for the president, there are staggered terms of two years for the rest of congress. While they have a fixed election date, there are checks and balances within the presidential system in that the continuity and the responsiveness of congress provide for a dynamic institutional response to issues of the times with a balance of corporate memory in the congress.
While the president is in a fixed term, the congress is in an alternating mode. Therefore, the congress is in fact representing, to some extent, the response to the major economic questions of the time. There is a continuity of issues that have evolved through the term of that president and that congress. With a fixed term, after the term is up of the president, the whole congress and the president could be shifted out the door. There is that check and balance in terms of that responsiveness.
If we think of just that for a moment, if we wanted to achieve the same thing with fixed elections in the parliamentary tradition, would we then say that it would be very important that there be that corporate memory and that there be the stability that would come from the presence in the House of parliamentarians who would be elected on the issues and the vision of how to respond to our times? Would it not then be in keeping, with attempting to trace the comparison with the presidential system, to talk about a staggered term for members of Parliament? Think about that. Would this not be confusing for the electorate? Who do they want within the fixed term of Parliament? Who do they want to support? We would have some parliamentarians across the country who would be elected at different times.
It is important to remember that the prime minister, unlike the president of the United States, is the leader of the party that is in power. That is his or her rather limited executive authority. He or she as prime minister would not enjoy the opportunities for veto. The mechanism that the prime minister has to keep in mind is that he or she has to maintain the confidence of the House, not to the same extent the president obviously would in a presidential system.
I would contend that at any given time it would be difficult under a system with a fixed election date to replicate that kind of authority, the same dynamics and ability, to hold the government to account. If there were that kind of ongoing rotation within the Parliament to try and keep that kind of consistency, people would not really know who the government was. I think that there are problems there.
The other point I would make is about the checks and balances which we wish to maintain through the parliamentary system, rather than weakening the system and making it less responsive. I would contend that it is more responsive to have a term set out, but within that term there are mechanisms whereby the government could be called into account by Parliament for various reasons. Of course the one that we have as our tradition in the Westminster system, the convention, is the vote of non-confidence through the budget or through money allocations.
If we think of this in the changing context of our times, the nature of the issues that have been facing Parliament have made it absolutely necessary for the parliamentary institutions to be more vigilant because more information is in the hands of our pluralistic society, through our interest groups.
I need not refer at great length to the issue that is affecting this Parliament at this very time. It is sparking the whole issue of whether there be an election. It is the sponsorship issue and the challenging with respect to the stewardship of tax moneys.
I would like to rest the case not on those who are totally opposed to reform. I would like to make that clear. Through the action plan that has been outlined in the House, there are members on both sides who wish to see reform. However, I think it is wrong-headed to pursue it from the perspective of a fixed election date alone, as if that would be the grand panacea.
The facts would lead us to the conclusion that within the context of a term, with the nature of financial and taxation issues which are of great question to Canadians, the government has to be vigilant. The government has to put forward its agenda and be prepared to defend it. The stewardship of tax moneys has to be transparent.
In fact there was a time when the auditor general reported once a year, and that was it. There was this huge, voluminous report that was thrown down. There was no role with respect to the committees. There was no role in how to deal with the estimates to the extent that the oversight provisions of committee should be raised. Those issues were not the substance on the agenda of other parliaments.
Here we are talking about those very issues in a more non-partisan way. If we are absolutely determined, as we should be, to be the stewards of the public interest, financial, social, environmental and so on, the issue does not have as much to do with how long we are here. It is how we make the institutions of the parliamentary system work more effectively while we are here.
That is why it would be my humble opinion that the issues related to proportional representation, how we get there and the terms of a fixed election date, comparing perhaps the presidential system or even systems in developing countries or whatever, are really to deflect what the essential issue is, as has been put forward by the Prime Minister and by the opposition side. That is how we can be more effective as parliamentarians, through the institutions of government in the parliamentary system. We can focus primarily on the committee system and from that look at the relationship to the oversight structures, such as the secretariat of Treasury Board, Treasury Board, the office of the Comptroller General, the role of the Auditor General, the role of committees in terms of project and program review and how the system becomes more stimulated and accountable.
Those are the essential issues. I would suggest, as I have said before, that the issue is simply not one of arriving at a fixed date with respect to how long this Parliament will sit.
I put those forward as very quickly responses to the points raised by some of the members who have a sincere desire to make Parliament more accountable. However, a fixed date for elections I just do not think will cut it.