Alistair MacGregor

[Grocery Industry, June 18th, 2024]

Mr. Speaker, people are increasingly turning to food banks in Halifax because of sky-high grocery prices, with food bank visits having risen by 21% since last year. Instead of tackling the corporate greed gouging these families, the Liberals gutted the NDP's bill to address price-fixing and harmful mergers that are increasing prices for Canadians. Just like the Conservatives, they would rather protect CEO profits over lowering prices for Canadians.

Why do the Liberals choose corporate power and profits over the people of Nova Scotia?

[Questions Passed as Orders for Returns, June 17th, 2024]

With regard to federal housing investments for Vancouver Island, since February 1, 2006, broken down by year: (a) how much federal funding was provided to support the construction of non-profit or community housing and how many units were developed; (b) how much federal funding was provided to support the construction of cooperative housing and how many units were developed; and (c) how much federal funding was provided to support the construction of purpose-built rental housing and how many units were developed?

[Amendments to the Standing Orders, June 12th, 2024]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to be rising in the House today to share a few remarks on Motion No. 109, put forward by my colleague from Lanark—Frontenac—Kingston. This motion specifically looks at the Standing Orders of the House of Commons.

For constituents in Cowichan—Malahat—Langford who might be watching this debate, I realize that whenever we talk about the Standing Orders, to people outside of this place it is a bit of inside baseball. However, the Standing Orders are extremely important, not only to the members who serve in this House but also to our constituents, because they are essentially the bylaws by which we operate. They spell out the procedure and practice of this place and set up the rules for debate, how voting can occur, how motions can be presented, and so on and so forth. They are extremely important, because while many Canadians may not be intimately aware of them or familiar with them, they are very important to allow me, as a member, and all of my colleagues to do our jobs in this place. Those rules are important because, in order to do our job properly, we need those rules. I have to be able to effectively represent the constituents of my riding, as every member does.

The Standing Orders are important, and probably even more so for opposition members. When I was first elected to the House of Commons in 2015, my first four years in this place were in opposition to a majority government. The incredible amount of power that a majority government wields is quite awesome to behold because, of course, it has the votes to win on every motion and every bill. As the opposition, when we are faced with a majority government, knowing it has the votes necessary to prevail in every instance, the only thing we have left is the rules of the House, the Standing Orders.

Majority governments have to walk a fine line. They cannot just barge their way through everything, because the opposition can use the Standing Orders of the House to create a real logjam. For every action, there can be an equal and opposite reaction. I recall that frequently, during those first four years of my time in the House of Commons, when the Liberal majority government behaved too much like a bully, there would be a reaction where we could tie up the House of Commons in procedural shenanigans. That is one of the options that an opposition can use to make its displeasure felt.

One of the biggest instances of that would be back in 2017, which, of course, was the famous filibuster at the procedure and House affairs committee. At that time, the government was trying to unilaterally change the Standing Orders. We have often tried to change them based on a consensus model, but the changes that the Liberals were proposing to the Standing Orders at the time would have, effectively, neutered the opposition's powers to hold the government to account in this place. Of course, it was a non-starter for all of the opposition parties.

One of the ways in which we protested against these proposed changes to the Standing Orders was to use the Standing Orders to launch our protest. I remember that, at that time, the procedure and House affairs committee went through a filibuster that lasted, I think, over 50 hours. There were frequent times in the House of Commons when the legislative agenda of the day was interrupted through dilatory motions and vote calls. It was all in an effort to make the opposition's displeasure known to the government. The Liberals did eventually back down, so the Standing Orders are quite important.

I will now get to Motion No. 109 and what is being proposed by the member for Lanark—Frontenac—Kingston. Essentially, several changes are being proposed in this motion, but it is really about improving the way the House can amend the Standing Orders by making it harder for the majority of the House to impose its will on the minority. It comes down to the model where a consensus is important. I am proud to support this motion. This is a very legitimate and proper motion being proposed on the Standing Order changes. We fundamentally believe that no one party should be doing this without the consent of the opposition.

Let us go through some of the details here. One of the first parts is that the government cannot use a provision that gives a minister the right to move a motion for which unanimous consent was denied. The government would not be able to use closure. A previous question could not be moved in order to prevent the tabling of amendments. The motion would also increase the amount of time in debate for concurrence of a committee report that contains changes to the Standing Orders. The motion would change how the House deals with private members' motions and opposition motions that propose amendments to the Standing Orders.

Instead of the House voting on the motion, the vote would be on referral of the matter to the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, otherwise known as PROC, which would then have 75 sitting days to report on the matter. Motion No. 109 itself is going to be referred to PROC to study these changes and report to the House on the matter within that time frame.

Again, all in all, this is a very reasonable proposal. For all the reasons I outlined, it is something that I am going to support. I realize that, for anyone listening to this debate, this is very much inside baseball. However, I can assure people outside the House of Commons that these kinds of changes are extremely important. They allow us to do our job, and I think that this is an important injection of fairness into how we amend the future.

[Countering Foreign Interference Act, June 12th, 2024]

Madam Speaker, part 1 of the bill has pretty significant proposed upgrades to the CSIS Act, particularly with how CSIS handles its dataset regime. That is following a fairly scathing report from the NSIRA, which showed that CSIS had regularly broken its legislative guidelines with respect to datasets.

As legislators, we are being asked to put a fair amount of trust into the executive branch and our intelligence agencies. I have no doubt that they do great work.

However, is my hon. colleague satisfied that our existing accountability mechanisms, our oversight mechanisms, such as NSICOP, NSIRA and the intelligence commissioner, are sufficient enough to maybe avoid reading another NSIRA report about how CSIS has breached its statutory guidelines in a number of years?

[Countering Foreign Interference Act, June 12th, 2024]

Madam Speaker, for part 1, part 2 and part 3, the coming-into-force provisions would be 60 days after the bill receives royal assent, which is a fairly reasonable timeline.

What I think my colleague is alluding to is part 4, for which the coming into force would really be left up to a date determined by Governor in Council. If we do want to have a registry set up and operational, that, I would submit, is where time is of the essence.

Public safety officials were not able to comment specifically on what kind of time frame they would need, but I think they understand from the questioning they received from members of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security that we treat the registry with seriousness and that we have high expectations of that.

Again, I hope the other place, the Senate, understands the urgency and passes the bill so it can land on the Governor General's desk in short order.

[Countering Foreign Interference Act, June 12th, 2024]

Madam Speaker, there was one amendment in particular submitted by my colleague, the member for Vancouver East, who, of course, has been personally and negatively impacted by foreign interference. She wanted to see an enhanced tier added to the registry part of the bill, still keeping it country-agnostic, but having an additional tier where the government could place people who were of direct concern because of the activities they were carrying out that were really quite harmful to the interests of Canada.

Having an enhanced tier would have strengthened the bill. Unfortunately, we did not get it passed. I know that my hon. colleague and the Bloc Québécois put forward a number of great amendments. One I particularly liked was giving public office holders a three-year window when they could not operate, but unfortunately that did not pass. Hopefully the Senate may take up some of our ideas. We shall see.

[Countering Foreign Interference Act, June 12th, 2024]

Madam Speaker, a lot of my initial concerns with the bill, after I had the chance to speak with officials from Public Safety Canada, CSIS and the RCMP, were addressed. However I do have to admit, as a legislator, that if the bill passes, I would be putting a lot of trust in the executive's hands. We can be very glad that we have oversight bodies like NSICOP, NSIRA and the intelligence commissioner, because those are very important feedback loops to keep the agencies within the confines of the law they are operating under. Again, this is one small part I get to play in helping us as a country address foreign interference with the seriousness it deserves.

[Countering Foreign Interference Act, June 12th, 2024]

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to rise in the House today to join my colleagues and share a few remarks on Bill C-70, a bill that I have become intimately familiar with over the last couple of weeks, given that I am a member of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security.

Of course, that committee was seized with this bill last week, where we had meetings over four days, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday of last week, with extended hours so that we could hear from witnesses, because of a programming motion from the House. I think that programming motion, and the fact that we have seen all parties in this place, usually a pretty partisan environment, put those differences aside to come together, I think underscores how important this legislation is and the realization from all political parties that this is a moment in time in Canadian history when we must meet the challenge united and with a clear purpose, because the threat is certainly there.

To put it into context, last week, of course, the report from NSICOP, the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, landed with the force of a bomb and, of course, has been dominating the news cycle ever since. I will not talk about the allegations toward members of Parliament in that report. I think the other parts of the report that are especially pertinent to tonight's debate are the fact that NSICOP has found, through its briefings with intelligence officials, that our intelligence community feels that our foreign adversaries regard Canada as a “low-risk, high reward” place in which to operate and pursue their strategic objectives. There are a number of reasons for this. That same report was also quite scathing of the Liberal government's response to the dire circumstances surrounding foreign interference: too little, too late.

That aside, we are at this moment and we do have Bill C-70 before us. It is important to understand that the bill has some pretty consequential amendments to existing statutes while also setting up a stand-alone law.

It is important to remember that when we are talking about foreign interference, it can be broadly separated into the interference or influence that we see publicly, coming not only from our adversaries but also from our allies, and the malicious and very pernicious aspect of foreign interference, which is the parts that happen in a clandestine way, the parts that are deceptive and underhanded, where adversaries are trying to use all tools at their disposal to influence how our democracy functions, sometimes to cause chaos, sometimes to pursue strategic objectives. It really depends on the circumstances and the country involved.

While we have had a slow response from the Liberal government, it is also very clear that our outdated national security laws are not up to the challenge of meeting that threat as they are currently written. I have used the phrase a couple of times over the last few days, as well as today, that essentially many of our laws were created in an analog era and that we need to bring them up to speed to meet the threat in what is a digital era. That is a big part of what Bill C-70 does.

What is in Bill C-70? The bill is divided into four parts. Part 1 deals with amendments to the CSIS Act. Many of those are in response to a pretty scathing report from NSIRA, which showed that CSIS has regularly broken its own statute's legislative guidelines in how it handles datasets. Again, when that law was crafted, back in 1984, the most advanced piece of technology in people's offices was probably a fax machine. We are a far cry from those days.

I think the other really consequential amendment to the CSIS Act is that it is now going to equip CSIS with the ability to share information with other interested parties, with parties that have a need to know some of this information. Under current laws, CSIS is very constrained in how it can share information. Again, if we are going to counter this threat with the seriousness it deserves, we need to equip our agencies with the tools that allow them to share this information.

Part 2 is also a very consequential update to the Security of Information Act. This part of the bill is really targeting the deceptive, clandestine nature of foreign interference. We all know that violations of any provision of the Security of Information Act come with hefty penalties, and in the bill before us, they are also there, because it underscores, again, how serious a nature these offences are. So, there are offences now for any foreign principals who are using violence, intimidation or threats to pursue strategic interests at the direction of, or in association with, a foreign principal, and there are hefty penalties going after anyone who is trying to influence governmental or legislative processes. Those are all spelled out in the Security of Information Act. Again, this is the part of the bill that is designed to go after the foreign interference that is not publicly known about, that is not going to be affected by the registry, which comes later on in the bill.

In part 4, there are also important updates to the Canada Evidence Act to really try to streamline the process. Evidence is often of a very sensitive nature and, again, we have heard a lot over the last two weeks of the gulf that exists between intelligence and evidence. However, when intelligence gets to a point where it can be used as evidence, we still need to handle it in a very secure way, and in a way that does not expose where our sources are, because, of course, that is of national interest to our country.

However, part 4, I think, is probably the part that has gotten the most attention in the bill. It would set up a registry so that we would have more accountability and transparency. It would be country agnostic, an important part to underline in this, so that even people who are working on the direction of, or in association with, friends and allies of Canada would still have to register if they are communicating with elected officials and if they are trying to influence some type of governmental process. It involves elected officials at the federal, provincial and municipal levels, and also with indigenous governments and organizations.

It is an important part, and I think the country-agnostic feature of the bill is also important. Canadians definitely have an interest in how our adversaries are behaving here on Canadian soil. We would like to see those persons registered, but we might also have a very legitimate interest to see how our friends and allies are operating here on Canadian soil, because we would be deluding ourselves if we did not think that our friends and allies, in some way or another, are trying to influence how Canada makes its decisions, which has been a part of statecraft ever since there were states.

In the brief time that I have left, I realize that there still are concerns out there from some members of the community. I highlighted earlier the National Council of Canadian Muslims, which has concerns about some of the aspects of the bill that are not very well defined. However, in my opinion, the bill does achieve a balancing act. Again, because of how dire the situation is with foreign interference, we need to meet this moment with a strong legislative response. I think that this is us, in the House of Commons, and later on in the Senate, but the Parliament of Canada as a whole, giving notice to our adversaries that their activities are now on our radar. We are aware of what they have been doing in Canada for quite some time now, and we are going to meet that challenge with a challenge of our own. This is really putting our cards on the table and showing people that we are serious about meeting this.

I am happy that there was a pretty collaborative effort at committee with amendments. The Bloc did not get all of the amendments that it wanted passed, and neither did the NDP, but that is the way democracy works at committee. However, all in all, I am quite happy with the product that has been reported back to the House. I am glad to see that the House has come together to see the bill passed through by the end of tomorrow. I hope that the Senate will take the bill under way with the seriousness that it deserves.

[Countering Foreign Interference Act, June 12th, 2024]

Madam Speaker, part of the NSICOP report's conclusions was that Canada is a “low-risk, high reward” place to operate in, so it is obvious that we need to meet this moment with these legislative safeguards.

I want to ask the member about the first part of the bill, the updates to the CSIS Act, because the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency came out with a pretty scathing review of how CSIS has handled its datasets, and we would do important upgrades here to bring what is essentially an analog law up to speed in a digital era.

Can the member talk about some of the safeguards that we would put into place with this legislation and the updates that we would put in place to make sure that CSIS is no longer violating the statute that it operates by?

[Countering Foreign Interference Act, June 12th, 2024]

Madam Speaker, in part 4 of the bill, which sets up the public registry, one of the key features of the registry is that it is country-agnostic. In other words, Canadians would be able to see how all countries' foreign principals are trying to exert influence in Canada: not only our adversaries, but also our friends and allies.

Can my hon. colleague comment on that feature of the registry, the fact that it is country-agnostic, and how that lends itself to accountability and transparency for Canadians to see?