Bob Dechert

[Protecting Canadians from Online Crime Act, September 22nd, 2014]

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the comments and questions by my colleague from the justice committee. She will know that the Spencer decision had been mooted in the lower courts and that everyone was quite well aware of those arguments. I think everyone on the Justice committee at the time that this bill was studied was aware of the arguments that were put before the Supreme Court.

The opposition seems to have a position that the government should wait for the courts to make decisions in cases. There are dozens of cases before the courts of this land at any given time, but what our government needs to do and intends to do is rebalance our justice legislation between the rights of the accused and the rights of the victims in order to restore people's faith in the justice system. We think Bill C-13 does that with respect to cyberbullying. We are implementing the recommendations of the cybercrime working group, and the member will know that those provisions are very necessary in order to allow the legal authorities to investigate such crimes and prevent these crimes from happening again in the future.

We need to move quickly. The member has called for a split of the bill. She will know that virtually every expert who was called by the opposition appeared before the committee, that these issues were significantly debated, and they will be debated again when the Senate debates the bill.

[Protecting Canadians from Online Crime Act, September 22nd, 2014]

Mr. Speaker, I am thankful for the opportunity to participate in today's very important debate on Bill C-13, the protecting Canadians from online crime act.

Bill C-13 would provide a strong criminal justice response to the problem of cyberbullying. Cyberbullying, much like bullying in general, is a very complex social phenomenon that requires the attention of all segments of society. Most bullying behaviour is not a criminal behaviour and should be dealt with outside of the criminal justice system. However, we know that the reach of the Internet, the speed at which information can be shared, and the ability to act anonymously have made cyberbullying a serious concern.

This problem cannot be fixed simply by enacting a new law that would adequately cover all instances of this behaviour, but that does not mean that the criminal law cannot be strengthened in this area. This is why Bill C-13 provides a targeted response within the government's broader commitment to address the issue of bullying and cyberbullying.

If passed into the law, the proposed Criminal Code amendments would create a new offence of non-consensual distribution of intimate images with accompanying complementary amendments. The second main purpose of Bill C-13 is to provide the police with tools to give them the ability to address all crimes committed via the Internet or that involve electronic evidence.

Let me state the obvious here. All of the elements of Bill C-13 logically go together. Police will be able to more effectively and efficiently investigate the proposed new offence and other crimes committed via the Internet or that involve electronic evidence with the proposed legally authorized tools.

Absent the new production and preservation orders proposed in Bill C-13, there would be no tool in the Criminal Code to enable the preservation and ensure that important evidence is not deleted. There would be no tool designed for production of specific subsets of tracking data and transmission data, nor would there be a tool to assist in tracing a communication by using one order with multiple providers. Without these tools, law enforcement's ability to protect Canadians from online crime and cyberbullying would be seriously hampered.

I would like to focus my remarks today on a specific provision included in Bill C-13, proposed subsection 487.0195(2) of the Criminal Code, which would provide immunity from civil and criminal liability to persons who voluntarily assist police. In a nutshell, proposed subsection 487.0195(2) would amend existing subsection 487.014(2) of the Criminal Code, which was enacted in 2004 with the creation of production orders in the Criminal Code. Subsection 487.014(2) was designed to clarify that the new production orders were not intended to preclude ongoing voluntary assistance where such assistance was not precluded by law and to reconfirm existing legal principles that such assistance would not create any liability, either civil or criminal.

When new authorities such as production orders are created in law, the result can be that common law authorities are displaced. This was not the intent when production orders were introduced into the Criminal Code in 2004, nor is it the intent with respect to the updates to production orders and the new preservation authorities proposed in Bill C-13.

The ability of the public to voluntarily assist police is essential to effective policing and a core component of ensuring public safety. Police may request information on a voluntary basis in many situations, including general policing duties that may not relate directly to investigating a crime, such as requesting information so they can contact family members when there is an accident.

However, I want to be clear. Bill C-13 would not create a new authority for voluntary assistance. It would simply clarify that any existing authority for voluntary assistance continues to be in place where not prohibited by law. It would also not create a new protection from civil or criminal liability but reconfirms the existing protection. This provision simply reconfirms existing legal principles that if an entity is legally permitted to turn over data to the police, then that entity will not be subject to civil or criminal liability for doing so. If an entity is prohibited by law from disclosing information, for example, by legislation or by contract, then immunity will not be available.

The minor revisions to existing subsection 487.014(2) that are proposed in Bill C-13 are primarily to make the provision more transparent and understandable by specifying that the protections from civil and criminal liability that are currently provided in section 25 of the Criminal Code, which deals with the protection of persons acting under authority, apply not only in the context of the current production orders but also in the context of the new production orders proposed in Bill C-13. The proposed amendments would also reflect the addition of preservation demands and orders to the Criminal Code.

This existing provision, which did not receive any attention when it was first enacted in 2004, attracted considerable criticism in the media and during committee hearings on Bill C-13. Indeed, this provision was wrongly reported as providing police with warrantless access to personal information and has been inaccurately described as a means of opening the floodgates of data between the private sector and the police.

In addition, some have also called for the deletion of this provision as a result of their interpretation of the June 2014 unanimous decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Spencer.

I wish first to confirm what the government has stated all along, a view supported by the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Spencer: that proposed subsection 487.0195(2) does not create any new search and seizure powers. Second, the proposed section continues to be required for those who continue to voluntarily assist the police where not prohibited by law. Those words are very specifically spelled out in the proposed legislation.

Specifically, the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Spencer said in paragraph 73 of the decision that the existing voluntary disclosure and immunity provision is “...a declaratory provision that confirms the existing common law powers of police officers to make enquiries”, as indicated by the fact that the section begins with the phrase “for greater certainty”. The decision makes it clear that Bill C-13 does not, and never did, create new police powers to access telecommunications data without a judicial warrant.

In R. v. Spencer, the court expanded the privacy protections afforded to information related to an Internet protocol, or IP, address in certain circumstances, thereby taking this information out of the realm of information that can be provided voluntarily. However, the court did not suggest that voluntary disclosures were now impermissible. Rather, it held that voluntary assistance could still be provided in exigent circumstances, or pursuant to a reasonable law, or where there is no reasonable expectation of privacy. This clearly leaves scope for permissible voluntary assistance and provision of information without judicial pre-authorization.

Since the R. v. Spencer decision still allows for voluntary assistance to police in those circumstances, the clarification and the protection from immunity contained an existing subsection 487.014(2) and proposed subsection 487.0195(2) are still needed.

Bill C-13 was thoroughly examined by the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights. The committee amended the bill to require a parliamentary review of proposed sections 487.011 to 487.02 of the Criminal Code—i.e., the new preservation demands and orders, the updated production order scheme, and the assistance order provision—seven years after these provisions come into force.

I agree with this amendment and said so at the justice committee. Given the highly technical nature of these reforms, I believe that a parliamentary review would be helpful to assess if the reforms have achieved their intended impacts. This amendment may also serve to alleviate some concerns expressed by privacy advocates, as it provides a future opportunity for inquiry into the privacy impacts of the legislation.

In summary. Bill C-13 was strengthened at committee and deserves to be passed into law in the form in which it was reported back to the House. I urge all hon. members to make this possible by ensuring the swift passage of the bill.

[Protecting Canadians from Online Crime Act, September 22nd, 2014]

Mr. Speaker, the member mentioned that the government likes to wrap itself in the testimony of victims, as if there is something inappropriate about telling Canadians about the stories of victims that have led to this specific bill. Then he goes on to extensively quote from the testimony of Ms. Todd, which is terrific. I think people have a right to know what was said in committee.

I wonder if the member heard that Ms. Todd met with the Minister of Justice following her appearance at the justice committee and then did a subsequent CBC Radio interview about two or three days later. I wonder if the member heard that interview and what she said then. Maybe he could quote from that next time he has an opportunity. If he has not had a chance to hear that interview, I would be happy to provide him with a transcript. He would find that after speaking with the Minister of Justice, Ms. Todd understood why many of these investigative powers are necessary in order to prevent the kind of thing that happened to her daughter from happening again.

The member also did not mention what Glen Canning or Allan Hubley said about Bill C-13 or why they think these investigative powers are critical to ensure that what happened to their children does not happen to other children.

I would like the member to tell us if there are any parts of recommendation 4 from the Cybercrime Working Group report of June 2013 that he disagrees with. That group of experts said that those recommendations were necessary in addition to the criminal offence of distributing an intimate image to ensure that these types of crimes can be properly investigated and prevented. Perhaps the member could tell us about that.

[Protecting Canadians from Online Crime Act, September 22nd, 2014]

Mr. Speaker, the member mentioned in her speech that she thinks this bill should be split into two pieces, one being a specific criminal provision having to do with the non-consensual distribution of intimate images, and everything else, that is, any investigative power, in a separate bill.

First, I did not hear from her what additional witnesses she thinks should come before the committee, since the committee had extensive hearings on this issue. My colleagues on the opposite side who were on the justice committee will confirm that.

Second, I wonder if the member has read the CCSO Cybercrime Working Group report, “Cyberbullying and the Non-consensual Distribution of Intimate Images”, and, in particular, recommendation number 4 of that report, which says:

The Working Group recommends that the investigative powers contained in the Criminal Code be modernized.... These amendments should include, among others:

Data preservation demands and orders;

New production orders to trace a specified communication;

New warrants and production orders for transmission data;

Improving judicial oversight while enhancing efficiencies in relation to authorizations, warrants and orders;

Other amendments to existing offences and investigative powers that will assist in the investigation of cyberbullying and other crimes that implicate electronic evidence.

How can the member stand here and say that we do not need these investigative powers to prevent the next Rehtaeh Parsons or Amanda Todd case from happening?

I would like to know if the member agrees with recommendation number 4 or if she disagrees with any of the parts of recommendation number 4.

[Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act, September 22nd, 2014]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank the Liberal justice critic for his speech and for his participation in the House of Commons justice committee proceedings this summer.

First, I would like to respond to something he mentioned in his speech. He said no lawyers, other than government lawyers, confirmed the constitutionality of Bill C-36. That is not true. Professor Benedet of UBC, one of Canada's foremost constitutional law experts, certainly did confirm that it was constitutional, as did several other lawyers. If he has forgotten, I would be happy to share the transcript of the parliamentary committee's work with him.

My question, though, for him is the same question I proposed to the NDP, which responded, when asked what it would do, that it will wait and find out. We do not know what either of these parties would do with respect to prostitution. What is the Liberal Party's position? Would it propose a bill to make the purchase of the sexual services of another person illegal in Canada?

[Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act, September 22nd, 2014]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank my friend, the NDP justice critic, for her contribution and participation in the House of Commons justice committee review over the summer.

I note that in her speech today, and at other opportunities, she mentioned that she did not understand how something could be illegal to purchase but not to sell. I would remind her that when the bill was introduced, the Minister of Justice said quite clearly that for the first time in Canada, prostitution would be made illegal by this bill.

The bill would provide an exemption to the persons who would sell their services, because, in the view of the government, we see them as primarily victims. The Minister of State for Western Economic Diversification made a good speech earlier about consent and how many people in this business were really not in a position to give consent because they were forced by their circumstances to do this.

What I want to ask her very succinctly is this. If her party were to propose a bill, would it make the purchase of sexual services of another person illegal?

[Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act, September 22nd, 2014]

Mr. Speaker, the member went on at some length to talk about specific provisions in the bill what would restrict prostitutes from communicating in a public place for the purpose of prostitution. Apparently she does not know that there was an amendment proposed and passed at the House justice committee on that very point that would restrict the communication in a public place provision to the schoolyard, the playground, and the daycare centre. I wonder if she could tell the House if she thinks it is a good idea that prostitutes be allowed, and perhaps encouraged, to communicate for the purposes of prostitution in those three places?

[Respecting Families of Murdered and Brutalized Persons Act, September 16th, 2014]

Mr. Speaker, it is a privilege to speak to the proposed amendments to the Criminal Code contained in the private member's bill before us today. The amendments contained in Bill C-587, the respecting families of murdered and brutalized persons act, introduced by my colleague, the member of Parliament for Okanagan—Shuswap, are based on the same fundamental idea that underlies many recent legislative initiatives passed by Parliament, which is the interests of victims of crime and of their families and loved ones.

That fundamental proposition is a straightforward one. Families and loved ones of murder victims should not become the secondary victims of a convicted murderer by being forced to relive the details of their terrible loss every time the killer applies for parole.

As hon. members may recall from past debates, both first and second degree murder are punishable by life imprisonment, subject to a period set out in section 745 of the Criminal Code, during which the murderer may not apply for parole. While all murders are morally blameworthy, first and second degree murder are distinguished from each other by the higher degree of moral blameworthiness associated with first degree murder that justifies the longer mandatory period of parole ineligibility of 25 years.

While the mandatory minimum period of parole ineligibility for second degree murder is 10 years, it may be increased in two situations.

First, if a second degree murderer has been convicted of a prior murder or of an intentional killing under the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, the parole ineligibility period will be automatically set for the same as first degree murder, namely 25 years. In such cases, the fact that the murderer has killed before is considered to increase his or her moral blameworthiness up to the level of a first degree murderer.

Second, even if the second degree murderer has not killed before, a judge has the discretion under section 745.4 of the Criminal Code to impose a period of parole ineligibility of up to 25 years based on the murderer's character, the nature and circumstances of the murder, and any jury recommendation in this regard. In short, the higher the degree of moral blameworthiness associated with a second degree murder, the longer the parole ineligibility period that may be imposed to reflect it.

It is important to keep the concept of moral blameworthiness in mind when considering the proposals put forward in Bill C-587. These proposals are directed at the most morally blameworthy of murders, those in which the murder victim has also been subjected to an abduction and to a sexual assault by the murderer. It is hard to imagine a more heinous series of acts committed against the victim.

The issue before us today is that, with the exception of the case of multiple murderers, the maximum parole ineligibility period for murder permitted under the Criminal Code is 25 years. This is true, no matter how terrible the circumstances in which the murder may have been committed.

As for multiple murderers, I am aware that in 2011, the Protecting Canadians by Ending Sentence Discounts for Multiple Murders Act came into force. These Criminal Code amendments permit a judge to impose a parole ineligibility period on a multiple murderer for the first murder in accordance with the provisions I have already described. The judge will also be authorized to impose consecutive parole ineligibility periods of 25 years, one for each victim after the first, to ensure that the lives of each and every victim will be reflected in the sentence ultimately imposed upon the murderer.

In short, this important legislation would help to ensure that no victim's life would be discounted at the time of sentencing.

However, the result of the seemingly arbitrary limit on parole ineligibility of 25 years on those who kill once in the circumstances reflected in Bill C-587 is a symbolic devaluation of the suffering of the murder victim, as well as an apparent disregard of the extreme level of moral blameworthiness exhibited by the murderer. One has only to recall the horrible murder of Tori Stafford by Michael Rafferty to realize the truth of this statement.

The member for Malpeque just said that this bill was a solution in search of a problem. I would ask him to review the terrible circumstances of the murder of that young girl, Tori Stafford, and then stand back up in the House and say whether there is no problem that needs to be addressed. This, in my view, addresses this situation and this problem. This problem has, unfortunately, occurred all too often in Canadian history. That is what we get from the moral equivalence of the Liberal Party.

Allow me to be more specific about what Bill C-587 would do.

First, it would amend section 745 of the Criminal Code to require a mandatory parole ineligibility period of 25 years for anyone convicted of murder who had also been convicted of committing one of the listed kidnapping and abduction offences, as well as one of the listed sexual offences against the murder victim. In short, the 25-year period would only apply if the murderer had been convicted of three offences against the same victim. This would ensure that this measure would be applied only against those whose crimes would justify this level of sanction.

Second, the bill would authorize a sentencing judge to replace that 25-year minimum parole ineligibility period with a longer period of up to 40 years based on the character of the offender, the nature and circumstances of the offences and any jury recommendation in this regard.

As I described earlier in the context of second degree murder, these are well-established Criminal Code criteria that permit the judge and jury who have heard the evidence at trial to make this important sentencing decision. Under the existing law, murderers who kidnap and sexually assault their victims already receive long sentences. This would continue to be true under Bill C-587.

However, the bill would also protect families and loved ones of murdered victims from the trauma of repeated parole applications of the murderer. As the hon. member for Okanagan—Shuswap said, when he introduced this legislation on April 7, “Sadistic criminals convicted of such heinous crimes are never granted parole, thus the hearings are unnecessary and are extremely painful for the victims’ families to endure”.

I will point out the terrible trauma that the victims of Clifford Olson went through when he had multiple parole hearings, even though we all knew, and he knew, that he would never be released. However, every two years, he would require the families of those victims to appear before a Parole Board hearing to go through and relive the horrible murders of their children over and over again.

In short, the bill is not just about creating stiffer penalties for sadistic murderers by allowing a judge to impose up to 40 years of parole ineligibility on the depraved murderers targeted by these measures. This bill is also about saving the families and loved ones of the victims from having to go through the agony of unnecessary and often traumatic Parole Board hearings.

If the member for Malpeque does not believe there is a problem here that needs to be solved, I would ask him to go and speak to the families of some of these victims and hear about the torture that they go through having to relive the awful circumstances of the murders of their loved ones over and over again. I would refer him to Sharon Rosenfeldt, who is the mother of one of Clifford Olson's victims. Perhaps he should speak to her and hear her point of view on this matter.

This is the fundamental proposition at the heart of the important measures proposed in the bill. It is far too often the case that the families and loved ones of victims experience a greater degree of pain and experience a greater sense of loss because the justice system has failed to protect them from being re-victimized every two years when the murderer applies in vein for parole.

Moreover, Bill C-587 is entirely consistent with past legislation passed by the House, such as the Protecting Canadians by Ending Sentence Discounts for Multiple Murders Act. It ensures that a life sentence of imprisonment for murder means just that: life in prison.

I will point out that in the past the Liberal justice critic has said that if the Liberals were to form a government, they would repeal that law which removed the faint hope clause and they would restore the faint hope clause, allowing murderers like the late Clifford Olson to have those continual Parole Board hearings.

Bill C-587 is also entirely consistent with another piece of important legislation that the House is also being asked to examine, Bill C-32, the victims bill of rights act, which was introduced on April 3 of this year. The victims bill of rights would put victims at the heart of the justice system in order to rebalance the scales of justice away from criminals and toward those who have suffered at their hands.

Bill C-587 is yet another example of this long overdue rebalancing. I urge all hon. members to examine it from this point of view. If they do, I am sure they will agree with me that it ought to be moved to the committee and third reading to ensure that it becomes the law of the land in the shortest time possible.

I thank all members for their attention and urge them to come together in the interests of the families and loved ones of the truly horrific crimes targeted by Bill C-587, such as the family of Tori Stafford. I strongly urge all members therefore to give their full support to this bill and ensure its swift passage.

[Criminal Code, June 18th, 2014]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to speak to Bill C-590, an act to amend the Criminal Code with respect to blood alcohol content.

I would first like to congratulate my hon. friend, the member for Prince Albert, for bringing this important bill forward. People should know that the member for Prince Albert has served on the agriculture committee, the international trade committee, the finance committee, and many other of the most important committees of this place. He is a great advocate of the Canadian agrifood industry, which he has a great deal of personal experience in. He has represented Canada on the international trade committee and in the travels with the international trade committee around the world, and does a great service to our country in promoting the trade of all the goods and services that Canada produces around the world. He has been, since 2011, president of ParlAmericas, which is a very important organization that represents legislators from all of the countries of North and South and Central America. He has travelled extensively in the United States, Mexico, Central America, and South America on behalf of Canada over the last several years, promoting our trade interests. For that alone, he is to be commended.

I believe that combatting impaired driving is an issue that unites all members in this House, as impaired driving kills and injures more Canadians than any other crime. Every day across Canada, families are devastated by the death or serious injury of a loved one. The pain and suffering caused by this crime makes it essential that we do whatever we can to reduce the incidence of impaired driving. Beyond the obvious social consequences of impaired driving, there is also a substantial financial cost on Canadian society. I note that the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, in a 2009 report entitled “Ending Alcohol-Impaired Driving: A Common Approach”, stated:

The average cost of impaired driving crashes in Canada from 1999 to 2006 has been calculated using the Real Dollar Estimate as approximately $1.9 billion per year. This figure is based on money spent, without considering any social costs. The average cost using the Willingness to Pay model is approximately $11.2 billion per year. This model includes money spent and a broad range of social-related costs.

Bill C-590 aims to deter the most dangerous drivers on the road, those with a blood alcohol concentration, or BAC, of 0.160 or more. Indeed, the standing committee, in its report, noted:

A study of alcohol use among fatally injured drivers, however, indicates that the bulk of the impaired driving problem lies with those drivers having a BAC over the current Criminal Code BAC limit of 0.08. Among the tested drivers in Canada, 62.9% showed no evidence of alcohol — 37.1% had been drinking, 4.3% had BACs below 0.05, 2.6% had BACs from 0.05 to 0.08, 9.4% had BACs from 0.081 to 0.160 and 20.8% had BACs over 0.160. In other words, 81.5% of fatally injured drinking drivers had BACs over the current limit of 0.08. High-BAC drivers (i.e. those with BACs over 160 mg/100 ml of blood) represent a disproportionate number of fatally injured drinking drivers.

I will repeat that last statistic because it really is quite important: 20.8%, or one in five, of all fatally injured drivers had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.160 or more. Anyone who has such a high BAC has consumed a very significant amount of alcohol. Although it is only an estimate, a BAC calculator on Quebec's Éduc’alcool website says that a 180-pound man has to drink eight bottles of beer in an hour to have a BAC of 0.166.

Accordingly, the standing committee concluded:

Section 255.1 of the Criminal Code states that if an impaired driving offence is committed by someone whose BAC exceeded 0.16 at the time [of] the offence..., this will be an aggravating factor on sentencing. This reflects the fact that driving with a high level of impairment (over 0.16 BAC or double the current legal limit) is generally indicative of serious problems. Even if a driver with this level of impairment is being detected for the first time, it is likely that this is a hard-core impaired driver. This is due to the fact that it is rarely the first time they have driven while impaired by alcohol — it is simply the first time they have been [caught]....

Bill C-590 would take dead aim at those high BAC drivers. The bill would create a new straight indictable offence of driving with a BAC exceeding 0.160, punishable by a maximum of 10 years' imprisonment and a mandatory minimum payment on a first offence of $2,000 plus 60 days' imprisonment, and on a second offence 240 days of imprisonment.

Such high mandatory minimum penalties should cause drivers to give a second thought to how much they are drinking before they get behind the wheel of a car.

Therefore, I urge all members to support higher mandatory minimum penalties for drivers with a blood alcohol concentration over 0.160. Members of the standing committee will, I am sure, want to hear from law enforcement, Mothers Against Drunk Driving Canada, and others regarding whether the proposed new offence and higher mandatory minimum penalties could be made more effective. In particular, there may be an advantage to the over 0.160 offence being a hybrid with penalties on summary conviction that are lower than the penalties on indictment. It is possible that prosecutors will be reluctant to proceed on the over 0.160 charge because of the more onerous procedures on indictment.

Bill C-590 also proposes higher mandatory minimum penalties for an impaired driver who causes bodily harm or death. Currently, subsection 255(3.3) of the Criminal Code provides:

For greater certainty, everyone who is liable to the punishment described in any of subsections (2) to (3.2) is also liable to the minimum punishment described in paragraph (1)(a).

What that means is that the mandatory minimum penalties that apply where there is no death or bodily harm with an offence of impaired driving, driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 0.80, or refusing to provide a breath or blood sample also apply to these offences when there is a death or bodily harm. There is a minimum fine of $1,000 for a first offence, 30 days' imprisonment for a second offence, and 120 days for a third offence.

It is obvious that these mandatory minimum penalties are unacceptable in these most serious cases. I understand that the courts do not give out fines in death and bodily injury cases. The purpose of these mandatory minimum penalties, when they were originally adopted, was to prevent the courts from imposing a conditional sentence of imprisonment.

As a result of amendments made in the Safe Streets and Communities Act, conditional sentences are not available where the offence has a maximum of 10 years and resulted in bodily harm. Still, it is theoretically possible for a court to impose a fine or a short period of imprisonment when the offence involves bodily harm or death.

I believe it is appropriate that Parliament indicates to the courts what the starting point should be, but I also believe that these proposed mandatory minimum penalties may not be appropriate in all cases.

Where the bodily harm is relatively minor, for example a broken wrist, 120 days for a first offender is, in my opinion, appropriate. However, there is a danger that we would send the courts the wrong message if we had the same mandatory minimum penalties for both bodily harm and death offences. The courts could conclude that Parliament considers 120 days' imprisonment sufficient for a death. Clearly it is not.

I do not have a view at this time as to what the appropriate minimum should be, but I wish to flag this concern for consideration at the justice committee. I urge all members to support Bill C-590 at second reading. Higher penalties for these offences are long overdue. The standing committee can consider whether improvements on the proposals can be made that the member for Prince Albert has brought forward. He has indicated his willingness to consider those amendments.

For the record, I want to add that there is another reason for a mandatory minimum penalty and that is that justice must not only be done, but it must be seen to be done. The people of Canada need to know that the justice system is working for them. When they see serious criminal offenders walk away from the courtroom and not go to prison, they lose faith in our justice system. When they lose faith in our justice system, then the justice system does not fulfill the purposes that the Canadian people wish it to. For all those reasons, I urge members in the House to support the bill.

[Memorial to Victims of Communism, June 18th, 2014]

Mr. Speaker, our government promised in the throne speech to remember the millions who suffered, and continue to suffer, under the tyranny of Communism by building a national memorial remembering its victims right here in our nation's capital.

Earlier today, on behalf of the eight million Canadians who are descendants of countries that lived through Communist terror, our government took the next step in fulfilling this promise and financing the six finalists.

These world-class teams will spend the coming weeks developing their concepts, which will be presented to a jury this August.

I join my Conservative colleagues in encouraging all Canadians to support this important initiative and applaud Tribute to Liberty for their hard work and dedication.