Bob Dechert

[Serious Time for the Most Serious Crime Act, October 5th, 2010]

Madam Speaker, I take this opportunity to thank the hon. member for he and his party's support for this very important bill, Bill S-6.

The member asked for some statistics. If he had an opportunity to catch all of my speech earlier, he would remember that I mentioned there were currently approximately 1,000 murderers incarcerated in our country. In 1996, 204 offenders to that point were eligible to apply for the faint hope clause, 79 had done so and of those 79, 55 were granted early parole, which represents an approximate 75% success rate. Perhaps he will find that interesting and will get updated information in committee.

I listened to the hon. member's speech with great interest and I did not hear him mention much about the impact of the constant possibility of faint hope parole hearings on the families and loved ones of victims. Could he perhaps comment on what impact that would have on people constantly worrying about having to relive the tragedies in their lives?

[Serious Time for the Most Serious Crime Act, October 5th, 2010]

Madam Speaker, I also look forward to working with the hon. member in the future on the justice committee.

As he will know, for current offenders the faint hope regime will continue. They will still need to apply for parole and in order to achieve parole would need to show some rehabilitation. For future murderers we are simply saying that they would serve 25 years and that, at the end of that 25 years, they would still need to apply for parole when the parole eligibility period expires. If they want to be paroled at the end of 25 years they would need to show that they have been rehabilitated.

[Serious Time for the Most Serious Crime Act, October 5th, 2010]

Madam Speaker, it is a great pleasure to rise today in support of the important Criminal Code amendments contained in Bill S-6 that will fulfill the government's platform commitment to repeal the Criminal Code faint hope regime.

As hon. members may be aware, the so-called faint hope regime is found in section 745.6 and related provisions of the Criminal Code. Basically, it allows those convicted of murder or high treason to apply to be eligible to seek parole as soon as they have served 15 years of their life sentence, no matter how many years of parole ineligibility remain to be served in the sentence originally imposed upon them.

Before going on I should note that because the National Defence Act incorporates by reference the faint hope regime in the Criminal Code, all the changes proposed in Bill S-6 would also apply to any member of the armed forces convicted of capital offences under that legislation.

Allow me to discuss for a moment the reasons these amendments have been brought forward and why the government places such importance on seeing them brought into law.

From the inception of the faint hope regime in 1976, the availability of early parole eligibility for convicted murderers has been a source of concern for many Canadians. These early concerns became more concrete as greater numbers of sentenced murderers began to benefit from early parole in the early 1990s. This in turn led to a citizens' petition for its repeal in the mid-1990s and to considerable negative newspaper commentary.

The passage of time has not alleviated those concerns. Many Canadians continue to be of the view that the existence of a mechanism that allows convicted murderers to short-circuit the lengthier period of parole ineligibility imposed at the time of sentencing offends truth in sentencing and appears to allow for overly lenient treatment of murderers.

In addition, victim advocacy groups argue that faint hope applications add to the trauma experienced by the families and loved ones of murder victims by forcing them to both live in dread that a convicted killer may bring an early application and then require them to relive the details of their terrible losses, during the faint hope review process and any subsequent parole board hearings. The measures proposed in Bill S-6 are in direct response to these concerns.

In this regard, let me briefly recap the current situation regarding parole eligibility for those who commit murder or high treason. I will not go into detail because Bill S-6 is virtually identical to Bill C-36 in the last session of Parliament and hon. members will already be familiar with the broad outlines of what is being proposed.

The Criminal Code currently provides that conviction for the offences of high treason and first degree and second degree murder carry mandatory terms of life imprisonment coupled with mandatory periods of parole ineligibility.

For high treason and first-degree murder, that period of time is 25 years, while for second degree murder it is 10 years except in three situations: first, it is automatically 25 years for any second degree murderer who has previously been convicted of either first or second degree murder; second, it is also automatically 25 years for any second degree murderer who has previously been convicted of an intentional killing under the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act; and third, it may be anywhere from 11 to 25 years if a judge decides to go beyond the normal 10-year limit in light of the offender's character, the nature and circumstances of the murder, and any jury recommendation in this regard.

However, the point to be made is that all first degree and at least some second degree murderers must spend at least 25 years in prison before they are eligible to apply for parole. While this may seem like an appropriately long time, the reality is that the faint hope regime provides a mechanism for offenders to apply to have their ineligibility period reduced so that they serve less time in prison before applying for parole.

What this means is that murderers who are supposed to be serving up to 25 years in jail before applying to the parole board are getting out of prison earlier than they would be if they had to serve the entire parole ineligibility period they were given at sentencing.

Before I go on to describe the current faint hope application process and the changes proposed by Bill S-6, I would also like to set out the changes to the faint hope regime that have been implemented since 1976.

The original procedure was for the offender to apply to the chief justice in the province where the murder took place to reduce the parole ineligibility period imposed at the time of sentencing. The chief justice would then appoint a Superior Court judge to empanel a 12-person jury to hear the application. If two-thirds of the jury agreed, the offender's ineligibility period could be changed as the jury saw fit.

Upon reaching the end of the ineligibility period, the offender could then apply directly to the Parole Board of Canada according to the normal standards for parole. By 1996, of the 204 offenders then eligible to apply for faint hope relief, 79 had done so and 55 had seen their parole ineligibility periods reduced. In other words, of those who applied, a full 75% had been successful.

In response to the public concerns and petition I mentioned earlier, the faint hope regime was amended in 1995, with the amendments coming into force two years later. These amendments had three effects. First, they entirely barred the access to faint hope regime for all future multiple murderers. Thus, since 1997, the faint hope regime has effectively been repealed for any post-1997 multiple murderer. This includes those who were convicted of murder prior to 1997 if they had committed another murder after that date.

Second, for those murderers who retained the right to apply for faint hope, the procedure was changed to require the Superior Court judge named by the chief justice of the province to conduct a paper review of each application beforehand to screen out applications that had no “reasonable prospect” of success. Only if an applicant could meet that new standard would a jury be empanelled to hear the application.

Third, the amendments also set a higher standard of jury unanimity as opposed to a mere two-thirds majority before the parole ineligibility period of an offender could be reduced. In 1999, the Criminal Code was amended yet again in response to the report of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights entitled “Victims' Rights—A Voice, Not a Veto”.

As a result, a judge sentencing someone convicted of first or second degree murder or high treason must state, both for the record and for the benefit of the families and loved ones of murder victims, both the existence and the nature of the faint hope regime. In short, families and loved ones of victims are now at least made aware of the faint hope regime in order to allow them to prepare themselves psychologically in the event that an offender decides to apply later.

Despite these piecemeal attempts to address the criticisms of the faint hope regime raised by concerned Canadians over the years, the faint hope regime remains problematic, nor have parliamentarians been immune from this controversy. Many have also voiced their concerns over the last few years and at least half a dozen private members' bills have been brought forward in that time seeking to repeal the faint hope regime in its entirety.

In the face of the continuing controversy surrounding this issue and the concerns that have been raised both inside and outside the House, it seems clear that this is the time to deal once and for all with the faint hope regime. In this regard, the bill before us today has to two fundamental purposes. The first is to amend the Criminal Code to bar offenders who commit murder and high treason after the date the amendment comes into force from applying for faint hope.

In short, Bill S-6 proposes, effectively, to repeal the faint hope regime entirely for all future offenders. Bill S-6 would thus complete the process begun in 1997 when all multiple murderers who committed at least one murder after the coming into force date were entirely barred from applying for faint hope.

After Bill S-6 is passed and comes into force, no murderer, single or multiple, will be able to apply for faint hope and it will effectively cease to exist except for currently sentenced offenders and anyone who may be convicted or committed murder prior to that date. They will continue to be able to apply until they have reached the end of the original parole ineligibility period imposed upon them.

In this regard, hon. members are no doubt aware that it is a fundamental constitutional principle that a sentence cannot be changed after it has been imposed. Both the mandatory parole ineligibility periods I described earlier, as well as the availability of faint hope, form part of the life sentence imposed on an offender found guilty of murder or high treason.

Repealing the faint hope regime as it applies to the more than 1,000 already incarcerated murderers in this country would be a retroactive change in sentence that would not survive a court challenge under the charter. That does not mean, however, that stricter faint hope application procedures cannot be applied to those who will continue to have the right to apply once this bill becomes law. Thus, the second thing Bill S-6 would do is to tighten up the three stages in the current faint hope application procedure, with the goal of restricting access to these offenders.

Let me now go through the current three-stage faint hope application process in order to highlight the significant changes proposed in Bill S-6. First, as I mentioned earlier, applicants must convince a Superior Court judge in the province where the conviction occurred that there is a reasonable prospect that their application will be successful.

If this threshold test is met, the judge will allow the application to proceed. This is a relatively easy threshold to meet. Bill S-6 will strengthen it by requiring applicants to prove that they have a substantial likelihood of success. This should prevent less-worthy applications from going forward.

At present, applicants rejected at this stage may reapply in as little as two years. Bill S-6 will increase this minimum waiting period from two to five years. An applicant who succeeds at stage one must then convince a jury from the jurisdiction where the murder occurred to agree unanimously to reduce his or her parole ineligibility period. An unsuccessful applicant may reapply in as little as two years. Bill S-6 will also change this waiting period to five years.

An applicant who is successful at stage two of the process is able to apply directly to the Parole Board of Canada. Bill S-6 proposes no changes in this area.

The net result of the change in waiting period from two to five years at stages one and two of the current process will be to reduce the overall number of applications that any offender may make. At present it is theoretically possible to apply every two years once 15 years have been served, for a total of five applications: after having served 15, 17, 19, 21 and 23 years respectively.

In normal circumstances, Bill S-6 will permit no more than two applications: after having served 15 years and once again after having served 20 years. Five years following the second rejection, an offender will have served the full 25 years and his or her parole ineligibility period will have expired.

However, this is not all that Bill S-6 will accomplish if passed into law. As things now stand, convicted offenders may apply for faint hope at any point after having served 15 years. The possibility that an application may come out of the blue with no prior warning causes great anxiety to the families and loved ones of murder victims.

For that reason, Bill S-6 will change this by requiring applicants to apply within 90 days of becoming eligible to do so. This means that applicants will have to apply within three months after completing 15 years of their sentence, and if rejected, within three months of the expiry of the next five-year waiting period.

The goal is to provide a greater degree of certainty to the families and loved ones of victims about when or whether a convicted murderer will bring a faint hope application.

Before closing, allow me to address briefly a criticism of Bill S-6 that was raised in the other place, namely that it ignores rehabilitation in favour of retribution. This criticism is misplaced for it appears to assume a role for Bill S-6 in the parole application process that it does not have.

As I have already mentioned, Bill S-6 does not change in any way the third stage in the faint hope application process for successful applicants of applying directly to the Parole Board of Canada.

There is nothing in this bill that in any way affects the ability of convicted murderers to rehabilitate themselves and to apply for parole in the normal course once the parole ineligibility period imposed on them at the time of sentencing has expired.

The bill simply insists that, for all future murderers, the full time in custody to which they were sentenced following conviction be served prior to making an application for parole. In the same way, for those who will continue to have the right to apply after 15 years, the bill simply insists that they follow a stricter procedure in the interests of the families and loved ones of their victims.

This government is committed to redressing the balance in Canada's criminal justice system by putting the interests of law-abiding citizens ahead of the rights of convicted criminals and by ensuring that families and loved ones of murder victims are not themselves victimized by the justice system.

The rationale for the bill before this House is very simple, that allowing murders, those convicted of the most serious offence in Canadian criminal law, a chance to get early parole is not truth in sentencing. Truth in sentencing means that those who commit the most serious crime will do the most serious time.

I am proud to support this historic measure. The government promised Canadians that it would get tough on violent crime and hold serious offenders accountable for their actions. The measures proposed in Bill S-6 offer further proof that this promise has been kept.

The reforms proposed in this bill have been many years in the making and are decades overdue. They reflect a well-tailored scheme that both responds to the concerns raised by the public and by victims' advocates that the faint hope regime as presently constituted allows for far too lenient treatment of murderers and measures those concerns against constitutional standards.

Bill S-6 proposes to effectively repeal the faint hope regime for all future murderers, as well as to require that currently sentenced offenders who may choose to make an application in the coming years do so according to stricter standards that fairly balance their rights against the legitimate interests of the families and loved ones of their victims.

These reforms are tough but they are fair and they are long overdue. For these reasons I support the bill and I call on all hon. members of the House to do so as well.

[Pakistan Flood Relief, September 30th, 2010]

Madam Speaker, the images of flooded villages and destroyed homes in Pakistan may be vanishing from our TV screens and newspapers, but the need for aid for our sisters and brothers in Pakistan remains great.

Paramedics from GlobalMedic of Mississauga have just returned from Pakistan and have told me that the situation there will get worse before it gets better, because of the effects of water-borne diseases and related issues. Last Sunday, the Canadian Friends of Pakistan held a fundraising event in Mississauga to support the good work that GlobalMedic is doing in Pakistan to aid the flood victims. This coming Saturday, OMNI Television will be hosting a daylong telethon for Pakistan relief assistance.

Our government has provided the world's largest pro-rata contribution to relief efforts for the Pakistan disaster and is matching every contribution made by Canadians on a dollar-for-dollar basis. I am proud to report that the people of Mississauga are responding to this humanitarian need. I would encourage all Canadians to continue to give generously to the many worthy Canadian and international charitable organizations involved in Pakistan flood relief.

[Combating Terrorism Act, September 20th, 2010]

That is what the chair of the Air India association said.

[Combating Terrorism Act, September 20th, 2010]

Mr. Speaker, as the member knows, the gun registry costs the Canadian taxpayers over a billion dollars and I dare say that this money would have been much better spent enforcing the criminal laws that we have in the country, keeping Canadians safe, putting more police officers on the streets and giving them better tools to do their job.

The Supreme Court of Canada made it very clear that the powers in Bill C-17 are constitutional and protect fundamental rights under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. For example, the power with respect to investigative hearings has a number of safeguards, including that only a judge of the provincial court or a superior court of criminal jurisdiction can hear a peace officer's application for an investigative hearing and the prior consent of the Attorney General of Canada or solicitor general of a province will be needed before a peace officer can apply for an investigative hearing order. In addition, there will have to be reasonable grounds to believe that a terrorism offence has or will be committed. In addition, the judge will have to be satisfied that reasonable attempts have been made to obtain the information by other means for both future and past terrorism offences.

The nature of these terrorism offences is such that the peace officers often do not know exactly when the terrorism incident will take place, but they have evidence to suggest that people are plotting the terrorism incidents.

On this side of the House we believe we cannot put the safety of the people of Canada at risk waiting for that time when the peace officer is going to say that the bomb is about the explode in a few minutes or an hour from now and then go to the court. We need to be able to act quickly and prevent that from happening to keep people safe in Canada.

[Combating Terrorism Act, September 20th, 2010]

Madam Speaker, if the member wants to know the definition of a terrorist activity, I would suggest she read the Criminal Code of Canada. She might also take the time to read the Air India Supreme Court decision, which I referred to in my speech earlier.

If she were to look at the Criminal Code of Canada, she would see that subsection 83.01(1)(b)(ii)(E) defines the general definition of terrorist activity in such a way as to exclude from the scope of a serious interference within a central service, lawful or unlawful advocacy protest, dissent or stoppage of work unless there is an intent to cause death, serious bodily harm, endangering a person's life or causing a serious risk to the health or safety of the public.

I suggest that perhaps the hon. member take the time to read the Criminal Code of Canada, which she is here to uphold, and then she will know what a terrorist activity actually is.

[Combating Terrorism Act, September 20th, 2010]

Madam Speaker, obviously I disagree with the member. Innocent people are being killed around the world on a daily basis by terrorists. Terrorist plots are happening right now in Canada. We have seen it with recent arrests. Our law enforcement officials are telling us that these provisions are necessary to keep Canadians safe.

While it appears that no investigative hearing had been held or recognizance with conditions imposed before the previous provisions expired, this should not suggest, in my opinion, that they are not important or not needed in the future. We should take comfort in the fact that based on past experiences with previous provisions, law enforcement officials and prosecutors have demonstrated caution and restraint with respect to the use of these provisions. Moreover, law enforcement agencies have expressed their support for the continuation of these previous provisions.

It is incumbent upon all members of the House to do what is necessary to keep Canadians safe. In my view Bill C-17 would do that.

[Combating Terrorism Act, September 20th, 2010]

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to take part in the second reading debate in relation to Bill C-17.

It is perhaps timely that this debate begins only days after the only man convicted in the Air India bombing, Inderjit Singh Reyat, was found guilty of committing perjury during the 2003 trial of Ajaib Singh Bagri and Ripudaman Singh Malik, who were ultimately acquitted of criminal charges arising from the Air India bombing. It is a sober reminder that terrorism has caused the death of hundreds of Canadians. Let us not forget the tragic total resulting from that mass murder, 329 passengers and crew, when Air India flight 182 was blown up in mid-flight, and two baggage handlers were killed at Tokyo's Narita Airport.

The hon. members of this House may recall that in November 2005, the Subcommittee on Public Safety and National Security of the Standing Committee on Justice, Human Rights, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness heard testimony from Maureen Basnicki, whose husband died at the World Trade Centre on 9/11, and from Mr. Bal Gupta, chair of the Air India Victims Families' Association. Their testimony was given as part of the parliamentary review of the Anti-terrorism Act. In his testimony, Mr. Gupta read into the record the following recommendations:

The Anti-terrorism Act should not be repealed or softened, and its provisions should be strengthened by closing loopholes...There will be more legal tools to compel witnesses to testify in terrorism-related cases.

At that time, the two powers that Bill C-17 proposes to reinstate, the investigative hearing and the recognizance with conditions, were part of the Anti-terrorism Act. They had yet to sunset. Later, according to newspaper reports, Mr. Gupta supported extending the life of these tools when Parliament was debating whether to extend them or to have them sunset in early 2007. As members know, they did sunset in 2007.

The Air India tragedy and the events of 9/11 remind us that when enacting anti-terrorism legislation for combating terrorism in a manner that has due regard for fundamental human rights, we must consider not only the rights and freedoms of those that may be accused of terrorism, but also the tragic human cost to terrorism itself, not only the deaths of or harm done to the victims, but also the harm done to their families.

I recently came across a study written by Professor Craig Forcese, which included the following quote from Mr. Justice Laws of the English Court of Appeal. It eloquently describes the difficult task facing legislators in this area. It is a long quote, but an important one, so I hope members will please bear with me. He wrote:

This grave and present threat [of terrorism] cannot be neutralised by the processes of investigation and trial pursuant to the general criminal law. The reach of those processes is marked by what can be proved beyond reasonable doubt...In these circumstances the state faces a dilemma. If it limits the means by which the citizens are protected against the threat of terrorist outrage to the ordinary measures of the criminal law, it leaves a yawning gap. It exposes its people to the possibility of indiscriminate murder committed by extremists who for want of evidence could not be brought to book in the criminal courts. But if it fills the gap by confining them without trial it affronts “the most fundamental and probably the oldest, most hardly won and the most universally recognised of human rights”: freedom from executive detention.

In light of these concerns, it is appropriate that any proposal to reinstate the powers of the investigative hearing and the recognizance with conditions should be subjected to rigorous review. It is right and proper that this bill should now be reviewed by this Parliament. In doing so, however, I would remind hon. members that this bill does not appear out of the blue. It is a culmination of efforts by previous Parliaments to seek to improve this legislation, including the parliamentary committees that reviewed the Anti-terrorism Act.

Bill C-17 was carefully drafted to respond to many of the recommendations made by both the Senate and the House of Commons committees that reviewed the Anti-terrorism Act. Not all recommendations were accepted but many were. In addition, a previous version of the Bill, Bill S-3, was reviewed by the Senate special committee on anti-terrorism, and as a result, further amendments were made. These are all incorporated into Bill C-17.

Further, I would add, there has also been a judicial review by the highest court of the land, the Supreme Court of Canada, of one of the two key tools found in this bill, the investigative hearing.

I wish to address much of the remainder of this speech to a number of criticisms made in the investigative hearing during that legal challenge and the court's response to them. Hopefully, this will give all hon. members a better understanding of the complex issues raised by this tool and how it was fashioned in a manner to protect fundamental human rights.

Perhaps the major argument against the investigative hearing was that it denied a person the right to silence and/or the right of self-incrimination. However, the court rejected this argument. After examining the robust protection against self-incrimination found in the then existing legislation, the court noted:

--the procedural protections available to the appellant in relation to the judicial investigative hearing are equal to and, in the case of derivative use immunity, greater than the protections afforded to witnesses compelled to testify in other proceedings, such as criminal trials, preliminary inquiries or commission hearings.

As well, in order to prevent possible future abuse, the court expanded the use and derivative use immunity protections beyond the scope of criminal proceedings to include deportation and extradition proceedings.

Another major argument was that the investigative hearing compromised the independence of the judiciary because it co-opted the judiciary into performing executive investigatory functions in place of its usual adjudicative role. However, the majority of the Supreme Court rejected this claim, arguing that:

The function of the judge in a judicial investigative hearing is not to act as “an agent of the state”, but rather, to protect the integrity of the investigation and, in particular, the interests of the named person vis-à-vis the state.

Another argument made was that the independence of Crown counsel was compromised because the Crown counsel's role became impermissibly intertwined with the police task of investigation. Again, the Supreme Court rejected this argument, pointing out that, in part:

--one may assume that by bringing Crown counsel into the judicial investigative hearing process, the legislature intended that the Crown would conduct itself according to its proper role as an officer of the court and its duty of impartiality in the public interest...The mere fact of their involvement in the investigation need not compromise Crown counsel’s objectivity, as the critical component is their own “necessary vigilance”--

Another argument was that the investigative hearing in the court challenge was that the judicial investigative hearing in the circumstances of this case served the improper purpose of obtaining pretrial discovery for the Air India trial. However, the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada rejected this argument, agreeing with the trial judge that its purpose had been predominantly investigative.

As well, in a companion case issued the same day, the Supreme Court held that the open court principle applies to an investigative hearing. It held that while the application for an investigative hearing should not be held in public, akin to the application for a search warrant where it comes to the investigative hearing itself, there should be a presumption of openness.

In reaching this conclusion, the court adapted the Dagenais/Mentuck test which had been developed in case law in relation to publication bans to the investigative hearing. The court acknowledged, however, that there could be circumstances where the presumption could be rebutted. It stated:

It may very well be that by necessity large parts of judicial investigative hearings will be held in secret. It may also very well be that the very existence of these hearings will at times have to be kept secret. It is too early to determine, in reality, how many hearings will be resorted to and what form they will take. This is an entirely novel procedure, and this is the first case — to our knowledge — in which it has been used.

To summarize, Bill C-17 builds upon the original provisions governing the investigative hearing. It builds upon them by adding additional safeguards, but the foundation remains the same. This foundation was examined by the Supreme Court of Canada in 2004 and was upheld to be constitutional. In our future deliberations about this bill, we should not forget that the investigative hearing has already passed the test of compliance with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Let me now proceed to the recognizance with conditions provision. Unlike the investigative hearing provision, the recognizance with conditions power created in 2001 by the Anti-terrorism Act was never tested in the courts. However, it is based on the peace bond provisions found in other parts of the Criminal Code, albeit with modifications so that it can be used to disrupt nascent terrorist activity.

It is particularly with regard to the recognizance with conditions that the quotation from Lord Justice Laws that I used at the beginning of my speech is apt.

This is because it can be used in circumstances where the information obtained by the police gives rise to a reasonable belief that a terrorist activity will be committed, where there is insufficient information that could allow the police to arrest the person for involvement in a terrorism offence, but there are reasonable grounds to suspect that it is necessary to impose a recognizance with conditions on the person to prevent the carrying out of the terrorist activity.

Some have argued that this is too great an extension of the criminal law power. Let regular police powers apply, they argue, in which case they mean that the police already have the power to arrest someone who they believe on reasonable grounds is about to commit an indictable offence. However, the difficulty with this proposal is that it would severely restrict the ability of the state to prevent terrorism because it requires an “about to commit test” which reports the concept of imminent harm.

In contrast, the recognizance with conditions provisions found in Bill C-17 increases the ability of the state to take preventative measures to protect persons from terrorism, but it does so, in my mind, in a way that is consistent with the rule of law. Hence the need for a two-pronged test to be satisfied: a reasonable grounds to belief test, and a reasonable grounds to suspect test. Reasonable suspicion alone is not enough.

Moreover, I also point out that important accountability mechanisms are built into the provisions of this bill. Some of these are carried forward from the original legislation. First and foremost, the investigative hearing and the recognizance with conditions would be subject to a sunset clause which would result in their expiry after five years unless renewed by parliamentary resolution. As well, there would be annual reporting requirements by the federal government and the provinces on the use of these provisions. Although, in the case of the federal government, there would be an expanded reporting requirement.

In addition, these provisions would not be able to be used unless the consent of the appropriate attorney general is first obtained. This is true even in the case of a person who is arrested without warrant under the recognizance with conditions tool. While the peace officer in such a case would be able to arrest the person to bring the individual before a judge, he or she would still have to obtain the consent of the appropriate attorney general in order to lay any information before such a judge. This is a condition that must be satisfied before a hearing can take place to decide if a recognizance should be imposed.

Also provided for in the bill is a provision inserted by the Senate when it was reviewing a previous version of Bill S-3. Parliament must review these provisions prior to the date that they sunset. As part of this review process Parliament would be able to examine the degree to which these provisions had been used, successfully or unsuccessfully, and would be able to make a determination based on the available evidence as to whether or not these provisions would continue to be needed.

I believe all of us in this House believe that terrorism should be combated. For those who believe that the existing criminal law is sufficient to combat terrorism, I respectfully disagree. I believe events both outside and inside Canada, such as the recent convictions in the Toronto 18 case and the recent arrests in Toronto, show that the threat of terrorism is an ongoing concern and that there is a need for the tools of the investigative hearing and the recognizance with conditions.

However, I also recognize that in order to combat terrorism successfully these measures must be crafted so as to ensure adequate protection of fundamental rights. By examining the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in relation to the investigative hearing, I hope I have dispelled the concerns that it violates fundamental human rights and basic notions of fairness. Indeed, I would ask all hon. members to reflect on the fact that Bill C-17 improves upon the safeguards found in the original legislation. I urge all members to support the passage of this bill.

[Air India Memorial Monument, May 25th, 2010]

Mr. Speaker, this June marks the 25th anniversary of Canada's worst act of terrorism, the Air India attack of 1985. On June 23, Canadians across the country remember this terrible act on Canada's National Day of Remembrance for Victims of Terrorism. Events are being planned across Canada, as well as in Ireland, to honour the hundreds of people killed during this act of terrorism.

Last week, we were deeply disturbed to hear that the Toronto monument to these victims had been vandalized.

In 2007 the Prime Minister and other leaders joined Air India families to unveil this important memorial where the names of the 329 victims are etched. The Toronto memorial faces the memorial in Ahakista, Ireland where the plane went down.

We are very pleased to hear that the monument will be restored in time to mark next month's anniversary. I believe I speak on behalf of all parties and all Canadians when I condemn the vandalism of this monument.