House of Commons photo

Crucial Fact

  • His favourite word was elections.

Last in Parliament October 2015, as NDP MP for Toronto—Danforth (Ontario)

Lost his last election, in 2015, with 40% of the vote.

Statements in the House

Democratic Reform April 16th, 2013

Mr. Speaker, I would like to first congratulate the minister for having graduated from promising legislation in due course yesterday to promising it in the near future.

With the recent charges, we are a step closer to catching those behind the fraud scheme in the last election. The Chief Electoral Officer recently said that election law reforms “...need to be enacted by spring 2014 to give Elections Canada enough time to fully integrate them in time” for the next general election.

These reforms are obviously urgently needed, so one more time: when are we going to see this legislation?

Democratic Reform April 15th, 2013

Mr. Speaker, now it is “in the very near future” and no longer “in due course”.

Charges have finally been laid against Conservative operative Michael Sona under the “Prohibitions” section of the Canada Elections Act. We are now one step closer to finding out who is ultimately responsible for this scheme. He is charged with wilfully preventing and endeavouring to prevent an elector from voting at an election—in everyday language, illegal vote suppression.

Why are Conservatives not serious about preventing this in the future, and why are they delaying new legislation?

Elections Canada March 28th, 2013

“Will be put forward in due course”, Mr. Speaker. Clearly, the government has no interest in cracking down on electoral fraud and no interest in explaining their involvement in fraudulent election calls. It has failed to act on giving more powers to Elections Canada.

The minister has a responsibility to Canadians. The commissioner is calling for stiffer penalties for election fraud. Why is the Conservative government suddenly so soft on crime when the suspects are its own campaigners?

Elections Canada March 28th, 2013

Mr. Speaker, in his report, the Chief Electoral Officer is asking for more investigative powers, additional penalities and fraud prevention tools.

The NDP made the same requests in its motion passed over a year ago and in the bill that I introduced because the Conservatives did not meet their own deadline.

When will the government finally take election fraud seriously and introduce a bill to strengthen the powers of Elections Canada?

Combating Terrorism Act March 28th, 2013

Mr. Speaker, I was not sure that the member had time to get to the question.

I understand that people are arriving at decisions on Bill S-7 in good faith from different perspectives. I feel, however, that it is more or less accepted in circles that take charter rights and the rule of law seriously that the Anti-terrorism Act went too far. So does this bill.

Combating Terrorism Act March 28th, 2013

Mr. Speaker, obviously there is a serious concern with terrorism, both globally and in Canada. We had evidence before the committee that I have no reason to disbelieve about a tendency, however large it is, for young members of some communities to actually leave the country in order to be part of terrorist training, et cetera. There are real issues here.

Our point is that the bill goes too far. We had no evidence of the necessity of the bill beyond that one data item. That is the only thing that committee witnesses from CSIS, the RCMP and the government detailed as the necessity for re-enacting the sunset of provisions.

What I have set out is the interconnection between all the provisions and the failure by the government to consider beefing up the protections in a way that meets our concerns, but in terms of the seriousness of terrorism and the need to combat it, I have every reason to believe that we need to be vigilant.

Combating Terrorism Act March 28th, 2013

Mr. Speaker, I will sum up, as I believe I am running toward the end of my time.

Once again, the government has exercised its strict policy that we have seen over the last two years of no amendments allowed in committee, especially if they come from the opposition. Conservatives voted down our suggestion for higher standards, and they were not willing to discuss with us whether the chair's rulings on beyond the scope were correct. Those that were admissible were dismissed completely by the government members, who had clear intentions going into the committee not to change a word. There was no interest in strengthening the rule of law or human rights beyond what the Conservatives had already decided was necessary.

It has become clear that the government has virtually no interest in legislative co-operation in Parliament. In committees, Conservative majorities routinely refuse to consider good-faith points from opposition committee members on ways to improve legislation, even when they are in line with the government's own objectives, let alone listen to arguments on the serious problems with the bill that need to be fixed.

I also want to note one particular slap in the face of the House of Commons.

It is worth noting that we prioritized having the director of CSIS appear before the public security committee. He had already appeared before the Senate and gave testimony that was very important, which necessitated detailed follow-up on the part of the House. CSIS knew of the need because it was expressly stated in my second reading speech. CSIS officials came to committee twice, yet on neither occasion did Director Fadden appear. This sequence of events shows major disrespect to the House of Commons when a government official would readily appear before a Senate committee but decline to appear before a House committee.

I would also like to add that there was one ruling that rejected the legal aid funding amendment, which said that this was improper because the bill had originated in the Senate. It being a Senate bill, and the Senate not able to table money bills, any amendment in the House of Commons having financial consequences was ruled out of order. Therefore, the practice of the Conservative government of starting legislation in the Senate ties the hands of the House of Commons to engage in the kind of legislative practice that is the right and privilege of the House of Commons. The order in which governments introduce bills is something that very much needs to be addressed and fixed.

Finally, our Liberal friends on this side of the House voted in favour of this legislation both at second reading and in committee. I look forward to seeing whether the party, which likes to call itself the “party of the charter”, is ready to rectify this by voting against the unnecessary and fraught measures contained in Bill S-7.

Combating Terrorism Act March 28th, 2013

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to speak to Bill S-7, the combating terrorism act, which my NDP colleagues and I opposed at second reading and continue to oppose based on the fact that the hearings in the House of Commons public safety committee, or SECU, revealed some serious hidden agendas on the government's part.

There are other problems we have with the re-enactment of provisions, albeit with some safeguards from the 2001 Anti-terrorism Act. My colleagues will address those in the third reading debate.

I will address how the hearings before the committee confirmed that Bill S-7 creates serious concerns with respect to the rule of law and human rights, notwithstanding the additional safeguards just outlined by the parliamentary secretary.

During the committee hearings on Bill S-7, my NDP colleagues and I raised several issues related to new offences created by the bill, but our questions were never fully answered by the government.

Many of our concerns related to these new “attempting to leave the country” offences remain, especially—and this is key—how they are linked to the re-enacted counter-terrorism measures from the Anti-terrorism Act of 2001, namely preventive detention, recognizance with conditions and investigative hearings.

For starters, it is clear as day from RCMP and CSIS testimony that the concerns I voiced in my speech at second reading are very well founded. There is a real potential that attempting to leave the country offences would serve as the trigger, first, for investigative hearings that would question friends, families and community members who know a suspect.

Second, once evidence arises through that investigative hearing method, that evidence would then be used to engage in up to 72 hours of preventive detention and then up to 12 months' recognizance with conditions, and indeed, it is important to note, up to 12 months of imprisonment without trial or conviction if one refuses to accept those conditions that are imposed or if one is deemed to have not complied with those conditions.

Such conditions could, and almost certainly would, involve confiscating passports so as to create a veiled, backdoor, de facto control order system, such as the U.K. explicitly uses to prohibit leaving the country. The key here is that all of this would occur implicitly, without it having been debated or structured in a proper way.

In this way, the new leaving the country offences need never be actually prosecuted, and that may well be ultimately the government's intention. They are just as likely, if not more likely, to serve as the reference point for disrupting a person's movement by using these re-enacted, extraordinary procedures of investigative hearings plus the recognizance with conditions provisions in tandem.

Before the bill came to the House, it was before the Senate. It started in the Senate. In committee there, the Minister of Justice said clearly that investigative hearings could be used to seek and get evidence of intent to leave the country for illicit purposes. As the bill itself states, evidence from investigative hearings cannot be used in criminal proceedings against a person questioned in the hearings.

This clearly points to the intention to use investigative hearings to interrogate family, neighbours, friends and others from a suspect's community, with attendant implications for discriminatory profiling, the potential for that discriminatory profiling and for instilling a feeling of harassment in a community that is the target of counter-terrorism surveillance.

CSIS and the RCMP effectively said, “Trust us”. They say that these provisions were not used before they sunsetted, so they will not be used much now. One wonders why there is the insistence of the government to re-enact them, but in any case, we should not believe it. Attempting to leave the country is a new offence of wide-ranging impact, and with respect to that offence or the series of offences that go under that label, the government has every intention of using investigative hearings.

The Minister of Justice, in that same testimony before the Senate, also linked recognizance with conditions orders to the new offence.

In the public security committee, government witnesses were presented with the scenario whereby evidence from investigative hearings is used not only as a basis for arrest of someone before leaving the country but also as the basis for securing recognizance with conditions without the need to actually prosecute.

Keep in mind this fancy term “recognizance with conditions” basically means limiting the liberty of citizens without trial or conviction. No witness denied that this trajectory was possible. It must be borne in mind, and I want to reiterate this, that any refusal to abide by conditions can lead to up to 12 months imprisonment, again without ever having been tried or convicted.

This is obviously a serious chain of state action and it is for this reason that the NDP not only is against the return of the sunset provisions that I have talked about, but also the reason why we have pushed for a range of additional safeguards to heighten monitoring and accountability in relation to how these provisions will operate in practice.

At committee, we concentrated at the amendment stage on such safeguards as it was a given, frankly, that the intrusive provisions would be accepted by the Conservative majority on committee. In committee we moved something like 18 amendments and not one was passed, either because the government majority voted them down or because they were ruled beyond the scope of the bill by the chair. In one case it was because the bill had originated in the Senate, to which I hope to get.

All the amendments were designed to enhance accountability as the government brought back these sunset anti-terrorism law provisions, while adding a new series of leaving the country offences and beefing up, from the Conservatives' point of view, a harbouring a terrorist offence. Half were ruled out of order. I argued unsuccessfully that such rulings misunderstood the legislative purposes of the bill and did not take into account a recent Speaker's ruling on when a bill should be deemed to be a money bill. Those are technical matters that we can leave for the moment.

What is important to note, and it was revealed in the parliamentary secretary's speech, is that this is a bill with three purposes. When a number of our amendments were ruled beyond the scope of the bill, the chair was not taking into account more than one purpose.

One purpose is terrorism repression. The second is rights' protections. We grant to the government that there are some elements in this that are a bit more protective of rights than the measures in 2001, including, for example, the right to counsel before an investigative hearing. We just feel they do not go nearly far enough. Third, separate from this, is institutional oversight and accountability and transparency mechanisms. These are all interconnected but have separate purposes. In our view, every amendment we proposed fit into one or other of these three purposes and thus none were beyond the scope of the bill.

The New Democratic Party believes we must seriously address the issue of terrorism. There is no doubt about that. However, we have to ensure respect for rights and freedoms.

That is why we introduced the amendments to heighten oversight, transparency and reporting in the bill in order to lessen the negative impacts on civil liberties, which the bill is bound to have. These amendments drew on testimony at committee and they also reflected the values that we believe were important to Canadians.

Let me describe some of the amendments that were attempted.

The first amendment would have provided for an inter-agency co-operation protocol between CSIS, the RCMP, CBSA and the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority to be put in place before the leaving the country offences could come into effect. Our rationale was that the exceptional state powers should be carefully circumscribed and accompanied by equally rigorous independent oversight which a protocol would have to build in. This amendment was deemed inadmissible as being beyond the scope.

However, the reason we believed the amendment was both necessary and within the scope of the bill was that in the Senate the director of CSIS drew particular attention to the fact that no protocols existed between these agencies for the kind of co-operation that he said would be needed in order to give effect to the leaving the country offences. He made it clear that such protocols were necessary.

Testimony before committee also indicated this, so we took it seriously by proposing a protocol for collaboration and that SIRC, the Security Intelligence Review Committee, which is the only relevant existing oversight committee in this field, must endorse it and only then, once the protocol was in place, would the provisions enter into force. We felt this was a reasonable provision. Now, because it was ruled out of order and adopted, we can only hope that the various relevant agencies will develop a protocol before these new offences enter into force.

The second amendment related to conditions for people to be charged with an offence related to harbouring terrorists. What the government wants is a provision that says everyone who knowingly harbours or conceals any person whom they know to be a person who is likely to carry out a terrorist activity for the purpose of enabling the person to facilitate or carry out any terrorist activities is guilty of an indictable offence liable to 10 years of imprisonment.

We wanted to change the words “likely to carry out a terrorist activity” to “intends to carry out a terrorist activity”. Our view, bolstered by the testimony and submissions, for example, from the Canadian Bar Association, is that likelihood is far too lax a standard, especially when we are asking somebody to think through to the mens rea state of another person. The term “likely” is far too speculative, but the amendment was defeated.

The third amendment we proposed was to ensure that testimony gathered from investigative hearings could not be used against the individual in any extradition and deportation proceedings, not only criminal proceedings. We heard from the parliamentary secretary that this was implicit. The Supreme Court ruled on this almost 10 years ago and said that in order to be compatible with the charter, that evidence could not be used in extradition and deportation proceedings. The Conservatives acknowledged this in committee and yet refused to write in the words that said this and made it clear.

We wanted this in bill simply because we believed that criminal law should be as clear as possible and that reasons of certainty, caution and respect for the rulings of the Supreme Court necessitated it. At the same time, it was specifically resisted. One can only ask whether the government is literally hoping that a newly-composed Supreme Court will eventually revisit that jurisprudence and that the only prohibition will be on using that evidence in criminal proceedings. Otherwise, it is impossible to fathom why it would have resisted including that amendment.

We also proposed that the right to counsel, which is written in Bill S-7, be extended to include a right to state-funded counsel, that is legal aid, if a person were dragged before an investigative hearing. Keep in mind that witnesses are brought before investigative hearings with no necessary, and definitely no suspicion of, wrongdoing on their own part. We felt that in this kind of context, it was important to ensure that people were not having to pay the costs of state investigation.

We also felt it was especially important to say that the right to counsel was a negative right. Those who can afford it will obviously be able to bring their lawyers and will have much greater protection in investigative hearings. For people who do not have the resources and cannot afford it, there is nothing in Bill S-7 that would allow them access to lawyers, despite the fact that elsewhere in the Criminal Code there is provision for federally-appointed, state-funded legal aid.

Another amendment revealed more information on the government's intent with the bill. We tried amending the provision on recognizance with conditions to ensure it was clear, and I want to emphasize this, that only persons determined to be potential participants in a terrorist activity could be subject to recognizance with conditions. Our concern was that people who were not themselves suspected of terrorist activity should not be the subject of the restrictions of liberty that were part of the recognizance with conditions regime. We thought this was a friendly amendment on a badly-written provision and were bowled over in the clause-by-clause process when what we thought was a friendly amendment was resisted. To our shock, the parliamentary secretary said that the government actually wanted to keep it broad precisely so recognizance with conditions could be imposed on someone who may not be suspected of any potential criminality themselves. The parliamentary secretary said:

The recognizance with conditions in its present form would provide the potential for a recognizance with conditions to be imposed to disrupt the nascent phase of a terrorist activity, even where the person who would be subject to the recognizance with conditions is not necessarily the person carrying out a terrorist activity.

The proposed amendment would seek to restrict the application of this measure.

That was the NDP-proposed amendment. She went on to say:

Because that is inconsistent with the policy intent underpinning the provision, we are opposed to it.

The government is on record as wishing to permit conditions to be imposed on perfectly innocent people. Failure to comply can lead to 12 months of imprisonment. Is that a regime we want in our country?

There was a whole series of amendments we then proposed that dealt with trying to ensure that the reporting procedures in Bill S-7 were more robust and less general than found in the bill. We wanted detailed information on the statistical use of the provisions, for example. A lot of testimony suggested we needed to have clarity and standards with respect to what the reviews of the operation and the provisions would entail, and we were seeking to assist with that.

We also wanted information specifically written into the review that would talk about exit control and exit information systems. The reason for that was, before the Senate, the director of CSIS indicated that there were no such comprehensive systems in place in Canada. However, there was every sign during the committee hearings that the government intended one way or the other to move toward more comprehensive exit information which could lead to exit control systems.

It was very clear that, not in Bill S-7 but in other legislation, the Conservatives had created enabling conditions to enable exit information to be accessed earlier than was currently possible in the process so before a plane left the country, it would be known who was on the plane and Canadian officers could go onboard and arrest people. However, this was not put in Bill S-7, but in Bill C-45, which is a budget bill.

We were simply taking the cue from the director of CSIS who had indicated that, before the cabinet, our proposals to strengthen the no-fly list were precisely because of the new leaving-the-country offences, yet no information was presented to us on the nature of the debates going on. We felt it was extremely important to ensure that the review mechanisms down the road would ensure that exit information and exit control were taken into account.

I believe I am nearly finished my time, although I have had to talk over an incredible hubbub and ruckus on the other side of the House.

Amendments also sought to ensure that a comprehensive review procedure expressly included the operation of the four leaving the country offences—

Housing March 18th, 2013

Mr. Speaker, recently the Conservatives voted down an NDP bill to create a national housing strategy and resorted to spreading manifestly false information that placed a ridiculous price tag on this non-spending bill.

In my riding of Toronto—Danforth, constituents understand the facts. They are concerned about substandard housing, unaffordable rents, job insecurity and homelessness in our city. The people of Toronto—Danforth understand that good-quality housing is not only a key component of poverty elimination, but also a social determinant of health. They also understand that homelessness costs the Canadian economy $4.5 billion each year, such that a housing strategy is nothing but fiscally responsible.

Investing in people is sound economic policy. For example, we must work with other levels of government to promote co-operatives, such as the successful Riverdale and Bain co-ops in my riding.

New Democrats will continue to put forward practical solutions to ensure everyone has a safe, secure and affordable place that they can call home.

Questions Passed as Orders for Return March 8th, 2013

With regard to the policies and practices concerning treatment of persons under the control of Canadian forces in Afghanistan in any part of the period from September 12, 2001, to present: (a) were each of Canada’s Defence Intelligence, Canadian Security and Intelligence Service, and the Canadian Security Establishment amongst the intelligence agencies based at Kandahar Air Field (KAF) base; (b) what other intelligence agencies, Canadian or non-Canadian, were based at KAF or operated out of KAF without being based there; (c) is the government aware of a military facility in Kandahar commonly known as Graceland and, if so, what sort of facility was, or is, it, and what institutional actors operated, or operate, from this facility; (d) is the government aware of a military facility in Kandahar commonly known as Gecko and, if so, what sort of facility was, or is, it, and what institutional actors operated, or operate, from this facility; (e) how do, or did, the facilities and the institutional actors operating from Gecko and Graceland (i) relate to each other, (ii) interact; (f) on what date did Canadian special forces, including JTF2, first arrive in Afghanistan and, if they have left, on what date did they leave Afghanistan; (g) if Canadian special forces, including JTF2, are currently in Afghanistan, whether as units or as individual personnel, in what capacity are they in Afghanistan; (h) has Canada ever transferred persons under its control to Afghan authorities with the knowledge that some of those persons would or could end up being held in the facilities of National Directorate of Security (NDS) Kabul; (i) does the government know of cases of persons under initial Canadian control who ended up being held in the facilities of NDS Kabul, whether under the control of NDS or whether under the control of one or more other Afghan or non-Afghan intelligence agencies and, if so, (i) how many, (ii) which other intelligence agency or agencies; (j) did Canada ever seek to trace persons who had been either detained by or otherwise under the control of Canadian special forces, including JTF2, and who Canada knew or suspected had ended up at NDS Kabul facilities and, if so, (i) for what reasons was tracing undertaken, (ii) how many persons did Canada seek to trace, (iii) what were the results of the efforts in terms of the number of persons who were located versus determining that persons were not traceable; (k) is the government familiar with the term, whether formal or informal, of “amplifying orders” being used in the Canadian military context, and, if so, what does this mean; (l) in the period in question (2001 to present), did General Rick Hillier ever issue “amplifying orders” that related, directly or indirectly, to the policy or practice of handing over persons under Canada’s control in Afghanistan to agents of another state, whether Afghan or non-Afghan and, if so, for each set of amplifying orders, (i) what were the dates of the orders, (ii) what previous orders, rules of engagement or other documents were being amplified, (iii) what was the content of the amplifying orders; (m) in relation to the May 25, 2006, capture of “11 suspected Taliban fighters” referenced at page 96 of Ian Hope, Dancing with the Dushman: Command Imperatives for the Counter-Insurgency Fight in Afghanistan (Canadian Defence Agency Press, 2008), could the government set out the manner in which each of these 11 persons controlled by Canadian forces were processed, including what is known about each’s subsequent trajectory after passing from the control of Canada until the point at which the government may have lost track of their whereabouts; (n) at any period and, if so, which periods, did the Canadian government consider that there were one or more categories of persons who Canada passed on to either Afghan or American authorities but who were not categorized as detainees, and did such categories have a designation, whether formal or informal; (o) were there persons under the control of Canadian forces who were transferred to Afghanistan, but who were not treated by Canada as covered by the provisions of the 2005 and 2007 Canada-Afghanistan Memorandums of Understanding on detainee transfer and, if so, on what basis were transfers of such persons not deemed covered by the agreements; (p) were there persons under the control of Canadian forces who were transferred to Afghanistan but whose existence and transfer was not made known to the International Committee of the Red Cross and, if so, on what basis was the Red Cross not informed; (q) during the 2011 Parliamentary process in which a Panel of Arbiters decided what information could be released to Parliament, were documents withheld from this process by the government if they concerned the transfer of persons that were not treated by Canada as covered by the provisions of the 2005 and 2007 Canada-Afghanistan Memorandums of Understanding on detainee transfer; (r) between September 12, 2001, and the entry into effect of the 2005 detainee-transfer Memorandum of Understanding, (i) how many detainees were transferred to US authorities, (ii) to which US authorities, (iii) how many detainees were transferred to Afghan authorities, (iv) to which Afghan authorities, (v) how many persons under the control of Canada, but not considered as detainees by Canada, were transferred to US authorities, (vi) to which US authorities, (vii) how many persons under the control of Canada, but not considered as detainees by Canada, were transferred to Afghan authorities, (viii) to which Afghan authorities; (s) between the entry into effect of the 2005 detainee-transfer Memorandum of Understanding and the entry into effect of the 2007 detainee-transfer Memorandum of Understanding, (i) how many detainees were transferred to US authorities, (ii) to which US authorities, (iii) how many detainees were transferred to Afghan authorities, (iv) to which Afghan authorities, (v) how many persons under the control of Canada, but not considered as detainees by Canada, were transferred to US authorities, (vi) to which US authorities, (vii) how many persons under the control of Canada, but not considered as detainees by Canada, were transferred to Afghan authorities, (viii) to which Afghan authorities; (t) between the entry into effect of the 2007 detainee-transfer Memorandum of Understanding and the present date, (i) how many detainees were transferred to US authorities, (ii) to which US authorities, (iii) how many detainees were transferred to Afghan authorities, (iv) to which Afghan authorities, (v) how many persons under the control of Canada, but not considered as detainees by Canada, were transferred to US authorities, (vi) to which US authorities, (vii) how many persons under the control of Canada, but not considered as detainees by Canada, were transferred to Afghan authorities, (viii) to which Afghan authorities; (u) before General Rick Hillier signed the 2005 detainee-transfer Memorandum of Understanding with Afghan Defence Minister Wardak, did General Hillier call or attempt to call the Canadian Defence Minister Graham from Afghanistan, in order to seek Graham’s authorization for Hillier to sign; (v) at the time of the signing of the 2005 detainee-transfer Memorandum of Understanding between Afghan Defence Minister Wardak and Canadian General Hillier, was the Ambassador of Canada to Afghanistan in the room when the document was signed and thus an eyewitness to each man signing the document; (w) have Canadian special forces, whether JTF2 or other, ever participated in operations designed to obtain control over or custody of persons in Afghanistan as a result of information, instructions or orders originating from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or another US intelligence agency and, if so, in what periods and resulting in how many captures; (x) if not, have Canadian special forces participated alongside or in coordination with United States special forces for such capture operations in Afghanistan where it is known or reasonably assumed by Canada that the US special forces are acting on information, instructions or orders originating from the CIA or another US intelligence agency; (y) have there ever been and are there now Canadian military special forces in Pakistan; (z) have Canadian special forces, whether JTF2 or other, ever participated in operations designed to obtain control over or custody of persons in Pakistan as a result of information, instructions or orders originating from the CIA or another US intelligence agency and, if so, in what periods and resulting in how many captures; (aa) if not, have Canadian special forces participated alongside or in coordination with US special forces for such capture operations in Pakistan where it is known or reasonably assumed by Canada that the US special forces are acting on information, instructions or orders originating from the CIA or another US intelligence agency?