Dave MacKenzie

[Business of Supply, April 10th, 2014]

Mr. Speaker, my constituents in Oxford have been more than disappointed in that member and his filibustering in both the House and committee, resulting in absolutely nothing other than his talking and getting his remarks in the blues.

I do not understand the member's whole issue about filibustering the House and why we need to move items through the House by using the process and the Standing Orders. He was filibustering earlier today to block my colleagues' motion in the Liberal Party.

[Business of Supply, April 10th, 2014]

Mr. Speaker, I do believe that my colleague was a member of the Liberal government in 2003, when the Liberal government used time allocation to get its bill for a massive overhaul of political financing through Parliament.

I do not know what was wrong with it then and what is wrong with it now. Somehow there is a loss in credibility, if the member supported it in 2003 but not now. It is something that has been used in the past, and there is no reason why it should not continue to be used today.

[Business of Supply, April 10th, 2014]

Mr. Speaker, it was interesting to hear the speech by the member for Western Arctic.

What we are talking about here is time allocation in a variety of different ways obviously. We made points about where time allocation is used in a variety of instances. I would just point out that I spoke about private members' business being time allocated by the Standing Orders.

My friend may not know this, but the member for Compton—Stanstead had a private member's bill to amend the Constitution. If he thinks that is not important, I do not know what is. That was time allocated due to the fact that it was private members' business.

[Business of Supply, April 10th, 2014]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to stand in the House today to speak against the motion moved by my opposition colleague. Essentially, the motion put forward today would prevent the government from using time allocation or closure on any bill amending the Canada Elections Act or the Parliament of Canada Act.

Before getting into the substance of today's opposition day motion, I just want to comment on how remarkable the choice of the Liberals is for today's debate. The top priority of Canadians is our economy. Canadians expect us to be here working on ways to keep our economic recovery going. Meanwhile, the Liberals have two days this spring when they get to pick their topic of discussion. Did they offer up an economic proposal or any economic idea? Absolutely not. Then again, maybe that is not surprising, since the Liberal leader thinks that our budget will balance itself, and he is still working on a definition of just who is in the middle class.

Let us come back to today's debate. I respect the intent of the hon. member's motion. Bills amending the Canada Elections Act and the Parliament of Canada Act are of particular interest to members, as they concern the very functioning of our democracy. It is understandable that many members would wish to speak to such bills. However, the motion is not necessary. If we respect Parliament and trust the traditions permitted to authorities of Parliament, we need not selectively limit them in this way.

In my speech today I will demonstrate how the rules of this House already provide an appropriate balance between the needs of the government of the day and the needs of the opposition. There is no need to further limit the government's flexibility to ensure that debates conclude and that decisions are taken on issues relating to Parliament and elections.

It would be helpful for hon. members to remember more generally why we have provisions in our rules for time allocation and closure in the first place. Before I do that, let me quickly review what exactly time allocation and closure entail.

Time allocation and closure are tools under the Standing Orders that allow the government to curtail debate on an item. The rules for time allocation are outlined in Standing Order 78. Essentially, they allow a minister of the crown to propose a motion to allot a specified number of days or hours to the proceedings on the stage of a bill. The Standing Orders differentiate between three scenarios and provide escalating restrictions on the government, depending on the level of agreement the government is able to secure from opposition parties.

First, when there is agreement among all the parties, a minister may propose a time allocation motion covering any or all stages of a bill. The Liberal motion would even block agreements among all three parties from being implemented.

Second, when there is agreement among a majority but not of all the parties, the minister's motion can only cover one stage in the legislative process, although the motion can apply to both report stage and third reading. The motion can be moved without notice.

Third, if there is no agreement with the other parties, the government can propose a time allocation motion unilaterally. In this case, the motion can cover only one stage of the legislative process. The amount of time allocated for that stage may not be less than one sitting day, and previous notice of the intent to move the motion is required.

The rules for closure are outlined in Standing Order 57. They allow the government to move a motion to prevent the adjournment of debate on any matter and to require a vote on the matter at the end of the sitting if the closure motion is adopted.

What is the purpose of time allocation and closure? Why do these rules exist in the first place?

In our system of government, it is important to balance the needs of the government and the needs of the opposition. Our rules of debate ensure an opportunity for the voices of members to be heard and for the opposition to do just that: express opposition to the government. However, so too must the rules allow the executive to have a legitimate expectation to govern.

Time in the House is precious and must be used carefully. The government must ensure that decisions see debate but not paralysis. We cannot and will not allow our system of government to fall prey to the legislative gridlock that can occur in other countries. Our ability to deal with global economic turbulence and other challenges facing our country relate to our ability to effectively and efficiently manage and allocate time in our House. Canadians expect no less of us. Canadians expect results from their legislature. They expect members to work hard and get things done on their behalf. We agree.

The government has been clear that it will ensure a productive, hard-working, and orderly Parliament that achieves those results. Timetabling bills is a way to organize government business while allowing a reasonable opportunity for voices to be heard.

However, there must be limits. Without time allocation and closure rules, we can theoretically have a situation where the opposition uses obstructionist and dilatory tactics to prevent a government bill from going to a vote.

O'Brien and Bosc state, on page 647:

One of the fundamental principles of parliamentary procedure is that debate in the House of Commons must lead to a decision within a reasonable period of time.

There are checks and balances built into our rules to ensure that matters enjoy a reasonable period of debate, but at a certain point, debate must end and a vote held to brings matters to a close.

I have outlined why time allocation exists. I now wish to highlight a few examples of time allocation.

First, I will highlight how time allocation is built into the Standing Orders governing debate on certain other items. Then I will provide some examples of time allocation being used on bills to amend the Canada Elections Act and the Parliament of Canada Act.

Let us consider the Standing Orders that govern debate on the Address in Reply to the Speech from the Throne, the budget, and private members' business.

Under our rules, all of these debates are timetabled.

Standing Order 50(1) provides for a maximum of six days' debate on the Address in Reply to the Speech from the Throne and any amendments proposed thereto.

Standing Order 84(2) provides for a maximum of four sitting days of debate on the budget motion and any amendments proposed thereto.

Finally, the Standing Orders governing private members' business contain several provisions for the timetabling of these items. These include Standing Order 93(1)(a), which provides that there be no more than two hours of debate on the second reading motion for an item of private members' business; and Standing Order 98(2), which provides for report and third reading stage to be taken up on two separate sitting days.

If timetabling is appropriate for issues of such fundamental importance as the government's budgetary policy and items of concern to constituents brought forward by individual members, it is hard to imagine why my hon. colleague thinks it is not appropriate for bills concerning Parliament and elections.

There are other examples in our Standing Orders of rules that ensure the orderly and timely conduct of business in this House.

Standing Order 66(2) provides for no more than three hours of debate on a motion to concur in a committee report.

Standing Order 38(1) provides that adjournment proceedings last no more than 30 minutes.

I would also argue that the provisions of Standing Order 76.1(5), which provides the Speaker with the power to group report stage motions for debate, are a type of timetabling. The intent behind this rule is to attempt to avoid a repetition of the committee stage of a bill or other dilatory tactics.

However, the supreme irony is that today's debate is itself time allocated. Under the Standing Orders, the Speaker will stand at 5:15 p.m. to interrupt the debate and put the motion to the House.

There are a number of other provisions of the Standing Orders that reflect the need to ensure that timely decisions are taken on matters brought before this House.

I will now turn to some specific examples of bills amending the Parliament of Canada Act and the Canada Elections Act and how such bills have been, or in the case of my first example, will be timetabled.

My hon. colleague, the member for Wellington—Halton Hills, recently introduced Bill C-586, the reform act, 2014. The member was added to the order of precedence when it was replenished last evening.

Bill C-586 would amend both the Parliament of Canada Act and the Canada Elections Act. As a private member's bill, it would be subject to time allocation under our Standing Orders, with no more than two hours of debate on the second reading and no more than two hours of debate on the report and third reading stages of that bill.

Is it fair to timetable a private member's bill amending the Parliament of Canada Act and the Canada Elections Act while denying the government the same opportunity with a government bill amending the same acts? In other words, is it fair for the rules of this place to allow a private member's bill on a certain subject to come to a vote, while potentially preventing a timely decision on a government bill on a similar subject?

I think at this time it would be prudent to point out to the House that my hon. colleagues from the opposite side of the House are trying to prevent a practice that they themselves have used in the past.

On June 10, 2003, a former Liberal government, lo and behold, moved a time allocation motion stipulating that no more than one further sitting day, just one, be allotted for consideration at report stage, and no more than one further sitting day be allotted for consideration at third reading, of Bill C-24. What was Bill C-24? Well, Bill C-24 amended the Canada Elections Act with respect to political financing.

Another example is found on February 22, 2000, when that same Chrétien Liberal government used time allocation on Bill C-2. Bill C-2 was the Canada Elections Act itself.

Maybe the Liberals think that replacing the Canada Elections Act should actually be exempt from a law that simply amends it. What is more, Bill C-2 was referred to committee before second reading. Debates for that procedure back then were capped at three hours. So, yes, those very same Liberals thought that a whole new elections law needed just 180 minutes of discussion in the chamber before getting sent off to committee.

Time allocation on an elections bill was considered to be appropriate back then. It is unclear to me what has changed since then.

There is no doubt that bills amending the Parliament of Canada Act or the Canada Elections Act are of particular importance to this place. So let us consider what would happen if this motion were adopted at some future time when the government brought forward an urgent bill amending these acts.

If this motion were to be adopted, the government of the day would have only one recourse to ensure that a timely decision were taken on such a bill, and that is through unanimous consent. Even if all the parties were in agreement, it would only take one member to deny that consent. The government must have the flexibility to timetable important legislative initiatives and bring things to a vote, especially bills concerning elections and the functioning of this legislature.

At its heart, time allocation is an effective scheduling and time-management tool. That is why I cannot support this motion.

In conclusion, time allocation and closure are necessary tools for the government under the Standing Orders. The government must be free to organize its business and to ensure that decisions are taken no matter the subject matter of the issue at hand.

Timetabling debate provides an appropriate balance between the opposition's right to be heard and the government's right to govern. Perhaps opposition members will vote against certain items of government business, and it is certainly their right to do so, but we must ensure that we get to the point where a vote is held and decisions are taken. Canadians expect no less. That is why I urge my hon. colleagues to vote against this motion.

[Petitions, April 3rd, 2014]

Mr. Speaker, the second petition is dealing with the extraction industry.

[Petitions, April 3rd, 2014]

Mr. Speaker, I have the honour to present two petitions today. The first one is dealing with farmers saving seeds.

[Truth National Tour, March 28th, 2014]

Mr. Speaker, yesterday the NDP tried to distance itself from the truth national tour, denying its affiliation with the truther cause and its belief that 9/11 was an inside job.

It should be mentioned, too, that the member for Vancouver Kingsway and the member for Vancouver East also had links and exchanges with the truther cause, with the member for Vancouver East delivering a truther petition in 2008. The petition states:

We further believe that elements within the US government were complicit in the murder of thousands of people on 9/11/2001.

It also says:

...scientific and eyewitness evidence shows that the 9/11 Commission Report is a fraudulent document and that those behind the report are consciously or unconsciously guilty of covering up what happened on 9/11/2001.

The NDP can say what it wants, but the real truth is that there is a disturbing pattern among its members, including the NDP leader and his deputy leader, the member for Halifax, of supporting and sustaining ideas of conspiracy—

[Northwest Territories Devolution Act, February 14th, 2014]

Mr. Speaker, I believe if you seek it you will find unanimous consent to see the clock as 1:30 p.m.

[Petitions, February 10th, 2014]

Mr. Speaker, I have the pleasure to present a petition from the people in my riding concerning the tragic death of a family member. This petition requests that when a fatal accident occurs, the driver who caused the accident resulting in the fatality be checked for alcohol consumption and drug use at the time and that the driver's cellphone be confiscated to be checked for text messages that were being written or sent at the time of the accident.

[Election of Committee Chairs, January 29th, 2014]

Mr. Speaker, it is a pleasure to participate in the debate of Motion No. 431 on the process for electing the chairs of committees of the House.

I know that my colleague, the member for Saskatoon—Humboldt, has brought forward this motion in the hopes of improving how we function and operate in this place.

As we know, Motion No. 431 would require the procedure and House affairs committee to consider the election of chairs by means of a preferential ballot system by all members of the House. It then goes on to require the committee to study the practice of committee chair elections in other Westminster-style parliaments.

As members of the House know, it is Standing Order 106 that sets out the current rules for electing committee chairs. I am afraid that if Canadians were to read this motion, they might come away with a skewed vision of how our current system actually works. For one, they might think we do not currently elect committee chairs.

It is worth highlighting for the public that our current process already involves the election of committee chairs by members of each committee, and there is nothing stopping them from nominating and electing the candidate of their choice.

While the current system may not be perfect, I think it is fair to say that the current rules have served us well. I was not aware of any egregious flaws in the way we currently elect committee chairs, but I support the intent of my colleague's motion.

I do want to focus my remarks today on what I see as some potential concerns and issues that must be addressed with respect to the system that my colleague is proposing through his motion and, in so doing, provide some additional context for the committee once this motion is adopted and sent to the procedure and House affairs committee for thoughtful consideration.

During the debate on this motion in the last session of Parliament, members from all sides identified a number of concerns and raised a number of questions with the proposed approach of electing committee chairs by means of a preferential ballot system by all members of the House.

As I alluded to just moments ago, I think it is worth asking a very basic question: Is there a need for changing the current system? What is currently not working? The entire premise on which this motion is based implies that our current system is somehow flawed and needs urgent fixing. I believe members on all sides are open to having the procedure and House affairs committee study the matter with this level of diligence.

Currently, as members know, a number of committee chairs are set aside for members of the official opposition. My guess is that the official opposition might take issue with having all members of the House voting for which of their members would become chair of one of those committees. I think it is fair to say that the official opposition, to its credit, has been judicious in who they have put forward to be elected as chairs of such committees as the public accounts committee and the government operations and estimates committee.

Often the chair is a seasoned parliamentarian who has extensive committee experience. I cannot imagine that they would want to lose control and have it thrown open to all members of the House to elect these chairs. However, let me not speak for the opposition. They have been doing so over the course of the debate on the motion, and if the motion is adopted, the procedure and House affairs committee must be mindful of the implications of the proposal.

Just as a government would take issue in a minority setting with having the majority of members of the House vote for all government chairs, so too would the opposition have similar concerns about the implications for a majority government electing government members as chairs of all committees.

Within the context of this issue, and a few others that I will highlight in a moment, I am curious as to why the member for Saskatoon—Humboldt would choose to go into such detail in the motion around the voting protocol that would be employed as part of this new system and stay silent on a myriad of other issues and concerns.

It would seem to me that the motion could have either been very general regarding the question of examining a new system or, alternatively, been as complete and comprehensive as possible.

Despite these reservations, I am prepared to support the motion and, if a majority of members agree, let the procedure and House affairs committee study the matter in greater detail.

There is another aspect of the proposed system that I hope the member can address. There are numerous circumstances that I think would lead a chair to vacate the position. To be consistent, are we then talking about an election by all members of the House every time there is a vacancy?

On a related note, what would be the mechanism for removing a chair, if elected by all members? Would a chair not have to be removed on the basis of a vote by all members as well? The resources and time that would potentially have to be expended under such a system causes concern.

I am aware of a situation occurring with the British Parliament currently. For the first time since a similar system was adopted in Britain, the Commons defence select committee has signalled there will be a first byelection with the impending departure of its chair. That race is being closely watched and may be of interest when considering this motion.

What about the issue of joint committees with the other chamber, where there is a House co-chair? What would the member for Saskatoon—Humboldt propose we do for the chairs of special or legislative committees? Is he suggesting that the Speaker should no longer play a role in the selection of special or legislative committee chairs?

Let us study the models and the facts, and let the committee do its work without constraint.

In looking past these immediate concerns, I do believe we could support our colleague's motion to investigate the merits of his proposal. While I see some flaws in the proposal, there is always merit in due consideration. In a meagre two hours of debate, it is difficult to flesh out an issue that may very well have unforeseen consequences. As a result, I am prepared, and I urge my colleagues, to support the motion so that the procedure and House affairs committee can hear from expert witnesses on the proposal. Before making the changes the motion is proposing, there should be a careful and thorough review of the current rules for committee chairs and serious consideration should be given to any and all potential scenarios and consequences.