Erin Weir

[Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, December 13th, 2016]

Mr. Speaker, my colleague from Winnipeg North is unusually magnanimous today, and I greatly appreciate his kind question.

He did sort of broaden NDP support for this trade agreement to a general statement in favour of free trade deals helping the middle class. I think this is an important distinction between the NDP and the government. While the government believes that any and all of these trade deals are a good thing and should be blindly supported, we in the NDP think it is very important to look at the specifics of the agreement and evaluate it on that basis.

It is for that reason that we had some very serious concerns with CETA, but we do not find those concerns present in this agreement. In fact, we see good reasons to support it.

[Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, December 13th, 2016]

Mr. Speaker, of all the Canadian provinces, Manitoba and Saskatchewan are the two that have the highest population share of Ukrainian ancestry. It is certainly a heritage of which we are extremely proud.

One of our great premiers, Roy Romanow, was of Ukrainian ancestry. He often told stories about his father emigrating from the Ukraine and working on the railroad, so there is a lot of excellent common heritage there. Mr. Romanow himself has made many great contributions to this country, first and foremost as premier of Saskatchewan, but before that he played a critical role in the patriation of the Constitution. After his time as premier, he also chaired a very important report on the future of public medicare in Canada. He would be just one example of an important Ukrainian Canadian from Saskatchewan.

Another example, from the same realm, was a fellow named Ed Tchorzewski, who was perhaps a bit less known nationally. He was a deputy premier of Saskatchewan. Unfortunately, he passed away recently, but his son, Dion Tchorzewski, continues as a very active lawyer in Regina and a very important member of the community.

I would like to turn to the trade agreement with Ukraine we are considering today. I would like to note that I rose in this House both on Friday and on Monday to speak against the comprehensive economic and trade agreement between Canada and the European Union. I made two main points in opposition to that deal. The first had to do with trade flows. I made the point that Canada has a deep trade deficit with the European Union, and in fact, that trade deficit is even deeper if we exclude the United Kingdom, which is leaving the EU in the wake of the Brexit vote. I made the point that simply amplifying or trying to amplify trade flows between Canada and what is left of the European Union would likely result in an even larger trade deficit, which would be a detraction from Canadian output and employment. That was one critique of CETA: its potential negative consequences in terms of trade flows.

My other critique of CETA was its investor-state provisions, which have very little to do with trade and everything to do with empowering foreign corporations to directly challenge our democratic laws, regulations, and public policies through a special, secretive commercial tribunal process, which CETA would apply to the municipal level of government for the first time.

As I said, my objections to CETA were the current pattern of trade between Canada and the EU as well as the investor-state provisions.

The reason the NDP is pleased to support this trade agreement with the Ukraine is that there would be a very different pattern of trade present. Currently, Canada runs a significant trade surplus with the Ukraine, and there is every reason to believe that this liberalization of trade could actually improve that trade surplus and could actually add to Canadian output and employment in modest but important ways. We think this agreement could actually be positive in terms of its effect on Canadian trade flows. That is the first important distinction between this deal and CETA.

The other important distinction, as my colleague from Elmwood—Transcona already explained very well, is that this deal does not include these pernicious investor-state provisions that would allow foreign investors to sue the Canadian government when our public interest regulations interfere with some sort of potential future or hoped-for profit. A major problem with CETA is that it would carry on these investor-state provisions and would impose them at the municipal level. The agreement with the Ukraine does not include those provisions, so we are happy to support it as a trade agreement.

Having said all that, I want to also express some concerns about the situation in the Ukraine and its potential ramifications for trade with Canada.

To be blunt, in Ukraine there is a lack of human rights, a lack of labour rights, and a lack environmental protections. Those can have some very negative consequences for trade flows. One example I would cite is that Ukraine has been a major source of steel dumping in world markets. There is a large-scale industry in Ukraine. It is really not subject to a lot of labour standards or environmental rules. The Canadian International Trade Tribunal has applied anti-dumping duties on Ukrainian steel. Just a few months ago, it renewed those duties, because it found that the problem still persisted that Ukrainian steel coming into Canada was very much underpriced.

I do not want to give the sense that everything is well with trade between Canada and Ukraine, but we see this agreement as a potentially useful tool to remedy that situation, in part because the agreement would allow Canada to continue to use those trade remedies to deal with the underpricing of Ukrainian steel.

I mentioned that there are a lot of people of Ukrainian origin in Regina. There are also a lot of people in Regina who work for a steel mill, so one of the things that is important to me about the agreement is the fact that it preserves Canada's ability to use trade remedies to correct some of the problems we see with Ukrainian steel imports.

Beyond steel, given the problems with human and labour rights in Ukraine, it is very important that the agreement also be accompanied by a human rights assessment. That is something the NDP is going to be proposing when the bill is before committee. We think it is very important, in supporting the agreement, to also support a robust human rights assessment to make sure that the benefits of trade are actually helping the people of Ukraine and are not just lining the pockets of oligarchs.

To sum up, there is a very proud Ukrainian heritage in our country, especially in the prairie provinces, especially in Saskatchewan. I think, for example, of the Regina Walsh Acres NDP Ukrainian banquet. It is a fantastic event in the northern part of my riding that I am often keen to attend. It is always a fantastic meal, with great dancing. It is a great social event.

In terms of the trade deal itself, the NDP is pleased to support it, because we have a constructive trade relationship with Ukraine. We run a trade surplus. We see the possibility that the agreement could actually add to Canadian output and employment while at the same time helping with Ukraine's economic development.

We are also happy to support the agreement because it actually is a trade agreement. It does not include these investor-state provisions that would allow foreign corporations to directly challenge our laws, regulations, and public policies.

Finally, we salute the fact that the agreement preserves Canada's ability to use trade remedy provisions when necessary to deal with some of the problems that exist with Ukrainian products, like steel, coming into Canada.

[Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, December 13th, 2016]

Mr. Speaker, the member for Elmwood—Transcona mentioned that the government had followed its own process for this agreement. Does the member have any insight as to why the government did not follow its own process for CETA?

[Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, December 12th, 2016]

Mr. Speaker, I want to ask about the theme of Brexit. The member for London—Fanshawe asked about the effect it would have on trade flows. I would like to ask whether the decision to leave the European Union by Britain reflected a turn away from this orthodoxy of free trade, corporate globalization, and whether that change in the temperament of the times should influence Canada's evaluation of CETA and other free trade agreements.

[December 12th, 2016]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for his question.

Yes, I do share that concern. I think it is rather clear that that agreement is going to cause an increase in drug prices. It really has nothing to do with free trade. The agreement is going to make it harder to produce and sell drugs at a modest price. This is really going to drive up prices, not only for individuals, but also for provincial governments that have to purchase drugs for their public health care systems.

[December 12th, 2016]

Mr. Speaker, I certainly agree with the proposition that we should be trying to remove these investor-state provisions from existing trade agreements. The U.S. president-elect has promised to renegotiate NAFTA, and I would submit that one of Canada's objectives in those negotiations should be to remove chapter 11, because, of course, Canada has been victimized by these investor-state challenges more so than either the United States or Mexico.

I also want to pick up on the point that the member for Saanich—Gulf Islands made about a regulatory chill. We have talked about specific investor-state cases and the negative effects they have had, but another effect they have is often to deter regulators from trying to strengthen standards or improve public policies in the first place. It is very difficult to measure this negative effect of investor-state provisions, but it is clearly pernicious to have regulators constantly having to second-guess whether some sort of improvement they might want to make to public interest regulation might attract one of these investor-state challenges. This is another reason to take these provisions out of trade agreements.

[December 12th, 2016]

Mr. Speaker, trade between Canada and Europe is already free. There are very few tariffs between Canada and the members of the European Union, which raises the question of why we need a comprehensive economic and trade agreement. However, if we are to evaluate this agreement as a trade deal, a logical starting point is to examine the current pattern of trade between Canada and the European Union.

In 2015, Canada exported $38 billion of merchandise to the European Union and imported $61 billion of merchandise from the EU. This imbalance meant a trade deficit of $23 billion.

An implication of this is that if CETA functioned as advertised and boosted bilateral trade flows, it would increase our trade deficit with the European Union. For example, a 10% increase in bilateral trade would boost exports by $4 billion and imports by $6 billion. That would raise our trade deficit with the EU by $2 billion, which is a subtraction from Canadian output and employment.

The economic models that were used to argue for CETA simply assumed balanced trade and full employment, but of course we know those assumptions are not realistic in the real world. Furthermore, these models take no account of Brexit. The United Kingdom has voted to leave the European Union, which is of course very consequential for CETA. The United Kingdom is the only major European economy with whom Canada is running a trade surplus.

In 2015, Canada exported $16 billion of merchandise to Britain and imported $9 billion. If we looked at the remaining European Union countries, Canada exported only $22 billion of merchandise and imported $52 billion. In other words, Canada imported more than twice as much as we exported to the European Union, excluding the United Kingdom, and that means a trade deficit of $30 billion with what remains of the EU.

In that scenario, a 10% increase in bilateral trade would boost our exports by just $2 billion and would increase our imports by $5 billion. That would raise Canada's trade deficit with what remains of the European Union by $3 billion, an even larger subtraction from Canadian output and employment.

When we look at the actual trade flows between Canada and the EU, particularly the EU excluding the United Kingdom, there is very little reason to believe that CETA could increase Canadian output and employment; but even if it did, CETA also makes it easier for European companies to bring in temporary foreign workers. Even if there were some increase in employment in Canada, there is absolutely no guarantee that it would go to Canadian workers.

Beyond trade, I think it is important to recognize that CETA has many other provisions that have nothing to do with free trade. As other New Democrats have mentioned in this debate, CETA would increase the duration of pharmaceutical patents. That is the opposite of trade liberalization. It is a restriction that would make it harder for generic drug manufacturers and harder to have competition in pharmaceuticals and it would boost the price of those medications for consumers.

Another aspect of CETA that is very controversial and has very little to do with trade is the investor-state dispute provisions. These provisions have been watered down somewhat to try to make CETA more palatable to Wallonia and other areas of Europe that were concerned, but nevertheless there still are investor-state provisions, and CETA for the first time extends these to the municipal level of government.

The question I would ask is, why do we need these provisions at all in CETA? The origin of investor-state provisions was in NAFTA where Canadian and American investors may have had doubts about the Mexican judicial system. However, clearly Canada has a well-functioning court system. Clearly, Europe has a trustworthy judicial system. Why is it even necessary to set up a special tribunal process that is only accessible to foreign investors? Why can Canadians not use the European court system, and why can European investors not use the Canadian court system? We really have not heard an answer to this question from the government side.

It is worth reviewing some of the outrageous cases that have been brought against Canada under the investor-state provisions of NAFTA. If we go back to the 1990s, there was the Ethyl case, in which Canada tried to ban a gasoline additive, MMT, that was already banned in the United States. However, the American producer of it sued Canada under NAFTA, and the Canadian government not only lifted the ban, but also paid $13 million U.S. in compensation.

More recently, we had the AbitibiBowater case, where AbitibiBowater, a Canadian pulp and paper company, shut down its last remaining mill in the province of Newfoundland and Labrador. The provincial government reclaimed water rights that it had given to AbitibiBowater to operate those mills. The company, which had registered itself in the United States, was able to present itself as an American investor and sued Canada under NAFTA for the loss of these water rights that it was no longer even using. What happened? The Canadian government paid AbitibiBowater $130 million in compensation.

To talk about an even more recent case, Lone Pine Resources is an Alberta-based oil and gas company that registered itself in Delaware and then used NAFTA to sue Canada because of Quebec's ban on fracking. Lone Pine Resources is claiming $250 million in compensation.

What we see in all of these cases is that companies are abusing the investor-state provisions of NAFTA to directly challenge democratic laws, regulations, and public policies that arguably interfere with their potential future profits. Given the bad experience we have had with the investor-state provisions of NAFTA, it is totally unclear why Canada is pushing to include these provisions in CETA. Again, it is not just a matter of re-including in CETA what is already in NAFTA. CETA actually goes farther, in the sense that it imposes this regime on municipalities, something that NAFTA and previous trade deals did not do. There is a real objection to the investor-state provisions in CETA, notwithstanding the government's efforts to water them down somewhat.

In conclusion, there is no case for CETA as a trade deal, if we look at the actual trade flows between Canada and what is left of the European Union after Brexit. Furthermore, there are many negative non-trade aspects of CETA, such as more temporary foreign workers, longer pharmaceutical patents, and more of these outrageous investor-state disputes. For all of these reasons, the NDP is opposing Bill C-30.

[German Heritage Month, December 9th, 2016]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to speak to this motion to establish German heritage month. This is a great opportunity to recognize the contribution of German Canadians to our society and to celebrate its many cultural traditions.

Saskatchewan's motto is “From Many Peoples Strength”. German Canadians have played an important part in building Saskatchewan through many of our industries, farms, and cities. Today, Regina is home to more than 60,000 people of German heritage. I am proud to count myself as one of them.

From 1867 to 1914, western Canada became home to millions of immigrant settlers seeking a new life. This immigration boom created new opportunities with many immigrants bringing with them knowledge and experience in agriculture and trades.

To give an example, Saskatchewan's population multiplied by 11 times from 1891 to 1911, including many German settlers. With Saskatchewan's rapid growth during these years, immigrants began to transform the Prairies and establish unique cultural settlements.

The Germans who came to Saskatchewan established two large colonies in the early 1900s. St. Peter's colony comprised 50 townships and had 7,000 people in 1914.

St. Joseph's colony comprised 77 townships, with a population in 1916 of around 11,000. Germans' influence on Saskatchewan's proud history can be seen in the names of towns right across the province.

German bloc settlements include the areas around Strasbourg, Bulyea, Leader, Burstall, Fox Valley, Eatonia, St. Walburg, Paradise Hill, Loon Lake, Goodsoil, Pierceland, Meadow Lake, Edenwold, Windthorst, Lemberg, Qu’appelle, Neudorf, Grayson, Langenburg, Kerrobert, Unity, Luseland, Macklin, Humboldt, Watson, Cudworth, Lampman, Midale, Tribune, Consul, Rockglen, Shaunavon, Swift Current.

Many Germans who migrated to Saskatchewan came from Russia and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. They were motivated by all that Canada had to offer: greater economic opportunity and improved quality of life as well as an escape from oppression and persecution.

This is a proud part of Canada's history and to this day, we are seen as a place of hope and freedom from persecution.

The outbreak of the First World War stopped the great wave of German and Eastern European immigration to Saskatchewan. However, after the war, Germans were again travelling in search of opportunity. Some of them stayed at a boarding house run by my great-grandmother in Regina.

In the Second World War, my great uncle served in the Royal Canadian Navy. He was on a corvette that accepted the surrender of a U-boat. When the German crew came off, one of them was a man who had stayed at his family home in the 1930s while looking for work in Regina.

A decade after the Second World War, Regina's German Club was formed in 1955. It opened its current clubhouse in 1968 as a gathering place for the German community in Regina. However, today it welcomes people from all backgrounds to come and experience the culture and cuisine of Germany in the heart of our city. As a member of the German Club for several years, I highly recommend visiting this facility.

The NDP is proud to support multiculturalism and we have a long history of highlighting our country's commitment to cultural diversity. We are pleased to support German heritage month as a way of recognizing German Canadian contributions to our country.

[Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, December 9th, 2016]

Mr. Speaker, my colleague is certainly correct that past Conservative and Liberal governments have taken the attitude that they should just sign any and all free trade agreements, without much regard for whether they are good deals, and without much regard for the actual provisions of those agreements. That is one of the ways we have been in trouble with things like investor-state provisions.

My colleague is also correct to note that there has been a shift away from this logic of free trade all the time and at all costs. There is a sort of re-evaluation of corporate globalization and what it means for working people. Rather than rushing ahead with this deal, I do think it would make sense for Canada to re-evaluate our position as well, and to re-evaluate our position in this changed world.

Certainly in terms of Brexit, as I pointed out in my speech, it removes from the European Union the one major economy with which we were running a trade surplus. The trade imbalance that Canada will suffer with what is left of the European Union is even worse, and the potential negative consequences of getting this deal wrong are even more dire.

My colleague has added some very good reasons to vote against Bill C-30.

[Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, December 9th, 2016]

Mr. Speaker, I would start by pointing out that in a couple of cases I mentioned, it was Canadian companies that were reconfiguring themselves as foreign corporations in order to use the investor-state provisions. However, this is not really about discriminatory treatment. This is about public policies, laws, and regulations costing a company that happens to be foreign, or that is able to characterize itself as foreign, some kind of future profit opportunity.

The Canadian court system would certainly uphold the rights of foreign investors, and I think the European court system would uphold the rights of Canadian investors. What we do not need is to create a special tribunal process that gives special privileges to foreign investors.