Mr. Speaker, I agree with some but certainly not all of the comments of the hon. member for Esquimalt-Juan de Fuca.
We should look at what Bill C-301 does. First, it would apply when an accused has two previous convictions for any of the 15 offences listed in the bill. Bill C-301 eliminates discretion of the court in sentencing the offender for the commission of a serious indictable offence.
I understand that violence in our society is an important problem, and I do not disagree with the intent here, but let us look at this for a moment. This response has some attractiveness; it is certainly simple and seems to be a very clear response. Is it the right answer to this problem?
It is true that all human institutions have human failings, so our courts are not perfect. However, by and large, if I read through decisions and look into the depth of the cases, I and most people also would find the same things, that we agree with the sentences if we actually have all the facts before us. One problem is that very often we only have a few very simple and limited facts about the case and the decision. Sometimes it seems the simplest answer is sometimes also the wrong answer.
It is noteworthy that all the offences listed in this bill already carry the maximum sentence of life imprisonment. In other words, the judge already has the power to impose life sentences for any one of these offences, let alone for three. Although he does not have to, he has the authority to do so, and to take into account various factors in deciding on the appropriate sentence. This reflects the basic principle of let the punishment fit the crime. And it should. It means the key decision maker in matching the penalty to the crime is the individual who was there to see the case and all the facts of the case, the judge.
I know we will hear the argument that a pattern of three serious offences is enough to prove that an automatic life sentence does fit the crime, or at least the pattern of crime. To make a life sentence mandatory for offences other than murder or treason is a significant and I think ill-advised departure from our criminal law.
The Criminal Code currently provides for a mandatory life sentence for first or second degree murder or for high treason. There are other mandatory minimum sentences, but they are the exception in our criminal law. Mandatory life sentences are extremely rare.
I refer my colleagues to the report of the Canadian Sentencing Commission, "Sentencing Reform in Canada: The Canadian Approach", chapter eight, in which the commission opposed mandatory minimum sentences on the grounds that they diminish the role of the judge and can therefore result in arbitrary punishment and other inequities.
As an alternative to mandatory minimum sentences, the commission set out a number of sentencing principles, including this statement at page 154 of its report:
The paramount principle governing the determination of a sentence is that the sentence be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender for the offence.
It seems to me that is as it should be. From Bill C-41, the sentencing bill now before the House, I refer to section 718(1): "A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender". The government is already adding that provision to the law with Bill C-41.
The reason for not removing the court's discretion to determine the sentence length is both sound and straightforward. The court should have the ability to consider both aggravating and mitigating factors that will help the criminal justice process impose the punishment that fits the crime.
The sentencing commission report sets out a long list of such aggravating factors at page 320, including the use of violence in the crime, existence of previous convictions, a manifestation of excessive cruelty toward the victim and other factors. Bill C-41 similarly acknowledges the importance of aggravating and mitigating factors in sentencing.
It is apparent with respect to the offences listed in the bill the court already has the authority to consider past offences as aggravating factors and to impose a life sentence for any of the offences listed in this bill.
The hon. member has tried to confine his three strikes model to a limited number of indictable offences and thereby avoid some of the excesses of the American statutes. He has succeeded only in narrowing the focus of Criminal Code offences that already carry a maximum life sentence.
Supporters of the bill will argue it is the pattern of offending that makes the difference, that requires this drastic change in our approach to sentencing. Let us examine the objectives of sentencing. One of the purposes of criminal law is denunciation through punishment. Nothing is achieved from the point of view of punishment by making a life sentence mandatory for three offences as opposed to allowing the court to consider all relevant factors in imposing sentence which can be life for any of the 15 listed offences. It seems likely such a pattern of repeat offending would lead the court to consider a very long sentence for any of these serious crimes.
The other purposes of sentencing include deterrence and the long term protection of society against criminals likely to reoffend. From this perspective, Bill C-301 casts too wide a net in its indiscriminate approach to patterns of offending. Would it not be better to tailor a law to the actual conduct that shows a likelihood of reoffending violently? Can we not focus on the circumstances of the offence, on the offender's mental state, on the brutality of his actions, all factors that evidence a continuing threat to the community?
We have such a law found in part 24 of the Criminal Code, dangers offender sections. This part specifically allows the court to impose an indeterminate sentence for a pattern of serious personal injury offences as defined in section 752 as follows:
An indictable offence, other than high treason, treason, first degree murder or second degree murder, involving, (i) the use or attempted use of violence against another person, or
(ii) conduct endangering or likely to endanger the life or safety of another person or inflicting or likely to inflict psychological damage upon another person, and for which the offender may be sentenced to imprisonment for ten years or more.
A number of particular sexual offences are also included in the definition. This approach to patterns of offending allows the court to link past offences and violent conduct to a prediction that the offender constitutes a threat to the life, safety or physical or mental well-being of other persons.
The court is also required to hear psychiatric evidence and dangerous offender hearings allow both the prosecution and the defence to introduce evidence about the potential threat posed by the offender to the community. Those are good opportunities to hear what threat there is and the reasons for a long sentence. This structured approach contrasts with the automatic life sentence this bill would impose.
I recommend we let the courts do their job. The Criminal Code already provides for life sentences for these 15 crimes and additionally sets out a dangerous offender procedure which targets patterns of violence and links such patterns to predictions of violent reoffending.