Mr. Speaker, I would like to organize my remarks around a series of questions and then proceed in sequence to answer them.
Number one, does the situation in Iraq pose a threat to international peace and security? More particularly, is there a clear and present danger that Saddam Hussein has the intent and the capacity to develop, transfer and use weapons of mass destruction?
Number two, what are the remedies available, political, diplomatic, economic and juridical to counter, contain and address this threat? Again, more particularly, have all the remedies short of military force been exhausted? This has to be a bedrock principle in our approach to appreciating the international and indeed Canadian domestic strategy with respect to Iraq. Have all remedies short of military force been exhausted?
Number three, what has been the experience and what is the status of the United Nations weapons inspection regime?
Number four, what role can and should the United Nations, particularly the UN Security Council now play in countering the Iraq threat?
Number five, does a democratic country like the United States or a coalition of democratic countries have the right to launch a pre-emptive strike against Iraq on the grounds that it constitutes a threat to international peace and security?
Number six, what are the risks involved in the use of military action and what are the risks involved in forgoing military action if all other remedies have been exhausted, short of military action, and we have come to the point where we have to make that decision?
Finally, what is the specific and distinguishable contribution that Canada can make?
I am not sure whether time will permit me to answer these questions, but I will take them now seriatim. I will begin with the first, whether the situation in Iraq poses a threat to international peace and security and in particular, whether there is a clear and present danger that the Saddam Hussein regime has both the intent and capacity to develop, transfer and use weapons of mass destruction.
The record demonstrates that Saddam Hussein has historically constituted a threat to international peace and security, whether one speaks of the acts of genocide against his own people in the Halabja genocide in 1988, the war crimes and crimes against humanity in the war with Iran, the crimes against the peace which has been called, if I may borrow from his own phrase, the mother of all international crimes in the acts of aggression against Kuwait, or in the torture, execution and repression of his own civilians. One could go on and on. The record is clear. The importance of that record is that Saddam Hussein has demonstrated the will and the capacity to commit the most horrific of international crimes.
It is no less clear that Iraq under Saddam Hussein has the intent and the capacity to produce chemical and biological weapons, retains the capacity to produce mass casualty chemical weapons and is on the threshold of acquiring weapons grade material for building nuclear weapons or constructing one on its own.
In other words, if Iraq is not yet a clear and present danger to international peace and security, its intent, coupled with its capacity and the historical record, places us in the position of appreciating that it is certainly in the process of evolving into such a clear and present and imminent danger to international peace and security as well as to regional instability and a threat within the Middle East itself. This leads me to the second question.
Given the remedies available, what can one characterize as the spectrum of remedies that we can identify as having been used and that can be used to contain, to counter and to redress the Iraqi threat?
First there will be political démarche, démarche for member states in the international community on a bilateral level and on a regional level, in particular the League of Arab States to whom the threat to international peace and security involves also, as I indicated, a threat to Middle East peace and security. We know that these démarches, from a political point of view, are being made by the Arab states themselves to Iraq.
Second, there are diplomatic remedies in the form of démarches from the United Nations and its specialized agencies, be it the Atomic Energy Commission or UNSCOM and the weapons inspection regime and the like.
Third are the economic remedies in the form of the economic sanctions.
Finally, interestingly enough, given the overall explosion in international criminal law, there are legal remedies. For example, there is the indictment of Saddam Hussein as a war criminal. It is a remedy however that has not been used, notwithstanding the salutary effects it may have in so indicting him, both with regard to isolating him in the international community as a kind of pariah of such a nature that ought to deter any other states from having any other relationships with him, if not also encouraging an opposition in that regard, not unlike what indictments have done with war criminals in other killing fields.
This brings me to the third point. What has been the experience and the status of the United Nations inspections regime in its relationship with Iraq, both from the beginning of that inspection regime to the present day?
An examination of the evidence demonstrates on the part of Iraq a pattern of obstruction, obfuscation, deception and denial, of accepting inspections without conditions and then imposing conditions, even at gunpoint, so as to obstruct, obfuscate and in fact immunize itself from any inspections regime.
This brings me to the fourth point. What role can and should the UN now play in countering the Iraqi threat given this pattern of obstruction and denial of a Union Nations inspection regime?
First, if there cannot be an agreement obtained between the United Nations inspection regime and Iraq with respect to a full, unfettered and unconditional access to an international inspection regime allowing for inspections anywhere, any time, including for example the presidential palaces of Saddam Hussein which thus far have been immune from inspection but which have been characterized as clearly able to be weapons of mass production factories, then the UN Security Council will have to unequivocally authorize such a weapons inspection regime supported by a chapter VII authority under the UN charter. It is a triggering mechanism whereby any obstruction or obfuscation, deception or denial by Iraq will result in a determination by the United Nations Security Council that such behaviour constitutes a threat to international peace and security and that such a determination will include also the authorization for the use of force under chapter VII in the name of and under the authority of the United Nations Security Council and, in effect, in the name of and under the authority of the community of nations. In effect this will constitute authority for forceable humanitarian intervention.
I prefer to use that approach rather than the terminology or characterization of this as war, not unlike for some of the authority that was given with respect to the NATO intervention in Kosovo. At that time the United Nations determined that the situation in Kosovo was a threat to international peace and security. It triggered a chapter VII authority. From that, NATO inferred that it had specific authority to militarily intervene although that had some questionable authority at the time; it was an inferred and not expressly a specific one. However the UN Security Council could now make this a specific one.
This brings me to the fifth question. Does a democratic country such as the United States, or a coalition of democratic countries, have the right under international law to launch a pre-emptive strike against Iraq on the grounds that Iraq constitutes a threat to international peace and security?
There would be two main sources of legal authority for that kind of strike by the United States or a coalition of democratic states. One would be the Kosovo precedent, that once the United Nations has determined, if it indeed does determine, that the situation in Iraq constitutes a threat to international peace and security but does not expressly subsequently also authorize forcible military intervention, then a coalition of democratic states, following upon the Kosovo precedent, can make, if it wishes, that kind of inference.
However, the situation in Iraq may have to demonstrate that it indeed constitutes such a threat to international peace and security for this first rubric to in fact be legally persuasive.
The second would be article 51 of the United Nations charter, the principle of self-defence against an armed attack. Here one will have to refine in the post-September 11 age, which is what I think the Bush doctrine has been trying to do, that there is such a doctrine of pre-emptive military intervention in anticipation of a threat to international peace and security, if not also a threat to the United States and the other democratic countries specifically.
In my view, neither of those two sources would be legally persuasive, particularly if one could not establish, and one is not yet established, that the United Nations has made a determination that the situation in Iraq constitutes a threat to international peace and security and that the United Nations has also, in light of that determination, arrived at a conclusion that the development, use and transfer by Iraq of weapons of mass destruction constitutes such a clear and present danger that it constitutes an armed attack under article 51 of the charter.
My own view is that until we reach those two points, if we do reach them, then any legal pre-emptive strike by the United States or a coalition of democratic states would not be anchored in an international legal authority.
Finally, because I know I will not have time for the distinguished role that Canada might play, what are the risks involved in using military action or the risks involved in not using military action?
As I address the House it is clear from the evidence that we know that over the past 14 months Iraq has been seeking to buy thousands of specially designed aluminum tubes capable of being used as components of centrifuges to enriched uranium. It is also developing a capacity to use drone aircraft to spray chemical and biological agents. It also appears to be expanding its efforts to enlist terrorists as carriers of weapons of mass destruction.
If indeed those facts can be demonstrated to be true then we can be relatively certain of two conclusions: one, Iraq is determined to not only develop nuclear weapons but the capacity also to deliver them; and second, that it does not yet have that capacity.
This brings us to the third and most difficult and disputed issue and conclusion. How much time do we have before these weapons become operational and is it enough to warrant further efforts short of attack, such as continuing UN inspections and other diplomatic action?
The Bush administration says no, that time is on Iraq's side and that as soon as it develops a nuclear capacity all hope of inspections and diplomacy will be futile. Therefore they seek, at this point, authority for a pre-emptive strike and even will launch it without it.
Others say, and I put myself in that camp, that we have not yet exhausted all the other remedies available, that we have not made the appropriate determinations under international law that would legitimate a pre-emptive strike by the United Nations and that Canada can play a distinguishable role now both in developing United Nations law in that regard and in developing the spectrum of remedies that are still available to us with respect to containing and controlling Saddam Hussein's regime.