Irwin Cotler

[Business of Supply, February 4th, 2014]

Mr. Speaker, such a parliamentary committee would be mandated through a review of the legislative and regulatory policy and administrative framework for the agencies responsible for national security in Canada.

I might add that this bill by the member for Malpeque stems from a 2004 report by an all-party committee of parliamentarians at the time, of which the Minister of Justice, Peter MacKay, was a member. We would expect the government's full—

[Business of Supply, February 4th, 2014]

Mr. Speaker, it is the first time I am hearing that the establishment of an oversight committee, which I regard as part of the responsibility of Parliament as a whole, would somehow be transformed into an alleged partisan mechanism.

It is a parliamentary committee that has been recommended by members on all sides of the House for over 10 years, one that exists in the American Congress and European parliaments. It would not be a novel undertaking, but a necessary undertaking, both for the protection of security and individual liberties.

[Business of Supply, February 4th, 2014]

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the motion standing in the name of my colleague, the member for Malpeque, expressing the House's concern over reports that Communications Security Establishment Canada has engaged in improper practices, including the monitoring of Canadians, and calling for parliamentary oversight of CSEC through the measures outlined in Bill C-551, the national security committee of parliamentarians act. Indeed, I was one of those who, some 10 years ago, recommended the establishment of such a committee.

Others have risen to contextualize today's debate, citing recent media reports that CSEC accessed the metadata of passengers at airports in Canada using airport Wi-Fi, an activity which would be beyond CSEC's mandate and which would infringe upon the privacy rights of Canadians. Rather than discuss these reports at length or dwell on the technical questions surrounding the proper use of metadata, I will organize my remarks around a discussion of the foundational principles that should exist in our discussion of anti-terrorism law, practice, and policy, and their impact on matters of privacy, personal and collected.

As I have written elsewhere, the foundational principle should be that of human security, which does not see security and rights as a zero-sum or trade-off exercise, but which is inclusive of both security and human rights and is organized around a dual perspective. The first principle is that transnational terrorism constitutes an assault on the security of a democracy such as Canada, and on the individual and collective rights of our inhabitants, our rights to life, liberty, and security for the person. In that context, anti-terrorism law and policies are designed to protect the security of democracy and the rights of its inhabitants.

At the same time, the enactment, enforcement, and application of our anti-terrorism law and policy must always comport with the rule of law. The Charter of Rights and Freedoms must always be respected; individuals and groups must never be singled out for differential and discriminatory treatment; torture must always be condemned; and vulnerable and visible minorities must always be protected, be it as targets of incitement to racism and hatred or targets of racial profiling. In the promotion and protection of human security, we must never undermine our individual and collective rights, which are a fundamental component of that human security itself.

As the Supreme Court of Canada has put it, the question is not whether to respond to acts of terror but rather how we respond. “The Constitution”, it added, “is not a suicide pact”. Therefore, anti-terrorism law and policy is clearly necessary. Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the centrepiece of our Constitution, and the proportionality principle, the linchpin of any purported limitation on any charter right, must always be adhered to and respected. The same goes for our privacy rights, which are concretized in two federal statutes, primarily the Privacy Act and the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act.

Constitutional democracies such as Canada can and should address the dilemma of how to respond to terrorism in an informed and principled way rather than in any political or politicized fashion. As such, I wholeheartedly support the bill referenced in this motion, which would allow for oversight by a committee of parliamentarians, both senators and members of the House of Commons, sworn to secrecy, to receive briefings and updates on the activities of Canada's security services, and to do so in as secure a setting as needed. The importance of this issue cannot be understated. Just last week, Interim Privacy Commissioner of Canada Chantal Bernier tabled a report entitled, “Checks and Controls: Reinforcing Privacy Protection and Oversight for the Canadian Intelligence Community in an Era of Cyber-Surveillance”, which states:

While secrecy may be an inherent aspect of many intelligence activities, so is accountability. Reporting, review and appropriate legal controls lead to accountability on the part of decision-makers and institutions.

I believe I can speak for all members of this place when I say that we seek accountability and come to expect it. This holds even in the national security context.

As Ms. Bernier's report states:

National security claims do not reduce accountability obligations and security bodies must account to Canadians for what they do with personal information. Independent review mechanisms ensure this accountability of security agencies, safeguard public trust and verify demonstrable respect for individual rights.

The report of the interim Privacy Commissioner is a fascinating look at the interplay between national security and the protection of Canadians' personal information and data. There are also recommendations therein for the government. I hope it will implement some of them in the near future.

However, a more serious debate needs to happen wherein parliamentarians can help define and fashion the contour between what is acceptable in the pursuit of safety and what behaviours infringe upon our civil liberties in ways that we would deem inappropriate and improper, particularly with respect to the rights of privacy.

Regrettably, it is not the government that has asked for this open dialogue. Thus, I am thankful that my Liberal colleague from Malpeque has initiated this debate. It is important that Canadians play their part in this discussion as well.

Elizabeth Renzetti, in yesterday's Globe and Mail, put it quite well in her column, aptly titled “As government snoops, Canadians...take a nap”. Indeed, we have been lacking here in that sense of urgency about what has been happening, compared with the sense of urgency in matters of this kind in the United States and European parliaments.

Alarm bells are now going off. The interim Privacy Commissioner has sounded the alarm. We ought to heed her advice. She is not the only one, however. It is useful here to recall the Auditor General's report of March 2009, wherein he declared:

For Canadians to have confidence in their security and intelligence organizations, they need to know that government agencies and departments maintain a balance between protecting the privacy of citizens and ensuring national security.

It is precisely that balance that we strive for through an informed debate on CSEC's activities and through the creation of a parliamentary oversight committee for Canada's security infrastructure, as outlined in my colleague's bill.

Moreover, some of the answers the government has offered leave much to be desired. For example, the top national security adviser to the Prime Minister, at a committee of the other place, testified yesterday that he is “not totally persuaded” that CSEC had “tapped into” Canadians' communications via airport Wi-Fi.

Saying that one is not persuaded is not a categorical denial. It is not a definitive no. Should not the top security adviser to the Prime Minister know for sure? We, as parliamentarians, on behalf of Canadians, have an obligation to discover fully what happened and why, and to pronounce ourselves thereupon.

In its statement on the recent media reports, CSEC noted:

The CSEC Commissioner is currently conducting another review of CSEC’s metadata activities. We welcome that review.

I am hopeful that this review will be made public and that we will require more transparency from CSEC, including, as the Privacy Commissioner has recommended, the publication of annual statistics of interception and the tabling of a non-classified report in Parliament.

In closing, it is not only possible but also necessary to work together to ensure the protection of both security and rights. While it is a challenging matter to resolve, I believe that parliamentarians are capable of co-operating across party lines to ensure that Canadians enjoy both a robust security infrastructure, on the one hand, and the fullest expression of the principles underpinning the charter and privacy legislation, on the other.

[Transparency of Payments Made by Mining, Oil and Gas Corporations to Foreign Governments Act, January 31st, 2014]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise today to address Bill C-474, the transparency of payments made by mining, oil, and gas corporations to foreign governments act.

I would like to start by commending the sponsor of this bill, the hon. member for Scarborough—Guildwood, for his persistent pursuit of this important legislation over the past several years.

Bill C-474, which my colleague has properly characterized as a sunshine bill, would compel Canadian extractive corporations operating abroad to submit an annual audited transparency report to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Natural Resources. The reporting requirement would mandate the disclosure of all payments provided by a corporation or its subsidiaries to a foreign government for the purpose of furthering its mining, oil, or gas industry activities and to publish this report on the company's website. A company that fails to comply with these disclosure requirements would be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine of not less than $20,000 and not more than $5,000,000.

Canada's international standing respecting our promotion and protection of human rights is something in which many of us take pride. Accordingly, our relationships with local populations and environments, and the foreign policy values we represent and exercise as a nation, have become bound up with our global mining footprint.

Indeed, 75% of the world's mining companies are based in Canada, and the approximately 1,300 Canadian extractive corporations invest hundreds of billions of dollars in more than 100 countries around the globe. Certainly, many of these companies respect human rights and the rule of law and thus engage in responsible resource development. However, the regrettable reality is that many do not, as my colleague from Scarborough—Guildwood has demonstrated.

Given our position as a world leader in the extractive industry, we have a moral responsibility to implement rules that will ensure the transparency and accountability of Canadian firms operating abroad.

I am therefore supporting Bill C-474 and urge all members in this place to do the same for two compelling reasons: first, because the bill would buttress the current criminal law regime by ensuring its enforceability; and second, because this bill would prevent Canadian corporate complicity in the human rights abuses of foreign governments by exposing their financial relationships with foreign governments to proper public scrutiny.

I turn first to the issue of criminal enforcement.

The current legal regime addressing the issue of illicit payments by Canadian companies to foreign governments is the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act. Bill C-474 would in fact enhance this act by providing prosecutors with sufficient evidence to meet the high burden of proof required in criminal prosecutions.

The difficulties of enforcing this act are apparent when one considers that the conviction obtained this past August in the Regina v. Karigar case was the first trial ever to have occurred under the Canadian Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act and only the fourth conviction obtained in the act's 14-year history.

Indeed, according to Jamie Kneen, a spokesperson for the Ottawa-based non-profit organization Mining Watch Canada, the RCMP has stated that it simply cannot keep tabs on corporate bribery and corruption in the extractive industry.

Simply put, what we are seeing here is an accountability and transparency gap that must be addressed by mandatory disclosure. As long as Canadian extractive companies are able to hide the details of their financial relationships with foreign governments, prosecutions—and in particular, effective prosecutions—under the CFPOA will remain few and far between.

The importance of the bill goes far beyond the question of criminal enforcement, however important that alone remains. Indeed, mandatory disclosure is inextricably intertwined with the question of Canada's reputation abroad as a defender of human rights and as a responsible global citizen.

In this regard, I refer to the Prime Minister himself, who expressed this very sentiment when he announced in June that he would be “...establishing new mandatory reporting standards for Canadian companies operating in [the extractive] sector” and further acknowledged that such standards would result in the enhancement of Canada's reputation as “...a world leader in promoting transparency and accountability...” both at home and abroad.

I am encouraged that the Prime Minister expressed this sentiment, and I am sure that we all agree with the proposition that we must effectively guard Canada's hard-earned but at-risk reputation as a defender of human rights. This bill would afford us an opportunity to take real action to further the rule of law in the international arena while enhancing our global reputation in this regard, and thus I am hopeful that all members of the House will join in this cause.

By passing Bill C-474 and implementing mandatory disclosure requirements, our message to Canadians and to the world will be clear: What is good for human rights is also good for business, that Canada is a global leader not only with regard to innovation and development but also with regard to the integration of human rights with economic development; that we will not waiver in our demand that multinational corporations and the governments with which they do business cannot simply disregard international human rights laws and norms with impunity, or under the cover of Canadian law.

Certainly, as I mentioned, criminal prosecutions alone are not enough to ensure responsible corporate citizenship based on respect for the rule of law and human rights. But by providing for transparency and accountability across the board, we will encourage Canadian companies to operate ethically and with the utmost respect for human rights. Yet, one might hope that such laws would not be needed for the simple reason that companies should seek, as it were, to do the right thing regardless of the content of statutes.

I recall the testimony last November before the Subcommittee on International Human Rights of Cliff Davis, president and CEO of Nevsun Resources, a Canadian-based mining company that operates one of the highest grade open pit base metal deposits in the world at the Bisha mine in Eritrea.

When I questioned Mr. Davis as to his company's response to reports from the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, and other major human rights organization that describe systematic Eritrean patterns of detention, torture, forced conscription, and the wholesale denial of freedom of religions and freedom of expression, he pleaded ignorance.

When I questioned him as to what, if any, steps his company had taken to bring these human rights violations to the attention of the Eritrean government, he replied that it was “not in [his] purview as president and CEO of [his] company”.

Mr. Davis' testimony illustrates the importance of the bill before us today. Indeed, this very “hear no evil, see no evil, speak no evil” mentality is precisely what Bill C-474 seeks to address. If Mr. Davis does not consider the systematic human rights abuses perpetrated by the government with which he does business to be within his purview, at the very least he should be required to disclose the nature of his dealings with human rights abusing regimes so that Canadians can judge for themselves.

The issue here is that transparency leads to accountability, which we must all seek.

In conclusion, Bill C-474 affirms that as Canadians we expect our corporations to appreciate and respond to the human rights realities in the countries where they operate and to engage with these issues in the context of their operations abroad. This is the meaning of good corporate citizenship, which must be firmly rooted in the principles of transparency, accountability, and the promotion and protection of human rights and the rule of law.

Accordingly, I support Bill C-474 because I strongly believe that it will discourage Canadian-based corporations from profiting from, or facilitating, human rights atrocities in foreign countries and will reinforce in the minds of Canadians, including in the minds of investors and shareholders, that human rights are good for business and good for the rule of law. Indeed, Canada's reputation as a human rights defender is at stake in this regard.

I trust that the House will give its full support to the bill.

[Petitions, January 31st, 2014]

Mr. Speaker, I rise to present a petition from Canadians concerned about harsh and degrading working conditions in the resource and extraction industry around the world, particularly with respect to what have been described as conflict minerals used in electronic equipment such as cellphones.

The petitioners call on the government to impose standards for identifying the source of these component materials so that Canadians can be confident that when they buy electronics, they are supporting safe and humane business practices.

[Questions Passed as Orders for Returns, January 27th, 2014]

With regard to the victims' surcharge: (a) for each of the last ten years, broken down by province and year; how much was collected; (b) broken down by program and service, how was the money in (a) spent; (c) broken down by province and year, in what percent of cases was a surcharge imposed; (d) since the enactment of the Increasing Offenders’ Accountability for Victims Act (IOAVA), how much, broken down by province and territory, has been collected; (e) for the ten years prior to the enactment of the IOAVA, how much money has the government given to victims' programs and services, broken down by program or service; (f) for the ten years prior to the enactment of the IOAVA, how much money has the government transferred to provinces for victims' programs and services, broken down by program or service; (g) for the ten years prior to the enactment of the IOAVA, broken down by year and province, in how many cases did a judge provide more than 20 years for surcharge repayment; (h) for the ten years prior to the enactment of the IOAVA, broken down by year and province, what were the mean, median, mode, and value of surcharges collected; (i) since the enactment of the IOAVA, broken down by year and province, what were the mean, median, and mode, and value of surcharges collected; (j) since the enactment of the IOAVA, how much money has the government given to victims' programs and services, broken down by program or service; (k) since the enactment of the IOAVA, in what specific cases, broken down by province, has a surcharge not been imposed; (l) since the enactment of the IOAVA, in what specific cases, broken down by province, has the collection of a surcharge been delayed more than 20 years; (m) prior to the enactment of the IOAVA, in which specific cases was the constitutionality of the surcharge challenged; (n) prior to the enactment of the IOAVA, in which specific cases did the Crown appeal on a matter solely related to the amount of the surcharge; (o) prior to the enactment of the IOAVA, in which specific cases did the Crown appeal on a matter solely related to the imposition of the surcharge; (p) since the enactment of the IOAVA, in which specific cases did the Crown appeal on a matter solely related to the amount of the surcharge; (q) since the enactment of the IOAVA, in which specific cases did the Crown appeal on a matter solely related to the imposition of the surcharge; (r) prior to the enactment of the IOAVA, in what circumstances did the Crown refer the matter of surcharge collection to a collection agency; (s) since the enactment of the IOAVA, in what circumstances has the Crown referred the matter of surcharge collection to a collection agency; (t) who was consulted with respect to the mandatory nature of the surcharge occasioned by the enactment of the IOAVA; (u) with respect to the IOAVA, were judges consulted, and if so, (i) to what extent, (ii) on what dates, (iii) by whom, (iv) with what outcome(s); (v) with respect to the IOAVA, were defense counsels consulted, and if so, (i) to what extent, (ii) on what dates, (iii) by whom, (iv) with what outcome(s); (w) with respect to the IOAVA, were Crown counsels consulted, and if so, (i) to what extent, (ii) on what dates, (iii) by whom, (iv) with what outcome(s); (x) did the government have any evidence to suggest judges would not delay the collection of surcharges upon enactment of the IOAVA; (y) did the government have any evidence to suggest judges would not reduce fines imposed upon enactment of the IOAVA; (z) since the IOAVA came into force, how many cases is the government currently appealing or did it appeal, broken down by province and with style of cause provided, in matters related to fine or surcharge imposition or collection; (aa) of the cases in (z), what offence was committed; (bb) of the cases in (z), what amount of fine was imposed; (cc) of the cases in (z), what amount of surcharge is to be imposed; (dd) of the cases in (z), what timeline for surcharge repayment was provided; (ee) of the cases in (z), how much is expected to be spent on the government’s appeal; (ff) of the cases in (z), what specific victims can be identified; (gg) of the cases in (z), in what way would victims be aided by the imposition of the surcharge; (hh) for the next fiscal year, how much is projected to be gained through the victims' surcharge, broken, down by province; (ii) for the next fiscal year, how much is to be transferred by the government to the provinces for victims' services; (jj) for the next fiscal year, how much is to be provided by the government directly for the provisions of victims' services; (kk) what are the specific services or programs in (jj) and how were they selected; (ll) what is the projected amount that victims' services will require to be fully funded in the next fiscal year; (mm) what requests for funding for victims' services has the government received for the next fiscal year; (nn) in what form(s) did the requests in (mm) come; (oo) how many of the requests in (mm) have been fulfilled or will be fulfilled, and by what amounts; (pp) what specific measures is government adopting, broken down by province and territory, to ensure fully funded victims' services; (qq) what specific benefits and objectives are sought through the surcharge that could not be sought through direct funding of victims' services or additional transfers to the provinces; (rr) are the benefits in and objectives in (qq) quantifiable, and if so, what are the most recent pieces of evidentiary proof that said benefit or objective is being achieved; (ss) how are the benefits and objectives in (qq) being evaluated to determine the effectiveness of the surcharge; (tt) has any direct correlation between offender deterrence and victim surcharge imposition been observed and, if so, what is it and by what measure was it determined; (uu) has any direct correlation between recidivism and victim surcharge imposition been observed and, if so, what is it and by what measure was it determined; (vv) is there any direct correlation observed between the collection of the victims' surcharge and the rate of victimization and, if so, what is it and by what measure was it determined; (ww) what additional policies are in place to ensure the timely and full funding for the provisions of victims' services; (xx) what measures are in place to ensure the timely and full funding for the provisions of victims' services should the mandatory surcharge be found unconstitutional; (yy) how will it be ensured that no victim will suffer as a consequence of litigation relating to the imposition or collection of the victim’s surcharge; (zz) how will it be ensured that the victims' surcharge is effective and (i) by what measures is it being evaluated, (ii) with what frequency, (iii) by whom; (aaa) what other metrics does the government track with respect to the victims' surcharge; (bbb) how much has been spent on the victims' surcharge program since its first inception; (ccc) during the development of the IOAVA, how was accountability defined and how is it measured; (ddd) does the victim's surcharge increase offenders' accountability for victims, and if so, how and by what measure; (eee) how does the government define “victimless crime”; (fff) is imposition of the victims' surcharge appropriate in cases of “victimless crime”; (ggg) to whom would the victims' surcharge fees go in in cases of “victimless crime”; (hhh) during the policy development of the IOAVA, what considerations were given to “victimless crime” and how was it determined to make the surcharge applicable in such cases?

[Criminal Code, December 6th, 2013]

moved for leave to introduce Bill C-561, An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (trafficking and transplanting human organs and other body parts).

Mr. Speaker, I am delighted to introduce legislation to address one of the most heinous practices in the modern world, namely organ harvesting.

This legislation, if adopted, would create penal sanctions for persons who in Canada or outside Canada are knowingly involved in the medical transplant of human organs or other body parts obtained or acquired as a consequence of a direct or indirect financial transaction, or without the donor's consent.

Beyond new criminal sanctions, it would also amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act to prevent entry into Canada of those who would engage in or otherwise facilitate such practices. Evidence points to organ harvesting in China where Falun Gong practitioners suffer unspeakable horrors. Yet there are cases as well, such as this summer in the U.K. of a child being trafficked for her organs.

We must combat human and organ trafficking in all forms, and I hope this legislation will add to Canada's abilities to prosecute and prevent any involvement with this abhorrent practice.

(Motions deemed adopted, bill read the first time and printed)

[Nelson Mandela, December 5th, 2013]

Mr. Speaker, we are all, wherever we are, deeply saddened and profoundly pained at the passing of a great world historical figure, Nelson Mandela, a person who endured 27 years in a South African prison and emerged to not only preside over the dismantling of apartheid, but in fact to make possible, as president, the establishment of a democratic, multiracial, free South Africa.

It was a little over 13 years ago, precisely on June 12, 2001, that we gathered in the House on a motion unanimously adopted to make Nelson Mandela an honorary citizen of Canada. As we said at the time, this conferral of honorary citizenship will have enduring resonance not only for Canada but internationally.

Let me summarize those considerations that inspired that honorary citizenship and that today really amount to a great testament to his everlasting humanitarian legacy that he bequeathed to each one of us, wherever we are.

The first was that Nelson Mandela was really the metaphor and message for the struggle for human rights and human dignity in our time. If apartheid was the ultimate assault on human rights and human dignity, South Africa was the first post-World War II country to have institutionalized racism as a matter of law. We should not forget that apartheid was not just a racist philosophy; it was a legal racist regime, and it was Mandela who fought and gave full expression to that struggle for human rights and human dignity against this racist legal regime.

Second, Mandela was the embodiment of the three great struggles of the 20th century: the long march toward freedom, as he put it, the march for democracy, and the march for equality.

Third, Mandela was a role model for nation-building wherever we are. He was the one who inspired the notion of establishing a rainbow coalition, of taking diverse peoples, even antagonistic peoples, adversaries, races, and identities, and welding them into a united rainbow coalition for nation-building.

As one who served as a member of his international legal team, I was privileged to hear the testimonies of those who had worked with him throughout the years in prison and afterward and who said of him the incredible testimony that Mandela was a person without rancour, without any sense of revenge, without any anger at all, a person without any malice—a person, yes, of resilience, yes, of determination, of commitment, but a person open to and therefore capable of welding together those diverse peoples into one nation.

Finally, he was most of all a metaphor for hope, particularly for the young, in his speaking of the importance also of education as a linchpin of the future.

I will close by saying one thing. May his memory serve always as an inspiration for all of us, wherever we are, and may that memory serve as a blessing for this House and everyone in this universe.

[Tibet, December 4th, 2013]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to join with other parliamentarians in welcoming Mr. Kaydor Aukatsang to Ottawa today, the new representative to North America of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, our distinguished honorary citizen.

The painful plight of Tibetans, where more than 120 from all sectors of society have self-immolated, is the ultimate cry of protest and witness against the ongoing persecution and repression.

Tibetans value democracy, freedom, religious liberty, and the rule of law, while adhering to non-violence in the pursuit of genuine autonomy, pursuant to the Chinese constitution. Regrettably, while Chinese President Xi Jinping speaks of transparency and the rule of law, the repression of political dissent, the silencing of independent media, and the criminalization of innocent Tibetans intensifies.

These actions shame a superpower that is a trustee of a great Chinese civilization and heritage. We urge the Chinese authorities to respect that great heritage, respect the rule of law, and see the Dalai Lama as a solution for a just and lasting peace for China and all Tibetans.

[Questions Passed as Orders for Returns, December 2nd, 2013]

With regard to international treaties and conventions dealing in whole or in part with human rights and with Canada’s international obligations in this regard: (a) does the government have any formal or informal procedures for regular review of those international human rights treaties that Canada has not yet signed, ratified, or otherwise accepted; (b) does the government have any formal or informal guidelines according to which it determines whether the specific obligations contained in a treaty or other international undertaking conflicts with the Constitution Act, 1867, and if so where can these guidelines be accessed; (c) do the guidelines referred to in (b) specify the standard according to which the government determines if any obligation contained in a treaty or other international undertaking violates any section of the Constitution Act, 1867; (d) has the government engaged in any review of its obligations under the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD); (e) does the government have any formal or informal guidelines according to which it determines whether the specific obligations contained in a treaty or other international undertaking require implementing legislation in order for Canada to be able to ratify or otherwise accept it, and if so where can these guidelines be accessed; (f) does the government have a position as to whether international agreements that establish a complaints mechanism or communications procedure for enforcement of the rights and obligations contained therein are necessarily unconstitutional; (g) does the government have a policy as to whether Canada will accept such agreements referred to in (f); (h) does the government undergo review of proposed international human rights agreements that would establish such a mechanism or procedure referred to in (f) on a case by case basis, (i) who is involved in this review, (ii) are the provinces and other interested stakeholders consulted in this regard; (i) has the government engaged in any discussions or consultations regarding Canada’s failure to make the relevant declaration under Article 14 of CERD, which would indicate Canada’s acceptance of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination’s competence to receive individual complaints, (i) has the government or any minister consulted with any individuals or organizations who have expressed any positions with regard to Canada’s failure to make the declaration referred to in subsection (i), (ii) does Canada’s failure to make the necessary declaration referred to in (a) cause it to be derelict with regard to its treaty obligations, pursuant to either CERD or any other international treaty or tenet of customary international law, (iii) is there any process, formal or otherwise, by which an individual can issue a complaint or communication to any international or intergovernmental organization or international tribunal pertaining to Canada’s obligations under CERD, (iv) has the government received any complaints or communications from any individuals, organizations, or State Parties to CERD regarding its obligations under the CERD, (v) has the government taken any action in response to such complaints referred to in (iv), (vi) does the government have a position as to whether Article 14 of CERD violates any section of the Constitution Act, 1867 and, if so, what specific sections does it violate, (vii) has the government engaged in any consultations, either with the provinces or with any other relevant stakeholders, regarding Canada’s failure to sign and accept Article 14 of CERD; (j) has the government engaged in any review of its obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), (i) has the government engaged in any discussions or consultations regarding Canada’s failure to sign the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (Optional Protocol), which establishes a communications procedure for individuals to file a complaint before the ICESCR Committee alleging a violation of the rights or obligations contained in the treaty, (ii) has the government or any minister consulted with any individuals or organizations who have expressed any positions with regard to Canada’s failure to sign the Optional Protocol referred to in (i), (iii) does Canada’s failure to sign the Optional Protocol referred to in (i) cause it to be derelict with regard to its treaty obligations, pursuant to either ICESCR or any other international treaty or tenet of customary international law, (iv) is there any process, formal or otherwise, by which an individual can issue a complaint or communication to any international or intergovernmental organization or international tribunal pertaining to Canada’s obligations under ICESCR, (v) has the government received any complaints or communications from any individuals, organizations, or State Parties to ICESCR regarding its obligations under ICESCR, (vi) has the government taken any action in response to such complaints referred to in (v), (vii) does the government have a position as to whether the Optional Protocol referred to in (i) violates any section of the Constitution Act, 1867 and, if so, what specific sections does it violate, (viii) has the government engaged in any consultations, either with the provinces or with any other relevant stakeholders, regarding Canada’s failure to sign and accept the Optional Protocol referred to in (i); (k) has the government engaged in any review of its obligations under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), (i) has the government engaged in any discussions or consultations regarding Canada’s failure to sign the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture or Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Optional Protocol), which establishes a system of unannounced visits by international and national monitoring bodies to places where persons are being deprived of their liberty, (ii) has the government or any minister consulted with any individuals or organizations who have expressed any positions with regard to Canada’s failure to sign the Optional Protocol referred to in (i), (iii) does Canada’s failure to sign the Optional Protocol referred to in (i) cause it to be derelict with regard to its treaty obligations, pursuant to either CAT or any other international treaty or tenet of customary international law, (iv) is there any process, formal or otherwise, by which an individual can issue a complaint or communication to any international or intergovernmental organization or international tribunal pertaining to Canada’s obligations under the Optional Protocol referred to in (i), (v) has the government received any complaints or communications from any individuals, organizations, or State Parties to CAT regarding its obligations under CAT, (vi) has the government taken any action in response to such complaints referred to in (v), (vii) does the government have a position as to whether the Optional Protocol referred to in (i) violates any section of the Constitution Act, 1867 and, if so, what specific sections does it violate, (viii) has the government engaged in any consultations, either with the provinces or with any other relevant stakeholders, regarding Canada’s failure to sign and accept the Optional Protocol referred to in (i), (ix) has the government received any requests either from a State Party to CAT or from any international or national monitoring group or other organization to visit a specific location in order to confirm allegations that Canada is derelict with regard to its obligations under CAT or where an individual is alleged to be deprived by Canada of their liberties, and if so how has the government responded, (l) has the government engaged in any review of its obligations under the Amendment to Article 43(2) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, and the Optional Protocol to the Convention to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, and Child Pornography, (i) has the government engaged in any discussions or consultations regarding Canada’s failure to sign the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a communications procedure (Third Optional Protocol), which establishes a complaints procedure by which individuals can allege a State Party’s violation of its obligations set out in the conventions or optional protocols referred to in (i), (ii) has the government or any minister consulted with any individuals or organizations who have expressed any positions with regard to Canada’s failure to sign the Third Optional Protocol referred to in (i), (iii) does Canada’s failure to sign the Third Optional Protocol referred to in (i) cause it to be derelict with regard to its treaty obligations, pursuant to either ICESCR or any other international treaty or tenet of customary international law, (iv) is there any process, formal or otherwise, by which an individual can issue a complaint or communication to any international or intergovernmental organization or international tribunal pertaining to Canada’s obligations under the Optional Protocol referred to in (i), (v) has the government received any complaints or communications from any individuals, organizations, or State Parties to any of the international agreements referred to in (i) regarding its obligations under any of those agreements, (vi) has the government taken any action in response to such complaints referred to in (v), (vii) does the government have a position as to whether the Third Optional Protocol referred to in (i) violates any section of the Constitution Act, 1867 and, if so, what specific sections does it violate, (viii) has the government engaged in any consultations, either with the provinces or with any other relevant stakeholders, regarding Canada’s failure to sign and accept the Third Optional Protocol referred to in (i); (m) has the government engaged in any discussions or consultations regarding Canada’s failure to sign the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (ICPRMW), (i) does Canada’s failure to sign the ICPRMW referred to in (e) cause it to be derelict with regard to its obligations pursuant to any international treaty or tenet of customary international law, (ii) is there any process, formal or otherwise, by which an individual can issue a complaint pertaining to Canada’s obligations towards migrant workers and temporary foreign workers under international law, (iii) is it the position of the government that temporary foreign workers in Canada who believe there rights pursuant to either domestic or international law have been violated should be allowed to remain in Canada pending the outcome of judicial proceedings in this regard, (iv) is there any formal policy in place by which temporary foreign workers in Canada can ensure that they are not deported pending the outcome of judicial proceedings relating to an alleged violation of their rights under international law, (v) does Canada have an obligation under international law to ensure that temporary foreign workers have access to Canadian courts to adjudicate violations of their rights under domestic or international law, (vi) is there any legal or constitutional barrier to Canada becoming a State Party to the ICPRMW referred to in (e); and (n) has the government engaged in any review of its obligations under the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), (i) has the government engaged in any discussions or consultations regarding Canada’s failure to sign the Optional Protocol to the CRPD, (ii) has the government or any minister consulted with any individuals or organizations who have expressed any positions with regard to Canada’s failure to sign the Third Optional Protocol referred to in (i), (iii) does Canada’s failure to sign the Optional Protocol referred to in (i) cause it to be derelict with regard to its treaty obligations, pursuant to either CRPD or any other international treaty or tenet of customary international law, (iv) is there any process, formal or otherwise, by which an individual can issue a complaint or communication to any international or intergovernmental organization or international tribunal pertaining to Canada’s obligations under the Optional Protocol referred to in (i), (v) has the government received any complaints or communications from any individuals, organizations, or State Parties to the international agreement referred to in (n) regarding its obligations under any of those agreements, (vi) has the government taken any action in response to such complaints referred to in (v), (vii) does the government have a position as to whether the Optional Protocol referred to in (i) violates any section of the Constitution Act, 1867 and, if so, what specific sections does it violate, (viii) has the government engaged in any consultations – either with the provinces or with any other relevant stakeholders--regarding Canada’s failure to sign and accept the Third Optional Protocol referred to in (i)?