Irwin Cotler

[Criminal Code, January 30th, 2013]

Mr. Speaker, I rise to address Bill C-444, the private member's bill put forward by the member for Red Deer, which seeks to increase penalties for offenders convicted of personating a peace officer for the purpose of facilitating the commission of another offence. I will be supporting the bill going to committee, and I thank the member for Red Deer for once again bringing this important issue to the attention of the House and to me personally in this regard.

The member for Red Deer has been engaged in this issue for some time, and his concern is as genuine as it is warranted. I share his concern and his outrage in this matter with respect to offenders who disguise themselves as police officers to facilitate their crimes, thereby undermining public trust in the police and other authorities. It is important that Parliament address this problem in as principled and effective way as possible.

Regrettably, while the principle underlying the private member's bill is important, the bill before us is unlikely to have the significant effect that the member himself seeks or that the House would seek. However laudable its intent, Bill C-444 emerges as yet another variation of a Conservative crime bill that attempts to deal with crime, as the member for Red Deer himself acknowledged, at the sentencing stage after the crime has been committed, after the investigation has been carried out and after the offender has been arrested, tried and convicted. In other words, after the very fact that it seeks to prevent and regrettably after it is already too late.

However to its credit, and this bears mention, it does not seek to attach mandatory minimums in the matter of sentencing. It does not seek to eliminate or circumscribe judicial discretion.

It has a laudable underlying objective. My concern is whether this particular legislation would seek the laudable objective that the member for Red Deer himself has in mind.

Accordingly, while I am prepared to send the bill to committee for further study, I expect that such further study may be less effectual than it might otherwise be. Therefore, I will use the remainder of my time to set forth certain considerations in respect of this contention. First, I will examine why the bill is unlikely to increase the length of prison terms for people convicted of personating a peace officer. Second, I will discuss why, even if it did lead to longer prison terms, it would not reduce the occurrence of this crime, which is the member's principal objective, with which I concur. Finally, I will explore other measures that might prove to be more effective and that will help underpin the very principle that underlines the bill.

As I said, Bill C-444 is not likely to have a major impact on the severity of sentences. To begin with, it should be noted that in cases of personation of a peace officer, Canada currently allows for sentences more severe than in many other jurisdictions. In 2009 the House unanimously passed Bill S-4, which established a five-year maximum prison term for personation as opposed to U.S. states like New York or Michigan, where the maximum is four years, or the United Kingdom, which allows only for a sentence of six months.

Canada's sentencing regime already takes this crime very seriously, and there is no reason to think that judges are overlooking important factors such as the purpose of the personation when handing down sentences. For example, in 2009 and 2010 a Winnipeg man dressed up as a police officer in order to gain access to crime scenes, without committing any further offence. He was sentenced to four and a half months. By contrast, in the case of the man who posed as an officer in the member's riding of Red Deer in order to kidnap and abuse a teenaged girl, the judge handed down a total sentence of 18 years, including the maximum sentence for personation permitted at the time.

Simply put, it appears that judges have been making appropriate use of their discretion in such cases. The additional guidance offered by Bill C-444 is therefore unlikely to result in penalties for personation that are more severe.

However, even assuming the bill were to result in longer sentences for personation of a peace officer for the purpose of committing another offence, it is unlikely that offenders would spend more time in jail as a consequence. While judges may generally issue concurrent or consecutive sentences as they see fit, sentences for offences that are part of the same criminal act tend to be served concurrently, and it is difficult to conceive of a scenario in which a judge would issue a longer sentence for personation than for the offence that the personation was intended to facilitate.

In other words, if an offender receives an 18-year sentence for aggravated sexual assault, it does not much matter to him or her whether his or her simultaneous offence for personation is a year or two or five.

This bill would therefore be unlikely to achieve the member's legitimate objective of having people who personate peace officers spend more time behind bars.

Of course, I appreciate that the member's ultimate objective is not longer prison terms for people who commit this crime, but, rather, fewer personations of peace officers in the first place and that this is his principal objective, which I share.

This brings me to my second point, which is that the deterrent effect of longer prison terms has been repeatedly shown to be minimal. Therefore, even if a judge were to be moved by this legislation to issue a longer sentence for personation than he or she would otherwise have done and even in the unusual circumstance that such a sentence were served consecutive to the sentence for the related offence, there would still be no reason to believe that the occurrence of the crime of personation in Canada would be reduced.

As was pointed out by Michael Jackson of the Canadian Bar Association at the justice committee's hearing on Bill C-10:

The evidence is overwhelming...in every jurisdiction where it's been studied, that putting more people in prison for longer periods of time has no salutary effect upon public safety...

In fact, a research summary on the Public Safety Department's own website, which compiles 50 studies involving over 300,000 offenders, finds that, “To argue for expanding the use of imprisonment in order to deter criminal behaviour is without empirical support”.

That is a conclusion that has been reached time and again by studies in Canada and jurisdictions around the world.

For example, in 2010 a man used a police officer's costume to commit a home invasion and robbery in Toronto. Do we truly believe that he spent the night before consulting the Criminal Code, poring over the jurisprudence and parsing the sentencing guidelines and had the guidelines been different, would have chosen not to proceed or to forego the outfit? Or in the case of the 2000 tragic kidnapping and assault in Red Deer, the member's riding, is it reasonable to assume that an offender who was prepared to risk the substantial penalties for kidnapping and aggravating sexual assault would have been dissuaded by the prospect of a slightly longer prison term for personating a peace officer. I suspect not.

Increasing the length of sentences is manifestly a less effective way of combatting all crimes, personation included.

This brings me to the final part of my remarks, in which I will propose some alternative methods for minimizing the occurrence of personation of peace officers to begin with, which is the private member's bill's objective.

First, we should examine how offenders acquire authentic looking police attire and accessories. As the member for Red Deer noted in debate on the previous version of his bill, a wide array of police equipment is available online and at security supply stores, including strobe lighting for vehicles and uniforms that can be made to look very real with very little alteration. It is certainly worth considering whether there are steps that might be taken to limit the availability of such items.

Second, the government could partner with police in a public awareness campaign to inform Canadians that all police officers carry badges and photo ID and that citizens themselves have the right to request to see an officer's identification and to call 9-1-1 for verification if they are truly suspicious. By empowering Canadians in this way, as well as by reducing the availability of authentic looking police equipment, we would significantly limit the capacity of offenders to pass as officers of the peace.

In conclusion, as I said at the outset, I support and applaud the member for Red Deer for consistently focusing the attention of the House on this very important issue and I will support Bill C-444 at second reading. At the very least, the bill would serve as a statement by Parliament of the seriousness with which we regard the crime of personation of a peace officer. However, we should seek to do more than make what is nonetheless a very important statement.

As I have outlined, there may be concrete steps that we could take that would have an impact on the occurrence of the crime itself. I trust that we will have the opportunity to discuss such steps at committee and that the government will take a seriously impactful action to combat the personation of peace officers in the very near future as represented in the private member's bill of the member for Red Deer.

[Criminal Code, January 29th, 2013]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise in debate on Bill C-452, on the question of human trafficking and how best to combat it. In particular, this legislation would seek to strengthen the provisions that punish exploitation and trafficking in persons.

I would like to congratulate my colleague from Ahuntsic for this bill and this very important step.

The true measure of a society's commitment to equality and human dignity is the protection it affords its most vulnerable members. And victims of human trafficking are some of the most vulnerable.

Accordingly, we must recognize and denounce human trafficking as the persistent and pervasive assault on human rights that it is, while providing increased protection for those who are most vulnerable to this massive criminal violation of human rights, namely women and children. At the same time, we must work to bring the perpetrators to justice and ensure that human traffickers are held to account fully for this reprehensible criminal conduct. My remarks this evening will focus on the implications this bill would have for the justice system, while situating the debate in the broader context of how we ought to combat human trafficking.

The crime of human trafficking, as I have said many times in this House, is one of the most pernicious, persistent and pervasive assaults on human rights. According to the 2012 United States Department of State report on human trafficking, an estimated 27 million people worldwide each year are victims of various crimes of exploitation and servitude, while an estimated $32 billion is generated by this immoral and illegal trade, making it one of the fastest growing criminal industries in the world today. The struggle to eradicate this crime, therefore, must certainly include legal tools to prosecute the offenders. It must also include policies to protect and support the victims while engaging in public education efforts to promote awareness of the trends and the means used to exploit and traffic the victims.

Accordingly, a holistic approach to this problem would require addressing the social factors that allow the crime of exploitation to occur in communities across our country, while working with all levels of government and community leaders to identify trends and patterns of exploitation, to communicate with the victims and to support the victims and their families during these moments of tremendous vulnerability. I commend the member for Ahuntsic for her involvement in this regard with the various stakeholders for this purpose.

To combat human trafficking, we need to do more than just impose new criminal penalties. For example, we need to correct the flaws in our immigration system because they leave temporary and foreign workers open to exploitation and abuse by their Canadian employers.

Bill C-452 makes a number of important amendments to the Criminal Code. First, it provides for consecutive sentences to be served for human trafficking convictions. Second, it grants the Canadian judiciary jurisdiction over human trafficking offences whether they are committed in Canada or abroad. Third, the bill clarifies the provisions related to human trafficking involving sexual exploitation. Fourth, it creates a presumption regarding the exploitation of one person by another. Finally, the bill adds the offences of procuring and trafficking in persons to the list of offences to which the forfeiture of proceeds of crime apply.

All of these proposed changes are indeed well intentioned, but some are somewhat flawed, particularly when viewed from a charter perspective. The Liberal Party will support this legislation and vote to send it to committee for further study and review in the hope that the concerns may be appropriately addressed.

I will begin with a provision that I wholeheartedly support.

The legislation expands the scope of the human trafficking provision in the code to the international arena. This is an important and most welcome change to our law. Simply put, the reach of this egregious trafficking crime is beyond our national borders and our laws must therefore reflect this reality.

For many human trafficking victims, exploitation may bring them to Canada. However, the original incident of abuse or threats made to their families occurs in far distant lands. We must seek justice not only for the final leg of this crime, but for the full scope of the abuse and cruelty inflicted on victims by their abusers.

Accordingly, while I support that provision and the provisions relating to human trafficking that include sexual exploitation, as well as extending or adding the offences of procuring and trafficking to the list of offences to which the proceeds of crime would apply, I am concerned by some other sections of the legislation. For example, Bill C-452 provides that sentences imposed upon a conviction of human trafficking are to be served consecutively to any other sentence imposed and punishment for an offence arising out of the same event or series of events.

I understand the well-intentioned motive behind this recommendation. My concern is that doing this could limit judicial discretion in a way that not only encroaches on judicial independence but may, however inadvertently, result in sentences that infringe upon charter-protected rights. Certainly these heinous acts should be punished severely. However, there may be situations where the imposition of consecutive, rather than concurrent sentencing is inadvisable. This is why judges should be allowed to retain their discretion in this regard, though certainly at committee we could address whether it might be best to encourage such sentences while perhaps not specifically requiring them.

As well, the bill establishes a presumption under section 279.01(3) of the Criminal Code that may be overly broad. It reads:

—a person who is not exploited and who lives with or is habitually in the company of or harbours a person who is exploited shall, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, be deemed to be exploiting or facilitating the exploitation of that person.

While one of the major issues in combatting trafficking since the crime of exploitation was first introduced in our Criminal Code has been the low number of criminal convictions for this crime, we should nonetheless be very mindful of casting too wide a net as this could raise both charter and common law concerns. Again, I am hopeful this can be addressed at committee.

Another change proposed by the legislation, which I support, modifies section 279 of the Criminal Code by enumerating the various elements of the crime of exploitation, particularly sexual services. This is an important change, in part because our own Department of Justice has found that trafficking for sexual exploitation is more prevalent in Canada than any other form of exploitation, especially in our large urban centres. By adding these new provisions in the code, we would provide law enforcement officials with additional tools to take on this challenge and better protect the Canadian public.

Let me reiterate that while it is vital that our criminal justice system be equipped to handle the full prosecution of this brutal crime, any success on this issue will only come with greater public awareness, mobilization and participation in combatting the crime to begin with. Because the perpetrators of human exploitation count on various social stigmas to isolate their victims, it is vital that we remove these stigmas and those barriers that prevent victims from seeking assistance. We must strengthen our grassroots strategy to detect and prevent human trafficking to begin with, as well as to support and protect victims in a manner that would enhance their co-operation and ability to report this abuse. As a country looking to address this challenge, we must not only seek to punish those who do harm to the innocent, we must also seek to heal and care for those who have been harmed in this fashion.

In summary, I am hopeful that the bill will be improved in committee. I applaud my colleague from Ahuntsic for bringing it forward and for her hard work on this issue, as well as that of the member for Kildonan—St. Paul. I am hopeful that by working together we can eradicate this evil of human trafficking in Canada once and for all.

[Faster Removal of Foreign Criminals Act, January 29th, 2013]

Mr. Speaker, the very title of the legislation, the faster removal of foreign criminals act, may suggest that Canada is somehow overrun with foreign terrorists, escaped convicts, war criminals and the like.

Ironically enough, the very war criminals who are in this country, and who should be addressed, may in fact end up being deported to a country where they will not face any justice, which will put us in breach of our international responsibilities under the International Criminal Court treaty and the like, or they will be deported to a country where there is a risk of torture.

On the one hand, we are not dealing with the serious war criminals in this country as we should, but we may be dealing with long-term Canadian residents, some of whom have lived here since childhood, and prospectively applying, however inadvertently, a pejorative label in the title of the legislation.

[Faster Removal of Foreign Criminals Act, January 29th, 2013]

Mr. Speaker, as I said elsewhere and reaffirmed today, I do not question the minister's motives. I think they are well-intentioned and I understand the manner in which he would like to use the public policy consideration for the purpose of achieving certain objectives.

Our problem with it is that, as it now reads, without any definable criteria, it does provide a prospective risk of untrammelled and arbitrary discretion. As well, it is not only this minister who will be exercising it, if he would so exercise it and would do so in a proper manner, but it is any other minister, once this legislation is passed, who may not, at the time, exercise it with the due diligence that should normally be warranted and which due diligence should better be prescribed with the criteria. The member for Winnipeg North proposed some of these criteria at committee, and I still would hope that those amendments may yet come into law.

[Faster Removal of Foreign Criminals Act, January 29th, 2013]

Mr. Speaker, the minister referenced a number of abuses of the immigration system, how the deportation process has been abused and the need, with which we concur, to improve the immigration system to ensure that serious criminals should not enjoy sanctuary in Canada and to provide necessary security for Canadians. All these are matters in which the House can concur.

However, Bill C-43 purports to address serious foreign criminality, which in fact is the aim of the parent bill, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. However, some of the provisions of Bill C-43 continue to remain troubling and some, in fact, may well contravene the charter. My colleague from Winnipeg North has suggested amendments, which I trust will enjoy support from all in this place.

My remarks this morning will first address some of the specific concerns with Bill C-43, including charter concerns. Second, and not unrelated, I will raise the question of why no report of charter inconsistency has yet been tabled by the Minister of Justice, pursuant to the exigencies of section 4.1 of the Department of Justice Act.

Before turning to these considerations there are two troubling situations from last year that warrant mention at the outset. In both cases a young permanent Canadian resident was deported to a war-torn, impoverished country. As these two young men were alone and unable to speak the local language, they were susceptible to the many criminal terrorist organizations in that country, Somalia, that prey on vulnerable youth. Indeed, in one of the cases the United Nations Human Rights Committee found that Canada jeopardized the right to life of the young man in question and was therefore in violation of its obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

These two young permanent residents of Canada, Saeed Jama and Jama Warsame, though they had been here since childhood, had indeed committed offences, mostly drug related, and as such deportation proceedings were initiated against them following their convictions. That is as it should be. When non-citizens commit crimes in Canada deportation is a reasonable option. However, I offer the case of Mr. Jama and Mr. Warsame to illustrate the perspective nuances and complicating factors that might arise in deportation cases and to underline the importance of due process and the right to appeal deportation orders, not only in matters of the criminal processes the minister has rightly mentioned and referenced but notably on humanitarian and compassionate grounds.

As we seek, quite rightly, to streamline our immigration and deportation processes it is critical to ensure that humanitarian and compassionate considerations, as well as charter rights to security of the person and fundamentals of due process are not marginalized in the name of short-run expediency. Regrettably, the effect of the bill before us does precisely that. First, it reduces the threshold at which a conviction results in automatic deportation with no possibility of appeal from a sentence of two years to a sentence of six months.

The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration has defended this change by arguing that judges have been issuing sentences of two years less a day in order to circumvent the statute. In fact, judges issue such sentences because two years is the dividing line between federal and provincial incarceration. Canadian citizens regularly receive sentences of two years less a day, thus demonstrating that immigration status is patently not the reason for such sentencing.

Furthermore, if the government is so concerned about sentences of two years less a day, why is it no less concerned about sentences of six months less a day? The standard should not be any arbitrary number of months but rather the qualitative seriousness of the offence. This brings me to the point that has been noted in prior debate on the bill. Many of the offences that result in six month sentences in no way justify automatic deportation with no possibility of appeal.

Bill C-43 would establish a situation where a person could be brought here as an infant, be raised here, be as much a Canadian as the rest of us and then be automatically expelled without due process for making a recording in a movie theatre or, since the coming into force of Bill C-10, for possessing six marijuana plants. At a time when the government is intent on ushering in new and longer mandatory minimum sentences with respect to new offences, it can hardly be said about the Canadian justice system that there is necessarily a correlation between the length of a sentence and the seriousness, let alone the serious criminality, of the offence.

In particular, if the Conservatives wish to evince a genuine desire to rid Canada of serious criminals to ensure that these criminals would be brought to justice pursuant to our international obligations in this regard as well, why do they not commit adequate resources to the war crimes program to prosecute war criminals in Canada, as I have repeatedly urged them to do? Indeed, the remedy of deporting a war criminal may result either in a serious war criminal not being held accountable for justice violations at all, or in the reverse, being sent to a country where there is a substantial risk of torture or other cruel or degrading punishment. In either case, what we need at this point is an enhanced war crimes program so that we can deal with the serious war criminals in this country for whom the deportation remedy is not a remedy at all.

A second problem with the legislation is that it would allow the Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism to deny temporary resident status for up to three years on the basis, as has been mentioned, of undefined public policy considerations. Even given the requirement that was added at committee, that the government produce an annual report listing and justifying such denials, this change would still carve out a sphere of unaccountable ministerial discretion and could lead to the further politicization of our immigration system. As a matter of fundamental fairness, people affected by government decisions should be informed of the reasons leading up to those decisions and allowed to present evidence in their favour. Bill C-43 would deny them that right. The legislation would also prohibit the minister from considering humanitarian and compassionate concerns in certain cases, which could also violate a number of Canada's international obligations.

In fact, several elements of the bill may contravene not only international agreements but our own Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The automatic deportation of individuals to situations of torture, terror and grave danger raises serious concerns with respect to section 7, the right to life, liberty and security of the person. As well, by denying the right to appeal the deportation orders and by empowering the minister to deny entry on arguably arbitrary and ill-defined grounds, the bill may violate the principles of fundamental justice.

These inconsistencies with the charter brush up against section 4.1 of the Department of Justice Act. Here, the Minister of Justice must, as stated in the act:

—examine...every Bill introduced in or presented to the House of Commons by a minister of the Crown, in order to ascertain whether any of the provisions thereof are inconsistent with the purposes and provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Minister shall report any such inconsistency to the House of Commons at the first convenient opportunity.

Yet, the Minister of Justice has tabled no such report on any bill or on this bill. This is not the first time that he has failed to do so when the government has introduced legislation that poses constitutional concerns. When I raised this issue at the justice committee hearings on Bill C-45 as well as in the House, the minister avoided the question. Indeed, a justice department employee is suing the government because he claims that he was suspended for raising this issue in court. I am not suggesting that the minister is deliberately violating the Department of Justice Act, but I await the minister's explanation of why he has apparently not been acting in accordance with it with respect to a number of bills, particularly if one takes the omnibus set of bills such as Bill C-10 with arguably constitutionally suspect provisions, as well as the one before us today in the so-called faster removal of foreign criminals act.

The title of the legislation is sufficiently disconcerting that I cannot close without addressing it. Many of these so-called foreign criminals referred to in Bill C-43 are long-time Canadian residents. To put that title on the bill is to pejoratively and prejudicially mischaracterize them at the outset and does harm to all our constituents.

[Questions Passed as Orders for Returns, January 28th, 2013]

With respect to judicial appointments made by the Minister of Justice: (a) by what process is each applicant reviewed; (b) which criteria are applied; (c) who is responsible for the review of each application; (d) who is responsible for the selection of individuals to conduct reviews of each application; (e) at what stages of the process and in what ways are the following factors considered: (i) gender, (ii) visible minority status, (iii) national or ethnic origin, (iv) race, (v) religion, (vi) sexual orientation, (vii) disability, (viii) parental status, (ix) marital status, (x) First Nations status, (xi) aboriginal status; (f) broken down by court and year from 2000-present, how many juridical appointments were made; (g) of appointments in (f), what is the breakdown by factor listed in (e); (h) for judicial appointments in (f), how many applicants were (i) considered for each position, (ii) recommended, (iii) considered “highly qualified”, (iv) considered “qualified”, (v) considered “not qualified”; (i) for (h)(i), (h)(ii), (h)(iii), (h)(iv) and (h)(v), what is the breakdown by factors in (e); (j) in what ways, when, and by whom is information relative to the factors in (e), (i) obtained or evaluated during the application process, (ii) reviewed and assessed during the consideration of appointments; (k) in what ways are the factors in (e) tracked and reported upon and to whom; (l) in what ways, by what metrics, and by whom, is judicial diversity measured on the bench and how often, to whom and by whom is the information reported; (m) what measures is the (i) Department of Justice, (ii) Minister of Justice taking to ensure the diversity of judicial appointments and a diverse applicant pool for each judicial vacancy; (n) what reviews of diversity among judicial appointments are currently underway; (o) what steps is the Department taking to ensure that diversity is considered throughout the appointments process; (p) by what metrics does the Department measure the diversity of applicants and appointments for judicial vacancies; (q) who is responsible for ensuring diversity of judicial appointments; (r) what measures are being undertaken by the individuals or agencies in (q); (s) in what ways, how often, and to whom do the individuals in (r) report on the issue of judicial diversity; (t) in what types of consultations and with which groups has the Minister of Justice engaged, with respect to diversity of judicial appointments; (u) by what protocol are applicants for judicial vacancies evaluated for each court within the Federal appointment power; (v) when were the protocols in (u) established and by whom; (w) in what ways is diversity a consideration in the protocols in (u); (x) are statistics kept with respect to diversity of appointments already made; (y) with respect to applicants for judicial appointments, how is diversity information collected, by whom, and at what stages of the process; (z) what is the role of the Canadian Judicial Council with respect to ensuring diversity of Canadian courts; (aa) what is the role of the Federal Commissioner for Judicial Affairs with respect to ensuring diversity of judicial appointments; (bb) what statistics are kept by the Canadian Judicial Council and the Federal Commissioner for Judicial Affairs with respect to diversity on the judiciary; and (cc) does the government have any goals with respect to (i) diversity of applicants, (ii) diversity of appointments and, if so, what are they, by whom were they established, and by what mechanisms are they ensured?

[Questions Passed as Orders for Returns, January 28th, 2013]

With respect to the appointment of judges to the Federal Courts, Superior Courts and similarly situated tribunals within the sphere of the federal power to appoint judges and members, between 2006 and 2012: (a) how is the language competence of candidates assessed; (b) how many unilingual Anglophone candidates were recommended by the Judicial Advisory Committee to the Justice Minister, (i) how many of them were later recommended by the Minister for appointment to the Federal Courts, (ii) in what years; (c) how many unilingual Anglophone candidates were recommended by each of the Judicial Advisory Committees in each one of the provinces and territories for appointed to the superior courts of various provinces and how many of them were later recommended by the Minister for appointment to superior courts, broken down by province and year; (d) how many unilingual Francophone candidates were recommended by the Judicial Advisory Committee to the Justice Minister, (i) how many of them were later recommended by the Minister for appointment to the Federal Courts, (ii) in what years; (e) how many unilingual Francophone candidates were recommended by each of the Judicial Advisory Committees in each one of the provinces and territories for appointment to the superior courts of various provinces and how many of them were later recommended by the Minister for appointment to superior courts, broken down by province and year; (f) how many bilingual candidates were recommended by the Judicial Advisory Committee to the federal Justice Minister and how many of them were later recommended by the Minister for appointment to the Federal Courts, broken down by year; (g) how many bilingual candidates were recommended by each of the Judicial Advisory Committees in each one of the provinces and territories for appointment to the superior courts of various provinces and how many of them were later recommended by the Minister for appointment to superior courts, broken down by province and year; (h) how many unilingual Anglophone candidates were considered for appointment to each of the federally-appointed tribunals, (i) how many of them were appointed, (ii) to what tribunals, (iii) in what years; (i) how many unilingual Francophone candidates were considered for appointment to each of the federally-appointed tribunals, (i) how many of them were appointed, (ii) to what tribunals, (iii) in what years; (j) how many bilingual candidates were considered for appointment to each of the federally-appointed tribunals, (i) how many of them were appointed, (ii) to what tribunals, (iii) in what years; (k) during this process, how high did the candidate’s competence in both official languages rank among the criteria considered by the Minister; (l) has the government put in place a process by which the language needs on the bench can be identified; (m) how are those needs addressed in the judicial appointment process; (n) how are the language needs assessed at the superior court level; (o) how are they addressed in the judicial appointment process; (p) for each judge listed, broken down by Anglophone, Francophone and bilingual judges, and by year, how many cases have been referred, heard and decided; (q) what is being done to ensure even case loads between Anglophone and Francophone judges; and (r) by what means, how often and by whom or which bodies is the case load difference between Anglophone and Francophone judges reviewed?

[Questions Passed as Orders for Returns, January 28th, 2013]

With regard to appointments within the Department of Justice between April 1, 2010, and March 31, 2011: (a) how many people were appointed; (b) to what position was each person appointed; (c) for each appointment, who was the delegated or sub-delegated official responsible for making the appointment; (d) on the basis of what criteria did the Department determine whether to implement an advertised or non-advertised appointment process; (e) for each appointment, which of the criteria in (d) were met or not met; (f) for which of the appointments was an advertised appointment process implemented; (g) for each advertised appointment, in what media outlets was the appointment advertised; (h) on what dates were each of the advertisements in (g) posted in each media outlet; (i) for each advertised appointment, what was the title of the position as stated in the advertisement; (j) for each advertised appointment, what was the description of the position as stated in the advertisement; (k) for each advertised appointment, what were the essential qualifications as listed in the advertisement with respect to (i) language proficiency, (ii) education, (iii) experience; (l) for each advertised appointment, what were the asset qualifications as listed in the advertisement with respect to (i) language proficiency, (ii) education, (iii) experience; (m) for each advertised appointment, which of the essential qualifications were met by the successful candidate; (n) for each advertised appointment, and for each essential qualification, on the basis of what documents did the Department determine that the successful candidate met or failed to meet the essential qualification; (o) for each advertised appointment, which of the asset qualifications were met by the successful candidate; (p) for each advertised appointment, and for each asset qualification, on the basis of what documents did the Department determine that the successful candidate met or failed to meet the asset qualification; (q) for each advertised appointment, which of the essential qualifications were met by each unsuccessful candidate; (r) for each advertised appointment, for each unsuccessful candidate, and for each essential qualification, on the basis of what documents did the Department of Justice determine that the essential qualification was met or not met; (s) for each advertised appointment, which of the asset qualifications were met by each unsuccessful candidate; (t) for each advertised appointment, for each unsuccessful candidate, and for each asset qualification, on the basis of what documents did the Department determine that the asset qualification was met or not met; (u) for each non-advertised appointment, who was the successful candidate; (v) for each non-advertised appointment, who were the unsuccessful candidates; (w) for each non-advertised appointment, what were the criteria according to which the candidates were evaluated by the Department; (x) for each non-advertised appointment, which of the criteria were met by the successful candidate; (y) for each non-advertised appointment, and for each criterion, on the basis of what documents did the Department determine that the successful candidate met or failed to meet the criterion; (z) for each non-advertised appointment, which of the criteria were met by each unsuccessful applicant; and (aa) for each non-advertised appointment, for each criterion, and for each unsuccessful candidate, on the basis of what documents did the Department determine that the criterion was met or not met?

[Questions Passed as Orders for Returns, January 28th, 2013]

With regard to the Minister of Public Safety’s decision to terminate the contracts of part-time prison chaplains in federal penitentiaries: (a) did the Minister consult with officials from Correctional Services Canada (CSC) and, if so, did CSC express support for these cuts; (b) did the Minister consult with corrections officials in Alberta and, if so, (i) which specific prison officials did the government consult with and from which specific institutions in Alberta, (ii) did corrections officials from institutions in Alberta support the cuts; (c) did the Minister consult with corrections officials in British Columbia and, if so, (i) which specific prison officials did the government consult with and from which specific institutions in British Columbia, (ii) did corrections officials from institutions in British Columbia support the cuts; (d) did the Minister consult with corrections officials in Nova Scotia and, if so, (i) which specific prison officials did the government consult with and from which specific institutions in Nova Scotia, (ii) did corrections officials from institutions in Nova Scotia support the cuts; (e) did the Minister consult with corrections officials in New Brunswick and, if so, (i) which specific prison officials did the government consult with and from which specific institutions in New Brunswick, (ii) did corrections officials from institutions in new Brunswick support the cuts; (f) did the Minister consult with corrections officials in Quebec and, if so, (i) which specific prison officials did the government consult with and from which specific institutions in Quebec, (ii) did corrections officials from institutions in Quebec support the cuts; (g) did the Minister consult with corrections officials in Ontario and, if so, (i) which specific prison officials did the government consult with and from which specific institutions in Ontario, (ii) did corrections officials from institutions in Ontario support the cuts; (h) did the Minister consult with corrections officials in Saskatchewan and, if so, (i) which specific prison officials did the government consult with and from which specific institutions in Saskatchewan, (ii) did corrections officials from institutions in Saskatchewan support the cuts; (i) did the Minister consult with corrections officials in Manitoba and, if so, (i) which specific prison officials did the government consult with and from which specific institutions in Manitoba, (ii) did corrections officials from institutions in Manitoba support the cuts; (j) did the Minister consult with members or leaders from any Canadian non-Christian religious groups and, if so, (i) what specific religious groups were consulted, (ii) did any of these groups support the decision to terminate the contracts of part-time prison chaplains, (iii) which specific groups objected and on what grounds; (k) did the government consult with any non-profit organizations or any other non-governmental organizations and, if so, (i) what specific non-profit or non-governmental organizations were consulted, (ii) did any of these groups support the decision to terminate the contracts of part-time prison chaplains, (iii) which specific organizations objected and on what grounds; (l) what is the national statistical breakdown of the federal prison population according to religious affiliation; (m) what is the statistical breakdown of the federal prison population according to religious affiliation in (i) Nova Scotia, (ii) New Brunswick, (iii) Quebec, (iv) Ontario, (v) Alberta, (vi) Saskatchewan, (vii) Manitoba, (viii) British Columbia; (n) how many federal prison inmates requested religious counsel from a clergy-person of their own faith in 2011, (i) with which faith group did the inmates who made these requests identify, (ii) for these inmates, were such clergy represented in the population of CSC full time-chaplains, (iii) for these inmates, were such clergy represented in the population of CSC part-time chaplains; (o) to which faith groups did the terminated chaplains identify; (p) how does the government define the concept of spiritual guidance and what training or credentials will be required of CSC-employed chaplains to provide such guidance to federal prison inmates who are not of the same faith group; (q) with whom has the Minister consulted to ensure that terminating the contracts of part-time federal prison chaplains will not disparately impact minority-faith Canadians; (r) has the Minister taken any steps to ensure that the cuts will not be vulnerable to a constitutional challenge pursuant to either Sections 2 or 15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms; and (s) has the Minister consulted with the Minister of Justice in regard to the constitutionality of these cuts and has the Minister of Justice confirmed that they are constitutionally sound?

[Increasing Offenders' Accountability for Victims Act, December 11th, 2012]

Mr. Speaker, I agree with the hon. member on the importance of prevention. As I said, I think the bill is lacking in that respect. It is also lacking in other respects, but the justice process begins with prevention. That is why I proposed a few amendments. I mentioned those on prevention, but there were also amendments on judicial discretion, rehabilitation and reintegration, while dealing with the protection of victims.