Jennifer O'Connell

[Countering Foreign Interference Act, June 12th, 2024]

Madam Speaker, I would like to acknowledge and thank my hon. colleague for his work on this legislation. I know he worked with the minister as well.

In his speech, the member mentioned some of the amendments at committee, in particular changes to the appointment of the commissioner, something Liberals supported as well. Could he speak about why this is so crucial to this process and why the committee moved forward with that amendment?

[Countering Foreign Interference Act, June 12th, 2024]

Madam Speaker, as I said in my speech, and I thank my hon. colleague for raising this, the balance that this legislation needs, not only in updating the tools for CSIS but also in creating those safeguards, is absolutely crucial. That is something we heard in testimony on this legislation at committee. I want to assure Canadians that these amendments are to apply to national security threats and risks, but in addition to that, we have ensured that the CSIS Act would, for the first time ever, have a five-year review so that parliamentarians and all Canadians can be part of this debate to ensure that the balance between national security and the protection of Canadians' rights and freedoms here in this country are paramount.

[Countering Foreign Interference Act, June 12th, 2024]

Madam Speaker, unfortunately, I cannot accept the hypocrisy in the question from the Conservative member. The fact is that it was in 2010, under Stephen Harper's government, that the alarm bells went off to alert the government to the issue of foreign interference. Mr. Harper did nothing to address it. In fact, he refused to create a committee of parliamentarians to review and provide oversight.

When the current opposition leader was democratic institutions minister, we asked him why he did nothing to strengthen and protect our democratic institutions. He essentially said that it was not politically advantageous to him at the time to do so.

Since we formed government in 2015, we have taken action while Conservatives have sat complicit. They have not provided a real approach to working with us and putting country over party on the issue of foreign interference.

[Countering Foreign Interference Act, June 12th, 2024]

Madam Speaker, I acknowledge the hard work that Bloc members did on the committee to bring forward the study and produce amendments. They worked diligently on the bill.

When it comes to the member's question regarding the work our government is doing, I take exception to that. It was in 2015, when we were first elected, that we began implementing measures dealing with foreign interference and strengthening our democratic institutions. That included creating the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, as well as creating the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force to monitor elections and introducing additional measures through the Canada Elections Act legislation.

This is not a stand-alone piece of legislation to deal with foreign interference. It is part of a building block, a foundation, to strengthen our democratic institutions.

[Countering Foreign Interference Act, June 12th, 2024]

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to speak in support of Bill C-70, which proposes, among other things, to amend the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act.

I hope that the report stage amendment offered today has the support of all parties. The amendment would permit CSIS to disclose, as part of a disclosure for the purpose of building resiliency against threat to the security of Canada, information specifically about a company to that company. The amendment would allow CSIS to be more candid and transparent with Canadian corporations and entities by disclosing information around specific threats and vulnerabilities affecting them. An example of this would be information about a foreign state's interest in acquiring the company's unique and proprietary information or technology. The reason the amendment is important is that this precision would ensure that companies, community organizations and universities have parity with individuals. The amendment is needed to ensure that the information sharing provisions found in the bill are the same for individuals and entities.

As members know, on May 30, we passed a motion that sped up the committee's study and clause-by-clause consideration of Bill C-70 at the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security. Events moved quickly, and when one part of the bill was amended to provide enhanced information sharing authority for individuals, the same was not done for companies or community organizations and universities, as there was not enough time to properly craft the appropriate amendment. As such, there now exists an imbalance in the legislation, and this important amendment addresses it. It is essential that we pass this report stage amendment to ensure that CSIS can make authorized disclosures to both individuals and entities to better equip Canadians and Canadian society with the information and tools they need to build resiliency against foreign threats. We know that state actors exploit Canada's vulnerabilities by targeting federal, provincial, territorial, municipal and indigenous governments; our open academic systems; private enterprises; and even communities and individuals.

The government has no obligation more important than the protection of its citizens. Unfortunately, we have seen a rise in the number of Canadians being threatened and harassed by foreign state actors, as well as a rise in foreign interference in our democratic institutions and our economy. The government's priority remains to protect Canada and Canadians against activities that undermine democratic values, economic interests, sovereignty and national security. In order to combat foreign interference, a whole-of-government and society response is required. The first step to combatting foreign interference is detecting it, which is why the bill introduces amendments to the CSIS Act.

CSIS is mandated to protect Canada's national security. The CSIS Act came into force in 1984, well before the prolific use of digital technology that we see today. Technological innovations make it more difficult to detect and identify threat actors, including those engaged in foreign interference activities. These innovations have created new avenues for threat to interfere in Canadian society and institutions, especially in the online space. The bill introduces several new powers to assist CSIS in its investigation of foreign interference. These will close gaps in CSIS's authorities, which have become more acute with the global shift towards digital communication and technology.

Throughout the consultation process, the government heard that we need to do more to protect vulnerable communities that are the targets of harassment and intimidation of foreign state actors. At the same time, we heard that any changes to the law need to be based on a real need and to continue to respect Canadian values. These changes do just that. In addition to the safeguards built into the bill itself, there are still robust review and oversight measures to which CSIS is subject. These were brought in by the government in 2019.

Both the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians provide a robust review function of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service's activities to ensure they are effective and compliant with the law. The two objectives of effectiveness and compliance with the law are guiding the government's response.

While technology has brought enormous benefits to society, it has also changed the way threat activity is conducted and how information flows. That is why, in addition to these new powers, the government is making other changes to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act to ensure we have the intelligence we need. This means updating the foreign intelligence provisions of the CSIS Act to account for changing technology. It also means we are making sure that CSIS can effectively use data to identify patterns of hostile activity, which may not be immediately obvious.

Finally, this means introducing a requirement that Parliament review the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act every five years. This would ensure that we are continually evaluating the tools we have and the ones we may need, as well as that we have a robust and open public debate about them. Such a debate would allow Canadians to weigh in regularly to ensure that we are meeting our two objectives of effectiveness and compliance with the law.

The threat of foreign interference is complex, but in order to counter it, we must detect it first. That is why these changes to the CSIS Act, when considered as part of a whole-of-government response to foreign interference, are so important.

[Questions on the Order Paper, June 12th, 2024]

Mr. Speaker, in response to (a)(i), the current national offload agreement was signed on January 26, 2023.

In response to (a)(ii), this agreement is valid from February 1, 2024 to January 31, 2025. This is a zero-sum agreement; therefore, there are no financial impacts nor financial gains/losses for the CBSA.

For more details pertaining to the national offload agreement, please visit National Offload Services - Tender Notice.

For the CBSA’s policy on offload services for highway examinations, please visit the offload policy for highway examinations.

In response to (a)(iii), the agreement was authorized at the assistant deputy minister level by the CBSA’s finance and corporate management branch, procurement and contracting division, in collaboration with the commercial and trade branch, commercial operations division.

In response to (b), the CBSA’s current agreement with Employment Professionals Canada, EPC, was established following a competitive procurement process and utilizes set fees. Although inflation and other factors have contributed to price increases in all goods and services in recent years, the CBSA is presently working to tender a new agreement. The new agreement will incorporate a new fee structure, similar to that of the United States, U.S., which will allow for more pricing flexibility, for example, pay per pallet versus one flat fee. The new flexibilities within the fee structure are expected to alleviate many of the concerns expressed.

In response to (c), the CBSA remains mindful of impacts on internal and external stakeholders. The CBSA is working on adding new provisions in the new agreement to allow for more pricing flexibility for clients who choose to use the on-site service provider at designated commercial offices.

In response to (d), it is the sole responsibility of the carrier to present the goods for examination upon request from the CBSA within the prescribed timelines. In these cases, if the carrier avails themselves of EPC’s services, then it will be the responsibility of EPC to offload the goods, present them for examination, then reload the goods. As per the agreement, the supplier must request and receive confirmation in writing of the contracting authority, in the CBSA, before the use of any subcontractors. The CBSA has not received any request from EPC and has not issued any confirmation to EPC related to the use of subcontractors.

In response to (e), the CBSA is not aware of EPC using subcontractors in the current context of this national offload agreement.

In response to (f), the CBSA’s national offload contract is a zero-sum agreement; therefore, there are no financial obligations nor any gains/losses for the CBSA.

In response to (g), the CBSA used a competitive process to ensure fair price and open and transparent procurement. The resulting agreement utilizes the offloading rates defined within the policy for highway examinations to ensure cost remains the same regardless of where the service is being provided across Canada. If the carrier avails themselves of the service provider EPC, then all fees are charged and collected solely by EPC. Carriers are not obligated to use services provided by EPC.

In response to (h), prior to the current agreement, the CBSA ran multiple competitive bidding processes for the offload contract since 2015. EPC has been the provider since 2015. The rates have varied from agreement to agreement and were established by the service provider during the competitive bidding process.

In response to (i), this process was competitive and posted on the government tender website, Buyandsell, for any supplier to provide a bid, which included a ceiling price per service required. A conflict of interest analysis was not completed.

In response to (j), EPC resources have been validated and confirmed by the CBSA security division. Only a resource with a valid security clearance can perform work on this agreement. The service provider is responsible for initiating the security clearance process and will work with Public Services and Procurement Canada, PSPC, for the issuing of all employee security clearances. It is the responsibility of the service provider to maintain all security clearances to ensure they are valid. The CBSA is not involved in the security clearance process.

In response to (k), this process was competitive and posted on the government tender website, Buyandsell, for any supplier to provide a bid, which included a ceiling price per service required.

[Budget Implementation Act, 2024, No. 1, June 11th, 2024]

Mr. Speaker, my hon. colleague comes from a riding in the GTA in Ontario, like I do. Can he possibly speak to how the investments in infrastructure in our communities are helping to support Canadians across this country, and in particular in his riding as well?

[Democratic Institutions, June 10th, 2024]

Mr. Speaker, I thank the leader of the Green Party for availing herself of and accepting the offer the minister has written to all party leaders to get their security clearance to be able to read this important report. I know that the minister would be happy to continue discussing that with her, as with all parliamentarians, and I will certainly raise this with him in terms of scheduling.

However, I will point out once again that we urge the Conservative leader to receive his security clearance so he can be better informed on the issue of foreign interference.

[Democratic Institutions, June 10th, 2024]

Mr. Speaker, it is a shame that the Conservatives want to heckle, and the irony is in the fact that they want to misrepresent what happened at committee.

While Conservatives play partisan games, we are steadfast and focused on countering foreign interference and putting in place the measures that will strengthen our democratic institutions. It is ironic that the Conservatives bring up NSICOP, a committee they voted against and in fact also pulled members off at one point.

We are going to do everything to ensure that our democratic institutions are protected from foreign interference.

[Democratic Institutions, June 7th, 2024]

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate that the Bloc members on the committee have been working hard and diligently with us, in good faith, on foreign interference. It is disappointing when Conservative mis-characterization of meetings takes place.

What is most important is that we are working hard to ensure that our democratic institutions are resilient and that we are combatting foreign interference. This is not a partisan issue, and it is why we have introduced a number of measures to strengthen our democratic institutions. This includes Bill C-70, which we are working on in committee.