Madam Speaker, I am glad to rise on this bill. I appreciate the sponsor's commitment and listened to his speech with regard to wanting to have this conversation to educate people. That is a very worthwhile conversation that we, as parliamentarians and Canadians, should be having.
I too once served on NSICOP; perhaps the sponsor had similar feelings to mine, which were to think about how little Parliament talks and thinks about national security. Frankly, there is a lot to be done with regard to cyber safety for Parliament and parliamentarians. I am not sure whether this was part of the member's rationale in thinking about this, but, certainly, I realized as a member of NSICOP how little parliamentarians are briefed in terms of just good cyber-hygiene measures. I will not say protected. I also realized how all parliamentarians must take this very seriously. I think there should be more conversations not only in our own caucuses but also among parliamentarians as a whole.
With that in mind, the idea and concept around this bill have merit. However, in the course of my speech, I will point out a few challenges with this bill that we could perhaps have further conversation on. I welcome feedback. There are some areas in the bill that need to be reflected upon, the first being with regard to parliamentary privilege.
One thing that is specified in the NSICOP Act is around clearance given and the waiving of parliamentary privilege. This is done to ensure that any members who receive clearance and, therefore, national security information cannot share that information and then use the protections of parliamentary privilege. For Canadians who may not know what that means, it means that we are protected in this place to be able to say things without fear of reprisal.
However, a higher level of protection needs to be ensured around national security matters, confidentiality and the safety of Canadian Armed Forces members and our security teams around the world. The NSICOP Act specifically waives parliamentary privilege. For a member who receives national security clearance through, let us say, legislation such as this and not the NSICOP Act, it would mean that they could say anything and not be prosecuted under the Security of Information Act, as an example. I do not know if that was a technical oversight.
I am certainly not saying that the sponsor of this bill is suggesting that parliamentary privilege should allow national security information to be shared through a loophole, but that is certainly a flaw in the drafting of this bill. As I said, the NSICOP Act specifically addresses it. As a former member of the committee, I had to sign documents saying I no longer had parliamentary privilege as a condition of my NSICOP days. Dealing with national security, it makes sense that we want to make sure that this technicality is clearly defined.
The issues around the need-to-know principle have been discussed, so I will not spend too much time on it. Members opposite spoke about the need or opportunity for this. However, they also indicated that there may never be a guarantee that information is given. It makes me wonder what this legislation would actually accomplish.
It is worthwhile to have the conversation to ensure that parliamentarians have access to classified information where it can help us in our duties. However, to just go through this process in this bill, knowingly accepting that the need-to-know question is not being addressed, again, makes me wonder if this is the best use of a private member's bill or the best way to provide information to parliamentarians on a national security level. Again, that is not to say the merits of this conversation are not worthwhile, but it is a challenge that we should discuss.
I also want to talk about NSICOP and the whole rationale of why it was originally created. It was created with kind of the intent of this private member's bill in mind. Members may recall that the recommendation for a national security committee of parliamentarians was made during former prime minister Harper's time. Canada was one of the only Five Eyes countries without any sort of parliamentarian oversight, without access to classified information. The former Harper government said no, absolutely not; there would be no national security clearance provided to any parliamentarians. It is interesting to me. I would be very pleased if the Conservatives had now come to see this as a mistake.
However, that is precisely why NSICOP was created, to create this space for national security clearance. It was not just clearance to members or individuals but also the process and the place to share that information in a proper and secure manner. It was how the information is then accessed, which must also be done in a way that respects national security.
That was precisely the design of NSICOP, to provide parliamentarians with access and the ability to determine their own areas of study. They can choose, as a committee represented by all parties, as well as the Senate, to make that determination.
Again, on the idea to provide more opportunities for people with clearance, I understand where the member is coming from. However, it does not address what information they would be looking for, where they would access it physically, how they would maintain it and, on this ad hoc basis, what would actually come of it.
It is important to know that pieces of intelligence do not equal a conclusion; there could be several individual pieces of intelligence, but unless they are all compiled together and a proper determination and reflection is done, they could be used out of context. This could actually mean that parliamentarians and other people are not better informed, and it could lead to some interesting outcomes, without the full picture. This is why NSICOP is a place where there is an opportunity to truly reflect on and bring all the intelligence pieces together then properly move forward on a recommendation, reflection or further study.
In regard to clearance itself, again, I recognize that the sponsor has said this does not guarantee anyone can receive clearance. This is a fair point, and I do not think the sponsor has that intention. However, I found it interesting when, not too long ago, the Conservative leader was actually offered national security clearance and to receive briefings on foreign interference, but he refused. He claimed it was because he would “not be muzzled”. It makes me nervous to see the Conservative leader not understanding the difference between breaching confidentiality and taking in information, being able to hold it in confidence and secret, but still being able to advocate one way or the other. He did not feel he could actually do that and not breach the confidentiality that would be required. Therefore, he chose not to seek clearance.
This raises concerns about who is accessing a clearance, what information they might receive and how they will actually view that in terms of sharing that information.
Again, I think the sponsor of the bill has very good intentions, and that is not part of it, but we cannot ignore the fact that his own leader believes national security clearance is a form of muzzling. That raises some questions for me. Again, I would love to have further conversations about how parliamentarians can better protect national security and work together with better cyber-goals.
